

AD 382049

H

E

R

O

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA  
VOLUME I**

In addition to security requirements which apply to this document and must be met, each transmittal outside the agencies of the U.S. government must have prior approval of the Office, Chief of Research and Development, DA, ATTN: CRDBES, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

When no longer needed, this report may be destroyed in accordance with applicable regulations.

1 February 1966

REGRADED **CONFIDENTIAL**

ON 26 April 1967

PER C. J. CANELLA  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Behavioral  
Sciences Division

Best Available Copy

GROUP 3  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification  
Not Automatically Declassified

D D  
JUL 3 1967  
DISPATCH  
D

**HISTORICAL EVALUATION AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATION**

2233 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20007

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA  
(Volume I)

A Report prepared for the Army Research Office  
under Contract No. DA-49-092-ARO-102,  
dated 6 May 1965

No statements or opinions expressed in this  
report or its annexes are to be interpreted  
as reflecting official views of the Army  
Research Office or of any official of the  
United States Government

Not to be quoted at length, ab-  
stracted, or reproduced without  
the specific permission of the  
Historical Evaluation and Re-  
search Organization, except in  
official publications of the  
Department of Defense

GROUP-3

Downgraded at 12 Year Intervals  
Not Automatically Declassified

Historical Evaluation and Research Organization  
2233 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C., 20007

1 February 1966

**CONFIDENTIAL**

"This document contains information affecting the National  
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the  
Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Section 793 and 794,  
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any  
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."



# ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA

## Table of Contents

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
SUMMARY . . . . .	vii
Purpose of the Study . . . . .	vii
Survey and Analysis of Experience . . . . .	vii
Summary of Conclusions . . . . .	viii
Current Applicability of the Study's Conclusions . . . . .	xi
Relationship of Counterinsurgency to Isolation . . . . .	xii
PREFACE . . . . .	xiii
Purpose of the Study . . . . .	xiii
Scope and Content . . . . .	xiii
Study Participants . . . . .	xiv
INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF GUERRILLA WAR . . .	1
General Observations . . . . .	1
The Spectrum of Guerrilla Warfare . . . . .	3
<u>Part One: The Guerrilla and Local Support . . .</u>	<u>5</u>
I THE NATURE OF LOCAL SUPPORT . . . . .	5
Voluntary Support . . . . .	5
Forced Support . . . . .	6
Factors of Local Support . . . . .	7
Summary . . . . .	12
II ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA FROM LOCAL SUPPORT . . .	15
Drawing Support Away from the Guerrilla . . . .	15
Action to Deny Guerrillas Access to Local Support . . . . .	17
Military Forces . . . . .	20
Military Civic Action . . . . .	21
Psychological Warfare . . . . .	22
Population and Supply Control . . . . .	23
The Role of Intelligence . . . . .	24

<u>Chapter</u>		<u>Page</u>
	<u>Part Two: The Guerrilla and External Support</u> . . .	27
III	THE NATURE OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT . . . . .	27
	General . . . . .	27
	The International System and Insurgency . . . .	29
	Insurgency and Subversion . . . . .	31
	Insurgency and Western Opinion . . . . .	34
	The Spectrum of Outside Nonmilitary Support . .	36
	The New Colonialism . . . . .	40
IV	NONMILITARY ASPECTS OF ISOLATION FROM EXTERNAL SUPPORT . . . . .	43
	The International Environment . . . . .	43
	Limiting Factors of Insurgent Success . . . .	44
	Outside Political Support and Countermeasures .	46
	Exploitation of Communist Weaknesses . . . . .	49
	Outside Psychological Support and Countermeasures . . . . .	49
	Outside Economic Support and Countermeasures .	51
	Summation . . . . .	54
V	MILITARY ASPECTS OF ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA FROM EXTERNAL SUPPORT . . . . .	55
	General . . . . .	55
	Transborder Sanctuary . . . . .	55
	Direct External Support . . . . .	57
	Interdiction of External Support by Cutting the Guerrilla Line of Communication within the Afflicted Country . . . . .	60
	Drawing the Guerrilla Away from his Outside Support . . . . .	63
	<u>Part Three: Evaluation</u> . . . . .	65
VI	CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	65
	General . . . . .	65
	Isolation from Local Support . . . . .	66
	Isolation from External Support . . . . .	69
VII	A THEORY OF ISOLATION . . . . .	73
	Introduction . . . . .	73
	A Model of Counterinsurrection: A Form of Political Warfare . . . . .	74

<u>Chapter</u>		<u>Page</u>
	Conditions for Selecting Isolation	
	Tactics . . . . .	75
	The Elements of Isolation Strategy . . . . .	77
	The Impact of Ideology . . . . .	79
	Summation . . . . .	81
VIII	APPLICABILITY OF CONCLUSIONS TO CURRENT PROBLEMS . . . . .	83
	General . . . . .	83
	Possible Applications in Vietnam . . . . .	83
	Application to Counterinsurgency Readiness . . . . .	89
	Relationship of Isolation to Modern Counterinsurgency . . . . .	91
	Appendix A--Terms of Reference . . . . .	93
	Appendix B--Summary Analysis of Measures to Isolate Guerrilla Forces . . . . .	97
	--Notes . . . . .	99

#### List of Supporting Volumes

#### CLASSIC AND BASIC CASE STUDIES (Volume II)

Guerrillas in the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Era, by Peter Paret . . . . .	1
Upper Burma, 1885-1890, by Frank H. Brooke . . . . .	21
The Boer Guerrillas, 1900-1902, by Frank H. Brooke . . . . .	33
France and the Guerrilla War in Vietnam: 1945-1954, by Frank N. Trager . . . . .	47
The Republic of Vietnam and Communist Insurgency, 1954-1965, by William A. Nighswonger . . . . .	91
The Chinese Civil War, 1927-1949, by S.M. Chiu . . . . .	135
Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency Efforts in Greece, 1941-1949, by Gunther E. Rothenberg . . . . .	173

Malaya, 1948-1960, by Riley Sunderland . . . . .	217
Guerrilla Operations in South Korea, 1945-1953, by Riley Sunderland and Marshall Andrews . . . . .	249
Appendix A--French Experience in Vietnam: Geographic and Historical Setting, by Frank N. Trager . . . . .	265
Introduction to Vietnam . . . . .	267
Vietnam: The French Intrusion and Conquest to the 1880s . . . . .	275
French Rule and Vietnamese Struggles for Inde- pendence, 1885-1925 . . . . .	289
French Rule and Vietnamese Struggles from the Mid-1920s through World War II . . . . .	315
General Observations on French Counterinsurgency Experience and Practice Prior to World War II . . .	321
Bibliography . . . . .	327

SUPPORTING CASE STUDIES  
(Volume III)

North America: The Revolutionary Period, by John Shy . . .	1
The American Civil War, by Marshall Andrews . . . . .	21
North America: The Indian Wars, by R. Ernest Dupuy . . . .	55
The Philippine Insurrection, November 1899-July 1902, by Linnea P. Raine . . . . .	77
The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: The Hukbalahap, 1942-1955, by Charles T.R. Bohannon . . . .	117
The Irish Troubles, 1916-1921, by Gunther E. Rothenberg . .	145
The German Experience in World War II, by Gunther E. Rothenberg . . . . .	163
Israel, by Gunther E. Rothenberg . . . . .	181

The Hungarian Uprising, October 23-December 15, 1956, by Andrew C. Janos . . . . .	207
A Summary of French Efforts at Isolating the Guerrilla During the Algerian Conflict, 1956-1962, by Peter Paret . . . . .	229

# CONFIDENTIAL

## Isolating the Guerrilla

### SUMMARY

#### Purpose of the Study

This study of "Isolating the Guerrilla" was undertaken for the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense to (1) examine and analyze historical experience in attempting to suppress guerrillas by isolating them from internal and external support and (2) suggest ways of applying the concept of isolating the guerrilla.

#### Survey and Analysis of Experience

The study presents detailed investigations of experience in 19 different guerrilla war situations, or campaigns, deemed to be particularly relevant to the concept of isolating guerrillas from their sources of internal or external support.\* These individual case studies focus on the environment of guerrillas operations--social, political, and physical; the organization, motivation, and operational techniques of guerrilla

---

\*These cases are: French Revolution and Napoleonic era; Burma, 1885-1890; Boer War, 1900-1902; France in Vietnam, 1945-1954; Communist Insurgency in Vietnam, 1954-1965; Chinese Civil War, 1927-1949; Greece, 1941-1949; Malaya, 1948-1960; South Korea, 1945-1953; American Revolution; American Civil War; American Indian Wars; Philippine Insurrection, 1899-1902; Hukbalahap Insurgency in the Philippines, 1942-1955; Ireland, 1916-1921; Israel, 1945-1948; Hungary, 1956, Algeria, 1956-1962. In addition, because of its particular relevance to the current serious US involvement in Vietnam, an appendix presents relevant aspects of the background of French involvement in Vietnam prior to 1945. The case study of the Chinese Civil War included a review of Japanese counterinsurgency operations against the Chinese Communists during World War II.

# CONFIDENTIAL

forces; the composition and direction of external as well as local support; and, principally, the nature and results of counterinsurgent efforts to nullify this support and suppress the insurgency.

Either as authors of individual case studies and analyses or as consultants, reviewers, or editors, 26 scholars and specialists in the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency participated in the study. The results of the general analysis of the experience is presented in the first volume of the study report; the case studies themselves are contained in two additional volumes.

### Summary of Conclusions

From a general analysis of the experience emerged a number of conclusions, summarized as follows:

#### General

Since an insurgency that enjoys appreciable popular support reflects a serious social maladjustment, the employment of military force to suppress it must be integrated with non-military measures to correct the maladjustment. The counterinsurgent effort should involve all departments of government and affect all elements in the society. To be effective, the guerrilla must have adequate local support, voluntary or forced, at a minimum including food and information. Physical and moral forms of external support can contribute substantially to effective insurgency. In the long run, success in isolating the guerrilla from his sources of internal and external support will permit the established government to seize the military initiative from the guerrilla and to assure his complete defeat due to his lack of recruits, supplies, and intelligence.

There are three fundamental preconditions for effectively isolating the guerrilla from local and/or external support: a high order of military competence in the counterguerrilla forces; an effective local administration working in close coordination with the military forces; and a perceptive and substantial response to popular grievances which have contributed to the insurgency.

### Isolation from Local Support

The military are fundamentally handicapped in dealing with the guerrilla because he is a part of the indigenous society and thus not readily identifiable as an enemy. Until or unless soldiers can clearly identify and attack the guerrilla, indiscriminate military efforts may aggravate the very maladjustments that have produced the insurgency. The problem of identification has not yet been solved in a satisfactory, comprehensive manner. Nevertheless, general action designed to isolate him from the society can be effective and can contribute toward more precise identification, since the guerrilla is forced to fight to reopen or retain his links to the sources of his support.

Isolation of the guerrilla from local support should include measures aimed at: (a) withdrawing the local civilian populace from supporting or adhering to the insurgent cause, (b) inducing popular loyalty or support for the incumbent government, (c) physically denying guerrillas access to local support, and (d) defeating the insurgent forces militarily. The military can make significant contributions to the first two of these categories by various forms of civic action. Militarily protected physical obstacles have been effective in denying access to support through supply control, population control, and interference with the flow of information to guerrillas.

Administrative and military action against the guerrilla insurgent must be prompt, thorough, initially massive, and intensive in order to offset the guerrilla's inherent initiative advantage. Counterinsurgent responses that merely match, or offset, what the guerrilla is capable of doing will usually be too little and too late. The cost of protracted effort--in blood, treasure, and unfavorable political and economic consequences--is inevitably far greater than a deliberately massive effort at an early stage of the insurgency. Force ratios, however, cannot be applied with arithmetic rigidity. As troops and police improve in quality, fewer will be needed for combat operations, but more may be needed to secure pacified areas. As the guerrillas suffer casualties, the ratios against them will shift in turn, but to retain the initiative against the numerically reduced insurgents may still require extensive operations.

Unity of command and coordination of military and civilian effort (administrative, political, and psychological) by the counterinsurgent are important if the guerrilla is to be isolated. At the same time local commanders should be given



considerable latitude in offering conciliation, clemency, and rewards for defection. Any ethnic differences within the local population can be exploited to deny guerrillas supply, intelligence, recruits, and sanctuary.

Continuity of effective intelligence is essential in isolating the guerrilla and best achieved through a single civil police intelligence system. Military combat intelligence personnel should not attempt to compete with or to duplicate this civil system unnecessarily, but rather should avail themselves of its services through close and intensive liaison.

#### External Support

An insurgent guerrilla force eventually must receive sufficient outside support to obtain general or de facto recognition as a legitimate belligerent and eventually as a legal government. Decisive military success is not essential for the guerrilla to attract this support; the government, on the other hand, needs essentially total victory so that it can establish and maintain security for the population.

Military measures against outside support include: sustained pressure on the guerrilla to make support excessively costly for the supporting nation; exploiting any differences which may exist between him and the supporting power or powers; physical obstacles--including naval blockade and the sealing of land frontiers--to inhibit entry of supplies and reinforcements; punitive raids into sanctuaries. In this latter respect, guerrilla success has often been facilitated by the accessibility of territory of a friendly power which can be used: (a) as a base of supplies and reinforcements; (b) for refuge, training, and re-staging of guerrilla forces; and (c) for moral and public relations support, and communications with the outside world. Communist sponsorship of insurgencies has been particularly effective in exploiting the concept of physical sanctuary for guerrilla forces in nominally neutral or nonbelligerent territory. For a variety of reasons, including mutual nuclear capabilities of the superpowers, there has been in recent times great reluctance to intervene with conventional ground forces against sanctuaries.

Nonmilitary measures against outside support include: diplomatic pressures on other nations to prevent any formal recognition of the insurgents; measures seeking the continued diplomatic support of other nations; propaganda-psychological warfare

CONFIDENTIAL

campaigns; economic pressures against nations providing any kind of support to the insurgents.

Communist-supported insurgency is a multifaceted form of war being intensively exploited by an enemy with a tactically flexible central doctrine. Communist use of insurgency for aggressive purposes through support of "wars of national liberation" has drastically modified the nature of the problems and challenges of insurgent warfare. This does not invalidate experience in the tactics and techniques of counterinsurgency, but it does require the development of new operational and organizational concepts for the application of these tactics and techniques.

#### Current Applicability of the Study's Conclusions

The study suggests that the conclusions summarized above can be applicable to current US problems in three major respects, as indicated below:

#### Possible Applications in Vietnam

Four specific suggestions are offered with respect to the war in Vietnam.

First, investigation should be undertaken of the feasibility and desirability of clearing a barrier strip, which would include suitable obstacles, along all or part of the land frontiers of South Vietnam. The report notes a number of serious problems and possible objections, but offers reasons why the barrier project warrants serious study and consideration.

(C) Second, one possible way of dealing with the sanctuary problem would be to send a force into southern Laos physically to block the Communists' use of this part of their sanctuary. This action might well be combined with the barrier project.

(C) Third, consideration should be given to undertaking covert long-range penetration raids into North Vietnam, employing guerrilla tactics against important objectives in the principal sanctuary for the Viet Cong.

(C) Fourth, as one way to reduce the combat risk and damage faced by South Vietnamese civilians in operational areas, consideration should be given to formal adoption of a policy of

# CONFIDENTIAL

employing temporarily incapacitating chemical and biological agents in such areas when military considerations will permit. It is suggested that such a policy, despite current world-wide abhorrence of chemical and biological warfare, if properly presented to the American and world public, could bring political and psychological benefits to the US effort.

## Current Counterinsurgency Readiness

Two suggestions were offered for current counterinsurgency readiness.

First is the development of a capability to commit, on short notice, forces suitably prepared for dealing with the military and civic action requirements of any conceivable insurgency situation. For such a force to be employed effectively, re-evaluation of current US military command and control organization, and of high-level interdepartmental coordination, would probably be necessary.

Second, there are ways in which the employment of new scientific developments may facilitate improved population control in counterinsurgency situations, in Vietnam or elsewhere. These developments include computerization for population registration and the use of harmless technical tests to ascertain where apparently innocent civilians, or captured prisoners, have recently been.

## Relationship of Counterinsurgency to Isolation

The report presents a tentative "theory of isolation." It is stressed, however, that this is only one aspect of a much larger requirement for the United States to develop practical overall theory, doctrine, and organization to deal with the new challenge of Communist aggression through the support of guerrilla insurgencies which for propaganda purposes the Communists equate with "wars of national liberation."

CONFIDENTIAL

## PREFACE

### Purpose of the Study

This study of "Isolating the Guerrilla" has been undertaken by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization for the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, under contract to the Army Research Office. The study's terms of reference (Appendix A) required HERO to examine historical experience relevant to a politico-military technique of counterinsurgency: isolating guerrilla forces from internal and external support.

### Scope and Content

In investigating this technique of isolating guerrilla forces, it was planned first to ascertain preconditions for its application, then to establish the military, political, and administrative measures involved, and, finally, to evaluate the results of these measures. From this data the study was to develop the critical aspects of the concept of isolating guerrilla forces and to suggest means of applying this concept.

Pursuant to this planned procedure, a group of 25 relevant cases was examined. Because the study assumed that the idea of isolation is unrelated to modern technology, the range of cases went back to the late 18th Century. However, since it is obvious that modern technology powerfully affects the physical capabilities of a state to isolate the guerrilla, the greater part of the research effort was devoted to the 20th Century, with a major emphasis on Southeast Asia.

In preparing case studies, participants were asked to focus on: the environment of guerrilla operations--social, political, and physical; the organization, motivations, and operational techniques of guerrilla forces; the composition and direction of outside as well as local support; and, finally and principally,

the description and the results of the counterinsurgent forces' effort to nullify this support and to suppress the insurgency. (A summary of the major aspects of each of the individual case studies is presented in tabular or matrix form in Appendix B.)

Analysis of the examples notes variations and differences among them, but mainly establishes both common and exceptional functional components of internal and external support, noting the relations of these components to the guerrillas. The actions taken to sever the links between the guerrillas and the various sources of their support were catalogued and appraised. Conclusions were then derived, which, in combination with the overall analysis, have provided a basis for a tentative approach to a theory of isolation. Finally, as required by the terms of reference, suggestions for implementing the theory of isolating the guerrilla, based upon the conclusions, are offered.

Volume I of this study report contains the report analysis. Volume II includes case studies which, for the purposes of this project, were classified either as classic or basic. The three classic examples were selected because they were deemed to include experience and practice in isolating the guerrilla which is still applicable despite advances in technology. The six basic cases were selected as examples directly relevant to dealing with Communist-inspired insurgency in the modern world.

Volume III includes ten supporting case studies, which offer relevant experience, but which have not been explored in the same detail as the basic examples.\*

### Study Participants

Listed below are the participants in this study of "Isolating the Guerrilla." The list includes authors of individual studies as well as those who served in a consultant, review, or editorial capacity.

---

\*The apparent discrepancy between the total number of cases studied, and those noted above is due to the fact that two of the studies were not included in this report (because they proved to have no relevance) and four have been combined into an appendix in Volume II.


Marshall Andrews, Historian and Journalist; HERO Associate  
 Charles T.R. Bohannon, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS, Ret.;  
 Special Consultant  
 Geoffrey, Lord Bourne, General, British Army, Ret.; Special  
 Consultant  
 Frank H. Brooke, Major General, British Army, Ret.; Special  
 Consultant  
 R. Ernest Dupuy, Colonel, USA, Ret.; HERO Staff Associate  
 Trevor N. Dupuy, Colonel, USA, Ret.; HERO Executive Director  
 Sin Ming Chiu, Associate Professor of History, Temple Uni-  
 versity; Special Consultant  
 Edward B. Glick, Associate Professor of Political Science,  
 Temple University; Special Consultant  
 M. Preston Goodfellow, Colonel, AUS, Ret., Journalist and  
 Special Warfare Analyst; Special Consultant  
 Gay M. Hammerman, HERO Research Staff Member  
 Grace P. Hayes, HERO Research Staff Member  
 Mary F. Hoyt, HERO Research Staff Member  
 Andrew C. Janos, Assistant Professor of Political Science,  
 University of California at Berkeley; Special Consultant  
 George Armstrong Kelly, IV, Assistant Director, Harvard De-  
 fense Studies Program; Special Consultant  
 William A. Nighswonger, Research Associate in International  
 Affairs, American University; Special Consultant  
 Wlodzimierz Onaciewicz, Lecturer in History and Government,  
 Georgetown University; HERO Staff Associate  
 Peter Paret, Associate Professor of History, University of  
 California at Davis; HERO Associate  
 Steuart L. Pittman, Shaw, Pittman, Potts, Trowbridge and  
 Madden, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil  
 Defense; Special Consultant  
 Linnea P. Raine, HERO Research Assistant, Assistant Study  
 Coordinator  
 Theodore Ropp, Professor of History; Duke University; HERO  
 Associate  
 Gunther E. Rothenberg, Associate Professor of History,  
 University of New Mexico; HERO Associate  
 John Shy, Associate Professor of History, Princeton Univer-  
 sity; Special Consultant  
 Riley Sunderland, HERO Staff Associate, Study Coordinator  
 M. Ladd Thomas, Associate Professor of Political Science  
 and Coordinator of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies,  
 Northern Illinois University; HERO Associate  
 Frank N. Trager, Professor of International Relations, New  
 York University; HERO Associate  
 Marcel Vigneras, Research Analysis Corporation; Special  
 Consultant  
 Edward C. Williamson, Associate Professor of History and  
 Political Science, Auburn University; Special Consultant

Particular acknowledgement must be given to those of the above-listed scholars who prepared the analytical papers which have formed the basis for the analytic report. These are: Mr. Andrews, General Brooke, Dr. Janos, Mr. Kelly, and Professor Rothenberg. In addition, we gratefully acknowledge an unsolicited contribution from Dr. Edward Gilfillan, Professor of Physics, Lowell Technological Institute, who, while working on another study for HERO, suggested that portion of Chapter VIII dealing with ways in which modern technology can be applied to the isolation of the guerrilla.

Coordination and surveillance of the professional effort in the study was performed by Mr. Riley Sunderland, Chairman of HERO's Research Committee, aided by Miss Linnea P. Raine, Assistant Study Coordinator. Responsibility for the production of this report is shared by Mrs. Judith Mitchell, HERO Administrative Officer, and her assistant, Mrs. Carol R. Sams.

Despite HERO's gratitude for the cooperation and contributions of the study participants, none of them, individually or collectively, should be held responsible for any portion of this report, or its supporting volumes, other than as may be specifically indicated.

As Executive Director of HERO, and as editor of this report, the undersigned assumes primary responsibility for its contents.



T. N. Dupuy  
Executive Director

Washington, D. C.  
31 January 1966

## INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF GUERRILLA WAR

### General Observations

Guerrilla warfare and guerrilla tactics may be closely related to each other, but not necessarily so. Guerrilla warfare throughout history has been the last resort of a desperate populace unable to overthrow repressive rule by any means other than armed revolt, and lacking conventional forces which could directly and overtly challenge the forces of the incumbent government. In taking up arms against the repressive ruling forces, the fighting man of the local population--the guerrilla--has perforce adopted tactics and techniques dictated by his relative military weakness. These guerrilla tactics reflect the following basic characteristics of the guerrilla:

1. The guerrilla operates on the principle of harassment or hit and run, rather than large-scale, sustained engagements. He does not stand up and fight, except under unusually favorable conditions, and he has no battle zone LOC.

2. The guerrilla is not easy to find or identify because (a) he is either indistinguishable from the local, uncommitted populace, or (b) he maintains himself regularly in hidden, remote, and relatively inaccessible hiding places when not operating, or (c) some combination of both is evident.

3. The guerrilla is operating against established forces of law and order; this provides him with several options but, fundamentally, it permits him to destroy without responsibility, inhibitions, or restrictions, save to the extent he may wish to curb destruction either to preserve resources for his own later use or to attract popular support and assistance (see below).

4. To survive and prosper the guerrilla needs various forms of active (though usually covert) assistance from the local populace, or substantial elements of it. As a corollary, the guerrilla is almost certainly doomed to failure if the populace is actively opposed to him and loyal to the forces of law and order.



The tactics and techniques of guerrilla forces have always been used to some extent by conventional forces, particularly when faced with the challenges of fighting guerrillas. These tactics and techniques have also been employed by partisans, who fit into the spectrum of military organization as irregular (and generally local) fighters, less well organized and generally less reliable than conventional forces, but distinguished from the true guerrillas by being more or less permanently organized into fighting units and more or less permanently engaged in military operations.

In this study we have not, however, attempted to distinguish between guerrilla warfare\* and guerrilla tactics, or between guerrillas and partisans. For purposes of this study we have focussed on isolating the guerrilla in terms of isolating guerrilla, partisan, or conventional forces employing guerrilla tactics in support of insurgency. Not the least reason for this has been the fact that since World War II we find that guerrilla tactics have been introduced throughout troubled areas by major Communist powers for their own selfish interests, whether or not a truly guerrilla warfare situation existed.

It is useful to note that there is much in common between guerrilla wars and internal wars. But they are not necessarily identical. Not all internal wars utilize guerrillas, nor is all guerrilla war, properly speaking, internal. International wars are frequently accompanied by variants of guerrilla; we need only see from our examples that this was true of the Peninsular War of 1808-1812, the Tyrolean uprising of 1809, and the diverse partisan and resistance movements of World War II.

As Mao Tse-tung and others have insisted, guerrilla warfare will not occur where conventional conflict can serve the insurgents. (Nor is it likely to occur as a direct result of a wholly successful coup d'état.) On the other hand, unless an incumbent regime fails from the outset to command the loyalty of the regular army or substantial parts of it, guerrilla warfare will be the normal form of violence in an insurgency.

---

\*The terms "guerrilla warfare" and "irregular warfare" are thus used synonymously in this report.

### The Spectrum of Guerrilla Warfare

Various forms of guerrilla war are presented in the supporting papers of this study. Since the mechanisms of both internal and outside aid are apt to be influenced by the perspective from which the conflict is viewed, a summary of these forms is useful:

1. Guerrilla wars fought in response to imperial expansion and colonial penetration.
2. Guerrilla wars fought to hasten the ebb of colonialism.
3. Guerrilla wars fought against occupying powers and/or their puppets in a general war situation.
4. Guerrilla wars that were frankly civil and internal within a sovereign state, often connected with social revolt, or counterrevolution.
5. Variations and combinations of the above.

Guerrilla wars of the first category belong largely to a past epoch, although recurrences are possible where new imperialism begin to weigh heavily on captive peoples. Aside from the broader consequences of the Cold War, the nuclear arms stalemate, and the Communist endorsement of "wars of national liberation," the particular potency of guerrilla activity in our era may be ascribed to a combination of all except the first form. What links the past and modern experiences is that the techniques of combat are (a) popular, in terms of involvement of local populations; (b) irregular and fluid; (3) internal or associated with home terrain; (d) developed for limited and frequently primitive armament; and (e) waged against an existing legal political structure on its own nominal territory.

The dislocations caused by general war (conquest, anarchy, hiatus of sovereignty, postwar conditions and settlements, etc ) have been extremely influential in the development of later guerrilla movement. Nationalism in Asia and Africa and the guerrilla insurrections it has prompted received a heady impetus from the experience of the thousands of colonial natives who had fought on the side of the Allies in the War of 1914-1918. The German and Japanese conquests and occupation policy of 1939-1945, together with European "loss of face" in the Orient, played a major role in the social, political, and anticolonial effervescence of the following years.

Guerrilla warfare has since World War II come into new importance as a substitute for large-scale conventional hostilities, when aggressive nations desire to extend their power. It has become a prelude to or a concomitant of successful seizure of specific world areas both by proponents of communism and by Communist states. They have dignified such unconventional hostilities as "wars of national liberation."

## Part One: The Guerrilla and Local Support

### CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF LOCAL SUPPORT

Investigation into guerrilla campaigns since the French Revolution re-emphasizes the vital dependence of the guerrilla upon local support for food, information, recruits, shelter, and supplies. With such support, he has not needed conventional lines of communication, and when pressed has simply disappeared into the general public. The advantage this has given him has compounded the inherent limitations of conventional military intelligence organizations and has substantially counteracted the tactical advantages in weapons and organization possessed by the established military, or counter guerrilla, force. Local support has been either voluntary or forced.

Such a classification should not, however, obscure the fact that human motivations are shifting, imprecise, and sometimes unclear even to the individual being motivated. There must always be a core of voluntary support for the guerrilla in any situation in which he receives considerable local support, no matter what pressures the guerrilla may put forth to exact forced support. As the guerrillas' fortunes improve, the general human desire to side with the winner is likely to lead more and more of the populace to provide support ever more willingly. Conversely, if the guerrilla begins to fail, voluntary support will dwindle from many who once cheered his success and gave him money and information, and they will later maintain they did so under duress. Thus local support can be taken as reflecting a collective state of mind, which both guerrillas and government attempt to influence.

#### Voluntary Support

One or both of two conditions has generally preceded the appearance of effective voluntary local support: (1) violent division over political, religious, ethnic, tribal, or other basic sentiment in the immediate area of irregular force operations;

(2) hostile or alien military occupation accompanied by the imposition of unacceptable political or religious requirements, oppressive requisitions, or unnecessarily harsh conduct, inspiring resistance and reprisal. Actually none of these latter obvious provocations must of necessity exist in the case of occupation. The simple reluctance to accept defeat can be, and has in fact often been, the genesis of guerrilla operations in occupied territory.

The first condition--divergent opinion of an ideological nature--generally produces localized irregular warfare, in which the guerrilla is either pitted against the local forces of law and order, or against other guerrillas. In the latter case, organized military forces of one or both sides are likely to enter the area and transform irregular into conventional warfare. In this case, guerrilla operations may continue as subsidiary to those of organized forces, or the guerrilla bands may be absorbed into them, abandoning both their identity and their modus operandi. Without such interposition, local guerrilla warfare may continue indefinitely and with mounting ferocity and (usually) futility.

The second condition--hostile military occupation--often leads to warfare of last resort; that is, the continuance of regular war by irregular means after major reverses in the field. The conduct of such operations may involve not only armed civilians and irregular forces, but fragments of defeated armies.

Both of these conditions and cases may be clearly recognized in the history of irregular warfare. Examples of both situations appear historically, often in conditions and combinations of sometimes great complexity. The historical case studies show that guerrillas in the first case (internal insurgency or civil war) strive to convert it to the second situation, in which their opponents will appear in the role of foreign oppressors or invaders.

#### Forced Support

This is a feature of guerrilla warfare that might be compared to organized crime. That is, members of the public, caught up in an area where guerrillas are operating, must furnish supplies and remain silent, under threat of death. Not unnaturally, as demonstrated in Vietnam during and since the French period, most people have usually cooperated when faced with such a choice.

Forced support is most easily imposed in areas where there has been a shattering of the colonial social and power structure, widespread and grinding poverty, weak or almost nonexistent local administration, or some combination of these conditions. In such circumstances, a few well-organized, intelligent, dedicated, trained, ruthless men offering a combination of threats and promises are assured of easy victims. This situation has often been remediable, however, by the introduction of effective pacifying forces under whose shelter measures can be undertaken to help the community regain self-confidence and police itself.

In the past, forced support, with its requisitions in cash and kind, has placed temptations in the way of guerrillas to which they often succumbed, degenerating into banditti. In recent years, Communist discipline has provided control, while Communist doctrine has given guerrillas a strong incentive to understand and maintain the difference between forced support and mere banditry, as well as providing a guide to the most effective means of extracting support.

#### Factors of Local Support

In considering local support one may identify a number of subsidiary factors common to all guerrilla warfare. In the scope of a report that examines only one counterinsurgent technique, these factors can only be touched upon; their detailed examination can be attempted only in a study of the whole phenomenon of guerrilla war.

#### Ideology

Ideological differences are understood to mean those conflicts in fundamental intellectual or emotional loyalties (usually relating to politics or religion) that have operated to set citizens of the same country at one another's throats.\* In this connection, one may note the classical nature of the Vendean uprising (Vol. II, p. 1), in which Breton and Norman peasants rallied round both priests and nobles, inspired patently by motives both religious

---

\*A definition of ideology in the Oxford Universal Dictionary reads as follows: "A system of ideas concerning phenomena, esp. those of social life; the manner of thinking characteristic of a class or an individual."

and political. The Napoleonic Wars (*ibid.*) brought with them a number of politically inspired guerrilla wars, of which that in Spain is best known. The American Civil War (Vol. III, p. 21) furnishes examples of guerrilla war with widespread local political support for both sides, in which political opinions were largely ideological in nature. Consequently, guerrilla bands like Quantrill's could range surprisingly far, and bloody and indecisive guerrilla war continued in several regions on into the peace.

Since the appearance of communism, the role of ideology as a basis for local support has become even more significant than in the past. And since Soviet Russia and the People's Republic of China use Communist ideology for their nationalistic purposes, most aspects of Communist guerrilla warfare seem better discussed in the context of outside support. However, it should be noted here that all Communist guerrilla campaigns have been conducted in recognition of the necessity for local support, and that when sufficient support was not likely to be spontaneous, a cadre of skilled guerrillas has been infiltrated to establish bases of local support from which to campaign. In Korea (Vol. I, p. 249) this was only partly successful but in Vietnam (Vol. I, pp. 47 and 91) establishment of these bases of local support has materially aided the guerrilla cause.

#### Socio-Economic Factors

As noted above, most guerrilla activity in recent years has appeared in areas characterized by poverty, and by a shaky social, economic, and political structure. Before the appearance of Marxism-Leninism both remedies and appeals tended to be local, and insurgent episodes were often settled with a minimum of outside consequences. Since then, communism and abstract Communist theory have provided panaceas with wide appeal to peoples in several stages of economic and social development.

The Russian revolution is an example of socio-economic and political factors combining to produce a rebellion where Marxist doctrinaires had not expected it. Though the leaders of the revolt were intellectuals rather than peasants or workers, and though Russia was an agricultural rather than an industrial power, nevertheless the grievances were there, and the Communists altered their doctrine to exploit them.

In contemporary insurgency the socio-economic factor, particularly when an underprivileged group appreciates both its condition and the possibility of improving it, is especially important,

since it leads in economically distressed areas to eager acceptance of almost any promise of equality and plenty. This in turn will generate local support, and from a wide range of social classes, even though such support may be directly opposed to the long-term interests of the people involved. A socio-economic response from the Western powers--if it can transcend cultural, political, linguistic, and military barriers--might well be decisive in meeting this particular challenge. If, however, the insurgents bar such action by force, then it seems irrefutable that access to the area can be gained and maintained only by military force, which must then provide security for an effective socio-economic effort.

### Psychological Factors

All factors contributing to local support have psychological aspects. Moreover, in all guerrilla campaigns psychological techniques have been consciously employed in propaganda in some form and to some degree to gain local support. The promise of escape from poverty, for example, is enormously attractive. Injecting the epithet "colonial," regardless of the facts of the case, has done much to win voluntary local support in those countries which have a history of colonial rule.

Recent events have shown that measures to lessen the harshness of counterinsurgency, to conquer without killing, as by the use of nonlethal gases, defoliation, food control, can be distorted to the advantage of the insurgent. Moreover, as in the US involvement in Vietnam, ethnic and religious differences, and charges of imperialism and colonialism, can be skillfully exploited.

A most important psychological aspect of local support is the widespread reluctance of the public to give information to the government. In any society it is evident that in comparable situations the guerrilla need only exploit an existing psychological weakness in the relation of a government to its people.

### Operational Factors

Local support affects every aspect of the guerrilla's operations. His operational problems appear different from those of the regular soldier in either conventional or guerrilla operations, but they are, in their fundamentals, identical. For example, both guerrilla and regular soldier must eat; both require ammunition; both need intelligence; both must have replacements. For the



guerrilla, most of these operational requirements are met entirely or in part from local civilian support.

The guerrillas' military objectives are either to assist in the operations of conventionally organized forces, to overthrow the established government through a popular or spontaneous uprising, or to develop their own capability to pass from guerrilla warfare to large-scale hostilities as conventionally organized forces. Operations in pursuit of these military objectives can include harassment of hostile lines of communication, collection of intelligence, destruction of materiel, ambush of enemy detachments, attacks on isolated detachments, terror directed against the guerrilla's social enemies, and diversion of enemy forces from conventional to counter guerrilla missions.

In modern guerrilla operations inspired or exploited by the Communists, the campaign is planned long in advance, and trained cadres are infiltrated into the area to establish themselves at strategic points (as in South Korea before 1950, Vol. II, p. 249, and as in South Vietnam between 1954 and 1956). If a genuine local insurrection can be promoted without involving the intruders and the sponsoring Communist power in military action, so much the better. If that objective fails, then the intruders seek to establish local support by terror, waging guerrilla warfare in the guise of a genuine local insurrection. In either event, resistance is denounced under various epithets, e.g., "reactionary," or "colonialist."

### Intelligence

The guerrilla who enjoys local support has a constant and effective intelligence and security service at his command. The local people, circulating freely, keep him informed of every move his adversaries make. Conversely, through sympathy or fear, counter guerrilla forces moving through the guerrilla base area find that the local population furnishes no information. The predicament of the counter guerrilla forces is compounded by the fact that conventional intelligence sections of military units, trained to gather and process combat intelligence, are normally neither prepared nor manned to gather and process information on hundreds of individuals. The remedy would seem to be for the soldier to concentrate on creating an environment in which the policeman--who is trained to handle such information--can work.

## Recruitment

At the outset of guerrilla operations, recruitment of irregular forces is usually based on ideological and socio-economic causes. Sometimes recruits are obtained from fragments of defeated armies and civilians cut off by invasion. Reputations of successful leaders, and the material rewards of raiding are some of the elements which have appealed to adventurous or greedy individuals. The long-run effectiveness of the irregular unit often depends on which of the foregoing factors has motivated the recruit. In general, those men motivated by ideological and basic socio-economic factors prove the most reliable and the least likely to be diverted to objectives not connected with the underlying strategy.

In modern insurgency there have been some recruits for guerrilla bands attracted by adventure or economic opportunity, but most have come from three general sources: those infiltrated from the aggressor base (as from North Vietnam, since 1954), those recruited locally by ideological conviction, and those forced into guerrilla service by terror. In general, recruitment of irregular forces has not been a major problem for guerrilla leaders until isolation measures have become effective--as in operations against insurgents in the Philippines and Malaya in the late 1950s.

## Control

Control of irregular fighters and their operations depends on such a great variety of factors that no more than two very general assertions appear justified: (1) irregular bands under direct military control generally operate productively toward accomplishment of broad strategic objectives; (2) those not so controlled often degenerate into lawless gangs. Those units established and recruited by individuals independently of the controlling authority rarely have been brought under its control.

In Communist-inspired guerrilla warfare--prevalent since 1917--guerrilla bands are held under rigid control by their devotion to a common ideology and by the efficiency of the apparatus created to propagate the ideology which, with few exceptions, has been communism. Those despatched by international communism to foment insurgency are chosen for their disciplined loyalty as well as for their skill, and all are thoroughly schooled in every step of their task and its ultimate goal. This system has been perfected empirically, operating with much greater efficiency in Southeast Asia than it did, for instance, in Greece or South Korea. By its increasing success it has developed a pattern which, in turn, may provide the ultimate clues to its defeat.

## Environment

Environment is one of the decisive factors in irregular warfare, influencing the socio-economic forces which often have built up to revolt. Through propinquity, in favorable geographical circumstances, environment can also facilitate the intrusion not only of ideological unrest but of forces capable of directing this unrest against established government.

Insofar as the actual combat of irregular warfare is concerned, physical environment is directly conducive to success or failure. Historically, successful guerrilla warfare has often been based on terrain, such as mountains, heavy forests, or jungle, relatively inaccessible to formations organized for large-scale conventional war on the European model. The guerrilla's ability to operate at any given distance from his base depends on his mobility and on his relations with the civilian population contiguous to his base. (This, of course, is less applicable for the part-time guerrilla, who has usually played a part in insurgencies, particularly in South Vietnam.) The sooner the band can disperse after an attack and make its way individually back to base with the help of friendly or terrorized civilians, the greater the radius of its operations. The guerrilla band also must have the capability of detecting at a distance hostile approaches to the base, a service often performed by local civilians.

Under certain circumstances, cities can provide satisfactory bases for small-scale guerrilla operations which may produce large-scale results. In the atmosphere of disruption which ordinarily accompanies irregular operations, cities are filled with refugees among whom the guerrilla readily loses himself. Even without the refugees, large cities provide not only innumerable hiding places but valuable targets as well. Saigon, where there have been bloody assaults on US installations, is an excellent modern example. Not only are US and friendly Vietnamese personnel rendered constantly apprehensive, but propaganda advantages, such as forcing repatriation of US dependents, have been gained.

## Summary

On the basis of the historical record it appears conclusive that:

1. Success of irregular forces is dependent upon support--or at least tolerance--by local civilians, whether voluntary or forced.

2. Local support of insurgent forces, as well as the insurgency itself, may arise from ideological, socio-economic, or personal sources. Support also may be induced by terror.

3. Controlled guerrilla activity often has been productive in supporting conventional warfare. Yet unless the strategic objectives of irregular forces coincide with those of the associated conventional forces, their operations may be not only pointless but harmful. Furthermore, uncontrolled guerrilla warfare usually degenerates into outlawry.

4. Environment as a factor in irregular force operations includes not only the terrain but the adjacent civilian population. A favorable environment--natural or created--is requisite to successful guerrilla operations.

## CHAPTER II. ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA

### FROM LOCAL SUPPORT

Two procedures have proved successful in depriving guerrillas of local support: drawing popular support to the government and away from the guerrilla, and physically cutting the links between the guerrilla and the local population that supports him. Neither procedure is simple, and successful counterinsurgencies have generally made use of both in various combinations.

#### Drawing Support Away from the Guerrilla

If a substantial part of the local support which a guerrilla force has enjoyed is transferred to the local government, the guerrilla's effectiveness is drastically reduced. Complete transfer of loyalty results in collapse and defeat.

The specific action taken by a government seeking to withdraw support from a guerrilla movement depends, like any other political or military procedure, on the causes that led to development of the insurgency, the nature of the people involved, and whether or not the support received by the guerrillas is voluntary.

First, and most important, is the provision of security to the population by establishment of law and order through the introduction of military or civil police protection. This is particularly effective when support of the guerrilla movement has in large degree been achieved by force. This method was particularly successful in the Philippines, during the Philippine insurrection, where the Katipunan was operating with threats and severe punishment for those who did not support its guerrilla forces. A potential danger in police activity is the possibility of turning supporters of the government into supporters of the insurgents through overly harsh police action. This happened with the British troops in Ireland in 1916-1920, and there is evidence that overenforcement of the British government's policy in Palestine in 1945-1949 lent itself to propaganda that helped the guerrilla cause both externally and internally.

A basic method used to effect withdrawal of support is through the use of propaganda and public information media. Modern means of communication have greatly increased the potential means of spreading propaganda and their significance is attested by such examples as the uprising in Hungary, where one of the first objectives of both insurgents and counterinsurgents was to gain control of radio stations. Through propaganda a government may convince the guerrillas' supporters that loyalty to it promises better prospects of economic security, and/or personal freedom, than continuing support of the guerrilla. It can also convince them that failure to remain loyal will result in punishment.

Providing essential content to propaganda is action to remove the specific grievance that formed the basis for the rebellion and which the insurgents promise to remedy. This may not be too difficult, if it is a simple economic or political problem and the remedy is undertaken before the guerrilla movement has had time to develop much strength. But normally the problem is more complicated, since there is likely to be a combination of grievances that cannot easily be remedied without a fundamental change in government policy. The British in Malaya attempted to provide increased security and a better life, establishing police posts, good roads, water supplies, electricity, schools, clinics, and employment to the population of guerrilla areas. But these improvements were offered after the supporters had been physically separated from the guerrilla by barbed-wire fences around the new villages; fences patrolled by police and Home Guards and lighted at night. Resettlement offers the most direct means of interdicting local support but it is also the most complicated and expensive. The problem is understood in South Vietnam; it has not yet been solved satisfactorily.

A further step, used, for instance, in both of the Philippines examples, and in Malaya, is the promise of amnesty to all who forswear the guerrilla cause and pledge allegiance to the established government. Carrying the threat of punishment through to execution, as in exiling Filipino Insurrecto leaders to Guam, may also serve to withdraw support for the cause, although such terror tactics may have the opposite effect and increase support, as did the execution of the revolutionary leader, José Rizal.

One of the safest generalizations to emerge from the case studies has been that the incumbent, particularly if a foreign occupant, will exploit successfully ethnic divisions to deny the guerrilla supply, intelligence, recruits, and sanctuary. The most outstanding example is British isolation of Chinese guerrillas

from the Malaysians, the French and American use of the Montagnards in Vietnam, and the exploitations of Serbo-Croat differences by the Germans during World War II.

#### Action to Deny Guerrillas Access to Local Support

The measures or methods to draw popular support from the guerrilla will, in general, take time to develop full effectiveness. Furthermore, by themselves they cannot be fully effective if the guerrilla remains, at any stage, capable of armed action and perhaps capable of regaining the initiative. Military operations and administrative (or civic) action designed to facilitate military operations will yield immediate results in cutting off local support for guerrillas and will reinforce and accelerate the effects of the efforts to withdraw popular support discussed above.

Military operations will necessarily have the primary aim of destroying the armed forces of the insurgents while protecting ambient civilians from guerrilla exactions. In effect, because of the guerrilla's elusiveness and hit-and-run tactics, this takes the form of a progressive whittling down of his fighting strength in a number of small-scale actions. By the nature of his logistic organization the guerrilla is unlikely to be able to concentrate a large force in one place, except for a limited time. At the outset of the insurgency, and perhaps for an extended period, the guerrilla has the initiative and the government forces will be essentially on the defensive, holding the main towns and other vital points, and the communications linking them. This will also include efforts to bring the insurgents to battle if the government forces are adequate. Once this "framework" phase has been established and the government need not fear the loss of the capital city or other vital centers, then the next phase can begin. This is when the government's armed forces can regroup and take the offensive.

To isolate the guerrilla from support, government forces have used several alternative tactical solutions. The first is to keep the insurgents on the run by the use of mobile columns of adequate strength. This entails good intelligence and a mobility superior, or at least equal, to that of the guerrillas. There are many examples of this type of antiguerrilla operation, such as those of the British in South Africa in 1900-1902, and the Americans in the Philippines, at about the same time. In both cases the colonial counterinsurgents were successful in the end, but large forces had to be used and the campaigns took many

months to complete. Similar tactics were applied by the French in crushing some of the early insurrections in Vietnam, and also by use of paratroops later in Algeria.

In these instances the government forces sometimes deliberately isolated the guerrilla from his sources of supply by burning farms, mills, and granaries and driving off livestock. A guerrilla force based on a sympathetic rural population from whom it is acquiring food, clothing, and animal transport is particularly vulnerable to this form of attack. Conversely, insurgents based mainly on towns, and operating only in small numbers, may be less vulnerable because, first, their supply problem is usually smaller and, second, since they can merge into the urban population more or less at will, their sources of supply can be more easily concealed. Ireland and Palestine are examples of this type of insurrection.

Once his source of supply (or of information, or of recruits) is threatened or actually cut, the guerrilla must fight to restore his links to his support or to obtain new sources. This provides the government forces with opportunities to continue and to intensify military pressure and attrition.

In an urban environment--again as in Ireland and Israel--the guerrilla's prime supply problem is likely to be that of arms and ammunition. The IRA, for instance, was suffering severely from a shortage of ammunition immediately before the British government offered negotiations, and it is probable that the Israelis would have had the same difficulty had the conflict been prolonged.

Frequently in the past, when government forces have embarked on campaigns to destroy sources of supply, this has been carried out with a harshness that tends to be counterproductive. In some cases, reprisals have been official policy designed to punish local inhabitants for supplying the guerrillas and to be a deterrent for the future. The American Revolutionary War, Ireland, and Palestine afford examples, however, in which the reprisal action itself became counterproductive. In the Vendée, the destruction of property clearly contained this element of punishment, combined with terror, but as a policy it was eventually abandoned after its ineffectiveness was realized.

The lesson is clear: extreme policies against the inhabitants and their property seldom have the direct effect of isolating the guerrilla, and thus hastening the end of the insurrection, unless combined with the process of isolating the guerrilla, and with some offer of clemency and conciliation. This is often effective in drawing discouraged or partially committed, part-time



guerrillas back to the government fold. (It is also often effective with the guerrilla leaders themselves.) It is noteworthy that often the military authorities are more ready for conciliation (from a position of strength) than their political masters. Outstanding examples of this are General Kleber in the Vendée and General Kitchener in South Africa. Both generals, if left to themselves, could probably have ended the insurgency at the point where they felt that military measures had had sufficient effect to justify conciliation to some degree. In Malaya, amnesties and clemency afforded to guerrillas--combined with cash payments--had a successful cumulative effect in inducing mass surrenders. It must be noted, in this context, that an adequate degree of military pressure on the guerrilla (including both attrition and the denial of supplies) is an essential prerequisite to any conciliatory approach.

Another method of denying the guerrilla access to support is by exploitation of natural obstacles, or creation of artificial ones. If there is no mountain range, sea, or river, then the artificial obstacle has often been an adequate substitute: blockhouse line, the wire fence, the mine field, or the wall. Sometimes such a man-made barrier may be used in combination with, or in prolongation of, a natural obstacle. The aim is to restrict the freedom of movement of the guerrilla, to separate him from an area source of supply, or to delimit an operational zone. An artificial obstacle can be used for these purposes to deny support locally or from outside (e.g., the electrified and mined wire fences put up by the French in Algeria to close the Moroccan and Tunisian frontiers) but when not watched continually by security forces it is not effective. Examples in this study of the successful use of artificial obstacles are the British blockhouse lines in South Africa and the floodlit wire fences round the "new villages" in Malaya. In the former case the blockhouse lines were a useful supplement to the mobile columns and farm-burning policy. In the latter, the fences, apart from protecting the village from surprise attack, were an extremely effective way of separating the guerrilla from his source of supply. The fact that artificial obstacles have been less successful in South Vietnam seems due to other administrative and military failures, clearly described in the relevant case study (Vol. II, p. 91).

A feature common to all the antiguerrilla campaigns examined in this study is the considerable time taken to bring each to a conclusion. The one exception is the Hungarian revolt of 1956. All the other examples ended only after years of conflict, and in most of these a large proportion of the time was taken up by

the government's slowly escalating efforts to cut off the insurgents from support. The moral is obvious: to succeed, the government should realize at the outset that it cannot expect quick results against determined guerrillas, who by definition have at least some support from the mass of the population, until and unless this support has been cut off.

### Military Forces

In modern industrialized countries, military forces exist primarily for defense against conventional external threats. Thus the needs of guerrilla war have often required drastic changes in military organization, sometimes permanently. Examples are the American emphasis on cavalry in operations against the Plains Indian in the 19th Century, and the raising of mounted infantry by the British in Burma and South Africa. The Germans in the Balkans developed the Jagdkommando which is an example of the "special force," or "counterband" concept. This concept is often an attractive one, but the balance of evidence in our cases suggests (though it does not prove) the preferable alternative of retraining and reequipping regular units. The "special force" has often proved counterproductive and seems susceptible to reliance upon a policy of reprisal and terror. Its excesses (whether proved or not) have often provided valuable propaganda material for the insurgent.

The selection of the military commander for counterinsurgency operations is of supreme importance, for--even more than in conventional warfare--he needs special attributes. The antiguerrilla high commander must be extremely resourceful, of flexible mind, and, above all, able to see beyond purely military requirements for victory and to appreciate the human and political elements involved in the struggle. Although seldom possible, the ideal leader would wield political as well as purely military power, as did General Arthur MacArthur in the Philippines, and (to an even greater extent) Field Marshal Sir Gerald W.R. Templer in Malaya. Though Templer's political power was far from unlimited, he had a sympathetic metropolitan government behind him, and his position as head of the local government gave him effective control of the civil administration. He was, therefore, able to carry out far-reaching policies aimed at isolating the guerrilla by means other than military, e.g., resettlement, "winning the hearts and minds of the people," propaganda and, most importantly, guiding nationalist aspirations and emotions. As a senior general of great ability he was able to direct the military effort and harmonize it with his civil aims; a rare combination, but undeniably effective.

Finally, there is the question of the ratio of the strength of the government's forces to that of the insurgents. This is at least indirectly relevant to the question of isolation, in the light of the nature of the missions to be performed. The ratio is not easy to assess with certainty, as it is complicated by such factors as terrain, relative armament, mobility, and the effect of airpower in modern times. It is, however, evident that if only for purposes of territorial control, government forces must secure a definite numerical predominance before the victory can be won. The ratio (when it can be determined at all) varies widely in the cases studied. In the Boer War the total of British forces deployed approached the sum of the whole Boer population in the main operational areas, and the ratio of combatant strength was of the order of ten to one in the later phases. The civil war in Greece produced, in 1947, a ratio of rather more than six to one in favor of the government; in Malaya, in 1948, the initial superiority of the government forces was small, but after the defensive (or "framework") phase, it rose steadily until 1959, when a position was reached in which two or three highly trained regular battalions were hunting down a dozen Communist guerrillas in a particular area.

#### Military Civic Action

It is clear from many of the case studies that the betterment of the living conditions of the mass of the people is an important factor in any attempt to isolate the guerrilla from local support. This has been discussed in general terms earlier as an important administrative aspect of drawing popular support from the guerrilla to the government. But it has direct military implications, also.

The political aim of improved living conditions is often combined with the military need to remove and resettle part of the population for operational purposes, and it is in this sector that organized military forces can be of great value. Also, military forces can act quickly. In addition to supplementing or even temporarily replacing the ordinary local forces of law and order, and thereby ensuring the protection and security of the people, they can do much in improving their physical conditions and environment. Experience in South Vietnam since 1954 is striking corroboration of the thesis that no large-scale civic program in the context of guerrilla warfare is likely to succeed without a minimum level of public security.

The use of troops in resettlement schemes has been common in recent years. The French army played a large part in the civil administration in Algeria and carried out resettlement, but at first its prime aim was to clear operational areas. In Malaya, British troops did much good work during the movement of the Chinese squatters to the "new villages," and in the early stages of the building of the villages. Army engineers helped with roads, bridges, and water supplies. Army doctors and medical orderlies set up informal clinics (as US forces are doing in Vietnam today) and quite normally helped out in the local civil hospitals, which were often understaffed. Much good will accrued when service transport, including aircraft and helicopters, was made available to take sick people to hospitals in emergency. Infantry battalions often "adopted" new villages (some of them were named by their inhabitants after the regiment or its commander) and played a large part in developing the community. Band concerts, movie shows, children's parties, and football matches were organized by the troops, and it is not too much to say that popularity merged into affection in many cases. Many of these activities were publicized by the press and the Government Information Service and did much to bring the people to the side of the government.

### Psychological Warfare

From the point of view of a government confronted with insurgency, psychological warfare has two aspects, one negative, the other positive. The negative one is denial to the enemy (the insurgent) of the opportunity to "get across" his case to his supporters, local or outside, preventing its dissemination by censorship methods or physical controls on the media of communication. The positive aspect is destruction of the insurgent's case and, at the same time, destruction of his will to fight, or reduction of the support he needs for fighting effectively.

The positive aspect is, in essence, to get into the mind of the guerrilla, and of his supporter in the local civilian population, and to convince them that there is no hope of guerrilla victory. Dostoevski wrote, "To destroy a man utterly it is necessary only to prove that his work is useless," and this is true of the guerrilla who often has to live mainly on hope. Propaganda must be directed mainly to this end and reiterated endlessly. Every possible means of psychological warfare must be used, including "black" and "grey" if possible, even if it is not necessarily credible at the time. This type of propaganda should be regarded always as an essential component of offensive action, and not as a substitute for it.

### Population and Supply Control

Some form of population control is essential in dealing with any form of subversion. It is even more important as a basis for most measures necessary in isolating the guerrilla. It is a big task for the government to learn as much as possible about every individual, but it has been achieved in one form or another, throughout history. The first essential is a registration of the population, and some form of personal identification. The ideal, from the government point of view, is an identity card with photograph, issued universally, with safeguards against forgery and duplication. This is a task for the civil police, but troops may also have to be used, and will probably be needed in any case to man checkpoints and to carry out surprise checks.

An additional instrument of population control is the travel permit to allow surveillance of internal movement and to discourage the guerrilla from using "open couriers." Such a system is ponderous, involving much administrative and clerical work. In addition booths and huts for carrying out searches of individuals have to be provided, together with the necessary staff, including women searchers. Some administrative streamlining can generally be achieved, however, by partially combining the apparatus for population control with the organization for supply control. The aim of both controls is to prevent, or at least to hinder, communication between the guerrilla and the populace. The administration of both is necessarily local in character, with clearly defined areas of responsibility.

Population control was quite successful in Malaya, but has been much less so in Vietnam. Vietnamese authority embarked on a large-scale program in 1961, but by that time it was too late, since they could not reach the extensive portion of the population under Viet Cong control for comprehensive fingerprinting, registration, and the like. As a result, it has been estimated that population control has only been about 50% effective.

Supply control consists initially of a list of proscribed articles, whose sale or movement is either prohibited or regulated. This entails a comprehensive government organization embracing manufacturing sources, wholesalers, and retail outlets. Restricted articles fall into three main groups--arms and ammunition; clothing, food, and medical supplies; and propaganda material. The last is an important category, including typewriters, duplicators, paper, stencils, carbon, inks, radios, and radio parts. Arms and ammunition obviously must be strictly controlled, but the much more complicated control of food, clothing, and medical supplies entails

a detailed rationing system applied to the whole population plus control of movement of bulk stores from factory or source to retail shop. Bulk supplies of food and clothing materials must be moved in supervised convoys with a manifest system, and staple foods are issued only on presentation of ration cards. The control of medical supplies is an important task. They are vital to the guerrilla, particularly in a protracted struggle, and can be effectively controlled only by an elaborate system of certificates and accounting.

In general, a meticulously applied population and supply control is quite the best means of isolating the guerrilla. It does, as noted above, imply a satisfactory standard of local administration and access to the great majority of the population. It requires, furthermore, a considerable diversion of resources (in manpower in particular) and effective law enforcement by police and troops.

### The Role of Intelligence

An effective and efficient intelligence organization is essential to a government facing an insurgency and is particularly important in the context of isolating the guerrilla from local support. Obviously, the whereabouts of the guerrilla forces must be known accurately for the purposes of military action, but his sources of local support must also be known in detail. But even before this it is desirable, if possible, to identify the individuals who comprise the guerrilla forces. This has always been the most difficult problem for the counterinsurgents, and no completely satisfactory intelligence solution has yet been produced.

Opinions differ on the best form of intelligence organization for those purposes, and, as our case studies show, there are variations according to the governmental structure of the country concerned. The alternatives are, broadly, a civil organization based on the existing police setup, and a military organization based on the armed forces. Having regard to the local nature of the intelligence requirements, it appears that the better alternative is usually one based on the civil police. If effective links are provided with the intelligence departments of the armed forces it is possible to meet most of the requirements. There is the additional advantage that a civil police intelligence system can be maintained on a local basis if, as is likely, military units move away from a particular area. In other words, continuity of information is ensured.

Intelligence requirements range from political information at one end of the scale to information of guerrilla force movements and strength at the other. The political aspect is vitally important in framing the government's psychological warfare plan and the propaganda to implement it. This is normally obtained by the technique of penetration, and the exploitation of all the normal sources such as informers, prisoners, captured documents, and intercepted messages. The requirements of the armed forces can be met by a combination of these and the normal military methods of reconnaissance in all its forms. An important factor here is the link-up between the two systems. An example is the British method developed in Malaya. The police obtained and collated the local intelligence, while the army, in addition to normal military intelligence functions, provided a number of officers attached to the police. These military intelligence officers worked within the police organization with the aim of extracting tactical information of value to the armed forces, and acting as a useful reinforcement to the police organization.

The main lesson is the need for cooperation between all gatherers of information and all users of information. There is always a tendency toward proliferation of intelligence organizations (there are said to be over 40 separate organizations operating in West Berlin today) and this must be firmly checked in any condition of insurgency. German operations against the various guerrilla forces in Occupied Europe in World War II were considerably handicapped by the competition between the the Abwehr, the SD, the Gestapo, and the various intelligence services of the puppet and satellite regimes.

Lastly there is the counterintelligence or counterespionage aspect. The part of the intelligence organization charged with this duty (preventing the enemy from gaining useful information) is obviously very important in any operations designed to isolate the guerrilla. Information is as necessary to success for him as are the other physical requirements provided by such local support as he enjoys. This has applied particularly in campaigns where terrorism has been a major factor, e.g., Ireland and Palestine, and has led sometimes to the creation of special counterterror organizations.

## Part Two: The Guerrilla and External Support

### CHAPTER III. THE NATURE OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT

#### General

As clearly shown by our case studies, guerrillas have normally sought outside support in such forms as political, psychological, financial, military, and technical assistance. Usually these various types of external support have been intermixed.

Before the rise of communism, contacts between the guerrilla and the outside were usually unsystematized, sporadic, and fortuitous, as exemplified by the rather haphazard nature of British intervention in the Vendée in the late 18th Century. Since World War II, provision of outside support for Communist guerrillas has been systematic and based on a carefully worked out and time-tested doctrine. This is not to suggest that the Communist procedures and measures are necessarily institutionalized, and unquestionably there has been, and always will be, an element of improvisation. But the procedures and doctrine are sophisticated and coherent.

Political and social instability, economic distress, a general sympathy for the mystique of the guerrilla rebelling against the colonial overlord, all have combined to offer an environment and opportunities, here in greater degree, there in lesser, for relatively riskless aggression by international communism through sponsorship or exploitation of insurrection and guerrilla warfare.

The nuclear stalemate has interacted with world public opinion to facilitate this use of guerrilla warfare for aggressive purposes. The possibility of escalation of an internal war to general nuclear warfare has made sympathizers with the established government reluctant to strike directly at the external source of support of the insurgency. Meanwhile, world public opinion has accepted the passage of guerrillas across frontiers without the outcry that arises when conventional forces cross frontiers. At



least in part this is because the Free World (neutrals as well as Western powers) have been maneuvered through skillful use of psychological warfare into accepting a double standard of conduct for Communist and non-Communist powers.

From fear of escalation, pressure of world opinion, and inevitable uncertainty about the size and importance of outside support, has come the sanctuary principle.\* In the Greek civil war, for instance, the Greek army did not attack into Albania or Yugoslav Macedonia, whence the guerrillas were drawing vital support. Nor, for their part, did the Yugoslav regular forces attack south into Greece, even when that country seemed shakiest. Such a direct attack might have prompted a vigorous Anglo-American response, perhaps even to start World War III. There was, of course, an analogous situation in the Korean War, when the UN forces refrained from attacking the Communist forces base of support in Manchuria, for fear of provoking Soviet intervention in the war. Similarly, during the Indochina War of 1945-1954, China was a sanctuary for the Viet Minh.

The idea of sanctuary has perhaps begun to erode somewhat in Southeast Asia, although probably only with respect to air operations. The weight of world opinion has accepted (though not without much protest) US aerial reprisals in North Vietnam and in Communist-controlled regions of Laos but would probably condemn movement of US ground troops into North Vietnam. No attacks have been made on the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China, both of whom have been overtly aiding North Vietnam. Either power is capable of retaliation and effective self-defense; the appreciation that they would not retaliate for the attacks on North Vietnam was daring as well as perceptive. The United States was not willing to go that far during the Korean War--against a relatively major power. Yet it would appear that sanctuary is no longer quite as privileged as it was, at least so far as freedom from air attack is concerned. However, the United States has been careful not to undertake ground action into North Vietnam, although guarded threats of possible pursuit into Cambodia have been made.

---

\*In some instances, e.g., Greece, the sanctuary has been facilitated by the vagaries of political frontiers that cut across ethnic groupings so that the rebel on one side might find, on the other side of the border, people allied to him by myriad social bonds, perhaps even those of clan or tribe.

### The International System and Insurgency

The type of irregular warfare exposed in the background studies ranges all the way from skirmishes of the First Seminole War to the current war in Southeast Asia. Each example illustrates some form of guerrilla action, but the conditions that separate the cases are manifold. The Peninsular War, for example, was not primarily a guerrilla war in its chief aspects, but the types of outside intervention which occurred are hardly irrelevant to counterinsurgency. Equally relevant were the efforts of the Confederacy in the American Civil War to achieve legitimacy, legality, and foreign support.

A pure case of confined guerrilla war is unthinkable today. All internal conflicts, from their origin and often long before they have passed the threshold of violence, have had international dimensions. Although outside support has not necessarily been decisive, it has usually been important, and our historical examples suggest that in the 20th Century its application is inevitable. In manifold subtle ways guerrilla war is "internationalized" from the moment the first shots are fired. This is not simply a function of the Cold War and the predominantly bipolar structure of the international system, but is implicit in the idea of insurgency itself, in which insurgents are endeavoring at least partially to supplant the incumbents as a legal entity in the international system.

An insurgent movement begins from a position of relatively great disadvantage with respect to the legal government, and it cannot triumph until and unless its victory can somehow be accepted by the international system. This illustrates explicitly the need for outside support, both military and nonmilitary. There are abundant cases to show that moral, political, and psychological support from the world at large can assist a guerrilla movement immeasurably. A modern case in point would surely be the Algerian Revolution. Although defeated militarily in a conventional sense within Algeria, the FLN managed to enlist such diverse forms of international support that it was able to gain independence from France on July 7, 1962, after over seven years of armed struggle. Crucial to this victory, and related to this method, was the FLN's successful use of psychological warfare waged in part through intermediaries, to erode French will to pursue the conflict.

The ultimate career of an insurgent movement, starting from a position of enormous power disadvantage, has depended in great measure on its success in promoting the separation of the twin

concepts of legality and legitimacy, both internally and before other nations. Legality it cannot acquire unless by coup d'etat (which is not our concern) or unless anarchy or armed intervention ensue; legitimacy it can gradually come to possess if it operates with skill. Its primary international effort in the nonmilitary sphere has been directed toward securing as wide as possible an assent to its legitimacy first as a belligerent, and --through a progressive discrediting of the legal government-- as a de facto government. This has clearly been the aim of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam.

Conversely, the established government and its supporters will seek to prevent this outcome, but are likely to suffer from reciprocal disadvantages in their attempt. If the insurgents commence from a position of conspicuous weakness, they cannot help but gain strength, provided they maintain and expand their bases of local support and create emergencies for the forces of order. Each act of violence draws publicity. Each success breeds attention and respect. And a well-orchestrated propaganda program seeks to capitalize abroad on these successes. If all goes well, the aura of legitimacy will gradually commence to change camps. When the stage is sufficiently set, the insurgents feel powerful enough to establish a rival government in a guerrilla zone or on foreign soil, thereby inviting judgment of their own legality.

The problem of the legal government is vexing in the sense that after the insurgent succeeds in eliciting outside support, the government itself must seek compensating aid from the international market if it has not done so all along. This exposes it to the charge of being a front for foreign interests and tends to force it to demonstrate a lack of self-sufficiency and to mortgage a portion of its legitimacy. This has been one of the principal problems facing the beleaguered government of South Vietnam.

This is reason enough--from the incumbent's viewpoint--that guerrilla movements should be nipped in the bud. If a guerrilla movement has managed to acquire a certain international respectability, and hard outside commitments, it will have eluded the hazards of purely internal decision and will be implicated in the strategy and self-respect of the major powers and in the delicate balance of the international system. Every knowledgeable guerrilla leader seeks this kind of assurance.

### Insurgency and Subversion

In the confused postwar backwash it has been possible for guerrilla movements to address themselves to a wide audience of international sympathizers, not only in the Communist bloc but in the Free World as well. Both the right of self-determination and the aspiration to social justice (professed by all modern insurgents) have an honored place in the Western treasury of values. And at least since the Bandung Conference of 1955 there has been an impressive solidarity among the new nations on this issue, if on little else. Thus the climate of the international system, despite its bipolarity, has been extremely favorable for the reception of insurgent legitimacy, especially when the guerrillas are attempting to expel a colonial power under the banner of self-determination.

This does not, however, alter the fact that most modern nationalist insurgents have seized upon the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine of revolutionary employment of guerrillas (because of its undoubted operational applicability) and, in the bargain, have tended to view the Western powers from the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninist politico-economic doctrine. Nor does it change the correlative fact that Communist-inspired and Communist-supported insurgencies have enjoyed the international benefits of their nationalist orientation as long as some pains were taken to conceal the red flag.

In the extraordinary chaos of the territorial revision of the last decades it has been inevitable that the strands of national liberation and social revolution would become interwoven with Marxist-Leninist theories and power drives in the underdeveloped world and easily confused in many quarters in the West. The history of Western political evolution and the vocation of many of the enlightened spirits of our civilization have pointed toward our endorsement of liberty for all peoples. Two case studies (Vol. III, pp. 1 and 145) have remarked on the support which both the American and Irish rebels received from a considerable segment of the British public and from the Whig and Liberal parties, respectively. Protests in favor of the insurgents in Malaya or the Greek Cypriots seem to follow in the same tradition, no less than the support given to the Vietnamese and Algerian revolutionaries by many French intellectuals, or the suspended attitude toward both Castro's Cuba and the Viet Cong that is or was widespread in Europe and Latin America.

While these confusions persist and are capitalized on by astute and vigorous insurgent propagandists, many individuals

continue to support Communist-aided or -inspired guerrilla movements, even while abhorring international communism. On the other hand, to ascribe to Moscow and Peking credit for manipulation of all nationalistic or socially progressive insurgencies is an oversimplification. Condemning all revolution out of hand merely intensifies the problem of assessing guerrilla movements objectively, and furnishes fuel to the propagandists of subversion.

It is not necessary to read the modern examples of insurgency explored in this study to recognize that international communism is dedicated to subversion, and that the rival Communist capitals, Moscow and Peking, are ideologically in concert on their objective to use subversion as elements of their programs aimed at the defeat of the West.

Subversion means two things and can work in two ways. It is the general environment (usually defined as being below the level of violence) in which a guerrilla movement takes shape and emerges, and it is the prescribed technique of intervention by which a major power, through the fomentation of social and political upheaval, seeks to sap the legitimacy of the government of a rival state. Often the two sides of subversion work together. For example, during World War II the Vietnamese Communists were able to capture leadership of the nationalist movement and use it later for a simultaneous war of independence and social revolution. In the case of other insurgencies, as in Algeria and Cyprus, the Communists were appreciated for their ability as rebel fighters, but kept at arm's length by the insurgent leaders.

Where subversion from the outside commands and precedes the outbreak of organized violence, it is obvious that the question of outside support has been raised even before the rifles bark. Past experience has shown that this is not always obvious at the time, however clear it becomes with hindsight. Modern revolutionaries, who do not care to sacrifice their slender chances at the outset, will take all possible care to conceal their indebtedness to foreigners with the object of solidifying nationalist sympathy within and international favor without. Ho Chi Minh did not formally request international recognition for his government--a move that cemented his Communist affiliations--until January 1950, after the Chinese Reds had reassuringly appeared on the Yunnan frontier. The remedy for this kind of deception--whose first overt appearance is usually in "national front" form--must lie in sophisticated spotting techniques and biographical knowledge of the various clandestine movements. Then, perhaps, the potential guerrillas can be isolated from their leaders and the leaders from misguided sectors of outside support.

If subversion is natively generated and the explosion of guerrilla violence takes a more purely nationalistic form, it is obvious from recent history that external subversion will not be long in seeking to introduce itself. Here, the procedures of inhibition will depend on the case in point. Possibly the insurgent leadership will not be anxious to allow this development and, like Nasser or Ferhat Abbas, will resist subversion while accepting support. The calculations of would-be supporters of the existing regime may have to be made on the spot in realistic terms involving multiple decisions.

We have pointed out that contemporary guerrilla movements, in striving to assert their legitimacy in the international community, have benefited quantitatively from the close and often opaque connection between the goals of independence and social revolution, and the cynical lip-service paid to both motives by totalitarian and aggressive communism. Today, however, the tide of anticolonialism is virtually at an end, at least insofar as the major Western powers are concerned. It thus becomes easier for the international audience to separate the two drives and judge accordingly. Leninist theory teaches that wars of independence in collaboration with the national bourgeoisie must ultimately be followed by Socialist revolution. But by no means all individuals, groups, or agencies--or all nations--that have willingly endorsed the struggle of guerrillas for self-determination will go to the extent of favoring complete destruction and reconstruction of the social order. The parties in power are not the obvious beneficiaries of ongoing revolution in the new nations; yesterday's insurgents are often today's statesmen; as evidenced by the Bourgibas, Nehrus, and Kenyattas.

Therefore, it should be theoretically possible to inhibit the outside support of future guerrilla movements on precisely these grounds. It should be easier to isolate and demonstrate the elements of conspiratorial subversion in the chaotic politics of the new nations, even though their characteristic instability makes for grave dangers.

The hope of the revolutionaries is of course to continue the profitable association with nationalism, to portray existing sovereign regimes as "neo-colonial," and to equate patriotism with social radicalism, especially in areas where economic and demographic pressures have become intolerable. Latent imperialism in some states and inevitable boundary conflicts help to fill out the strategy.

The first observation accounts somewhat for the current American preoccupation with Latin America as a center for mounting

guerrilla activity. Although sovereign for over a century, many of these states do not offer or have not until recently offered effective political participation or social justice to their people. Aside from the fact that they lie within a sensitive US sphere of influence, these cases seem earmarked as proving grounds for testing of the Communist axiom that revolution does not end with independence and that parliamentary regimes are a sham. Both the successes of reform and the elimination of insurgencies in this area can speak eloquently to those sectors which unreflectingly ascribe legitimacy to guerrilla movement, willy-nilly, and accept the broadest possible definition of "wars of liberation." Undoubtedly many of the present regimes of the new nations will also be watching this development, with a certain fear, but also opportunistically.

Our case studies suggest that in the near future socially radical or Communist guerrilla movements will arise in the underdeveloped nations with the pretense of stigmatizing the "nationalism" and "patriotism" of existing regimes. The theme of neocolonialism will be broadcast at large. This communication can be challenged, and outside political and psychological support inhibited, if the counterpropaganda can demonstrate that it is the guerrillas who are jeopardizing effective independence and latitude of national action. The reaction of other underdeveloped countries, both in their domestic policies and in their performance in international bodies, is apt to depend largely on the caliber of this response.

#### Insurgency and Western Opinion

Guerrillas frequently receive military hardware from the Communist bloc and mass enthusiasm from the new nations, but it is especially in the West and through the gaining of Western sympathies that they achieve legitimacy. As has been so clearly demonstrated in the United States recently, in varying degrees audiences such as intellectuals, labor leaders, entertainers, church groups, and students are often touched by the arguments guerrilla movements put forward. The cruelty and ineptitude of the existing regime are underscored; the Cromwellian purity and patriotism of the guerrillas are set against them. The guerrillas are righteous and representative. Sometimes all this is not far from being the case. But many fail to look beyond the genus guerrilla movement in making the assessment, and equate all popular uprisings.

What is not often realized is that a characteristic, fully articulated guerrilla movement (e.g., the FLN or the National Liberation Front) has easily as many external agents as it has officers on the field of combat. These persons are devoting full skill and time and conviction to cultivating hard support abroad and to changing attitudes wherever they will count. They may additionally be aided by local Communist parties and front groups. Their task is similar to that of forming a "popular front," and they are often remarkably successful.

For example, although many Americans, such as Senator John F. Kennedy in 1957, instinctively favored an independent Algeria, the FLN missions in this country and in the vicinity of the United Nations nevertheless performed salesmanship of high distinction. They succeeded in conveying the idea that this was a war of independence like our own. They capitalized skillfully on the torture and atrocity issues, publishing a voluminous white paper in English in 1960. And it is probably no accident that when French works about the Algerian war came to be translated here, the proportion was heavily weighted to the insurgent side, including several books by Communists.

In the meantime, El Moudjahid, the FLN's official weekly paper, was rampantly anti-American.

This same quality of propaganda efficiency will not necessarily be found in every guerrilla organization and its quest for outside support. Splits, differences of opinion, personal rivalries among guerrilla leaders are not unknown and offer opportunities to their opponents. In 1918-1919, Irish agents in the United States differed strongly among themselves and sought to hamper one another's activities. More recently, the two Israeli organizations, the Hagana and the Irgun Zevai Leumi were openly split after 1944.

Although it will probably not be possible in the West for Communist movements to ingratiate themselves as successfully as, say, the Irish or Israelis, here, too, the rules of the game are the same. How many moderate Americans have been happy to accept the suggestion that the Viet Cong is independent of Hanoi and that it is, in essence, a "national front" movement? How many French and British find the existence of the Castro regime very tolerable and absolutely unconnected with their own destinies?

These attitudes, insofar as they are innocent, are admirable examples of our plurality of opinion, of sympathy for the underdog, and related to a tradition of "objectivity" which refuses to see the world as black and white. But much is due also to a confusion



between endorsing independence for colonial areas and endorsing an aggressive nationalism, between endorsing social improvement in the poor areas of the globe and endorsing a severe and illiberal doctrine of social improvement whose progressive encroachments weaken the West.

Few of these attitudes, taken individually, are worth mentioning. But taken together they contribute to a climate of opinion in which policy becomes hamstrung. Nonintervention may be all the insurgents desire, and a government will be hard-pressed not to choose this solution if its public opinion is shaky. Of course, a government will act if it feels its own vital interests threatened, but it will be reluctant to act for an ally.

There is no possible Western world in which this kind of thing will not take place, nor would it be desirable that there were. The American people, in particular, have been profoundly and historically sympathetic to the self-determination of oppressed and subject peoples, identifying early American experience with theirs. But Western governments, and particularly that of the United States, seem to have fallen down somewhat in the task of educating their publics to the problems which insurgent war poses. Front groups, protests, marches, and manifestos cannot and should not be prevented in the United States, but it might seem that official voices could be raised to keep opinion leaders reminded that this is a difficult problem. The American government's careful and reasoned response to a segment of the academic community concerning the war in South Vietnam--largely through the efforts of respected academicians--may have been a milestone in this regard.

#### The Spectrum of Outside Nonmilitary Support

Extensive outside support has never been solely responsible for the triumph of a guerrilla movement, although it is often a component of that victory. In all probability significant outside support may not develop unless the guerrilla movement shows strength, durability, and mounting success. Otherwise, doubters will hesitate, liberal well-wishers will question the representativeness of the insurgents, and even friendly sponsoring powers will not wish to become gravely implicated.

If, then, a guerrilla movement has to demonstrate durability and stature before receiving significant amounts of outside aid, what procedures will it be likely to employ to solicit such aid?

On the whole--whatever its political doctrine or conspiratorial association--the movement will seek, at least at the outset, to appeal to as wide an audience as it can. Since there are many and diverse nations in the world, an insurgency will perforce tailor and diversify its propaganda so as to strike a chord with each disparate group it hopes to enlist for its cause.

Once it is well established, a typical modern guerrilla movement can count on Communist-bloc support in accordance with the "wars of liberation" principle, even if it is not itself Communist. Even when a guerrilla movement has been stimulated by Communist agents, it will usually have to prove both its seriousness as a catalyst for social upheaval and its nuisance value against the Free World before the support is overt. Conversely, it will have to estimate--in view of its geographical location and in view of the value Moscow or Peking sets on the area in which the conflict is taking place--how much effective support it can expect in return for inevitable concessions to bloc politics. Our examples suggest that if the area is tangent to the Communist bloc, serious arrangements can be expected, but presently (and particularly after the Cuban missile crisis) support is at best oblique and prudent if it is in Latin America or Central Africa. In general the Communists have tended to distribute their aid quietly (Moscow especially) until they are persuaded of backing a fairly sure thing. At this point, demonstrative propaganda and diplomatic recognition ensue.

Thus, the current guerrilla--whether he wants it or not--can expect the sympathy and at least the passive support of communism for his efforts. He can, however, anticipate being disowned or discredited if he commits serious errors--the worst of them being failure to solidify the allegiance of his own population.

Three other current restrictions on the automatic nature of Communist support to "wars of liberation" may be noted. In the first instance, the Communists may see greater international benefit in cultivating good relations with the regime (let us say, Nasser-type) against which the guerrillas have risen. Second, the Communists may balk at the final seizure of power by an insurgent group, feeling that it might produce unwanted Western intervention or perhaps lead to major war. Moscow's restraint of the Tudeh Party in Iran in the early 1950s is frequently cited in this connection. Third, there are the unfathomable ramifications of the Sino-Soviet split in third areas, leading presumably to a fragmentation of bloc policy wherever rival Communist movements oppose each other (the Dominican Republic and the war in Vietnam are timely examples of this situation).

Many revolutionaries have been roamers. Expelled from their homelands by political exile or by choice, they cultivated attachments in various parts of the globe which served their parties in good stead when they returned to take part in revolutionary uprisings. In the past the impact of these foreign contacts has been profound. Today, the situation is mixed. Self-determination (in one form or another) is a fact for much of the globe, and--with the conspicuous exception of the émigrés from Communist-dominated lands--colonies of exiles are no longer so conspicuous. The good old days of plotting in exile are perhaps past, but the age of subversion is in full rhythm. The problem persists.

Guerrilla warfare is the prerequisite and strength of the weak who would come to power, especially in a state where social and political solidarity is flimsy. Today, the colonial period has practically ended, and guerrilla movements are increasingly less able to associate their cause with the imperative of independence. Nevertheless, in the authoritarian and oligarchic sovereign states that remain, there is abundant mileage to be gained from social justice issues. Insurgent guerrillas (as well as revolutionaries who have thus far avoided violence) will manage to associate this appeal with attack on the patriotism and nationalism of the regime they oppose. A classic example is Castro's campaign against Batista, where a majority of the Cuban people and outside observers came to doubt seriously whether the dictator really had Cuban interests at heart. Consequently, it is easy to see why guerrilla movements may continue to find exceptional support and strength in wide areas of the underdeveloped world.

However, the prospects have changed somewhat. "Wars of liberation" are no longer necessarily "wars of independence." Responsible rulers in newly independent states recognize--perhaps from their own experience--that guerrilla insurgency is a spreading contagion, and that he who speaks in praise of revolution elsewhere is likely to be one of its next victims.

In the past, as we have noted, there was an almost unbroken solidarity among the new nations in favor of active insurgencies. The bond of new nationalism was so potent that political dogma became a very secondary criterion. Carefully correct felicitations were frequently exchanged between the leaders of various insurgent movements. This attitude was endorsed at Bandung, where numerous resolutions were carried in favor of budding colonial uprisings, including the Algerian. Provisional governments were invited to "third world" conferences. Even if the political leadership of a given country might be wary of too activist a commitment to such regimes, both internal and diplomatic pressures and the whole mystique of new nationhood were generally decisive.

It was the disruption in the Congo in 1960 which really cracked this solidarity, although intimations of Afro-Asian discord had sometimes boiled up over the Arab-Israeli dispute. The farsighted action of France in summarily freeing her Black African colonies at a time when she could have confidence in their existing leadership was influential in assuring substantial pro-Western sentiment in Africa, and this has affected the stance of the entire neutral world. With the issue of independence largely passed by, the "third world" does not automatically endorse any given guerrilla movement. The ruling elites of underdeveloped countries have a general interest in global stability and legitimacy.

The increasing social differentiation of these countries, however, as well as traditional ethnic and religious divisions, pose dangers for the future. Here is not only fertile ground for subversion, but potential support for revolutionary upheaval in other areas, provided that the elements so affected (e.g., labor unions, professionals, intellectuals, students) are in a position to contribute positive support.

With respect to inhibiting nonmilitary support for guerrilla movements in countries of the uncommitted and underdeveloped world, a first dictate would seem to be political and diplomatic: break down the solidarity of the bloc so that virtual unanimity, even on sensitive issues, becomes less customary. A second useful policy is encouragement of contacts and exchanges with underdeveloped nations friendly to the West. A third, as we have mentioned, is the skillful separation of the themes of nationalism and social revolution in the evolution of the "third world"; they have been closely linked up to this date. A fourth is, of course, the patient exercise of power and realism, letting deeds speak when they have something to say.

While an efficient insurgent movement will distribute its propaganda activities in all major countries and may indeed establish foreign headquarters in certain of them (as the FLN did in West Germany), its most thorough action will be concentrated in that major country which is most heavily involved in the support of its incumbent opponent, or in the proprietary country if it is an anticolonial uprising. The reasons for this are obvious: any short-circuit that can be effected in the public trend of thought will have direct repercussions on the course of the conflict. Thus, while it is very useful to the Viet Cong to render America's role in Southeast Asia unpopular with Europeans, the benefits will be much greater if American opinion itself can be influenced against its government's declared policies.

There are, of course, more specialized solicitations of support among discrete professional, ethnic, and religious groups. Spontaneously, the Islamic world is touched when a Muslim revolts; automatically, the feelings of a man of color will go out to non-Caucasian insurgents; many lawyers will bristle at breaches of international jurisprudence; students will sympathize with rebel students; men of religion will bridle at vivid accounts of indecent cruelty. The insurgent propagandist has all these stops to play on. Moreover, instantaneous psychological reactions are not easily dispelled by cold war logic.

Concerning international organizations, three special instances command our attention. The first is the international Communist movement, which, as a transmission belt, as a supplier of funds, or as a procurer of information is a worthy instrument for any who have access to its resources. The second is the United Nations, which, as a platform for insurgencies and their sponsors, has been extremely influential on more than one occasion. The Tunisian demand for independence, pressed in 1952 and 1953 and actually brought to a favorable vote (instructing France to settle the issue in line with the principle of self-determination) in the latter year, did much to hasten the transfer of sovereignty. And with Greece as spokesman in 1957, the Greek Cypriots were able to obtain a favorable UN vote regarding their aspirations (although they had to sacrifice enosis for independence). Finally, there is the special case of the Arab League, which, with its funds, diplomatic pressures, channels of communication, Maghreb bureaus, and general good offices, played a large role in organizing and supporting the rebel movements in the three French North African states.

The primary quests of an insurgency are for power and legitimacy. The first is won by force of arms in a guerrilla-type combat which may, at its culmination, develop into a classical war of mobility. Here, outside military aid may be of the essence. But the second is won through varieties of agitation, propaganda, and persuasion. The relation between the two techniques is obvious, and both are commonly present and synchronized in an effective modern insurgency such as that in Vietnam today.

### The New Colonialism

In summation, it is readily demonstrable that, since World War II, insurgency has become an instrument of colonialism operating under the guise of "liberation." A sharp line of demarcation may be discerned between most instances of insurgency (and

its supporting irregular warfare) today and that of the preceding 125 years or so. The historical record, which is before us in the basic papers as well as in an immense germane literature, shows that guerrillas in the past usually sought outside aid, but rarely obtained it save when they themselves were able to provide useful support to the regular forces of a power engaged in conventional conflict with a common enemy.

Moral support often has gone to insurgents, but with relatively little palpable effect, since its expression in military or other overt action would have led to war. Sympathy for the Boers, the Filipinos (1898-1913), the Ethiopians (1935-1936), the Spanish "Republicans" (1936-1939), to cite a few examples, was widespread but generally ineffectual. The United States had to go to war with Spain in 1898 in order to render effective support to Cuban insurgents.

Financial and material support has been occasionally afforded --but usually without substantial benefit to the guerrillas, and sometimes to the ultimate disadvantage of those affording support. Thus, British financial aid to Spain in the Napoleonic Wars went to the Junta, and relatively little ever reached the guerrillas doing the fighting. Allied support in World War II was freely given to Tito's guerrillas rather than to those of Mihailovic, with the result that Yugoslavia was lost to communism, a loss that was not necessarily inevitable.

The United States is therefore faced with a new set of facts and conditions in insurgent guerrilla warfare affecting our interests. These must not only be recognized; we must adjust to them. The methods which defeated Aguinaldo, and the conditions surrounding his insurgency, are only partially comparable with those which relate to Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Cong.

## CHAPTER IV. NONMILITARY ASPECTS OF ISOLATION

### FROM EXTERNAL SUPPORT

#### The International Environment

Prior to World War II the characteristic system of European diplomacy had for centuries been multipolar, that is to say, based on a plurality of leading members, none of which was clearly preponderant over the others or could become so; the regulatory device was the balance of power. Since 1945, however, we have experienced a bipolarity based on the preponderant power of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the nuclear stalemate between them.

The incidence of nuclear weapons and the powerful trend of decolonization have simultaneously produced a situation in which relative prudence and piecemeal tactics are appropriate in the exercise of power, even by the superstates. This condition, as we have seen, has furnished a wide field for politico-military subversion. Overt war is increasingly dangerous, and so those who would change the status quo have found that use of the entire sphere of irregular, subversive activity to promote relatively gradual change is not only promising but requisite. A major and sudden loss for one side will result in a glittering gain for the other and possibly compel escalating or apocalyptic reprisal. The surer method is to advance obliquely and gradually, wherever possible by proxy, utilizing all the excuses and possibilities of legitimacy which the consensual attitudes of the international system confer.

This has been the atmosphere in which the general problem of denying outside support to the revisionist guerrilla must be understood. One cannot attack the problem by seeking vainly to alter the propensities of the international system, but unless one understands the system as it operates, accepting its rules, one may very well go astray in seeking a solution.

There is also the matter of ideology, expressed in the notion of patterns of a "heterogeneous system." Although it is dangerous to subscribe to the notion that the so-called Communist and capitalist worlds are drawing closer together; it may not be foolish to speculate that the multiplication of "revisionisms" might have the effect of reducing the power of revisionism per se in the world. And the present trend is toward particularization and diffusion. Heterogeneity in a more frankly multipower world may beget less dangerous subversions, and it should increase the spectrum of means by which the insurgent search for outside support can be countered--propagandistically, diplomatically, and physically.

### Limiting Factors of Insurgent Success

The wide spectrum of techniques available to a modern guerrilla movement for gaining international support has already been noted. But the limiting features should be clearly understood and utilized by an opponent. They can be expressed briefly as follows:

1. Preparation. The serious preparation of a guerrilla uprising by such means as internal subversion, training of cadres, precommitment of outside support, creation of invulnerable bases, and establishment of channels of communications, contributes heavily to ultimate success. Countermeasures should envisage the exploration and exploitation of any known weaknesses in the guerrilla's range of preparation.

2. Duration. The capacity for a guerrilla movement to persist and grow not only suggests to the outside world that the movement is being successful, but by the very fact of duration allows for the multiplication and permanent implantation of useful channels to the outside. In this regard time is usually on the side of the insurgent. Disruptions in the rhythm of the conflict, however, may cause him serious trouble, especially if his contacts with the outside are not solidly assured.\* Even a diplomatic crisis short of increased intervention or escalation might serve this purpose.

---

\*In some instances, of course, hard-pressed insurgents may welcome a disruption or interruption of a conflict that is not going well, particularly if this can be accomplished on relatively favorable terms. Thus the IRA in Ireland was happy to accept a truce when it was at the end of its resources.



3. Technology. At the outset of an insurgent movement, the guerrillas must usually fight with limited and simple weapons. While this does not in itself put them at a serious disadvantage, they may suffer severely from technological weaknesses in other respects. In particular, the efforts of an insurgency's external organization to gain outside support will depend in large part on the modernity and sophistication of its operation. This is particularly true in such matters as propaganda techniques and economic planning. Sophistication and modern technology can be, and often have been, provided by Communist sponsors, as in both North and South Vietnam in the current war.

4. Proximity. It has been pointed out time and again that one of the critical elements in the success of guerrilla movements has been the accessibility of the territory of a friendly power--for supply, training, restaging, and moral support. Although this point is not so obvious in the case of nonmilitary aid, it is nevertheless of great importance. Insurgencies thrive on publicity, and it is much harder for timely publicity to emerge from the combat zone if the word cannot be sent out through friendly territory close at hand. Similarly, the whole problem of outward communication that a modern guerrilla movement needs is rendered much more precarious.

5. Leadership. Sound leadership is critical in all phases of a guerrilla operation, and insurgent movements founder for the lack of it. But dynamic leadership also provides a catalytic and charismatic effect within and a propagandistic effect without. It is easier for a guerrilla movement to arrest attention abroad if that movement is firmly associated in people's minds with a popular and skillful leader. For instance, Castro's cigar, beard, and fatigues did much to collect sympathy for his movement abroad, as did Ho Chi Minh's ascetic physiognomy and cultured bearing. It is good politics for an insurgency to have an interesting face to present to the international public. Conversely, if the leader can be attacked and unmasked directly by counterpropaganda, or is captured or killed, the cause of the rebellion may suffer.

6. Decision-making skill. In an average insurgency, skill at making decisions is customarily also an attribute of leadership, although certain decisions may be entrusted to collective bodies, of which, for example, the FLN in time came to possess several. Brilliance and timeliness of decision-making will tend to allow an insurgency to capitalize on all the techniques mentioned here, within the measure of its means. Persistent failure will usually lead to liquidations and reorganizations. However, there are certain inherent weaknesses of decision-making

in any guerrilla operation. One of the most conspicuous derives from the fact that decisions have to be made both inside and outside the combat area, and that the internal and external organizations--especially if their communications are attenuated and difficult--may come into conflict. The opponent should be prepared to research and exploit these differences when they occur and to cast all possible doubt on the representatives of a movement's external agents, to create suspicions that they are freebooters incapable of speaking officially for the movement. Difficulties of this sort, if they can be created, may also spill back upon the internal organization and affect its morale. This has been attempted by the Americans and South Vietnamese with respect to the Viet Cong and North Vietnam, but our case study would suggest the effort has not yet had discernible success.

7. Solidarity. Part of a guerrilla movement's capacity to elicit outside sympathy and support depends upon its pretension of representing a united popular will at home. The established government will therefore seek mercilessly to destroy this image by exploiting all flaws that appear. These are most apt to emerge in the conflict of the external and internal organizations, between an insurgent movement and its acknowledged outside support, in the context of relations with potentially friendly states, and in clashes of personality. All possibilities of this sort should be carefully considered. Furthermore, guerrillas themselves--if often chauvinistically attached to the idea of their own heroic community--need to be constantly reassured that they are not an island in a hostile world. Ho Chi Minh incessantly told his people: "The reactionary colonialists' aggressive war is unjust and hated by everyone. Our resistance for national salvation is a just war, therefore it is receiving the support of many people. The majority of the French people want to live in peace and friendship. The peoples of the colonies sympathize with us. The Asian peoples support us. Public opinion all over the world approves us." (Speech of July 19, 1947.) It is this image of solidarity which must be attacked, within and without, by exploitation of error and use of fact, reciprocally, if the guerrilla is to be weakened.

#### Outside Political Support and Countermeasures

In our consideration of countermeasures against outside political support, we are construing the word "political" in the more restricted and traditional sense of "diplomatic," or the area covering international relations.

As we have insisted, the external representatives of an insurgent movement have a fundamental objective: to impress the legitimacy of their movement on as wide as possible a sector of the international community through persuasion and demonstration. They will stress the popularity and representativeness of their faction, and the corruption and repressiveness of the regime they are opposing. They will play the "underdog" role for all it is worth in the proper quarters, but in diplomatic milieu where power talks, they will insist on their growing strength and invincibility. They will attempt to prove that they have a healthier respect for international legality than their opponents. They will evoke historical precedent in their favor, especially if colonialism is the issue, to prove the continuity of the nation and their right to speak for it in its present form. If, by chance, certain of their leaders have already fulfilled state functions or if (as in the case of Ho Chi Minh, Sukarno, and others) the case can be made that they have already been the tenants of a legitimate state, this point will be pressed home. They will, as suggested earlier, make every effort to affect public opinion in those countries where government policy is hesitant. And they will seek, at a certain point in their evolution, to gain admittance to regional and international councils and conferences for the sake of further augmenting their legitimacy.

These tactics, if skillfully pursued, should contribute to the expansion of outside diplomatic support, implicit and explicit, and--what is just as important--to the attrition of the material and moral resources of the incumbent regime. After all, the incumbents have started with recognized sovereignty in the eyes of the world community and the legal right to request and receive aid and intervention. Any denial of this primary power is an absolute gain for the insurgency.

In the diplomatic arena, two hurdles are apt to be of special importance. The first is the struggle toward the acquisition of legitimate belligerent rights for the insurgents, which, if granted, effectively "internationalizes" the war and promotes the tacit admission that there are two legitimate centers of sovereignty in conflict. The second is the formation of a provisional government and the request for official diplomatic recognition from outside powers. The first condition will be achieved gradually and brought about by the evolution of the conflict; once it is achieved de facto, the insurgents will have gained potent political ammunition. In their quest for this aspect of legitimacy they are likely to play on such sensitive themes as the rules of war and the Geneva Convention concerning prisoners, as the Algerians did with such skill; and as the Viet Cong has done in the case of American and South Vietnamese use of tear gas. The

government will be tempted to rebuff such a challenge, but if it is accepted, it will automatically grant a kind of legitimacy to the insurgent.

As for establishment of a provisional government, and the quest for diplomatic recognition, the insurgency will usually wish to take the step at a moment when military events contribute to the impact or when it is willing to run the risk of offending or inhibiting certain kinds of support to make gains elsewhere. This action tends to polarize the conflict by lining up the official international community on one side or the other. It promotes dangers as well as benefits for an insurgent movement, but it is an inevitable step along the path of legitimacy.

These insurgent diplomatic efforts will usually first be directed toward influential nongovernmental bodies, such as international labor, youth and professional congresses, ad hoc conferences, and the like.

The countermeasures to these tactics are not easy to pinpoint since the exact possibilities will depend upon the political character of the insurgency, its impact on the major actors of the system, the relations of the major actors with each other, and a variety of other political factors. Basically, however, the indicated responses may be divided into the following categories:

1. Rebuttal of insurgent pretensions to legitimacy.
2. Diplomatic pressures to prevent the piecemeal surrender of attributes of legitimacy by the established government. (This does not necessarily preclude granting limited belligerent rights to the insurgents, if required; this is a separate issue.)
3. Achievement of alliance solidarity in support of the legitimacy and legality of the established government.
4. Diplomatic bargaining with would-be insurgent supporters to insure their neutrality in return for counterconcessions.
5. Anticipation and disruption of major insurgent moves in the diplomatic sphere.
6. Internal diversionary or retaliatory acts against the insurgents to offset or minimize insurgent gains.
7. Mobilization of international bodies to reject insurgent pretensions.

### Exploitation of Communist Weaknesses

Undoubtedly it is most difficult for supporters of an incumbent regime to interfere effectively with both the channels and circumstances of outside support to a guerrilla movement by the Communist bloc. However, there are certain propensities in Communist outside support that can possibly, under the best of circumstances, be exploited:

1. Moscow may be in a mood today to limit given instances of guerrilla support, especially if they occur in areas where China, rather than the Soviet Union, is dominant in subversion. There are also asymmetrical but feasible quid pro quos that might be offered to Moscow in this connection. At least Soviet support may possibly be rendered desultory and mechanical.

2. In the face of the Sino-Soviet disturbance it may become increasingly possible to disrupt the fidelity of communications between the guerrilla movements and the Communist centers. Suspicion can enter where solidarity previously was the rule. An excellent example of the exploitation of inter-Communist difficulties was in Greece, where the KKE was split internally, while the Tito-Stalin rift finally closed the border.

3. With the breakup of European colonial empires almost completed, and the establishment of numerous uncommitted governments throughout the underdeveloped world, frankly Communist-identified insurgencies may become less plausible. Consequently, the techniques of overt support to guerrillas by the Communist bloc may become more difficult, indeed less profitable.

4. Any sequence of failures in which the Communist nations are implicated may have a cumulative deterrent effect on future actions.

### Outside Psychological Support and Countermeasures

The psychological factor in guerrilla warfare is two-sided. On the one hand, the insurgent makes strenuous efforts to convey the successes of the internal movement to the outside world, and, on the other, he is feeding back to his combat forces the record of sympathy and support elicited abroad. The two processes go hand-in-hand, and it is logical to assume that the established government will seek the disruption of both, parlaying victories in one sphere into the other, just as the insurgent has been doing.

Effective propaganda requires a combination of skillful presentation, adequate technology, and understanding of audiences. This is no less true for the established government than for the insurgent. In the most recent examples we have studied, both parties have employed a wide range of propaganda and counterpropaganda addressed to a variety of audiences.

The guerrilla thrives on certain well-tested themes, which must somehow be countered by his opponent: David vs. Goliath, purity vs. corruption, honor vs. treachery, poor vs. rich, generous vs. profiteering, etc. In addition to this general picture of good vs. evil, there are other refrains. The government is guilty of atrocity (torture, germ-warfare, rapes, and civil violence). The government is conceited and dissolute. The government is a henchman of greedy powers. The people have never been allowed free choice. The minority which rules is antipopular and a antipatriotic. The revolutionary brings laws and justice; the incumbent is cruel and arbitrary. And so forth. If "independence" can be added to this battery of charges, the more powerful the magic.

It will be noted to what a remarkable degree insurgent propaganda seizes particular incidents and builds them up into a general cause célèbre. This is a device by which the Communists have profited for decades, and are exploiting to the hilt today in Vietnam. Should an innocent woman or child be killed in the course of a manifestation, a village search, or a skirmish, the incident will not go unpublicized. The execution of a single Greek guerrilla in the civil war of 1947-1949 elicited both a drawing by Picasso and a poem by Paul Eluard.

All these techniques have their serious repercussions in the outside world if assisted by wide and effective channels of transmission.

At the same time external guerrilla propaganda reveals an interesting dichotomy. On the one hand, it stresses the cruelty and injustice of its opponent and the sufferings imposed on the people; on the other, it spares no effort to represent the incumbent as essentially weak and cowardly, on the run before the indignant might of decent world opinion, a "paper tiger." The problem for the incumbent and his supporters is to turn the equation around: to show justice as the accompaniment of strength and to equate the weakness of the guerrilla with the need for deceit.

The question of psychological support is a big issue. From the cases studied in support of this report we can deduce a few guidelines to inhibit the insurgent's propaganda tactics and to appeal to the likely audiences.

1. The government must accept the insurgent's choice of audiences, including an assessment of what he has to gain from each, and must develop positive propaganda for direction toward the same audience.

2. The government, instead of wasting valuable energy in logical refutation of insurgent claims, should practice many of the same techniques that are causing him trouble. We have found no evidence that this was done systematically in any of our examples.

3. Individual guerrilla atrocities and gaucheries should be systematically reported and emphasized.

4. Orchestrated attacks on the personal conduct or past biography of guerrilla leaders can pay dividends, since public opinion tends to associate the respectability of movements with the behavior of the leadership.

5. Any refutation of guerrilla propaganda that effectively contests its legitimacy is especially valuable.

6. External failures of insurgent activity or schismatic developments among supporting powers should be skillfully and fully reported by leaflet, whispering campaign, or broadcast to the combat zones and internal areas of support.

7. Splits in the guerrilla organization for outside support can be exploited. Simulated propaganda of one faction against another, publicizing the split, covert aid to dissident elements, are a few of the many devices that can be used to profit by such a situation.

8. In short, in the allotment of time and energy to psychological countermeasures, more attack and less defense is probably indicated. This does not ignore the fact that systematic refutations will have to be made, especially where sophisticated and fundamentally open-minded audiences are involved.

#### Outside Economic Support and Countermeasures

Money is the life's blood of the modern guerrilla movement, and to the extent that funds and resources are not obtained internally through seizure, intimidation, or voluntary contribution, they must come from the outside. Well-organized channels of

finance, set on foot in advance of the outbreak of actual guerrilla combat, can immeasurably simplify the task of an insurgency and reduce the duration of its struggle. In general, if there is no friendly border or if air and other communications are severely interdicted by the forces of order, food and small arms and ammunition supplies for the guerrilla must be assured from the inside. Outside funds will be useful, however, to cover external agitation, diplomatic activity, bribery, and the inevitable large purchases of sophisticated arms, medical supplies, and ancillary equipment that will hopefully be introduced as the struggle progresses more favorably. The anomaly is that, not only have modern guerrilla movements been successful in securing large financial resources from sympathetic powers, but that, owing to the very structure of free enterprise on which the capitalist world prides itself, they have managed to deal profitably and privately in Western countries without undue difficulty. In the absence of restrictive legislation, business is always business.

The following have been promising economic targets for typical, well-developed guerrilla movements:

A. Friendly governments.

B. Conationalists in foreign countries, who are sympathetic or forced to contribute through intimidation (the remarkable success of the FLN in collecting funds from the 400,000 Algerians in metropolitan France is to be recalled in this regard, as is the ability of the Chinese Communists to obtain contributions from overseas Chinese).

C. Speculators, who regard the future prospects of extensive dealings with a guerrilla-movement-come-to-power as very attractive.

D. Nonofficial bodies which have a stake in the outcome of the conflict, such as the AFL-CIO in North Africa, which desired an influence over the Maghrebian labor unions.

E. Commercial and shipping profiteers with little political interest in the conflict.

F. Governments, government agencies, and economic concerns under their influence that perceived an opportunity to expand their economic markets at the expense of competitors who were restrained for political reasons.

G. "Front" groups susceptible to raising contributions for humanitarian reasons.



Provided that a nation supporting the incumbent regime desires to take steps to inhibit the flow of funds to the guerrillas, the following measures, ranging from least to most Draconian, may be available:

1. Public indications of support for the incumbent regime.
2. Voluntary requests to all nationals to refrain from guerrilla supply, and public blacklisting of intermediary "dummy" agencies.
3. Close surveillance and (to the extent possible) police supervision of suspected insurgent agents, their environment, and their contacts, both at home and abroad.
4. Diplomatic requests to friendly powers to impose similar restrictions.
5. Selective supervision of currency outflow and requests to friendly powers to do the same.
6. Assignment of sanctions to all individuals and firms doing business with the insurgents.
7. Passage of criminal legislation to the same end.
8. Refusal of national ports and harbor facilities to hulls known to have carried supplies for transshipment to the insurgents.
9. Graduated diplomatic threats to other powers permitting or having commerce with the insurgents.
10. Imposition of sanctions on foreign suppliers.
11. Asymmetrical economic or other retaliation or punishment for noncompliance.
12. Physical interdiction of insurgent supply through blockade, search, and seizure.

It must be recognized, however, that the less severe remedies are not likely successfully to staunch the flow of the more subtle forms of economic support, and that the harsher measures will usually seem self-defeating. Although the United States is not pleased that Canada and the Western European powers trade with Cuba, it has not been willing to pass beyond official protest. Furthermore, even domestic legislation regulating foreign commerce will never be airtight, and in the most democratic countries it will be subject to review in the courts. The gloomy conclusion

is that in a free country, and especially in a free-enterprise country, economic support is elusive and difficult to inhibit unless real public feeling can be developed to deter it.\*

There are three basic gradations of technique that a government can employ with regard to its own nationals: education, persuasion, and penalization. With regard to others, we have suggested a gamut of diplomatic pressures, none of which is likely to bring satisfaction unless the other government sees its interest in the same light. Past evidence seems to suggest that these matters are best dealt with in a quiet, bilateral fashion and not under the glare of publicity that accompanies the meetings of such organizations as NATO and the OAS.

#### Summation

The success of an insurgency in gaining the moral, psychological, political, and economic commitments which it needs from the outside will be directly related to its ability to exploit the characteristic tolerances of the international system. Attempted countermeasures that lose sight of this fact will probably fail.

The fundamental quest of the insurgent for nonmilitary support abroad revolves decisively around his need to cultivate the aura of legitimacy. This provides a point of attack for those attempting to disrupt this activity.

---

\*See also the extensive and relevant materials regarding economic assistance to participants in the Spanish Civil War.

## CHAPTER V. MILITARY ASPECTS OF ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA FROM EXTERNAL SUPPORT

### General

The simplest manifestation of guerrilla warfare--such as in the resistance of the American Indians or the Naga tribes of India--is the response of primitive peoples to encroachments by a more advanced civilization. On a more sophisticated level, the measures taken by a revolutionary government against religion and against a traditional way of life unleashed the resistance in the Vendée. Later, the Napoleonic armies, which lived off the country, forced the Russian peasants to resort to guerrilla warfare, in large part because of the food shortage the military exactions provoked, although nationalism played some part. Concurrently, an aspect of ideology, in the form of simple national patriotism, was evident in the peasant struggles, in Spain and in the Tyrol. The importance of the respective roles played by hunger, hatred of the foreigner, attachment to native folkways, nationalism, and other manifestations of ideology cannot be precisely measured.

Outside support has not been necessary at the start of a guerrilla insurrection, though it has obviously helped when available. Moreover, guerrilla warfare alone has rarely defeated the regular army of a well-established government. To achieve decisive results the guerrilla must in the end, as we have noted, obtain external support to create a counteradministration and a counterstate.

### Transborder Sanctuary

One of the basic forms of external support is the availability of transborder sanctuary. Sometimes, this is available by default, simply because the neighboring government's authority does not extend into the border region. A classic case of this nature existed along the US-Mexican border between 1850-1890.

For three-quarters of a century after the Mexican War the border region remained a half-explored wilderness, the domicile of Indian tribes still unsubdued by either country (Vol. III, p. 55). The Indians committed depredations in one country and took refuge in the other. They recognized no boundary, but knew that once across the Rio Grande they were fairly safe from pursuit. In the years immediately after the Civil War the worst offenders were the Kickapoos, a small but warlike tribe which had migrated south during the 1860s, and settled in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, about 40 miles below the Rio Grande. Regarded with favor by the local authorities and population, the Kickapoos behaved peacefully in Mexico and their loot brought from the United States contributed to the prosperity of the area. Because of their depredations the US Government repeatedly attempted in vain to have the tribe returned to its jurisdiction.

After a series of reprisal raids by US forces, undertaken despite Mexican protests, the Kickapoos were returned to US control in 1875. The stabilization of settlement in Texas and improved Texas police forces deterred further Indian raids in this region.

In the 1870s the problem shifted westward to New Mexico and Arizona where the Apaches presented the main menace. After committing their depredations, the Apaches usually sought refuge in the Sierra Madre mountains of Chihuahua and Sonora. But since the Apaches attacked Mexicans as well as Americans, they were not protected by the Mexican authorities. Indeed, in 1882 both governments reached an agreement by which troops of either country could cross the international boundary in close pursuit of hostile Indians. The agreement, periodically renewed, worked tolerably well and though the Apaches were not completely subdued until the 1890s, it ended the problem of transborder sanctuary.

Similar problems of transborder sanctuary for raiding tribesmen were encountered during the course of European colonial expansion in Africa and Asia. From Algeria, the French mounted repeated punitive expeditions into Tunisia and Morocco, virtually annexing both countries eventually. Similar problems plagued the British Northwest Frontier in India as well as the Burmese border areas (Vol. II, p. 21). Foreign support of recalcitrant tribesmen, either by adjoining native states or by rival colonial powers, was sometimes a factor. In the case of the colonial rivalries, diplomatic means, backed by a show of naval and military force, sufficed; in the case of the native states eventual occupation of the base of external support was often resorted to. Generally, the superior organization and

technology, both civil and military, of the colonial power reduced the problem of tribal raiding to a bandit nuisance. There were three major exceptions between the World Wars. From 1920 to 1925 the Riffis under Abd el Krim nearly drove Spain and France out of northeastern Morocco; at about the same time the Druzes were seriously threatening French control of Syria; and in the 1920s and 1930s there was a revival of fighting on the Northwest Frontier in India. It is noteworthy that Abd el Krim employed some foreign experts and received some support from anti-French elements in England.

#### Direct External Support

More difficult than dealing with simple tribal raidings, or even primitive native uprisings aided by essentially freelance technicians, is the case when guerrillas receive systematic support of a foreign nation or nations. Here, two basic situations have existed.

The first has been when a hostile state has deliberately fomented guerrilla warfare in another state to put pressure on the victim and to impress the friends of the victim with the earnest of its hostile intentions. Thus Sudeten German leaders on Hitler's orders engaged in a brief show of incursions, by a Sudeten Freicorps into Czechoslovakia; more recently President Sukarno introduced guerrilla warfare, first against Dutch New Guinea, and later against Malaysia. On the other hand, a short terrorist campaign waged by Austrian Nazis, on orders from Berlin, failed in 1934 under the pressure of an Italian military counterdemonstration. But this type of operation is essentially political-diplomatic and an accessory to the overall political picture.

The second type of external guerrilla support is more significant. It consists of external support for guerrilla operations which may or may not be revolutionary. During World War II in Western Europe the Resistance was not revolutionary (that is in opposition to the established regime) where it was approved or inspired by the legal government in exile. It was semirevolutionary in France, where it opposed Vichy. In Eastern Europe (except for Russia) the Resistance sometimes began as a nonrevolutionary movement, but soon was captured by revolutionary forces. This was particularly true in the Far East, where the few effective Resistance movements were particularly susceptible to anticolonial revolutionary slogans. In both China and Vietnam

the revolutionary aim also overshadowed the resistance to the foreign invader theme very early. The pure type of revolutionary guerrilla warfare was that in Ireland, Israel, and Cyprus.

To deal with this type of external support for an existing insurgency (whether or not revolutionary in nature) represents a much more serious military problem than dealing with the old style of marginal tribal guerrilla warfare.

Answering the challenge of transborder guerrilla support with reprisal raids and strikes against the support bases has historic precedents. In the 16th Century guerrilla warfare against adjoining Christian states was a deliberate part of Ottoman strategy. Unable to commit its regular forces for extended periods, the Porte relied on a large irregular border establishment to keep up pressure. This was countered by Hapsburgs and Romanoffs by special border forces and counterraids. The danger in this was that such reprisal raids could, and often did, escalate into full-scale war. In full-scale war, guerrillas become auxiliaries of the main army and strikes against their bases become part of the normal overall conduct of war. There are, however, complications. When Napoleon attempted to eliminate Turkish bases in Palestine, which supported guerrilla warfare against the French in Egypt, he merely extended his commitments without gaining the desired result. And when the counterinsurgent tries to interfere with neutral countries whence supplies come to guerrillas he may well consolidate neutral feeling against him. This, at least, was the experience of the British during the Revolutionary War (Vol. III, p. 1).

In the 20th Century guerrillas often receive external support from countries ostensibly nonbelligerent. Reprisal raids against foreign bases where the guerrillas receive training, recuperate, and return to their zone of operations have been avoided, even before the complications of nuclear deterrence and stalemate emerged. For instance, the United States, Britain, and Greece carefully avoided any action against transborder guerrilla bases during the Greek civil war (Vol. II, p. 173). The United States also condemned Israeli reprisal against fedayin bases as well as the French air attacks (during the Algerian War) on Tunisian border villages, such as the operation against Salkiet in February 1958.

Modern opposition to such transborder actions appears to be based on three main considerations. For one, such actions have in the past been used as pretexts for aggression; second, they may be ineffective unless launched on a sufficiently large scale;

third, they are potentially escalatory in the nuclear age. If raids are on a small scale, diplomatic complications and unfavorable effects on neutral public opinion may well outweigh any advantage. In the case of the current US aerial operations against North Vietnam it may be doubted if Communist leaders believe that the United States has expansionist intent, although the operations are on a scale large enough to be called serious. It must be recognized, however, that aerial attacks short of truly catastrophic have often, in the past, strengthened the victim's will to fight and to retaliate, even if assymetrically. If American aerial pressure, plus the costs of intervention in the south, lead North Vietnam to change its policies, then views as to the merits of such operations will change accordingly.

Since much of warfare is a balancing of cost against advantage, if the costs of intervention from a sanctuary can be run up to the point where the operation ceases to be profitable, then the intervening regime will be under heavy internal pressure to change its policies. The point between profit and loss may be that at which the regime is losing so many of its cadres and soldiers as to impair its control over its own country. This could possibly eventuate from retaliatory counter guerrilla raids into the sanctuary by irregular government forces, being careful to make clear the distinction from a formal invasion by conventional forces. Whether such operations would have the desired effect must remain doubtful; even the Israelis had to escalate their response to conventional war in 1956.

Attacks against the regular military establishment of the nation giving external support to the guerrillas are not likely to be particularly effective--but can be downright dangerous. Partially this is due to the very nature of guerrilla warfare. Essentially, it is a voluntary effort, dependent on a considerable degree of motivation. Outsiders cannot by themselves organize a people's war without adequate local support.

There are some few historic examples where the threat of force, open or implied, against the unfriendly state has been a deterrent against supporting guerrillas. In 1809 French threats forced Vienna to abandon its semiovert aid to the Tyroleans, and during the Boer War British seapower, among other factors, prevented potentially hostile nations from giving aid to the Boers.

A particular problem to be considered is the scope of outside support. In the initial stages the guerrilla support requirements are limited to small arms and ammunition much of which can be obtained locally. To pass into the higher stages of warfare, however, outside support is almost always necessary

for ultimate guerrilla success. But the fortunes of war may place enough weapons into the guerrillas' hands without external aid. The Italian arms and equipment obtained in 1943 by the Balkan partisans are one such instance (Vol. III, p. 163) and in 1945 the armies of Mao Tse-tung acquired part of the equipment of the Japanese Kwantung army. These windfalls allowed the equipment of large, standard formations. The Viet-minh divisions were trained in China during their war against France, and the Greek partisans obtained their heavy equipment from abroad. On the other hand, in Malaya and the Philippines the Communist guerrillas, by and large, received little direct external support and failed. The list could be prolonged almost indefinitely, merely to show that while there is no consistent pattern, guerrillas almost invariably need considerable outside support to transform themselves into an army able to fight on a conventional set-piece pattern. The rare exceptions have occurred when the armed forces of the established regime may have become so eroded from within that they have gone over en masse to the enemy. This, for instance, provided Castro with the forces for his final offensive.

Interdiction of External Support by Cutting  
the Guerrilla Line of Communication  
within the Afflicted Country

Normally the first, and in many ways most attractive, measure to cut external support for the guerrilla is to cut the line of communications with the source by military action within the afflicted country. This avoids diplomatic complications and minimizes adverse public opinion abroad. It allows the use of already existing organs of supervision and control operating in conjunction with the military. Two main types of action seem indicated here. First, preventive measures before the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, and second, measures designed to interdict support arriving from abroad. Naval interception, although not strictly "within the afflicted country," is in this category.

The first type of action is mainly indirect. It may consist of publicizing the efforts to alleviate the social, economic, and political problems which furnish the necessary cause for the guerrilla movement. It is possible that the establishment of Irish Home Rule in 1914 might have prevented the outbreak of the Irish troubles (although it might have caused rebellion in Ulster). At the same time internal security forces



and administration may be strengthened. To be sure, neither action can be guaranteed to prevent the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, especially if it is sponsored from abroad. Sometimes the established government may be unable to make the concessions required without totally changing its own character. However, improving the administrative machinery and changing the orientation of the armed forces from conventional toward counter guerrilla operations appears to be worthwhile.

Once battle has been joined, success in interdicting the guerrillas from external support depends to a large degree upon geographic conditions. A country isolated by natural barriers, or located among countries which oppose the guerrillas, makes easier the counterinsurgent's interdiction of external support. A small country, or one easily compartmentalized, also favors interdiction. Lengthy borders, especially if the adjoining countries are favorable to the guerrillas, as was the case in Greece, China, Algeria, Vietnam, complicate the problem of interdiction.

A high proportion of coastline to land borders usually helps the counterinsurgent because maritime traffic can be controlled, to a large degree, with a limited amount of technical means and, except in times of war, the counterinsurgent is likely to have naval supremacy. But during peacetime, and when neutrals are involved in support of the guerrilla, naval interception presents certain difficulties. Coastal traffic is notoriously hard to intercept and control and small amounts of supplies usually have reached the guerrilla along this route. Port control, even of the most stringent kind, has not always prevented the smuggling of small arms, money, and propaganda materiel. Coastal shipping and port smuggling provided sufficient materiel for the EOKA operations in Cyprus. Moreover, the most stringent port controls often cause so much economic damage, by delaying the unloading of cargo, etc., that they may become counterproductive.

Interception on the high seas is more effective but, certainly in peacetime, is likely to cause diplomatic, legal, and propaganda difficulties. The British attempts to blockade the colonies and to control neutral shipping led to the formation of a League of Armed Neutrality against England (Vol. III, p. 1). During the Boer War the search of a German mail steamer provoked a serious incident. In 1945-1948, naval interception of shipping carrying men and materiel to Palestine was only partially effective because political considerations prevented the Admiralty from halting ships on the high seas (Vol. III, p. 181).

During the Algerian war, however, the French intercepted high seas shipping with only minor international repercussions. The Royal Navy intercepted a vital shipment of arms shortly before the Irish Easter Rising of 1916 (Vol. III, p. 145). A successful example of military action against enemy bases, undertaken in large part to halt coastal traffic to the Greek partisans, was the German occupation of Leros in November 1943. Even so, this was of only limited usefulness because alternate bases in Cyprus and the Middle East were available to the Allies.

Airborne support for guerrillas was provided on a massive scale during World War II by the Western Allies as well as the Soviet Union. It was, of course, much cheaper to bring in supplies when the guerrillas were in actual possession of air strips. Then, too, personnel could be evacuated this way. The other method, essentially a one-way operation (since helicopters were not in use), was by parachute, sometimes on a massive scale. According to one source 198,000 Sten guns, 2,000 Brens, 128,000 rifles, 58,000 pistols, 723,000 grenades, 9,000 mines, and 585,000 kilograms of explosives were parachuted into France. Countermeasures against airborne support included attempts to destroy or occupy the bases, fighter and anti-aircraft interception, and above all denial of suitable landing and drop zones to the guerrilla. Once the guerrilla established a secure area under his control, however, the interception of airborne supplies became more difficult. In any case it seems likely in the future, as in the past, that small amounts of supplies and small groups of key personnel can be brought in by air despite very strong countermeasures.

History provides numerous examples of operations to interdict support reaching guerrillas across land frontiers. In addition to the usual border control by customs, the counterinsurgent has invariably employed roving patrols and ambushes of guerrilla convoys. Usually supply convoys, often mule trains, move by night and guerrilla staging areas are especially vulnerable to attack. Much depends here on an active and accurate intelligence network. Excellent examples of night operations against guerrilla convoys are the actions of Major Orde Wingate and his Special Night Squads during the Arab revolt in Palestine, 1937-1938.

Patrols and static control points have sometimes been supplemented with artificial barriers such as the lines of the Romans. In more recent times both the British and the French have built land barriers to halt the influx of outside aid. During the Arab revolt in Palestine the British erected "Teggard's

wall," a barbed-wire barrier, reinforced by blockhouses, across northern Palestine and successfully interrupted infiltration from Syria. Similarly, the Boer country was compartmentalized by a chain of blockhouses, sometimes with wired intervals. In Algeria, the French built the Morice line to seal off the Algerian-Tunisian border. Electrified wire, mine fields, aerial observation, and the evacuation of the population from the border area combined to make a tight seal. The experiment, while costly, was highly successful in interdicting the movement of personnel and supplies. However, the forced removal of the population in Algeria was counterproductive and thus aided the guerrilla.

Interdiction of supplies may have unforeseen effects on guerrilla warfare. In the case of the Greek Communists, massive foreign support tempted them prematurely into large-scale operations. On the other hand, isolation of the FLN in Algeria prevented it from passing into the large units phase of operations.

#### Drawing the Guerrilla Away from his Outside Support

Relations between the sponsor nation and the supported guerrilla are likely to be difficult. Guerrilla warfare requires months and even years of suffering and during this period tensions may well develop between the sponsoring nation and the guerrillas, indeed even among foreign-based leadership (governments in exile), and the men in the field. At the simplest level the guerrilla feels that he is exploited and starved of support; the supporting nation or government may feel that the guerrillas have suspiciously autonomous tendencies.

Even when guerrilla warfare is sponsored by governments in exile, the guerrillas often tend to grow away from the aims and character of that government. The guerrilla develops a dynamism of his own which the government in exile may not understand and may not be willing to support. French Royalist and British support of the Vendée rising was not very successful, in large part because the French émigré leadership was unwilling to adapt itself to the "social and military conditions of partisan warfare" (Vol. II, p. 1). The split between the governments in exile and the Balkan guerrillas is a prime example and the Germans were able to exploit it and even to draw manpower from royalist guerrillas against Communist-led partisans (Vol. III, p. 163). Or, as in Greece, ideological differences between the guerrillas and

their sponsors, coupled with military defeat, may well lead to a decision by the sponsoring nation to end its support rather than to waste further assets.

Military action, keeping constant pressure on the guerrillas, is likely to hasten the process. It may result merely in splitting the guerrilla movement, but it also may result in a real division between the guerrilla and his sponsor. On the tactical level, it also is true that military pressure and successes of the counterinsurgent are likely to be reflected in the relations between the guerrillas, the population, and the outside supporters. Thus it was common experience during World War II that local support for Allied missions cooled and sometimes was withdrawn completely whenever the fortunes of war, local as well as on the main front, favored the Axis.

Coupled with the above operations is the necessity to provide easy surrender terms for the guerrilla. This again will give him a choice of accepting or rejecting outside support and may again tend to drive a wedge between the two parties.

### Part Three: Evaluation

#### CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS

##### General

1. An insurgency that enjoys an appreciable measure of voluntary popular support reflects a very real maladjustment in the society in which the insurgency occurs. Thus the employment of military force necessary to suppress insurrection must be integrated with nonmilitary measures designed to correct the maladjustment, which will involve all departments of government, and affect all elements of the society.

2. To be militarily effective, an insurgent guerrilla force must have voluntary or forced support from a substantial element of the local population in its area of activity. At a minimum, this support includes food and information. Physical and moral forms of external support can contribute substantially to effective insurgency. Guerrilla operations can sometimes be temporarily continued by an insurgent force without local support when it can receive regular and adequate physical support from outside sources, but in such a case the force begins to lose the essential characteristics of the guerrilla.

3. Ultimately, effective counterinsurgent action to isolate the guerrilla from his sources of support will permit the established government to seize the initiative from the guerrilla and through military attrition assure his complete defeat due to his lack of recruits, supplies, and intelligence.

4. There are three fundamental preconditions for effectively isolating the guerrilla from local and/or external support: a high order of military competence in the counter guerrilla forces; an effective local administration working in close coordination with the military forces; and a perceptive and substantial response to popular grievances which have contributed to the insurgency. In further detail these preconditions can be spelled out as follows:

a. Military competence in counterinsurgency implies not only forces with a high order of military effectiveness in conventional tactics and techniques, but also an ability through training, experience, and acclimatization to adapt these tactics and techniques to the local environment in which the guerrilla is operating. It includes leadership which is not only fully proficient in conventional operations, but which is prepared (inherently or by indoctrination) to apply this proficiency both imaginatively and flexibly.

b. Isolating the guerrilla from local support (and often from external support, as well) requires a local administration which can initiate and implement a long series of administrative measures to control the movement of population and goods, to gather information, and to police affected areas. These measures, in turn, require competent, honest, and humane administrators and policemen. Use of military personnel in these essentially administrative roles may sometimes be necessary, but this can only be a short-term expedient, not a substitute.

c. Every insurgency situation is the result either of popular grievances which have led to revolt or external manipulation which has exploited or created some elements of popular grievance. Military and administrative effectiveness offer an opportunity to provide a response to the grievance or grievances in such a way as to offer a viable and more attractive alternative to what the guerrilla promises, and by contrast to remove some of his support. Perhaps the principal reason for French failure in counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam and Algeria was their apparent inability to present a truly viable alternative; in contrast, the British in Malaya were able to offer both independence and a better life.

#### Isolation from Local Support

5. The military are fundamentally handicapped in dealing with the guerrilla because he is a part of the indigenous society and thus not readily identifiable as an enemy. Therefore, the mere application of military force, even on a massive scale, is not effective until or unless soldiers can clearly identify and attack the guerrilla. Indiscriminate military efforts may aggravate the very maladjustments that have produced the guerrilla.

6. The problem of identifying the guerrilla so as to distinguish him readily from the indigenous society, and thus be

able to fight him and effectively to isolate him from his sources of support, has not yet been solved in a satisfactory, comprehensive manner.

7. Despite lack of precise means of early identification of the guerrilla, general action designed to isolate him from the society can be effective and can contribute toward more precise identification since the guerrilla is forced to fight to reopen or to retain his links to the sources of his support.

8. Isolation of the guerrilla from local support should include measures aimed at: (a) withdrawing the local civilian populace from supporting or adhering to the insurgent cause, (b) inducing popular loyalty or support for the incumbent government, (c) physically denying guerrillas access to local support, and (d) defeating the insurgent forces militarily. There will be considerable overlap in measures fitting these four distinct categories, which are spelled out in further detail below:

a. Experience shows that military action can contribute directly to administrative measures intended to withdraw the local civilian population support from the guerrilla. This includes: provision of physical security to permit effective law and order as well as protection and security to the civilian populace, particularly security from terrorism and from raids; civic action in support of the political and administrative goals of removing the grievances which led directly or indirectly to the insurgency; psychological warfare (which must be combined with both active military operations and effective nonmilitary measures both to attract popular support and to draw the people away from the guerrilla).

b. Actions which military forces can take to attract popular support to the government, while drawing the population away from the guerrilla, include the following: seizure of all opportunities to encourage rapport between the military forces and the population by kindness, consideration, courtesy, and various types of "civic actions" to help them and to improve their living conditions which troops can take without interfering with their primary combat missions; all possible measures to avoid casualties to noncombatants or damage to their possessions when they are inadvertently in the way of combat operations.

c. Action to deny guerrillas physical access to local support includes both supply denial or control, and population control. Both of these measures require a closely integrated combination of military and administrative actions.

d. Defeating the guerrilla militarily will require efforts to bring him to battle as frequently as possible against forces with superior combat capability. Threatening or destroying the guerrilla's links to his support will probably force him to reopen or retain these links, and should contribute to efforts to seize the initiative and to wear him down by military attrition.

9. Militarily protected physical obstacles to impede unauthorized communication, to prevent unhindered movement of goods of all types, and to inhibit uncontrolled movement of local population and of guerrillas, have been effective in facilitating both supply denial and population control. They have also severely hampered the flow of information to guerrillas.

10. Action against the guerrilla insurgent must be prompt, thorough, initially massive, and intensive in order to offset the guerrilla's inherent initiative advantage. Counterinsurgent responses that merely match, or offset, what the guerrilla is capable of doing will usually be too little and too late. A natural desire to avoid excessive force and unpopular measures, e.g., curfews, food control, in suppressing insurgency among one's own people tends toward a government hesitancy and a restraint that permits the guerrilla to retain the initiative, and thereby to increase his strength and prestige. In such a situation, government reactions to the guerrilla tend to increase gradually in scope and intensity, so lagging behind events that the result is a gradual frustration-induced escalation to the point where either the insurgent is eventually successful or the counterinsurgents are required to employ, with considerable ruthlessness, a greater effort and far more sweeping measures than what might have seemed excessive initially, but which could have suppressed the insurrection in the first place. The cost of the more protracted effort in blood, treasure, and unfavorable political and economic consequences is inevitably far greater than a deliberately massive effort at an early stage of the insurgency.

11. Force ratios cannot be applied with arithmetic rigidity. As troops and police improve in quality, fewer will be needed for combat operations, but more may be needed to secure pacified areas. As the guerrillas suffer casualties, the ratios against them will shift in turn, but to retain the initiative against the numerically reduced insurgents may require extensive operations. The highly trained, expert soldier; the policeman with his intelligence sources; the part-time home guardsman; each has different (though related) and important functions in counterinsurgency.



12. Unity of command and coordination of military and civilian effort (administrative, political, and psychological) by the counterinsurgent are important if the guerrilla is to be isolated. All parts of the counterinsurgent team must pull together and in the same direction.

13. Local commanders should be given considerable latitude in offering conciliation and clemency to insurgents, particularly after successful military punitive action. Rewards for defection have been particularly effective in such circumstances. They are particularly effective in counteracting forced support.

14. Ethnic differences within the local population could possibly interfere with the counterinsurgent effort, but can be exploited to deny guerrillas supply, intelligence, recruits, and sanctuary.

15. Continuity of effective intelligence, essential in isolating the guerrilla, is best achieved through a single civil police intelligence system. The military, which of course requires adequate combat intelligence, should not attempt to compete with or to duplicate this civil system unnecessarily, but rather should avail themselves of its services through close and intensive liaison.

#### Isolation from External Support

16. For ultimate success in achieving its political objectives, an insurgent guerrilla force must not only seek and retain the support of a substantial element of the local population in its area of activity, but must also obtain sufficient outside moral support to obtain general or de facto recognition as a legitimate belligerent and eventually as a legal government.

17. Experience shows that guerrillas do not necessarily need decisive military successes in order to obtain sufficient outside support that will eventually enable them to be successful politically; the government, however, needs essentially total victory so that it can establish and maintain the security acceptable to the population.

18. One of the critical elements in the success of guerrilla movements has often (although not invariably) been the accessibility of territory of a friendly power which can be used: (a) as a base of supplies and reinforcements; (b) for refuge, training, and restaging of guerrilla forces; and (c) for moral

and public relations support, and communications with the outside world. Once the guerrilla has access to such a sanctuary, he will generally fight if necessary to maintain his links with the outside.

19. Military measures which have been successful in isolating guerrillas from outside support include: such sustained pressure on the guerrilla that external support must be on a scale more expensive than the supporting nation or nations are willing to continue; clemency and conciliation for the guerrilla to exploit any differences which may exist between him and the supporting power or powers; physical obstacles--including naval blockade and sealing land frontiers--to interdict or inhibit movement of supplies and reinforcements from the supporting power; punitive raids into neutral sanctuaries from which outside support has been provided, or where the guerrillas have taken refuge.

20. Communist sponsorship of insurgencies has been particularly effective in exploiting the concept of physical sanctuary for guerrilla forces in nominally neutral or nonbelligerent territory. The fact and dangers of a situation of world power bipolarity and of mutual nuclear capability has created fears of the possibility of escalation and has served to inhibit legitimate governments, and their Free World supporters, from direct response against either the actual sanctuary territory or the major Communist power or powers directly or indirectly sponsoring the insurgency. (Sanctuary, of course, works both ways in such a situation.) The fact that the United States has made air attacks against sanctuary regions has not to date affected this reluctance to intervene against sanctuaries with conventional ground forces.

21. Nonmilitary measures which have been successful in isolating guerrillas from outside support include: diplomatic pressures on other nations to prevent surrender of the attributes of legitimacy to the insurgents; measures to obtain the active support of other nations in asserting the legitimacy of the established government; an active, aggressive propaganda-psychological warfare campaign to offset that of the insurgents, and, if possible, seize the propaganda initiative; strong economic pressures--from blacklisting to sanctions--against nations providing any kind of physical or moral support to the insurgents.

22. Insurgency as sponsored by the Communists is a multifaceted form of war in a highly variable set of circumstances, being intensively exploited by an enemy whose central doctrine has proved tactically flexible. It can be countered only with tactics of equal flexibility.

23. The Communist use and sponsorship of insurgency through support of "wars of national liberation," has drastically modified the nature of the problems and challenges of insurgent warfare. The United States must recognize, and adapt itself to, the fact that in such instances insurgency is merely a blatant method of expansionist aggression. This does not in any way invalidate experience in the tactics and techniques of counterinsurgency, but it does require the development of new operational and organizational concepts for the application of these tactics and techniques.

## CHAPTER VII. A THEORY OF ISOLATION\*

### Introduction

The conclusions which have emerged from the study of "Isolating the Guerrilla" suggest a basis for a theory of isolation in counterinsurgency. This chapter is intended to suggest such a theory.

The analytic problem involved in developing a conceptual framework based on a series of case studies is threefold: first, to define the area of inquiry and establish criteria of relevance as to what should be investigated; second, to compare the pattern of the given structure or action in respect to similarities and differences; and third, to make an attempt to account for differences (variations) in terms of certain elements (variables) of the situation in which action takes place.

This chapter attempts to formulate generalizations concerning the fundamental principles and variations in the strategy and tactics of isolating guerrillas and to relate the choice of means to a set of situational variables. The ultimate purpose of such generalizations is to develop a theory of "isolation." But before this can be done it is necessary to place "isolation" in a proper perspective by establishing the relationship of isolation to other types of counterinsurrectionary activity and to political warfare. From this it will be possible to draw a dividing line between what is relevant and what is irrelevant to investigating strategies of isolation.

---

\*This chapter has been adapted, with substantial modifications, from an analytical paper prepared for this study by Dr. Janos.

A Model of Counterinsurrection:  
A Form of Political Warfare

As a first step in establishing an analytic framework for the concept of "isolating the guerrilla" a model insurrectionary situation may be constructed. In so doing it is important to make a distinction between irregular forces alien to the civilian population (for instance a group of foreign agents or soldiers parachuted into hostile territory with the task of harassment, sabotage, and disruption of communications) and the guerrilla who can count on the active or passive support of the local population either voluntarily or through force. In the former case we have a group employing guerrilla tactics, but which is not in any true sense comprised of guerrillas. Such a force poses a purely military problem, to be dealt with in purely military terms.

In the model representing a true guerrilla situation, however, the insurgent is practically coterminous with the population; civilians perform insurgent acts as part-time or full-time guerrillas. The fighting man is a recruit from local society. He is dependent on fellow members of the society for intelligence and supplies. The most important sanctuary of the fighting man is his human environment. After performing his guerrilla act, he changes roles and submerges in the local population. In such a situation the tasks of the counterinsurgent forces is political as well as military. Counterinsurgency involves political warfare with the objective of establishing a monopoly of control over a given area and population. In contrast to military strategy, the target of political warfare is the entire population and not an enemy army.

The most extreme form of political warfare and population control is total liquidation, genocide, or physical dislocation. This strategy was applied against recalcitrant North American Indians. It was initiated (but not completed) in the Vendée. The Soviets applied this strategy in pacifying rural Lithuania after World War II; part of the inhabitants of the country were exterminated, the rest transported to remote regions in Siberia. The Communists also exterminated a substantial proportion of the Jewish population in Russia as an alleged part of the counter-guerrilla effort during the Russian civil war. Both Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany attempted to exterminate the potentially hostile intelligentsia in Poland during World War II.

The second strategic alternative is the use of terror, in which extreme measures are used to suppress insurgency. In this

concept of pacification the population is not doomed to extermination, but it becomes the principal target of operations and is subjected to ruthless and random acts of coercion. It is a violent means of preventing the population from participating in insurgency, and therefore is an extreme form of isolating insurgent forces. The methods of terror and the conditions that lead to its use are described in the case studies of the Russian suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and of German acts of violence against the Balkan and the Russian populations.

The third strategic alternative is that which, for purposes of this analysis, we shall describe as "isolation." It is the isolation of the guerrilla from the population by less extreme physical or psychological techniques. The former will include tactical barriers and surveillance, the latter psychological warfare. Violence may and will be applied but in a selective and punitive rather than random and pre-emptive manner. The essence of the strategy is persuasion, the use of propaganda to spread the belief that there is much to be lost and little to be gained by giving the guerrilla aid and comfort. Propaganda by word, of course, will have to be supplemented by propaganda by deed. In order to be successful, the government has to demonstrate that it is able to remove the conditions of popular dissatisfaction; that it is able to protect the population from the vengeance of the guerrilla; and, above all, that it is winning rather than losing the war. The success of isolation will therefore be dependent on military operations. If the government is able to maintain its military ascendancy, its control over the population is half established.

#### Conditions for Selecting Isolation Tactics

Before discussing variations of the strategy of isolation, the conditions under which the strategy will be selected as the instrument of pacification must be established. What elements of a situation will guide the choice of isolation as a means to attain the ultimate political objective of population control?

1. Popular support. It must be obvious that the strategy of pacification will be related to the degree of popular support given to the insurgents and counterinsurgents (government). If the bulk of the population actively, or at least passively, supports the government's efforts to combat the insurgency, the operations will have a predominantly military character. If the population is divided, "isolation" will be a feasible strategy

of political warfare. However, if and when popular support is increasing for the guerrillas, the feasibility of terror will increase as opposed to the less extreme form of isolation. Theoretically, of course, in extreme cases the strategy of total liquidation would be considered by totalitarian governments.

2. Capabilities. The strategy of terror and total liquidation requires overwhelming military preponderance, again as was evidenced in the suppression of the Hungarian revolt of 1956. In the absence of such preponderance a campaign of terror will remain ineffective, as suggested by the example of the French expeditionary force in Mexico, 1861-1867. Thus, the second controlling variable of counterinsurgent strategy will be relative military capabilities.

3. Transpacification goals. The selection of means to obtain the objective of population control will also depend on the long-range perspective and goals of the counterinsurgent. Is he interested in stable and efficient government after the defeat of the insurrection, or is he, as a foreign occupying force, merely interested in temporary control in order to promote the goal of winning a war in another geographical area? If the ultimate goal is stable and efficient government, the use of large-scale terror will rarely be the principal means of pacification. On the other hand, temporary control with limited future objectives will be conducive to terroristic techniques of pacification. This might seem to be contradicted by the Hungarian experience of 1956 because here the Soviets were presumably interested in long-run stability and consolidation. These considerations, however, were superseded by another set of goals concerning the overall stability of the Soviet bloc and the domestic political system in the Soviet Union.

4. The "will" of the incumbent. In his study On War, von Clausewitz argues that the "will" or morale of the fighting man is as significant as physical-military capabilities. This proposition is particularly relevant in certain forms of political warfare, since "tougher" techniques of terror and genocide have a tendency to tax the morale of the army of pacification. Such techniques can be applied systematically only if the counterinsurgent and his auxiliaries have a strong rationale for the justness and the morality of their action. An army of pacification animated by nationalist, revolutionary, or religious symbols (like the Republican forces in the Vendée, the Soviet forces in Hungary, the Nazi SS in exterminating Jews, or the Spanish Inquisition) may survive the horrors of pacification better than the de-ideologized army of the modern Western democracy.

### The Elements of Isolation Strategy

What then are the variations of the strategy of isolation as it has been discussed in preceding paragraphs? What elements of the situation control the selection of the tactics to be used to achieve the strategic objective?

### Guerrilla Resources

It is obvious that some of the most sophisticated modern techniques suggested (fingerprinting, mug shots, computers) or actually applied (barbed-wire fences around villages, the use of flood lights on public roads, electric fences) are costly. An embattled government facing massive popular rebellion can hardly count on an excess of resources that are necessary to the employment of these technological devices. This may also apply to re-settlement programs. It should be remembered that such extensive and expensive programs have been undertaken only by colonial or "supporting" powers such as Britain in Malaya and France in Algeria and the United States in Vietnam.

### Social Background of the Guerrilla

A further hypothesis that we may suggest is that the tactics of the counterinsurgent will vary according to the social background of the insurgent. If the hard core of fighters is recruited from industrial workers, the means of isolation will be different from those used in a conflict in which the "activists" are peasants or tribesmen. The peasant as a guerrilla lives off the land, he is more mobile than the worker because he can stay away for prolonged periods, and even in the high season of agricultural labor he can be substituted by members of his family. On the other hand, the worker and his family have to rely on wages and the factory bench. His job requires skills, he cannot be easily substituted by members of his family. Thus, where the hard core of the rebels are industrial workers, the struggle will be confined to cities and will have a part-time character with limited engagements.

The appropriate response patterns for different backgrounds have not emerged in discrete form from the case studies. But one proposition seems to have general validity: the destruction of the production base (factory, farm, etc.) tends to be counterproductive, because then the part-time insurgent is more



disposed to transform himself into a full-time partisan. This appears to have been fully realized by Soviet commanders in Hungary in 1956, when they insisted that all factories should start to operate and all economic activity be resumed immediately after the suppression of the uprising.

### The Setting of the Insurgency

It is one of the cardinal principles of political as well as military warfare that strategy should be adapted to and make use of the conditions of the environment. This includes not only the terrain, but also (in the case of political warfare) the existing social conditions. The selection of strategically relevant aspects of the setting is thus a critically important task in developing a theory of counterinsurrection.

Ecology. The first setting variable that ought to be considered in determining the tactics of isolation is the ecology of society. Here one might construct a number of complex typologies. However, for the purposes of the present analysis we will confine our propositions to distinctions between urban and rural societies.

In one important respect the problem of isolation is more difficult in cities than in the countryside, due to the dimensions and the impersonal character of social relations. In the village the stranger is immediately recognized and the pattern of rural settlement is such that--within or around villages--it is relatively easy to set up physical barriers to restrict the movement of men and materiel. By contrast, in the city the movement of strangers and the flow of reinforcements are much harder to control. This usually has to be done on the basis of small units. Counterinsurgents in big European cities have generally used the concierges of apartment houses as a source of information. In times of crisis and street fighting (Hungary, 1956; Paris, 1830 and 1848) there have been orders from the counterinsurgents to keep all gates locked at all hours of the day, which is the equivalent of setting up watch towers and barbed wire around the village in the countryside.

However, on a general basis, an urban population can be more easily controlled in times of insurrection by an efficient government through a well-developed network of informers, raids on houses, and spot checks at busy intersections during which people of suspicious identity may be detained. On balance,

however, as clearly demonstrated by our case studies, the guerilla has greater scope for initiative and for military operations in a rural environment.

Technical-economic diversity. The techniques of isolation will not only vary with the ecology, but also with the technical-economic diversity of society. The more diversified the division of labor in a given society and the more advanced the economic system, the easier it will be to disrupt "normal" life, and the more difficult it will be to maintain and defend it on the part of the government. The sabotaging of the power plant of a big city, for instance, may work havoc and panic on its inhabitants. Economic life depends on communications and the free flow of transportation. To keep, or win over, a population, the counterinsurgents will have to do their utmost to guard the services and the functioning of the economy.

Ethnic-linguistic fragmentation. The last setting variable that the counterinsurgent should consider is the homogeneity or fragmentation, particularly the ethnic-linguistic fragmentation of a given society. The last seems to be particularly relevant in the period of modern nationalism. The established government will usually exploit ethnic divisions to deny the guerrilla supply, intelligence, recruits, and sanctuary.

### The Impact of Ideology

Finally, although tangential to the narrower question of isolation, some consideration must be given to the role of ideology in the outcome of insurrections. Ideology, for purposes of this analysis, can be defined in terms of a set of basic beliefs about social reality combined with value preferences of an absolute character. Accordingly, ideology is both a guide for action and a psychological instrument to rationalize the consequences of action. Communist ideology, for instance, includes the ultimate goal of a perfect and ethical society and defends political means and the necessity of sacrifice both in terms of this goal and in terms of the inevitable character of social processes.

One generally accepted proposition concerning ideology is that such commonly shared beliefs and ultimate goals are powerful factors in building up group cohesion and morale. Thus, if a ruling elite and its auxiliaries are animated by commonly

accepted goals and ethical principles, it will be more difficult to overthrow their regime. They will also be willing to use more ruthless methods with less remorse given the absolute nature of their commitment. Similarly, a strongly indoctrinated and ideology-oriented guerrilla will be better able to survive in the face of great adversity and military superiority of his opponent.

What is not clear, however, is how the content of ideology affects the behavior of an insurgent. Do different ideologies have a differential impact on behavior? Do Communists, Fascists, religious fanatics, and others behave differently in a guerrilla situation, and if so in what particular respect? Or to put it in different terms, what aspects of ideology are decisive in conditioning insurgent (and counterinsurgent) behavior?

In this theoretical context, a breakdown along Communist-non-Communist lines may be less useful than a distinction between revolutionary and nonrevolutionary (conservative) insurgents or guerrillas.\* The difference between the two will be basically in terms of the price they are willing to pay. The revolutionary with his teleological and future-oriented perspective will be ready to inflict greater deprivations and demand much greater sacrifices than his conservative counterpart. The latter, as a matter of habit, will protect existing social institutions and their integrity, and may fear destruction more than defeat. This attitude was characteristic of some of the anti-Napoleonic guerrillas. The King of Prussia, for instance, in reply to a memorandum by Generals Scharnhorst and Gneisenau expressed his doubt whether the anarchy of a popular insurrection would not be a greater evil than surrender to the French.

The second significant aspect of ideology is the group in reference to which the goals and principles are applicable. In the ideology of 19th-Century liberalism, as well as 20th-Century fascism, the group whose salvation was sought was the nation. In contrast, for Marxism-Leninism, at least as the ideology has been known until recently, the reference group transcends ethnic, linguistic, and political boundaries. It is the workers of the world. Somewhat similarly, the reference group of religious movements is often international and concern with the welfare of

---

\*The special nature of the use of Communist ideology as a basis for a new kind of imperialism is, of course, a different issue and is discussed at considerable length elsewhere in this report.

the immediate community is tempered by ultimate concern with salvation.

From the point of view of counterinsurrection and political warfare, the internationalist (or supranationalist) insurgent with his universalistic orientation will be a more formidable opponent than the nationalist with his particularistic orientation. Whether as insurgent or counterinsurgent, the nationalist will usually consider the organic unity of the community as one of his goals and will probably be reluctant to risk the extinction (or decimation) of the nation as a prize for victory in guerrilla warfare.

### Summation

Five major propositions emerge from this theoretical analysis:

1. Counterinsurrection, political warfare, and isolation represent different levels of analysis and generality.
2. Political warfare is a type of counterinsurrectionary activity analytically distinct from "military" warfare.
3. "Isolation" is one strategy of internal political warfare. As such it is a means of establishing ultimate control over a territory, and in particular over its population.
4. The tactics of isolation (the variations within the strategy) are both military and administrative, depending on resources, the character of the guerrilla, and the setting in which the conflict takes place.
5. More intensive study is required as to the role of ideology in insurrection and in particular on the extent to which Communist ideology in insurrection will affect the tactics of counterinsurrection.

From the point of view of practical politics different "levels of analysis" (first proposition above) refer to different levels of decision-making and responsibilities. Decisions concerning objectives, costs, and the time factor (rapid or protracted pacification) are usually made at the highest level of national politics.

The adaptation of means to the policy objective usually takes place at the staff level and involves political and administrative as well as military decisions. In the most critical stages of an insurrection it can be expected that military requirements and decisions will take operational precedence over those that are nonmilitary--although the ultimate political objectives will be overriding, and the use or resort to certain means and techniques may be ruled out by political decision-makers. The use of terror, for instance, may be vetoed on political grounds even though it may be the optimum strategy from the point of view of military operations.

It is obvious that the tentative theory of isolation which has emerged from this analysis requires an organizational mechanism that is neither wholly military nor wholly political, yet which assures the closest integration of both in response to overall political authority. The elaboration of such a mechanism is beyond the scope of this study. It would appear, however, to be an urgent requirement for effective employment of isolation as a strategy of counterinsurrection.

## CHAPTER VIII. APPLICABILITY OF CONCLUSIONS

### TO CURRENT PROBLEMS\*

#### General

The terms of reference for this study requires HERO to "suggest means to separate . . . guerrillas from the rest of the population" and to "suggest workable responses to outside support." Accordingly, it is the purpose of this chapter to point out some specific ways in which the conclusions can be applied to current operational and policy problems facing the United States in the area of counterinsurgency.

First, serious consideration has been given to ways in which operations currently under way in Vietnam might benefit from adaptations of several of the conclusions in the previous chapter of this report. Following this are some suggestions regarding possible improvements in general readiness to deal with insurgency situations. Some general comments are then offered regarding the relationship of the results of this study to current issues of counterinsurgency theory, doctrine, and organization.

#### Possible Applications in Vietnam

##### The Obstacle Concept

The study has shown conclusively that physical obstacles, when properly defended, have been most effective in isolating

---

\*Scholars participating in this study were not unanimous in endorsing the recommendations and suggestions of this chapter. The editor, with the approval of HERO's Policy Advisory Committee, takes full responsibility for this chapter and its contents.

guerrilla forces from both local and external support. HERO believes that urgent consideration should be given to the possibility of applying this concept to Vietnam. Specifically, serious consideration should be given to the establishment of a cleared and defended barrier strip or corridor along the entire land frontier of Vietnam or--as a possibly more attractive alternative--along the northern and northwestern land frontier, in combination with the counterinsurgency action suggested below. If feasible, such a defended barrier might effectively isolate the Viet Cong guerrillas from the external support which appears to be indispensable to their continued effectiveness.

This is not an original suggestion; similar ideas have been considered and rejected in the past for various reasons, mainly because of difficulty and cost. The general magnitude, expense, and engineering difficulties (as well as military difficulties) involved in establishing such a barrier would be enormous. There is, furthermore, a psychological aspect to such a program that might be assumed to reflect a defensive, defeatist attitude.

The participants in this study are neither organized, nor technically qualified, to undertake the detailed and thorough investigation of this proposition. The reasons for a detailed examination of this project have seemed sufficiently weighty to a group with considerable and varied professional competence, however, as to suggest that the project warrants serious attention. The reasons follow:

The principal technical problems in the actual establishment of such a barrier appear to be those of engineering, logistical drain, time, security for the working parties, and overall expense. Those of us who are familiar with this and comparable terrain in Southeast Asia have no doubts that the establishment of the corridor is technically feasible. The example of the Ledo Road, some 271 miles of which was cut through virgin jungle, with a trace at least 150 feet wide, and across varied terrain quite similar to that of Vietnam's frontiers, is clear evidence that the job could be done. The land frontiers of South Vietnam are about 850 miles long, of which about 450 miles lie along the Cambodian frontier.

As to time and level of effort, it has been arbitrarily calculated from scanty records available, that the construction of the Ledo Road, from the time really serious work and effort began, took a total effort of a force very roughly the equivalent of 20 engineer construction companies, over a period of 12 months, at a cost estimated at \$149 million. Only a fraction of this time and effort, however, was applied to the clearing of

the trace. On the basis of observation, it is assumed that in the order of 5% of the effort was applied to the clearing of the 150-foot trace. (This assumption could be wrong by a factor of two or more without affecting the argument here presented.) Thus, approximately the same engineering effort that went into the construction of the Ledo Road could clear an 800-yard strip along the frontiers with North Vietnam and Laos, or something in the order of twice that effort could clear an 800-yard strip along the entire land frontier of South Vietnam. Further assuming that a concentration of effort twice as large as that which went into the Ledo Road could be efficiently employed, a corridor along the northern part of the frontier could possibly be cleared in approximately 6 months; the entire frontier corridor could possibly be completed in 12 months by a force not exceeding 10 engineer battalions or the equivalent.

Obviously, such rough and arbitrary calculations would have to be checked by serious engineering studies.

As to the logistical effort, if this project has the potential value suggested, then diversion of the necessary resources should be quite feasible. The same is true of cost, which (on the basis of the Ledo example and allowing for inflation since 1944) would presumably not exceed \$200 million for the northern frontier effort, or \$400 million for the entire corridor. These costs and effort are very great. In comparison with what the United States is now spending, and may expect to spend in future years, these figures become much more reasonable. They would still be reasonable, in this context, if the rough estimates given above should prove too small by a factor of two or more.

It is impossible, in this context, to estimate the total combat force which would be required to protect the engineering force engaged on this task. Obviously it would have to be substantial; it would appear to be well within the capability of current US land, air, and naval air force commitments to Vietnam.

Without detailed study it is not possible to suggest the specific nature of the obstacles that would be used to block the cleared area, nor the specific forces, tactics, and techniques to patrol the barrier, or to react to either large-scale intrusions or small-scale infiltration. Presumably barbed-wire concertinas, land mines, incapacitating chemicals, and the like, would contribute to the obstacle. Air and ground patrols, combined with rapid helicopter movement of the requisite ground combat forces from a relatively small number of troop concentrations, would be a part of the defense scheme.



There will be some other problems (nonmilitary as well as military) which will require consideration in any overall study of such a project.

One of these is security of planning, which should also consider possible cover plans to explain the increased engineering equipment shipments (although perhaps the additional equipment beyond what is already going into engineering construction efforts in Vietnam would not be so great as to arouse suspicions).

Another problem will be the economic impact of such a project, particularly on the already strained economy of South Vietnam. The impact of this cannot be assessed in this report. Nor is it possible to evaluate what use, if any, might feasibly be made of the significant amount of lumber which will be produced by the effort. The long-term economic impact of the project might well be beneficial in terms of contribution to the stability of Southeast Asia.

As to the overall military problem, HERO does not agree with the argument that the establishment and defense of such a barrier would be a defensive, Maginot-like approach. The amount of effort which would be required for a defensive effort against small-scale infiltration would probably permit a reduction, and certainly no increase, in the forces now employed in purely defensive and security roles in South Vietnam. Obviously, such a cordon could not and should not be expected to block a major military invasion or penetration. But it will permit quick identification and location of any such effort and greatly facilitate any efforts which need to be made to react to, and to defeat, such a penetration.

There is nothing defeatist or inherently defensive about field fortifications in themselves. It is the use which is made of such works which determines the attitude and spirit of the fighting forces. Warfare against guerrilla insurgents is--in purely military terms--essentially a strategically defensive task; the establishment of a barrier corridor would not make it any more so. It should, in fact, contribute with more lasting results to an increase in the tactical offensive effort, which should be waged as aggressively as possible.

# CONFIDENTIAL

## Dealing with the Sanctuary Problem (c)

(c) Whether or not a barrier corridor is established, serious consideration must be given to the possibility of undertaking large-scale expeditions into the territories of Laos and Cambodia to diminish the utility of these areas as sanctuaries and as communications routes for the Viet Cong.

(c) The weighing of risks, dangers, and losses against possible benefits is a politico-military problem beyond the scope of this study and requiring the most intensive additional study of its own. The problem of privileged sanctuaries for guerrillas has been treated differently in different circumstances and with varying results that probably defy any conclusion other than that the circumstances must be considered separately in each different case. There is ample US experience to provide a basis for justifying punitive expeditions against sanctuaries if such seem desirable.

(c) For a number of reasons the international repercussions of any expedition into Cambodia would probably be far greater, and more damaging politically to the United States, than would be the case for an expedition into Laos. This fact prompts the suggestion that an expedition into southeast Laos, combined with the cleared barrier corridor only along the North Vietnam and Laos frontiers of South Vietnam, might eliminate the sanctuaries and assure the isolation of the Viet Cong from overland support from North Vietnam. This would have the additional advantage of reducing the amount of time and effort that would be required for establishing the barrier corridor and might result in a smaller total force contingent to be applied to the overall isolation effort. Furthermore, an important additional and incidental benefit to be derived would be to extend the control (with US support and involvement) of the Laotian government into the area now controlled by the Pathet Lao east of the Mekong and north of the Cambodian frontier.

## Possible Operations in North Vietnam (c)

(c) It is obvious from this study that a true guerrilla force cannot operate effectively in an insurgency without local support. It is most unlikely that the Communist regime in North Vietnam would, in the foreseeable future, be sufficiently vulnerable to permit establishment of a guerrilla insurgent force in North Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

(c) The study also suggests, however, that effective military forces using guerrilla tactics can, under some specialized circumstances, maintain themselves in hostile territory if they can be assured of adequate external support. There is reason to believe that large-scale but covert operations against selected targets in North Vietnam might be feasible for forces employing guerrilla tactics; could yield significant tactical advantage; and could be accomplished without the possible dangers of an overt invasion of the North Vietnam sanctuary.

(c) Presumably such a force would operate as a long-range penetration unit, and its activities would neither be announced nor officially acknowledged. At some later time it might prove desirable to make the operation overt, or to initiate an overt operation, but this would probably not be desirable under circumstances as they now exist and are likely to exist in the immediate future.

## Reducing Combat Risk and Damage to the Civil Population (c)

(c) Important elements in any counterinsurgency program are the provision of security to the local population and undertaking measures to assure them of the consideration and support of the counterinsurgency forces. It is desirable to do anything possible, and militarily acceptable, that can reduce the impact of the war on the civil population, particularly if this can be presented positively in the counterinsurgent propaganda program.

(c) This fact provides an opportunity to the United States to initiate the use on a regular basis of temporarily incapacitating chemical or biological agents in operations in Vietnam in which elements of the civilian population might be unavoidably involved.

((c)) There are many political, diplomatic, and psychological problems which could inhibit a declared US policy of employing temporarily incapacitating chemical and biological weapons in Vietnam or any other counterinsurgency situation.\* There is

---

(c) \*HERO has recently completed a classified study for the Army's Combat Developments Command which bears some relationship to this issue.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

reason to believe, however, that the military advantages which accrue from such use, in addition to the unquestionably valuable humanitarian and psychological advantages which could be derived if the matter is properly handled, warrant a most serious effort to obtain a high-level governmental decision to employ such weapons in Vietnam. If the United States takes a positive public information approach, general public acceptance of the employment of such weapons can probably be obtained, and (aside from any purely military advantages) great political benefits can be reaped in Vietnam by making certain that the population knows that US forces will do everything possible to keep them from being killed or permanently injured in battle and to keep from destroying their property.

## Application to Counterinsurgency Readiness (u)

### Creation of an Improved Counterinsurgency Intervention Capability (u)

(u) In order to provide the effective military support and presence which our studies have shown to be an essential part of isolating the guerrilla, as and when the interests of the United States and its allies may require, consideration should be given to immediate development of a capability by the US armed forces that would permit, on short notice, the commitment of an appreciable force of air and ground combat units with appropriate logistical support. These units should be prepared to operate independently, or as elements of a larger force, at some distance from their operational bases; they must be trained and prepared to operate creditably and with increasing efficiency in jungle, forest, and mountain; they must be led by officers and noncommissioned officers well schooled in the fundamentals of guerrilla tactics and counterinsurgency. Any such force, when committed, should include one or more properly trained detachments specifically organized for suitable civic action missions in the area of operations.

(u) Establishment of such a capability would require development of doctrine, and the maintenance on a relatively extensive scale of training facilities and appropriately located equipment depots. Furthermore, the planning for the employment of such forces, and the command and control mechanisms for directing them once they are employed, may well require a fundamental restructuring of existing command arrangements within the Department

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

of Defense, and new techniques of very high-level interdepartmental coordination. Serious consideration should probably be given to the development of such arrangements and techniques.

## New Scientific Aids in Population Control (c)

(c) Before the computer age it has been extremely difficult to deal with the detailed data necessary to register every individual in a population, running, perhaps, to tens of millions.\* Now such data can be stored, sorted, and made available by a computer contained in a small ship or building; communications facilities are good enough to make the information available at the point where the capture is made within an hour of the time when numerical descriptions of fingerprints plus vital statistics are sent in.

(c) To accumulate the necessary data, populations of whole villages would be fingerprinted, photographed, and required to provide vital statistics and personal histories, including the names and locations of all relatives. This could be done by police of the indigenous power (with such supervision by US advisers as might seem desirable for accuracy and thoroughness). Thereafter the data would be processed by electronic means that can be readily made available. Local police could then periodically sample group populations, picking up individuals at random at odd times and places, and any newcomers would have to explain themselves. The effect of an accurate, operating system of this kind on the morale of the guerrillas should be considerable.

(c) It is further possible by harmless technical means to establish whether an individual has been, within the past few months, in an area where his normal civilian occupations would not take him. Areas, such as swamps, jungles, and roadside weeds, not normally visited by civilians but of possible use to the guerrillas as staging areas, paths, ammunition and supply dumps, and ambush sites, could be sprayed from the air every

---

(c) \* Identity cards were issued to the entire population of Malaya during the Emergency. This was accomplished by a highly sophisticated administrative machinery in a relatively small population. The Diem regime in South Vietnam, dealing with a population roughly three times as large, found this a task beyond its capabilities, even with American help.

# CONFIDENTIAL

few weeks with harmless and invisible chemical substances\* of types difficult or impossible to wash off completely. A prisoner, or an individual being subjected to spot check, could be tested for the presence of these substances on his skin; in favorable cases it might be possible to trace his movements for the past few weeks by such means.

## Relationship of Isolation to Modern Counterinsurgency (v)

(v) Throughout this study the participants have endeavored to keep their attention focussed on one technique of counterinsurgency, that of isolating guerrilla forces from local and external support. In the process, however, we have been forced to consider the general nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency, now as well as in the past, and to note other techniques which must be, or can be, employed in dealing with guerrilla forces involved in insurgency.

(v) We have noted that a tremendous research effort has been directed toward the problems of insurgency and counterinsurgency in this country in recent years. Yet again and again we have been struck by three apparent shortcomings either in the research or its application.

(v) First, there appears to be a dichotomy between research results and practice, both in the Government and in the field.

(v) Equally significant to us is the fact that there does not appear to have as yet been any concentrated effort made to investigate the possibility that development of a theory of counterinsurgency may be as feasible, and as useful doctrinally, as has been the effort devoted to development of theories of general and limited wars and of deterrence.

(v) Perhaps most important of all, we have not seen adequate recognition, in terms of theory, doctrine, or organization, that the United States is today faced with a largely new and

---

(c)\*Harmless radiological or biological substances could also be used, but the political consequences would probably be unacceptable. Simple and harmless radioactive materials would be particularly adaptable, since these materials can be detected and identified by simple instruments at levels many thousandfold less than with biological materials.

CONFIDENTIAL

highly effective concept of guerrilla warfare which is being used by the Communist great powers to advance their own objectives by supporting "wars of national liberation."

In recognition of this situation we have attempted to develop a tentative "theory of isolation," as presented in the preceding chapter. Within the limits of our terms of reference we cannot with propriety do more. We believe it essential to stress, however, that this is only one aspect of a much larger, and extremely urgent, requirement.

## Appendix A

### TERMS OF REFERENCE

#### Isolating the Guerrilla

##### I. Concept

The Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) proposes to examine the problem of isolating guerrillas. It defines this isolation as cutting off the support guerrillas receive from (a) their countrymen and (b) outside powers. The basic hypothesis is that guerrillas cannot remain operational unless they are supported by either or both of these sources. Case studies will include instances in which internal or external support was successfully interdicted. It is expected these will provide the necessary means of distinguishing effective and ineffective techniques.

The role of local sympathizers will be studied by first establishing: which sections of the population contributed leadership; which filled the ranks; and which supported with money, supplies, information, shelter, and other contributions short of actual armed support. This will help determine (among other things) whether prosperous elements in a nation have generally opposed Communist guerrillas, or whether a significant number have supported them, and if so for what reasons. On the assumption that guerrilla casualty rates are a function both of popular support and of the skill of soldiers and police, the study will also correlate these rates with military, political, and sociological features of each of the several insurrections. Particular attention will be paid to:

1. The impact of military successes by either side on popular attitudes.
2. Measures taken by government to separate the guerrillas from the rest of the population.
3. Measures taken by either side to win popular support.
4. The guerrillas' problems of logistical support.
5. Terrain problems.

In examining the role of outside powers who support guerrillas the study will consider: the related problems of acceptable loss rates and replacement flows; the provision of cadres and volunteers; the role of resupply, rest, and rehabilitation; outside intervention; and the impact of support to the guerrillas from nations hostile to the local government on the latter's policies,



on its allies, and on the morale of its sympathizers among the local population.

Through analysis of the basic historical studies, the project will seek to:

1. Clarify the functional relationships among the guerrillas, their sympathizers, and outside powers.
2. Provide a definitive study of the nature, timing, and components of local popular support.
3. Suggest means to separate the guerrillas from the rest of the population and so deprive them of logistical support, recruits, and information.
4. Suggest workable responses to outside support.

## II. Background

In the years since 1793, when the Vendée section of France arose in an attempt to restore the French monarchy and simultaneously launched the first modern popular uprising that was linked neither with an army nor a state (unlike the guerrillas of the American Revolution) guerrilla warfare has grown in importance until today it seems established as the most common means whereby nations try to change boundaries and upset the balance of power. In these 170 years, different nations have had widely varying success in dealing with it. The French Republic put down the Vendée uprising, but failed in Haiti; the French empire could not cope with the Spaniards. Subsequent French regimes failed, won, failed again in Mexico and North Africa, and failed in Vietnam. Britain was successful with the Burmans, with the Boers, in the Northwest Frontier of India, and in Malaya; won in Kenya, failed in Cyprus and in Ireland. Guerrillas have included monarchists, republicans, Communists, nationalists, minority and majority groups, aristocrats, the middle class, peasants, Europeans, Africans, Arabs, Asians, Latin and North Americans. Guerrilla warfare is by no means a Communist monopoly nor, for that matter, is the Communist record one of unvarying success. The range of experience is a wide one, covering a long period of time.

On the basis of a cursory review of this experience it appears that the guerrilla must fail unless he has some base of support. To stay operational the guerrilla must have information about the government forces, he must have a steady supply of food, he must be able to replace his casualties, he needs a modest amount of ammunition, and he must be able to recruit. He can frequently hope to get food, drugs, and arms from outside the country, although these commodities can on occasion be obtained locally. He cannot get tactical information about local soldiers and police

from outside the country, and he has little use for replacements who do not fit easily into the life of the countryside in appearance, language, manner, and knowledge of the terrain. Therefore local support is essential while outside support is to be classed only as very desirable. Moreover, the guerrilla cannot dispense with support any more than the regular soldier can survive the smashing of his logistical base. Therefore, how to isolate the guerrilla from support seems to be a basic question well worth examining.

## Appendix B

## SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF MEASURES TO ISOLATE GUERRILLA FORCES

Analytic Factors			Case Examples																							
			American Revolution 1775-1783	American Indian Wars 1793-1890	French Revolu- tion & Napoleonic Wars 1793-1815	American Civil War 1861-1865	Ruma 1885-1890	Philippine Insurrection 1896-1902	Boer War 1899-1901	Irish Trouble 1916-1921	Chinese Civil War 1927-1949	Chinese Commu- nist vs. Japan 1937-1945	Germans in World War II 1939-1945	Yugoslavia 1944-1949	Israel 1945-1948	South Korea 1945-1953	French Indochina 1945-1954	Guerrillas in Philippines 1945-1955	Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960	American Expedi- tion in Vietnam 1954-date	1958-1962	Hungarian 1956				
Nature of the Guerrilla War and Support to Guerrilla Forces	Environment or Terrain	Urban	No	No	1	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	?	?	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A				
		1 Plain	Yes	Var	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
		2 Mountainous	Yes	Var	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No				
		3 Temperate forest	Yes	Var	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	No	?	?	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No	No				
		4 Jungle	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A			
	Motivation for Guerrillas and Internal Support	Related to Ongoing Conventional War	Yes	Rare	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	g	h	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No				
		Ideology (or related)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
		Nationalism (or related)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes				
		Social Protest	Yes	Rare	Rare	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No				
	Nature of Effective External Support	Terror	Yes	No	Rare	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Rare	?	Rare	Yes	?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	?				
		Military and/or Material	Yes	Rare	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No				
		Political and/or Moral	Yes	Rare	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
		Sanctuary	No	Yes	No	c	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	j	Yes	Yes	No				
Isolation from External Support	Physical Interdiction (blockade, etc.)		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes					
	Invasion of Sanctuary		N/A	Yes	N/A	No	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	No	j	No	Rare	No					
	Propaganda		Yes	No	Rare	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes					
Isolation from Local Support	Measures Affecting Guerrillas and Populace	Economic Pressures	Yes	No	Rare	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	?	?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No				
		Reward for Defection	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	?	?	Rare	?	Yes	Yes	No	?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No				
		Counterterror	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes*	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes				
		Obstacles	No	No	Yes*	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes				
	Population Control	Propaganda	Yes	Yes	Rare	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No				
		Interdiction	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes				
		Registration	No	Yes	Yes*	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	1	No	Yes*	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes*	No				
		Detention	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes*	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	?	Yes*	Yes				
	Supply and/or Control	Registration and/or Surveillance	Rare	No	Rare	No	No	Yes	?	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes				
		Rationing	No	Yes	Yes*	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes*	?				
		Interdiction	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	?				
		Destruction/Confiscation	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes	No	Yes	?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Rare	Yes	Yes*	?				
	Attracting Support to the Local Government	Civic Action	Rare	Rare	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Rare	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes*	No				
		Redress of Grievances	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No				
		Security from Terror	Rare	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	?	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes*	No				
Using Trained Local Leaders			?	Rare	?	No	No	Yes	?	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes					
Successful Outcome of Counterinsurgency			a	Yes	c	a	Yes	Yes	Yes	a	b	b	b	Yes	a	Yes	a	Yes	Yes	?	No	Yes				
Same Side Wins in Ongoing Conventional War			a	Yes	c	?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A				

## Notes to Appendix B

### SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF MEASURES TO ISOLATE GUERRILLA FORCES

#### I. Explanation of Analytical Criteria

A. Example. Based on case studies for this report, each of these examples analyzes instances, or series of instances, in which guerrilla operations took place and whether or not certain attempts were made to isolate the guerrilla from local and outside support. Each is self-contained and can be related to other examples in only a qualitative, not quantitative, comparison. There would be no validity in a statistical analysis based upon the body of examples as a whole, or upon any group selected from them.

#### B. Nature of the Guerrilla War and Support to Guerrilla Forces.

1. Environment or Terrain. Operations were carried out either in urban areas or rural. In the case of rural areas an attempt was made to identify the particular terrain utilized by the guerrillas--broad flat plains, mountainous areas, temperate forest, or jungle.

2. Related to an Ongoing Conventional War. In several instances guerrilla operations were being conducted as an adjunct to a conventional war being waged such as those in South Korea. In other instances guerrilla operations were being undertaken within the same time frame as an ongoing major conventional war, which could adversely or propitiously affect outside support to the guerrilla, but which might not be directly related to the example (such as the Chinese Civil War).

3. Motivation for Guerrillas and Internal Support. The underlying reason or motivation for each instance of conflict is broken down broadly into ideology (e.g., communism or

Roman Catholicism to name only two), nationalism, social protest (reaction to prevailing conditions), and terror (the application of which has often motivated support).

4. Nature of Effective External Support. External support, including military/material and political/moral, was usually sought by the guerrillas. Sanctuaries have also been sought, where available. In this analysis instances of outside support are recorded only if the attempts were successful and affected the situation to a recognizable degree.

C. Isolation from External Support. In instances where effective outside support was provided, an analysis of counterinsurgent attempts to cut this support included four techniques or objectives: physical interdiction (including blockades); invasion of sanctuary; propaganda; and economic measures. The first two responses were usually directed to military/material support while the second two were usually undertaken to counteract moral or political support.

D. Isolation from Local Support. The following objectives and techniques were chosen as significant and representative measures which the counterinsurgent utilized in order to cut off local support to the guerrilla. It is important to note here that "intelligence" is not mentioned as this technique is regarded as being present in and a constant to every counterinsurgent operation. Only variables are indicated.

1. Measures Affecting Guerrillas and Populace. The four measures included here--reward for defection, counterterror, obstacles, and propaganda--were directed toward both the guerrillas and/or the local population, depending upon an individual set of conditions.

2. Denying Support to Guerrillas. In denying the guerrillas their local support, two objectives are analyzed.

a. In order to control the population, the following techniques are measured: interdiction (physically preventing or controlling the movement of a person or persons); resettlement (moving a group of the population from one area to another); detention (holding and/or deporting an individual or individuals) which is here assumed to include concentration (holding of a large group of the population in a circumscribed area); and registration and/or surveillance (maintaining record of population and census and/or keeping track of identity, activities, and movement of the population).

b. In effectively controlling supplies, the following three techniques are observed: rationing (effective apportioning of prescribed amounts of food by counterinsurgent authorities to the inhabitants of an area); interdiction (the stopping or control of the movement of food and supplies along the roads and other routes of transport); and destruction and/or confiscation (the laying waste to the countryside with intent to destroy crops and production and/or the searching out and taking possession of illegal stores belonging to local inhabitants by counterinsurgent authorities).

3. Attracting Support to the Legal Government. In certain cases it has been found advantageous for purposes of isolation to attempt to use certain techniques in order to draw the sympathy of the population toward the counterinsurgent and away from the insurgents operating in that area. Four such techniques are observable.

a. Civic Action. Certain measures to alleviate prevailing social and/or health conditions may be undertaken by the counterinsurgents in towns and villages of a given area in order to offer the local inhabitants a better life.

b. Redress of Grievances. It has often been advantageous to offer to the population political alternatives to the one offered by the guerrillas as well as to the one previously in existence (i.e., the British in Malaya). This may decrease the dynamism of the insurgent cause.

c. Security from Terror. In many instances counterinsurgents have provided protection through military, police, and constabulary forces in order to prevent reprisals and revenge on potential, or actual, informers and sympathetic elements of the population.

d. Using Trained Local Leaders. Sympathy and support of the local population may be attracted to the counterinsurgents by the utilization of educated and trained local inhabitants in positions of influence and importance within the given area or country.

E. Successful Outcome of Counterinsurgency. Was the insurrection put down?

F. Same Side Wins as in Ongoing Conventional War. Self-explanatory.

## II. Terms, Abbreviations, and Symbols Used

N/A--Not applicable.

Rare--Used infrequently.

Varied--Used sporadically over a prolonged period of time.

?--Insufficient data to allow statement.

\*--Used but not successfully either because the measure proved counterproductive or was ineffectual. In most such instances the measure was abandoned.

#--Used only in the Algerian example. Peter Paret states in Volume III that "In theory the French understood the importance of nonmilitary measures in this type of conflict, but in practice these measures suffered from representing an unacceptable national policy, from being ill-conceived, and from being carried out too often as an afterthought." letter of the alphabet ("a," "b," "c," etc.)--refers to footnote.

## III. Footnotes

a. Guerrilla operations were conducted by both sides, although primarily by the revolutionaries, who were successful.

b. In Spain there was considerable urban as well as rural guerrilla activity. In the Verdée and the Tyrol it was mainly rural.

c. Three operations were analyzed in which two were successfully carried out and one unsuccessfully terminated.

d. Guerrilla operations were being conducted at different times by both sides. Some guerrilla conflict was still in progress at the time major insurgent operations were terminated.

e. Confederate guerrillas made a few raids into the Northern States from Canada.

f. The Boer War provides the only important instance within the experiences analyzed during which "concentration" was implemented for purposes of consciously denying support to the guerrillas. As is explained above, concentration is defined for purposes here as detention on a larger scale.

g. The relationship existed, but quite indirectly.

h. Directly, but with an important exception. The opponents were on the same side in the conventional war. The CCP and the Kuomintang fought against the Japanese in World War II.

i. German use of resettlement was primarily related to punitive, suppressive, or Nazi political/ideological objectives, and only rarely or incidentally related to counterinsurrection activity.

j. The Communist insurgents had bases in the border regions of Thailand; there was some British-Thai military cooperation in attempting to eliminate these bases.



AD816037

H

E

R

O

## CLASSIC AND BASIC CASE STUDIES


### VOLUME II

Each transmittal of this document outside the agencies of the U.S. Government must have prior approval of the Office, Chief of Research and Development, DA, ATTN: CRDBES, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Destroy this report when no longer needed.  
Do not return it to the originator.

## ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA

1 February 1966



HISTORICAL EVALUATION AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

2233 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20007

## ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA

### Classic and Basic Case Studies (Volume II)

A Report prepared for the Army Research Office  
under Contract No. DA-49-092-ARO-102,  
dated 6 May 1965

No statements or opinions expressed in this  
report or its annexes are to be interpreted  
as reflecting official views of the Army  
Research Office or of any official of the  
United States Government

Not to be quoted at length, ab-  
stracted, or reproduced without  
the specific permission of the  
Historical Evaluation and Re-  
search Organization, except in  
official publications of the  
Department of Defense

Historical Evaluation and Research Organization  
2233 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C., 20007

1 February 1966

CLASSIC AND BASIC CASE STUDIES  
(Volume II)

Guerrillas in the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Era, by Peter Paret . . . . .	1
Upper Burma, 1885-1890, by Frank H. Brooke. . . . .	21
The Boer Guerrillas, 1900-1902, by Frank H. Brooke. . . . .	33
France and the Guerrilla War in Vietnam: 1945-1954, by Frank N. Trager . . . . .	47
The Republic of Vietnam and Communist Insurgency, 1954-1965, by William A. Nighswonger . . . . .	91
The Chinese Civil War, 1927-1949, by S.M. Chiu. . . . .	135
Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency Efforts in Greece, 1941-1949, by Gunther E. Rothenberg. . . . .	173
Malaya, 1948-1960, by Riley Sunderland. . . . .	217
Guerrilla Operations in South Korea, 1945-1953, by Riley Sunderland and Marshall Andrews. . . . .	249
Appendix A--French Experience in Vietnam: Geographic and Historical Setting, by Frank N. Trager . . . . .	265
Introduction to Vietnam. . . . .	267
Vietnam: The French Intrusion and Conquest to the 1880s. . . . .	275
French Rule and Vietnamese Struggles for Inde- pendence, 1885-1925 . . . . .	289
French Rule and Vietnamese Struggles from the Mid-1920s through World War II. . . . .	315
General Observations on French Counterinsurgency Experience and Practice Prior to World War II . .	321
Bibliography . . . . .	327

Guerrillas in the French Revolution and the  
Napoleonic Era

by

Peter Paret

INTRODUCTION

The French Revolution ushered in a new era of warfare. Tactical innovations, a gradual but a last complete break with former operational and strategic concepts, the replacement of the mercenary by the citizen-soldier--these and other changes increased the potentials of war and made it a vastly more powerful and more destructive instrument of state policy. The revolution in warfare between nations was accompanied by a significant expansion of another type of conflict: armed disputes within the boundaries of a single state. By itself internal war was nothing new. Its various forms punctuate all of history, and there had been two important instances, the American War for Independence and the Corsican insurrection, in the years just preceding 1789, but with the outbreak of the French Revolution these internal struggles acquired a new dynamic. To later generations the irregular wars of this period became classics, to be analyzed, interpreted, and at times emulated. Most important and influential among them were the guerrilla wars in the Vendée, in Spain, and in the Tyrol. Less significant episodes were the German popular resistance to the French in the 1790s and Russian guerrilla activity against the Grande Armée in 1812. All contain characteristics that recur in the insurrections and irregular operations of the 19th and 20th Centuries, and that should be briefly noted here. However, a study concerned with the problem of isolating the guerrilla will find the uprising in the Vendée the most instructive episode and the one deserving the greatest attention.

German resistance to the revolutionary armies in the Rhineland and Russian partisans in 1812 exemplify one type of irregular

warfare: the use of armed civilians to assist regular forces against a foreign invader. In both cases the mobilization of civilians was officially sanctioned and organized, the civilians fought not as independent groups but in closest possible coordination with regular units, and in neither campaign did their efforts carry much weight--though later patriotic historians tried to glorify the civilians' contribution.

In Germany, an Imperial Edict of January 21, 1794, called on the principalities on the east bank of the Rhine to arm their subjects as a last means to repel the French. Several thousand peasants in the Palatinate and along the upper Rhine were formed into partisan bands, and operated in conjunction with light troops against French supply columns and isolated detachments. Their greatest successes were the liberation of a prisoner transport and the capture of a wagon train.

In the Napoleonic invasion of Russia there is no evidence of any but isolated guerrilla action during the first half of the campaign. During the retreat from Moscow, peasant bands supported cossacks and regulars in harassing the French columns, cutting off stragglers, and depriving the French of food and shelter. In neither campaign do the French staff reports reflect particular concern about this form of opposition, and no special means were devised to counter it. In 1794 and 1795, the heyday of revolutionary enthusiasm in the French forces, the French command did distribute leaflets among the German peasants, calling on them not to fight for the aristocrats against the Republic, but little energy was invested in this effort. In general, armed civilians were seen as a strictly military problem, whose most serious implications lay in the area of discipline, since troops were bound to be more than ordinarily ruthless in their dealings with an unreliable population.

Guerrillas in Spain and in the Tyrol were also civilians attempting to repel a foreign invader. But their operations differed in important respects from the conventional use of armed civilians as auxiliaries of regular troops fighting on the defensive in their own country, and each of these episodes exemplifies a distinct kind of guerrilla war.

Spanish guerrillas began as auxiliaries of the regular forces. When these forces collapsed the armed civilians became the carriers of the major Spanish military effort, though in an operational sense they continued to be auxiliaries--now of the British armies under Moore and Wellington. The guerrillas enjoyed encouragement and support from the regime in exile that had been overthrown by the French; their main impetus, however, was not official but came

from their attachment to the monarchy, the church, their national pride and their hatred of the invaders. Since the guerrillas genuinely expressed the sentiment of the overwhelming majority of Spaniards, the French saw little hope of separating them from their popular base. During the years of French occupation, hardly any propaganda was addressed to the peasants and townspeople; the French placed their faith in conventional military countermeasures, strongly laced with terror, in espionage, bribes, and the exploitation of regional differences, jealousies, and aspirations. There can be little doubt that this combination would have sufficed to achieve a reasonable degree of pacification of most of the country, barring certain mountain strongholds, if the guerrillas had been on their own. The real threat to the French presence and the force that finally destroyed it was the British army.

As in Spain so in the Tyrol an entire society resisted military occupation and political change imposed by a foreign power. But here the occupying power did not have to deal with a complex national society, possessing vast material and emotional resources; the Tyrolese were numerically weak, and though their cultural cohesion was great they lacked political and military expertise. Their territory was ideally suited for ambushes and raids; but it was too restricted for extensive maneuvering, or the establishment of sanctuaries, and could be isolated from the rest of the world without much difficulty. Finally, the dominant position of France and the unwillingness of many Austrian leaders to support a popular war meant that the backing of the Austrian government was ambiguous and ineffective. Politically and militarily the Tyrolese fought on their own. The Bavarian occupying forces and their French allies responded to the insurrection with conventional military and police measures. They saw their major task as keeping the road network open, occupying the various towns, and from these centers extending their control over the countryside. Wherever possible, the peasants were induced to concentrate their forces, since pitched battles lent themselves to the tactics of regular troops. Although appeals were made to the Tyrolese to stop fighting, there was little effort to change their views. It was assumed--and rightly as events were to show--that repeated military defeats of the guerrillas would lead to pacification.

The irregular fighting that occurred in Germany, in Spain, the Tyrol, and Russia, did not transgress the essentially conventional character of these operations. In the Rhineland, Spain, and Russia the partisans were adjuncts of the regular forces and fought with official approval. To a varying degree their motives

might be termed ideological; they fought not only because they were ordered to do so, but for a number of patriotic and religious reasons. Their enthusiasm and fanaticism, their failure to obey the rules of war, their readiness to improvise, affected the character of the fighting, made it more ruthless and more destructive of society as a whole. Nevertheless, their opponents felt it unnecessary to depart far from the conventional military and police techniques in their countermeasures. This also holds true of the insurrection in the Tyrol, where the peasants were not officially recognized auxiliaries of regular forces, but a small self-contained society rising up in its entirety. The insurrection in the Vendée, however, was a clash of rival ideologies, a civil war in which both sides resorted to unconventional techniques. Their struggle shows in well-defined form many of the problems that seem constant elements in revolutionary wars today: the importance of propaganda, for instance, and of ideological control of the fighters; the great difficulties of coordinating military with political and psychological measures; the problem of unity of command in a popular movement; the insurgents' need for foreign support; and the need for the legitimate forces to isolate the guerrilla from his popular and economic base and to turn him into an easy target for conventional operations.

The area of the uprising lay along the northwest coast of France. In the north its limit was set by the Loire, flowing from Saumur west past Nantes to the Bay of Biscay; sixty miles to the south it ended along the road connecting the little Atlantic port of Les Sables d'Olonne with Niort. To the west it was limited by the sea, to the east by a line formed by the towns of Saumur, Thouars, and Parthenay. The country lying within this rectangle possesses widely differing characteristics. Near the coast it is flat, marshy, crisscrossed by canals. Farther east the ground rises and becomes wooded; fields and buildings are enclosed by the proliferating hedges that have given this land its name, the Bocage. The river Sevre and two ranges of rocky heights divide the Bocage diagonally from north to south; beyond lie a succession of valleys and arid plateaus which gradually give way to the rich agricultural districts on the eastern limits of the Vendée. To the north the Bocage extends to the valley of the Loire; but here too the country is broken and heavily wooded, with many hedged-in farms and a few small towns which during the 18th Century were centers of the region's modest textile industry. These areas were not only remote from the rest of the French monarchy, but somewhat isolated from each other. In the entire territory no more than two or three highways were reasonably serviceable in all seasons. From administrative and

military, as well as from social and economic, points of view the bad roads proved almost as great a barrier to movement as did the hedges and ditches among which the Vendean peasant isolated himself.

In 1790 about 800,000 people lived in the Vendée, nine-tenths of whom worked on the land. A minority of the peasants owned or leased sufficient property to support themselves comfortably, but most were small tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and day-laborers. At least one-tenth of the rural population was unemployed or only seasonally employed. The economy was less developed than in most other parts of France, and it continued to be hamstrung by special legislation favoring the privileged classes. But despite economic hardship and feudal irritants the relationship between peasants and nobility was generally harmonious. Both shared to a considerable extent a provincial outlook, a love for their region and its traditions, which was often stronger than their attachment to the country as a whole. The very numerous clergy played an important role in reinforcing this social cohesion; throughout the area, the parish priests possessed almost absolute spiritual and intellectual authority. Finally, perhaps 6% of the population could be considered to belong to the middle classes, but their economic power was still undeveloped. They were scattered through the territory, and they hardly yet formed an integrated social class. During the insurrection their allegiance was divided. Many of the middle class were prominent in the Republican National Guard, while only a few led insurgent detachments; on the other hand, many served with the peasant bands as physicians, quartermasters, and in other specialist capacities.

To sum up, the Vendée was populated by an economically and culturally rather backward society. The conflict of interests among its various classes was considerable; but beneath the antagonisms unifying forces continued to flourish. Most significant among these was the peasant's abiding religiosity. Despite all quarrels, a feeling of fellowship continued to unite peasants and nobility, in particular both groups felt deeply suspicious of any central government, whether royalist or republican. The topography of the region, which had helped to isolate its population from new ideas and influences, made the outbreak of the insurrection possible and assured its long duration.

During the first year of the French Revolution, the Vendée in general accepted the great political and social changes emanating from Paris. This receptivity was compromised late in



1790 when the government intensified its attacks on the political powers of the clergy. Priests who refused to swear a special oath of allegiance to the new constitution were dismissed and replaced by more cooperative colleagues; these, however, were not accepted by the peasants, and riots broke out in a number of parishes. Many of the deposed priests hid in the countryside and became fomenters and subsequently leaders of the rebellion. As the relations of the government with the peasants became strained over the religious issue, conditions in other areas also deteriorated. The war was unpopular; unemployment rose; the value of money declined seriously, and the peasants reacted to the decline in value in the classic manner by hoarding their produce. This in turn produced food shortages in the towns, and the government resorted to requisitions, which the peasants resisted. The news of Louis XVI's trial and execution further incensed them, and when in March 1793 the government began to draft men to fight against the First Coalition, the Vendée rose up in open revolt.

A few days after fighting had begun the insurgents controlled nearly all the Vendean countryside, with the government still holding the towns and harbors that surrounded the region. The insurrection now faced a choice between two main courses of action: either an immediate offensive could exploit the weakness of the Republican forces while they were still off balance, extend the rebellion to neighboring regions, and seek contact with other opposition movements and with England. Or the emphasis could be placed on strengthening the defensive potential of the movement by organizing, training, and equipping the dozens of separate peasant bands into fighting units, setting up a command structure with a general staff and commander in chief, and forming an administration to take the place of the murdered or imprisoned Republican officials. On the other hand, the immediate Republican concern should have been the containment of the uprising until a useful military force could be assembled to undertake offensive operations.

Not surprisingly, neither side fully understood its own situation or that of its opponent; but during the early weeks the confusion within Republican leadership did much to assure the continued success of the insurrection. The government at this time was itself in profound crisis; the moderate Republic was being replaced by a revolutionary government, and it required time and much trial and error before the new leaders could impose their own radical methods on the administrative machinery and make it work. Under the circumstances a realistic evaluation of their opponents was impossible; faith in the revolution demanded the belief that the brigands in the Vendée would vanish before the

bayonets of the National Guard; reverses could be explained only as treason. But even more objective men would have found it difficult to refuse the call for help from patriots in isolated towns and to resist the pressures from rivals and critics for an immediate stamping out of the disorders. Small detachments were therefore pushed into insurgent territory, only to be ambushed or overwhelmed by greatly superior numbers. Larger units followed to meet with the same fate. By the middle of May, six weeks after the outbreak of fighting, the insurgents had not only repulsed the armies sent against them, inflicted thousands of casualties and captured weapons and equipment necessary for maintaining large forces in the field, they had also broken two links in the chain of Republican strongpoints that encircled them.

But these achievements could not make up for two serious omissions: the military momentum had not been followed up by spreading the insurrection to other parts of the country, and remarkably little had been done to strengthen its base. Responsibility for both failures rested fundamentally with the lack of unity among the Vendean command. The chiefs who emerged out of the confusion of the early fighting varied greatly in background and purpose. Some were peasants or artisans, others former gendarmes; a few had been smugglers; many were nobles who had opposed the Revolution from the beginning, while a number of their peers had acquiesced in the new order but were chosen or even compelled by their former feudal dependents to assume command. The disparity in the motives for fighting was equally great. The peasants and many of the subordinate chiefs had taken up arms to defend the church and to rid themselves of revolutionary conscription, taxes, and forced contributions. Most of the aristocratic leaders, on the contrary, were primarily concerned with the reestablishment of the monarchy. These and other differences handicapped continuity and large-scale operations. Finally, personal ambition and jealousy permitted neither the election of an effective supreme commander nor the achievement of lasting cooperation among the chiefs.

Of the more than 60,000 men in the Vendean forces, about one-seventh were permanently under arms. Apart from providing the core of the infantry, the permanent cadres formed most of the small cavalry, the artillery, the quartermasters, the messengers, and medics. The other 50,000 to 55,000 effectives worked on their farms until the regional commander issued an order to muster, which was transmitted from parish to parish by the sounding of church-bells. Forced recruitment played an increasingly important part as the war went on. But it also happened that parishes or entire districts refused to heed the order for a

rassemblement, either from a feeling that there had been enough fighting for a while or because farmwork needed to be done.

During his short periods of service in the field the Vendean did not turn into a soldier but remained an armed civilian, with his own ideas about the war and an innate resistance to any kind of conformity imposed from above. Only a few ever acquired uniforms. Most wore civilian clothes or the captured Republican blue, marked with a cockade or sash in white--the royal color--or possibly a patch showing a crucifix or the sacred heart. Discipline was a weak reed for any of their chiefs to rely on. The campaigns afford numerous examples of looting, indiscriminate destruction, and the killing of prisoners in the face of contrary orders, although, to be sure, in other cases the same things were done as part of an implicit policy of terror or retaliation. With the absence of uniforms and of exact obedience went an almost total lack of drill. Movements in close order and firing by volleys were sometimes attempted, but never with great effect. The Vendean followed most readily, and most successfully, those chiefs who understood their particular qualities and tried to exploit rather than change them. On the whole they were better marksmen than the Republican infantry, and individual sniping in any case made for greater accuracy than firing by command. Their use of the terrain, too, was almost always superior. They were masters of what the military writers of the time called the petite guerre, or the guerre de détachements: irregular warfare waged by small groups, moving rapidly through the thickly wooded, obstructed country to blow up a bridge far behind enemy lines, ambush a supply column, or overwhelm an isolated post.

When it came to large-scale encounters, the Vendean sought to combine the methods of guerrilla fighting and sometimes of terror--for instance, in attacking behind a screen of Republican prisoners--with the employment of the numbers and cohesion required for battle. Often they started with the inestimable advantage of knowing the opponent's position while masking their own.

The great art of the rebels /as one of the ablest of Republican leaders, General Kléber, wrote at the time/ lies in constantly sending out cavalry and infantry patrols in every direction from their main force. The cavalry range twelve, sixteen, twenty, even as far as twenty-four kilometers, while behind them the foot-soldiers carry off all the supplies they can find. In this manner the mounted detachments spread fear throughout the area without it being possible to discover the

exact route by which the main force will follow, and this is why there have been so many vague and uncertain reports about the enemy. It must be acknowledged that here the enemy has always enjoyed a great ascendancy over us.

By the end of May the government no longer discounted the seriousness of the insurrection. But while the Republic was fighting Austria, Prussia, and England, the Vendée continued to be a minor theater of war. The government felt unable to detach more than 60,000 effectives--mainly National Guards and second-line troops--for the purpose of bringing the rebellion under control and for political reasons refused to entrust this force to a single supreme commander. To assure the loyalty of their military leaders, civilian commissioners were sent from Paris, and these political agents were joined by "deputies on mission" to maintain more secure civilian control over the operations. Sent to the provinces to organize the new revolutionary government, their power over the army has been described as "omnipotent in all that concerned recruitment, weapons, munitions, requisitions, the appointment and dismissal of officials, the dismissal of generals. They were to set examples of courage and patriotism, to encourage loyal administrations, replace the others, and supervise the sale of émigré property." This last touches on a further function: they played a significant part in the formulation and execution of nonmilitary measures to end the rebellion.

On March 19, in its first rage against the insurgents, the Convention had passed a law stipulating the death penalty for all rebel leaders and soldiers, for everyone who opposed recruitment, or who was captured bearing arms or showing the white cockade. The property of the executed was to be confiscated by the state. The totality and harshness of this conception were unique. Possibly, rather than actually to be carried out, the law was intended to demonstrate the government's determination and to frighten the Vendéans into submission; but although its provisions were not yet generally applied, they gave a free hand to any senior commander or official.

A more conciliatory attitude largely inspired by Danton briefly gained ascendancy during April and May. On May 7 the deputies on mission in the West were instructed that their "first and most pressing duty is to contribute with all their might to the enlightenment of the misguided citizens; to scatter the rebels, to punish the brigands, the chiefs of the mutineers, and to return to the nation those citizens lost to her through

seduction, ignorance, and prejudices." Three days later a decree amended the law of March 19 to apply only to the leaders and instigators of the revolt. This was followed by an appeal of the Convention to the insurgents, phrased in the same conciliatory spirit but hardly proffering arguments that would sway the peasants. After enumerating the benefits brought to the Vendée by the Revolution and condemning the monarchy as tyrannical and unpatriotic, the proclamation continued:

You want to retain your religion. But who has tried to rob you of it, to trouble your consciences? Have you been asked to change anything in your beliefs, in the ceremonies of your worship? No; you have been deprived of those men whom you regarded as the only legitimate priests; but haven't they justified this necessary harshness by their own conduct? Are these men, who today preach murder and pillage, the real ministers of a peace-loving God, or are they vile satellites of despots risen against your country? . . .

Those priests who call themselves the only true Catholics are paid by the gold of Protestant England. Does England squander money to avenge a religion which she herself persecutes and despises? No, but so that France will lacerate herself with her own hands; if your blood flows for the cause of slavery and ours for the cause of liberty, it is still French blood.

Renounce these shameful errors. Abandon to the sword of the law that vile pack of insolent slaves, of hypocritical priests, who have turned you into abused agents of their venal wickedness. . . . Show yourself again worthy of assuming the name of Frenchmen! Then you will find none but brothers in the whole Republic, which now is regretfully arming herself to punish you, which--ready to crush you with all her might--will weep over successes gained at the cost of your blood.

If scruples still trouble your consciences, remember that religious freedom is one of the necessary conditions of a Republican constitution.

As can be seen, the proclamation committed the not uncommon propaganda error of expressing its authors' convictions rather than successfully playing on the feelings of its audience. Only the explicit promise that if they surrendered the mass of the insurgents would not be punished could have had real effect. The accusation of Protestant and English support, which might be supposed to touch Vendean prejudices, lacked all supporting evidence,

and indeed at this time not so much as a British penny or market had reached the rebels. Besides, any advantage derived from raising this bogey must have been more than canceled out by the virulent attacks on the clergy, whose influence had in no way diminished since the outbreak of fighting. As it had in the past, the government continued to misjudge the nature and intensity of the people's religious beliefs. Never would the Vendéans freely accept a Catholic church purified according to Republican principles; they wanted no intermediary between themselves and their priests, and the assurance of religious toleration must have sounded to their ears like blasphemous derision. Patriotism, finally, which meant so much to the deputies in Paris, had not yet reached a sufficient stage of development among the peasants to prove a useful target for propaganda. The Convention saw only the national union, which inexplicably had been disrupted; the Vendéans, a godless and hypocritical interference in their lives. It needed more than an offer of clemency to bridge the emotional gap between the two sides.

Throughout the summer of 1793 the Vendéans gained a series of victories over the disjointed Republican forces, but the unwillingness of the peasants to leave their farms for extended periods of time and disagreement among the chiefs on what the next move ought to be enabled the government gradually to mobilize sufficient resources. In August a corps of well-trained and experienced soldiers, the 12,000 veterans of the Army of Mayence, was for the first time sent against the Vendée. Simultaneously with their dispatch to the West, the Convention repealed the moderate punitive laws of May; for a time some hope of conciliation had been held out, but now the rebels were again to be terrorized into submission.

If the Committee of Public Safety too often discounted professional expertise, its members at least thoroughly understood the need for intermingling political and military measures in revolutionary warfare. In truly remarkable fashion the decree of August 1 indicated the whole range of weapons that the revolution was preparing to launch against the internal enemy in the West. Its first paragraph ordered the army of Mayence to be transported to the Vendée. Article II called for political purges of the staffs and civilian employees of the Republican army, and Article III for the rigorous execution of the laws against deserters and traitors. Articles IV and V ordered the formation of engineer, rifle, and light-infantry companies. Articles VI and VII dealt with the shipment of combustible materials to assist in the destruction of hedges, woods, and forests, and ordered that the crops and animals of rebels be seized.



Article VIII called for expulsion from the Vendée of all women, children, and sick relatives of insurgents. Articles IX, XI, XII, and XV concerned matters of army organization and the communication of the decree. Article X ordered a levée en masse of the population in the neighboring department. Article XIII demanded that only patriotic expressions and the names of dead Republicans or of martyrs to the cause of liberty be chosen as passwords; and Article XIV ordered the confiscation of all rebel property. The right of executing captured Vendéans without trial was several times reaffirmed in succeeding months. In the conflict with the Vendée, as elsewhere in France, terror had become part of acknowledged policy.

The army of Mayence reached the west in the last days of August. On September 2 a council of war of the senior generals and deputies on mission agreed on a new plan of operations, which attempted to draw the best possible advantage from the newly arrived regulars. The National Guard and Volunteer units were to operate in active defense along the boundaries of the Vendée, while the regulars, formed in several mutually supporting columns attacked the center of the territory from several directions. By the middle of September they had penetrated deeply into the Bocage. Once more the peasants mobilized their full strength and in three battles were able to ambush, defeat, and maul the regulars; but again they failed to follow up their victories, and the government forces reorganized and continued their slow and costly advance to the heart of the insurrection. On October 17 at the battle of Cholet the Vendean armies were fixed and totally defeated. A remnant, joined by thousands of old men, women, and children, crossed the Loire and for two months maintained itself in Brittany, hoping to contact an English squadron sent for their support, but on December 23 they were caught and annihilated. Only small groups of survivors found their way back to the Vendée.

The Vendean armies were destroyed, but would military victory mean the end of the war? The evidence of history and Clausewitz's famous dictum to the contrary, men generally find it difficult not to succumb to the temptation of drawing a rigid line between war and peace, as though the two were absolute opposites rather than contiguous and overlapping areas in the relations between individuals, parties, and states. Nowhere is this intermixture so clearly evident as in the beginning and terminating stages of internal conflicts. The defeat of the organized forces of one or the other side leaves behind armed enemy remnants, lawlessness, and a vacuum of social disorder which the victorious power must fill by both military and nonmilitary

means. Even more important than the need to punish and reorganize is the problem of convincing the opposition--which, as in the Vendée, may make up a great part of the population--that it should again acquiesce in the legal order.

In the Vendée these tasks were rendered more difficult by two factors that had marked the insurrection from its beginnings. France was engaged in fighting a foreign alliance, which heightened the danger created by dissensions at home and the intensity of emotion and reaction they engendered. Unrest within the country could not be isolated from the external conflict. At every opportunity dissension was promoted and exploited by the allies; certainly without English support active anti-Republicanism in the west would have subsided far earlier than in the event it did. Of equal importance was the fact that the revolution had not yet run its course. On the contrary, the campaign north of the Loire and the months of pacification that followed coincided with the climax of radicalism, the supremacy of the terror in Paris. It could hardly be expected that the revolution would treat its opponents with the degree of tolerance that is possible to more stable governments.

The purely military part of pacification appeared relatively simple. The insurgents had suffered too greatly physically and morally to allow any further organized resistance for the time being. Only a few chiefs retained their independence, and their operations did not amount to more than guerrilla actions and uncoordinated raids, which kept the Republican forces busy but caused no real damage.

The lack of equipment became increasingly serious. In the past the Vendéans had been able to arm themselves wholly from captured Republican stores; now they were too weak to risk a large-scale engagement, and the only possibility of reequipping their cadres and of arming recruits lay in assistance from overseas. Several British vessels actually landed muskets and powder. The Vendean's insufficient popular support even led them to request foreign regulars, a point they had always shied away from during the period of their ascendancy. Slowly the scheme of landing a strong expeditionary corps took hold, but over the preparations the year passed.

If the Vendée no longer presented a serious military threat, what of its general attitude toward the Republic? Certain developments suggested that the bulk of the insurgents--that is, the peasantry--had lost much of its former resolve to carry on the struggle against the revolution. Already in early October 1793 a slackening of resistance had been noted, and the disasters of the



following two months could not but help to deepen this defeatism. The smashing of the rebels' civil and military structure, furthermore, lifted the restraint that had lain over the villages. As the repeated failures of musters showed, it was no longer as easy as it once had been to compel people to take up arms. On this general weariness and wish for peace, a policy of conciliation might be built which would gradually reintegrate the insurgents into the nation. The essential conditions of such a policy were on the one hand for the government to show some sympathy with the religious aspirations of the country population--or at least to refrain from carrying out wholesale punishments--and on the other to protect the people from the counterrevolutionary die-hards, who continued to maintain themselves precariously in the Bocage.

A plan to answer both requirements had been worked out by Kleber in the days after the victory of Cholet. The main military effort, he suggested, should be directed toward preventing musters which might increase the guerrilla bands and seeing to it that no stores or equipment fell into their hands. This Kleber proposed to accomplish by stationing garrisons in the Bocage; setting up strongpoints at road junctions, river crossings, and important heights, which were to serve as bases for small mobile columns that would traverse the countryside; engage groups of insurgents; collect arms; and re-establish security. "An essential objective," he wrote, ". . . is to cut off the enemy's supplies, to disturb and harass him without let-up; but above all we must win the confidence of the country population. . . . Let us immediately attack the known rassemblements, let us destroy them, let us protect the country, and all will return to order."

This plan of conciliation, however, was never seriously considered by the government; no attempts were made to gain the peasants' confidence, to differentiate between leaders and followers; instead the Vendée was to be treated as conquered territory. At the end of 1793 a new group of deputies was sent to the west to purge, execute, and confiscate. At the same time a new general-in-chief was appointed, Turreau, a professional of no marked political convictions who, if he held any ideas on the war that differed from the radical view, was careful not to let them influence his actions. Under him the army of the west became for some months the impassive instrument of the Convention's declared policy of extermination.

Turreau based his operations on a program consisting of 15 main points:

1. Prevent the Vendéans from receiving any assistance from foreign countries.

2. Cut all their communications with subversive groups elsewhere.

3. Remove from the insurgent territory all inhabitants who had not taken up arms, because some, under the guise of neutrality, favor the rebels, while the others (the smaller group), although loyal to the Republic, also provide assistance which they cannot refuse in the face of compulsion.

4. Remove from the interior of the Vendée all animals, all foodstuffs, all means of subsistence, and evacuate all military posts.

5. Destroy the rebel hide-outs, and in general all places that might offer them cover and resources.

6. Surround the entire theater of war south of the Loire first by posts located at the main towns of the perimeter, and later, when the warm season returns, by fortified camps.

7. Traverse the Vendée in all directions by columns which pursue the rebels without let-up, destroy their hide-outs, and protect the removal of supplies.

/8-12, and 14, give details of the military arrangements./

13. Post 24 cannon-boats on the Loire to control and guard navigation, and to inspect the buildings on the riverbanks, and particularly the bridges.

15. Disarm all communities adjacent to the theater of war, because the enemy could begin new insurrections there, could rob patriots of their weapons and ammunition, or receive them from inhabitants attached to the royalist party.

Despite the misgivings of several of his subordinates at the extent of these measures, Turreau wasted little time in putting his plan into effect. During the last week of January, 12 mobile columns--soon known to everyone, Republican or royalist, as colonnes infernales--crossed the Vendée from east to west. Their commanders had orders to ". . . use all measures to discover the rebels, all are to be killed. Villages, farms, woods, heaths, brush, and in general all things that can be burned are to be

delivered to the flames. . . . To facilitate the operations, the general places 40 to 50 pioneers or laborers at the head of his column, who do the felling in woods and forests necessary for spreading the fire." The order concluded with a list of 13 of the largest towns in the Vendée that were exempted from burning.

The first promenade of the colonnes infernales was soon followed by others, and until June the columns remained active. The amount of destruction they visited on the country has never been accurately established. Some of it properly came under the heading of military necessity, such as the leveling of hedges to widen the roads, or at any rate was difficult to avoid when contending with snipers and a frightened, hostile populace. But by far the greater part was deliberately punitive. One general reported:

For the good of the Republic Les Echaubrognes [a bourg three miles from Cholet] no longer exists, not a single house remains. Six murdered volunteers were found, as well as muskets and ammunition. Nothing has escaped the vengeance of the nation; at the moment of writing I am having fourteen women shot who were denounced to me. Yesterday I burnt every mill that I could see . . . today I can burn three-quarters of this town [Maulevrier] without risk, it's not necessary to have such a large place for [quartering] a detachment of 200 men. . . . In a tree-trunk two soldiers found a priest; I had him shot. . . .

Attached to the columns were agents of the specially formed Commission civile et administrative, charged with the confiscation and evacuation of crops, animals, and other goods. Until it was suppressed in September 1794 in the course of the Thermidorean reaction, the commission by its own account confiscated 46,694 farm animals, 153,000 hundredweights of grain, hay, and straw, 111,000 pounds of various metals, and a vast catalogue of other items, down to 50 children's shirts.

Two further tasks of the columns were the evacuation of insurgent families and--of more immediate importance--the disarming of the Vendéans. Since sizable engagements with their attendant loss of equipment were becoming more and more infrequent, the authorities held out pardons to individual rebels who would surrender their arms. These appeals were heeded by thousands, very many of whom--according to a score of Republican witnesses--were then executed.

These measures--execution, resettlement, destruction, and appropriation--were directed at rebels and rebel sympathizers, but to a lesser degree they also affected the inhabitants who had remained loyal to the Republic. National Guards that had opposed the rebel armies for a year were now disbanded, thus making the communities in the interior defenseless. These were in any case to be destroyed and the citizens evacuated to other departments, so that, as one decree explained, "none but rebels will remain in the insurgent territory, who then can be destroyed more easily, without confusing them with innocent citizens." The expulsion of patriots, with all the emotional and economic deprivation such moves entail, began on March 28 and continued until the end of May.

The savagery of this program aroused violent opposition even among government supporters, while corrupting and demoralizing the troops charged with carrying it into effect. But the most serious consequence of the radical policy proved to be the reaction it caused among the Vendean peasants. Extreme repression can hardly be expected to induce willing cooperation. On the contrary, the terror reawakened the desire for resistance among the population. Those few armed bands that still maintained themselves in the woods almost doubled in size during the spring of 1794 as new recruits joined them from the devastated villages and farms.

By the end of spring the failure of the repressive system could no longer be ignored. In particular the extent of economic destruction and of indiscipline among the troops convinced the government that a change was needed, and Paris reverted to the former course of punishing only the chiefs and instigators of rebellion. More moderate deputies were sent to the area, military commanders were given a free hand, the refugees were recalled, the colonnes infernales were disbanded, and the confiscation of grain and animals ceased. The new methods reverted to Kleber's proposals: the insurrection had to be isolated, its armed forces defeated, and the people won back to the Republican cause. The radicals had tried to empty the Vendée, to create a vacuum in which their soldiers could safely operate. The new commanders, on the contrary, covered the territory with a grid of fixed points--fortified camps, posts, and guards--between which mobile detachments sought out the rebel bands. Within this security system the population could regain the ways of peaceful existence, while the insurgents were deprived of moral and physical sustenance, and gradually hunted down.

By December 1794 this plan had succeeded to such an extent that the Republicans felt secure enough to proclaim an amnesty

that granted an immediate pardon to all rebels--chiefs as well as followers--who surrendered their arms. This time the promise of clemency was kept, and the insurgent commanders could no longer hold their bands together. Negotiations were opened between the Republic and the remaining rebel chiefs, which led to an armistice, and on February 17, 1795, to a formal treaty that granted the Vendéans freedom from conscription, the free exercise of their faith, and some restitution and indemnities for losses suffered during the war. The mass of insurgents had been conceded their strongest wishes; but never were the differences between leaders and followers more obvious than now. While the peasants willingly accepted the settlement and returned to their farms, the royalist chiefs submitted only out of weakness and to gain time. The long-awaited English expedition, they knew, was near at hand, and with its support they might hope to raise the entire west against the Republic. These plans were aided by their continued possession of some military power. As part of the reintegration of the bands into society, the Republican negotiators had authorized the establishment of a "territorial guard" under the control of the chiefs. This force, numbering about 4,000 men, served as a legitimate means of maintaining the old cadres under arms and could be used to trigger off a new uprising. On June 25, one chief successfully attacked a Republican camp in the Bocage, after which he issued a proclamation declaring that the insurgents had "taken up arms again and renewed their irrefutable oath not to lay them down until the heir presumptive to the French crown had ascended the throne of our fathers. . . ."

The day after this coup, a British fleet landed a force of 4,500 French émigrés at Quiberon, 60 miles north of Nantes, where thousands of Breton guerrillas awaited them. The presence on French soil of well-equipped regulars, with the assurance of reinforcement, supported by a large and militarily active part of the population, could have developed into a serious threat to the Republic. But again the contradictions inherent in every Bourbon attempt to wage a popular war proved fatal. Even before debarkation, rivalry among the émigré commanders wasted invaluable hours, and this initial handicap was heightened by disagreements which quickly appeared between émigrés and peasants. Few of the returning nobles were ready to overcome their pride of caste, to consider the peasants real soldiers, to accept the social and military conditions of partisan warfare. While the leaders attempted to bring some cohesion to their operations, the Republic was given time to concentrate superior forces against the invasion, which it was soon able to contain. On July 20 government forces attacked the beachhead, which in the meantime had been reinforced by a

second squadron from Jersey, and destroyed the Anglo-émigré army. Only 900 émigrés and 1,400 guerrillas with some civilian sympathizers were able to save themselves on the British vessels. In early fall another attempt to land in the Vendée ended ignominiously, and the insurgents were again left to their own devices.

The end of the long struggle was clearly at hand. By the middle of 1796 all armed bands had been mopped up, the countryside had been pacified, and the population had come to accept the inevitability of Republican rule. Of the approximately 800,000 inhabitants of the region, approximately 160,000 had perished during the struggle.

Upper Burma, 1885-1890

by

Frank H. Brooke

GENERAL BACKGROUND AND TERRAIN

To call a Burman a Burmese  
Is hardly likely to please.  
He may be a Chin, Karen or Kachin  
Or even an Arakanese!

Bernard Fergusson's light-hearted jingle goes to the heart of the matter, though he could have added the Shans and the Mons to his list of ethnic groups.\* Burma has always been conscious of her variety of peoples, many of them capable of clear subdivision by language and custom as well as habitat.

Burma, in area, is slightly smaller than the State of Texas (or it may be more tactful to say that Texas is slightly bigger than Burma), rather elongated in shape from north to south, and over 1,000 miles long with an average width of 400 miles. A horseshoe-shaped ring of mountains and hills surrounds the country, and forms a natural land frontier, with the Bay of Bengal on the south and southwest. The rivers run from north to south, with the Irrawaddy and its tributary the Chindwin to the west, the Sittang in the center, and the Salween to the east. Though only the Irrawaddy is navigable, the river valleys and the natural line of communication throughout the country and, being cultivable, are the main areas of population. In the north, the mountain areas are heavily forested with jungle on the lower slopes and in the foothills. Jungle areas cover large tracts in

---

\*As a point of scholarly American usage, the word "Burmese" denotes a citizen of Burma, and "Burman" a member of the majority ethnic group. As the quoted poem shows, however, British usage is different, which causes a certain amount of confusion.

the plains and the Arakan and Pegu Yoma (hills) between the river basins. The Shan States to the east are largely grassland at altitudes between 2,000 and 4,000 feet, with the River Salween running through a series of deep, rocky gorges.

Some 200 miles from the sea, the Irrawaddy forms its delta--a large, fertile area intersected by branches of the main river and a number of canals. To the southeast, the Province of Tenasserim is a long strip, the frontier with Thailand following the line of the watershed.

The climate is tropical with a heavy rainfall--ranging from about 200 inches in some hill areas to about 85 inches in the delta--in the regular monsoon period, May to September. The monsoon varies less than in India, but droughts occur occasionally in the north and center of the country, and the so-called "dry zone" has a rainfall of only 30 inches. The soil is alluvial and generally fertile, permitting widespread cultivation of the staple food--rice. In the hilly regions rice is grown by cutting and burning forest tracts, leading to a wasteful and nomadic cultivation, and here it is a matter of subsistence farming for the hill tribes. In the plains, however, much of the land has been for centuries under irrigation and natural flooding, with the result that it has been a surplus food producing area throughout recorded history.

The population in the historical past is not known accurately, but at the beginning of the 19th Century it was probably about 4,000,000. It increased rapidly during the century, reaching about 23,000,000 at the present day. The Burmans form a large majority of the population--three-quarters of the whole. The Karens, the Chins, and the Kachins--the other three main racial groups--share the same ethnic origin, but developed their separate existences largely in the northern semicircle of hills. The Shans maintained their identity to the east, sharing many characteristics with their neighbors the Thais (both are Thais in ethnic origin).

#### EARLY HISTORY

The story of Burma is one of turbulence and war, with the true Burmans establishing their ascendancy nearly 1,000 years ago. In the course of time they subdued the other races by fire and sword--particularly the Mons who were almost annihilated and then absorbed. The Shans paid tribute, and the hill races were, broadly speaking, kept in the hills. Burman civilization was



centered in the Irrawaddy and Pegu areas, roughly in the center of the country.

The Alaungpaya dynasty established a strong and ruthless central authority at Ava, near Mandalay, and in the 19th Century its policy was one of expansion. Wars were launched against the Arakan and against the Shan chieftains to the east. An invasion of Assam, the war against the Mons (resulting in the capture of Pegu and Rangoon) and a punitive expedition against Manipur were among the events of this time.

Burma's threats to Bengal in her imperialist expansion brought her up against the British East India Company which had only recently dealt with its French rivals. In fact, Britain and Burma engaged in an imperialist conflict and a struggle was inevitable. The war which followed in 1824 resulted in the cession of Arakan and Tenasserim to the British, and the war of 1852 (known as the Second Burmese War) added the Province of Pegu to British Burma. In the ensuing 30 years the British administration was consolidated in Lower Burma, consisting largely of the three maritime provinces extending northward to Prome and Toungoo.

The newly annexed province was hardly peaceful for the first three years, with a stubborn resistance movement headed by local leaders helped by raids across the frontier from Upper Burma. Eventually it was pacified, and general prosperity prevailed.

In Upper Burma the Alaungpaya dynasty ruled from Ava. After a series of palace revolutions (the succession to the Peacock Throne has been described as hereditary tempered by assassination) King Mindon began his long reign. A sincere Buddhist, he hated bloodshed and strove to maintain friendly relations with the British and so preserve his independence (he even hoped for the return of the lost province of Pegu). His administration was carried out in the countryside by "myosas"--semifeudal local territorial chiefs, some hereditary and some appointed--ruling through the headmen (myothugis) of "circles," which can be defined as groups of villages. Buddhism's influence was powerful and ubiquitous, with monasteries in or near most of the villages and townships. All Burmese were Buddhists, and it is an odd contradiction that sincere followers of that peaceful religion should have been so much given to violence, bloodshed, and gross cruelty. The hill races, the Chins, Karens, and Kachins, were generally not Buddhists, but Animists. A few had been converted to Christianity by European missionaries, but at this time their number was not great, though increasing.

During the 30 years following the war of 1852, considerable efforts were made to increase trade between British Burma and Upper Burma and to extend trade with China. The old quest for an overland route to Unnan was revived. In the meantime, the French were expanding their empire in Indochina and also attempting to get the major share of the increasing trade. They made themselves masters of Tongking, "the key to China." (One of their main outposts near the frontier was in a village named Dien Bien Phu.) Their intrigues with the Court of Ava were the prime cause of the Third Burmese War.

### THE WAR OF 1885

The "good King" Mindon died in 1878, without nominating a successor, though he suggested that three of his sons should rule jointly. This was hardly likely to work out successfully, and a series of palace intrigues brought Thibaw to the throne. He was completely dominated by his wife, Supayalat. Her nominees became his ministers, and a reign of terror culminated in the cold-blooded massacre of 80 of the king's relations. This event produced a strong reaction in British circles, and Anglo-Burmese relations steadily deteriorated. A dispute over Manipur and the Kabaw Valley worsened affairs considerably.

Internally, Upper Burma was disturbed. Dacoity (armed robbery by gangs) became rife, the hill-dwelling Kachins rebelled against Thibaw's authority, Chinese guerrillas sacked Bhamo, and most of the Shan Sawbwas (feudal princes) renounced their allegiance to the king. Thibaw decided on closer ties with the French, which was encouraged in Paris. (This was the time of intense Franco-British rivalry in Asia.) A French consul arrived in Mandalay, and it was clear that large-scale concessions to the French were in the air. These included the prospect of the supply of arms to Thibaw overland from Tongking. In the event, the French modified their policy, but it was too late. Thibaw was committed to his policy of hostility to the British, and the Burmese treatment of a British timber company became the final casus belli.

### Military Operations

The British general commanding in Rangoon had said earlier that he could take Mandalay with 500 men but would need 10 times that number to pacify Upper Burma. Events proved him right, though his factor of 10 became nearly 60.

The operations against Mandalay carried out by General Prendergast with a mixed force of British and Indian troops were completely successful. Within 24 hours the city had surrendered, and King Thibaw capitulated on November 28, 1885. He and his queen went into exile, but his army refused to surrender and carried on widespread guerrilla warfare for five years. The local myothugis (most of them with a military background in any case) led the resistance by scattered bands all over the country, while five royal princes--all claiming the throne--held out in different areas.

The insurgents consisted partly of soldiers mobilized for the war under the existing semifeudal system, and partly of the dacoit gangs which had always infested Burma. Most were well armed and mobile, depending for support on the villagers and obtaining it by terror. The cruel methods used by the guerrillas ranged from the burning of villages and the massacre of their inhabitants to the torture and crucifixion of selected victims. The policy of terror, while it served its purpose of obtaining supplies at the time, undoubtedly helped the British forces in the long run. As successive districts were cleared of guerrillas and civil administration became effective, the British could count on local support from the indigenous population to a growing extent. Incidentally the official history of the war draws a distinction, by implication at any rate, between "insurgents" and "dacoits." Both were pursued with equal energy and it seems that the term "insurgents" was used for the larger groups of about 300 guerrillas.

The actual number of guerrillas operating at any one time is difficult to determine, but it clearly varied greatly, with some areas quiescent for considerable periods during which the guerrillas resorted to productive enterprise. In many cases the guerrilla bands raided other areas for supplies of food. Isolated British garrisons were often attacked with the aim of obtaining arms and ammunition, apart, of course, from the patriotic motive. There were also, as in the case of so many partisan movements in World War II, the incentives of settling old scores and of gaining a favorable position (from the political point of view) at the war's end.

There was little overall coordination except when one of the major guerrilla leaders (e.g., one of the princes with pretensions to the throne) managed to collect a number of scattered groups for a specific purpose. It appears that the maximum size of any one force under one leader was about 2,000 men, but this was rare, and a guerrilla group of 300 or 400 men was more usual.

### The British Reaction

It has been realized beforehand that the capture of Mandalay would be only the first step, and the plans for the next phase included troop reinforcements, arrangements for effective civil administration, and the raising of an armed police force. The guerrilla actions early in 1886 (Mandalay had fallen in November 1885) were so violent that even larger forces had to be brought in. The total strength of the Regular troops engaged rose to 32,000 all arms, with 8,500 armed police in support.

This force was organized in six brigades (each commanded by a brigadier-general) with two major-generals commanding divisions. Each brigade consisted of cavalry, artillery, engineers, and infantry units, with logistic support. The strength of each brigade varied in accordance with its tasks and the size of the district allotted to it. In each brigade district there were subordinate commands on a geographical basis with a township or village as its center. Each garrison operated one or more mobile columns. The strength of these columns also varied considerably in accordance with the situation prevailing in the area; but generally they could be described as of "company group" size with all arms represented as necessary.

Cavalry were found so useful in enhancing mobility that not only were regiments brought specially from India and elsewhere, but mounted infantry contingents were raised in large numbers. Often they remained with and operated with their parent regiments of British or Indian infantry. Horses were brought from England, India, and Australia, and an interesting fact here is that the moral effect of the "gigantic" horses (the Burmese never having seen anything bigger than their own tiny 12 hand ponies) was overwhelming. Many successful mounted charges were made when the guerrillas were caught in the open or surprised in a village.

Artillery was used extensively against insurgents in stockaded camps or when entrenched, firing over open sights with plain shell. Guns were generally decentralized in sections (or pairs) to the columns, so as to be available at any time. The Royal Navy provided some artillery support and also operated on the Irrawaddy with steam launches.

The military engineers provided signal communications on an extensive scale, combining telegraphic and visual signalling in a highly effective manner. They also improved road communications and built bridges. The country was intersected, even in jungle

areas, by many tracks and bridle paths, connecting the scattered villages. By widening these or cutting new roads, the mobility of the armed forces was vastly improved, even if the infantry still had to march and the other arms remained dependent on packhorses.

An early aim of the British was the establishment of civil administration in the pacified areas. To this end, a Chief Commissioner from Upper Burma was appointed at the outset with headquarters in Mandalay and Deputy Commissioners to the various districts. In 1886 it is recorded in the official history that, under the joint authority of the Chief Commissioner and the commander in chief, meetings of civil and military officers were to take place to decide policy and priorities. This is clearly the forerunner of the War Executive Committee system developed in Malaya 60 years later.

The Chief Commissioner hoped to work, in the first place, through King Thibaw's loose but fairly effective administrative machine, but the king's discredited and unreliable officials were hardly any use under the existing conditions. So government was carried out through the Deputy Commissioners, who in turn made use of any reliable local leaders and organized their districts using the traditional "circle" system. Later, the civil administration was reorganized on the Indian pattern, making the village the subdivision, but this was probably a mistake. As districts were cleared of insurgents and dacoits, the local population and its leaders gained confidence, and it was possible to distribute some of the confiscated weapons for the self-defense of small communities. Here again there is a parallel with the Home Guard raised in Malayan townships and villages in 1950 and the earlier arming there of intrinsically loyal villages, very much on the pattern of the "strategic hamlets" in South Vietnam today.

The police were recruited largely from India, as Burmese were considered to be unreliable in the context. The police recruits were often ex-soldiers of the Indian army, including Gurkhas, and organized on paramilitary lines in battalions. They became an efficient force and were able, as operations progressed, to take over districts from the soldiers who were then able to concentrate for operations against the insurgent areas.

### The Pattern of Operations

Things did not go well for the British forces from early in 1886, and Lord Roberts--then Commander in Chief in India--moved his headquarters to Burma to take personal command of the forces engaged. The raids by the insurgents were widespread and destructive enough to question the credibility of the annexation. The small-scale actions are perfectly described in one of Rudyard Kipling's verses of the time:

A Snider squibbed in the jungle,  
Somebody laughed and fled,  
And the men of the First Shikaris  
Picked up their subaltern dead,  
With a big blue mark on his forehead  
And the back blown out of his head.

The actions of the time are best conveyed by another quotation, this, from the official history, being an extract from a report to a superior officer on the activities of a noted insurgent leader, Hla U:

Lieutenant Holland submits an account of Hla U and his mode of living. He appears to have had two main resorts from whence he carried out his raids in the Myinmu District, viz Magyioke in the north and Kyauk-tat in the south. As regards the latter, his power extended to sixteen neighbouring villages, where he has always had willing followers. Some of them have been specially ready to assist him, acting as his agents in cattle-lifting and supplying him with food, while at Kyauk-tat. At present he never remains on any one spot for more than 12 hours; and, if possible, he never stops in any place we have visited or know of. His camps, though formed in places difficult of access, have always an easy outlet of escape; they have without exception an unfailing supply of water. Both Hla U and his men are wary in the extreme, have an excellent system of outposts, and a method of dispersing and re-assembling which is marvellous. Lieutenant Holland considers that troops are unequal to the task of taking him.

Lieutenant Holland (and his is a typical case) need not have been so pessimistic in his conclusion, because two months later Hla U was found dead. He had been killed by his own men, perhaps mainly because of the constant pressure and pursuit by Lieutenant

Holland, and perhaps partly because of his ruthless terrorizing of his own supporters. The pattern in this case is a recurrent one in the study of guerrilla warfare. A pursuit appears to become a hopeless "stern chase" (in nautical parlance) and then, because the pressure has been kept up, the guerrilla loses heart, quarrels with his own people and then either surrenders or, if he persists, is liquidated or betrayed by his own side. There are many examples of this sequence of events in the history of this war, and they are, in every respect, identical with hundreds of case histories of the Malayan campaign. The lessons are clear -- constant pressure on the guerrilla pays off in the end and, conversely, terrorist pressure by the guerrilla defeats itself in the long run, provided there is a reasonable alternative to guerrilla rule. The alternative, for its part, must obviously be acceptable in general terms, and probably benevolent in terms of law and order.

#### THE LATER YEARS

When the total of British troops had risen to 32,000 in 1887, and their efficiency had grown with experience and acclimatization, the tide began to turn. Constant patrolling between bases supplemented the mobile columns operating against the guerrilla bands whenever they were located. The speed of movement of the cavalry and the mounted infantry enabled them to keep on the track of the guerrillas even in jungle country. (The jungle in Upper Burma, it may be remarked, is not as thick as it is in the Malayan Peninsula or Borneo.)

Great progress was made in the improvement of communications. The railway was extended to Mandalay from Toungoo in the valley of the Sittang and later carried on up the western side of the Irrawaddy Valley to Myitkyina. The Irrawaddy itself was used extensively by steamers (stern-wheelers in the main) and a large road program was put in hand with remarkable speed. In particular, lateral roads were built to open up the country between the major axes in the river valleys. All these measures contributed greatly to the efficiency of government. The Deputy Commissioners were able to travel about their districts and to supervise the disarmament of their people. Police posts were established, and the Pax Britannica became a reality. Undoubtedly, the high caliber of the civil officers and their astounding energy brought a security to the countryside which it had never known before.

The main groups of insurgents had been largely broken up into small gangs by military action early in 1889. The remaining



Holland, and perhaps partly because of his ruthless terrorizing of his own supporters. The pattern in this case is a recurrent one in the study of guerrilla warfare. A pursuit appears to become a hopeless "stern chase" (in nautical parlance) and then, because the pressure has been kept up, the guerrilla loses heart, quarrels with his own people and then either surrenders or, if he persists, is liquidated or betrayed by his own side. There are many examples of this sequence of events in the history of this war, and they are, in every respect, identical with hundreds of case histories of the Malayan campaign. The lessons are clear -- constant pressure on the guerrilla pays off in the end and, conversely, terrorist pressure by the guerrilla defeats itself in the long run, provided there is a reasonable alternative to guerrilla rule. The alternative, for its part, must obviously be acceptable in general terms, and probably benevolent in terms of law and order.

#### THE LATER YEARS

When the total of British troops had risen to 32,000 in 1887, and their efficiency had grown with experience and acclimatization, the tide began to turn. Constant patrolling between bases supplemented the mobile columns operating against the guerrilla bands whenever they were located. The speed of movement of the cavalry and the mounted infantry enabled them to keep on the track of the guerrillas even in jungle country. (The jungle in Upper Burma, it may be remarked, is not as thick as it is in the Malayan Peninsula or Borneo.)

Great progress was made in the improvement of communications. The railway was extended to Mandalay from Toungoo in the valley of the Sittang and later carried on up the western side of the Irrawaddy Valley to Myitkyina. The Irrawaddy itself was used extensively by steamers (stern-wheelers in the main) and a large road program was put in hand with remarkable speed. In particular, lateral roads were built to open up the country between the major axes in the river valleys. All these measures contributed greatly to the efficiency of government. The Deputy Commissioners were able to travel about their districts and to supervise the disarmament of their people. Police posts were established, and the Pax Britannica became a reality. Undoubtedly, the high caliber of the civil officers and their astounding energy brought a security to the countryside which it had never known before.

The main groups of insurgents had been largely broken up into small gangs by military action early in 1889. The remaining



gangs were relentlessly hunted by the soldiers, and latterly to a growing extent by the police, who began to enlist local men, particularly the Kachins of the north. In the later phases, the use of very small parties of soldiers, able to move swiftly and secretly, to surprise the insurgents, was the rule and was very effective. An amnesty was proclaimed and insurgents who surrendered voluntarily were merely disarmed. This policy of clemency paid good dividends.

By 1891 the whole of Upper Burma was at peace. A few expeditions were sent to the Shan States where the feudal rulers had thrown off their allegiance to Thibaw in 1884, but there was little fighting. A few of the guerrilla leaders remained at large, and one, Bo Cho, was not disposed of until 1920 in the broken country of Mount Popa, a mere 100 miles from Mandalay. It is worth noting that, by 1891, the British and Indian troops in Upper Burma had been reduced to some 16,000 from the 1887 figure of 32,000, while the police had increased from nothing to 15,000.

#### CONCLUSION

The lessons of this campaign can be summarized as follows:

- a. A clear political aim, i.e., the annexation of Upper Burma and the determination to pursue it.
- b. Adequate military forces of the right type.
- c. Proper plans for civil administration, including the provision of trained men and police.
- d. Good communications, including road, river, and railway routes, and telegraph facilities.
- e. Good cooperation between civil and military.
- f. In the military sphere:
  - (1) Mobility and speed,
  - (2) The correct use of all arms including light artillery,
  - (3) The use, at the right time, of small parties to surprise guerrillas.

g. The value of clemency toward surrendering guerrillas and the effectiveness of an amnesty policy at the right time.

In this case, the guerrillas had no outside support whatever. The French, who might have been expected to help in the light of their previous activities, did nothing after the fall of Mandalay, though Franco-British rivalry continued at a high pitch for years afterward. One can only surmise that they were deterred by the success of the military operations against Thibaw in the first place and, in the second, by the determination shown by the British to bring the guerrilla phase to an end.

All guerrilla support was internal. It was obtained largely by terror and partly from patriotic or nationalist motives. It consisted almost entirely of food and perhaps a small amount of locally made gunpowder. The British forces' method of isolating the guerrillas from this support was essentially simple. It was to keep the guerrilla on the move and away from the villages where he might get support. Coupled with this was an energetic civil administration, moving in with the troops or very close behind them and demonstrating the advantages of a settled life with law and order as the prime ingredient. Most people will settle for a quiet life.

### Bibliography

Christian, John Leroy. Modern Burma. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942.

Hall, Daniel G.E. Burma. New York: Longmans, 1950.

History of the Third Burmese War 1885-1890, Parts I to VI. India: Government Printing Office

Scott, Sir James G. Burma from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. London: T.F. Unwin, Ltd., 1924.

## The Boer Guerrillas, 1900-1902

by

Frank H. Brooke

### BACKGROUND

The causes of the war between the British government and the Boer Republics which began in 1899 are many and complex. They are studied further below as they are essentially part of the struggle which continued for three years. The war itself can be divided into two main phases--the conventional campaign of 1899-1900, and the guerrilla campaign of 1900-1902. Each of these can be further subdivided into two parts. The "conventional" fighting began with a series of British defeats and Boer successes. This subphase was ended with the arrival of Roberts and Kitchener, and the second subphase continued through the British successes of 1900 which culminated in the fall of the capitals of the Boer Republics and the flight of President Kruger. The guerrilla phase, in turn, can be conveniently divided into the "pre-blockhouse" and "post-blockhouse" subphases.

The terrain influenced operations in all phases to a notable extent. Apart from the coastal plain of limited depth, the country rises steeply to a vast plateau at a height of 4,000 to 6,000 feet, with ranges of mountains topping 10,000 feet in places. With some exceptions the country is well watered, though the normal rainfall is low by Temperate Zone standards and the greater part can be described as of savannah type, mainly grassland and subject to occasional but severe drought. The two great rivers, the Vaal and the Orange, running roughly from east to west, marked the southern boundaries of the two Boer Republics. On the west and south the Orange Free State was bordered by the British settlement of Natal. To the North the Transvaal Republic had the Portuguese territory of Mozambique on its eastern frontier, the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland on the west, and the new country of Rhodesia across the Limpopo River to the north.

The Boer Republics were thus landlocked with no direct access to the sea. The ports of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and Durban were in British territory. The only other port in the whole area, Lourenço Marques on Delagoa Bay, was Portuguese. By the beginning of the war in 1899 there was an extensive rail network connecting the ports in British South Africa with the Boer capitals of Bloemfontein and Pretoria. The railways had come into being as a result of the diamond and gold finds made in 1871 and 1886. However, in 1895 the Transvaal Republic had realized its need for another route to the sea, and a railway was opened between Pretoria and Delagoa Bay. Apart from the railways, communications were poor, consisting mainly of dirt and gravel roads carrying horse- or ox-drawn wagons.

Along the railway lines and a few of the roads ran a fairly well-developed telegraph system, while Cape Town and Durban were in touch with the outside world by ocean cable.

The development of the diamond and gold mines had changed the economy of the country in a revolutionary way from 1871 onward, but this development was restricted, broadly speaking, to the towns of Kimberley and Johannesburg, the ports of Cape Town and Durban, and the railways that linked them. In the rest of the country and particularly in the Boer Republics, life went on much as before with a thin and scattered farming population continuing a remote and pastoral existence. The Boer population was scattered because of the nature of the land and the type of farming (a typical homestead might be 5,000 acres, mainly grazing land). The white population of the Transvaal and Orange Free State in 1899 is not known accurately (there was no census until 1904) but was probably about a third of a million, with the Boer element totalling about 200,000. The remainder were farming settlers of British stock and the mining communities--mainly British, but including a number of US citizens.

#### NATURE OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT

The Boer himself (the term "Boer" is used rather than the modern one "Afrikaner") stemmed from the original Dutch settlers at the Cape of Good Hope, established there by the Dutch East India Company early in the mid-17th Century to provide fresh provisions for their ships trading to the East. The burghers were reinforced by successive waves of immigrants from Holland and by a large French Huguenot element after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The Huguenots were completely absorbed almost at once, leaving only their surnames and some influence on

the language of the "Cape Dutch" to survive the strongly nationalist atmosphere they entered.

The Cape Dutch were independent by nature (there were many minor rebellions and quarrels with their Amsterdam-appointed governors and officials), strongly Calvinist by religion, and basically republican by conviction. Isolated from Europe, they lived a life of their own for 200 years, preserving their religious and political freedom as far as they could, and expanding their foothold at the Cape ever further into Africa. They fought and subdued the few native tribes and built up a fairly prosperous rural economy based on slave labor.

Into this static 17th-Century society came the British to forestall a French occupation of the Cape under Napoleon. First by conquest, and then by purchase, the British secured definitive possession of the Cape at the Treaty of Paris in 1814. British colonial administration and liberal views on the treatment of the colored man did not suit the Boers at all. They had always maintained a policy of racial superiority, believing it to be justified by Holy Writ ("the sons of Ham . . ."), and the abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire in 1834 was the last straw for many. In 1835 the Great Trek away from the domination of the British began. Hundreds and thousands of Boer farmers with their families and their cattle set off toward the free open spaces of the east and north, continuing and accelerating a trend that had begun earlier. On the way they met the Zulus and other Bantu tribes who were migrating southward at the same time. Many battles were fought to enable the Trek to go on and to secure land already occupied. They pushed east into Natal as well as to the north, where they established themselves beyond the Orange and Vaal Rivers. In 1820 the British government had sponsored a settlement by British colonists (mainly veterans of the Napoleonic Wars) in the eastern coastal districts. The Boer thrust into Natal was resisted by the British government, and a short war followed. In 1842 British authority was established in Natal, and a year later it became a British colony, being combined with Cape Colony for administration.

In 1848 the country between the Vaal and Orange Rivers was declared British territory. Though the Boers were not united on this, a minority took up arms and were defeated by British forces. As a result of various conventions and agreements between 1854 and 1856 the British withdrew from the country north of the Orange River, and the Orange Free State came into existence, while the independence of the Transvaal as the South African Republic was recognized by the British government.

The inhabitants of both republics fought a number of wars against the Kaffirs and the Basuto tribes, but South Africa was then relatively peaceful until the founding in 1871 of the town of Kimberley, as the center of the diamond industry. As already remarked, this new source of wealth changed the whole economy, and further inspired a bitter disagreement between the British and the Orange Free State. Briefly, the British government had annexed the diamond lands claimed by the Free State, though settling the matter by a money payment three years later.

From 1877 for some years the British government worked toward a federation of all the South Africa territories. This was a sensible and sincere aim, but when the Transvaal was "annexed" as a step toward it there followed vigorous protests by the Boers. The Boers at this time strove only for the independence of the two republics they had carved out for themselves; but within a few years a movement for a larger program of "South Africa for the South Africans" gained strength. Encouraged by this, the Transvaal revolted and the first Boer War began in 1880. The British forces were defeated at Majuba, and Gladstone's government conceded independence to the Transvaal under the suzerainty of Great Britain in 1881.

During the next few years the British government was concerned to check German Imperial expansion eastward from Southwest Africa and concluded treaties with the Bechuanaland native chiefs to ensure the route to the north where Cecil Rhodes was developing the country which was to bear his name. The Boers at this time attempted to establish a republic in Zululand to gain access to the sea, but were frustrated by the British, who annexed St. Lucia Bay.

In 1886 gold was discovered in rich reefs on the Rand in the southern Transvaal. The usual "rush" followed, and the city of Johannesburg was laid out. Four years later the railway from Cape Town reached the new gold-mining center, and the development of its immense wealth truly began. The mining community was largely British, with a considerable number of American miners and financiers. The Transvaal government, though grateful for the money brought in by taxation (the Boers had always been averse to paying taxes to the British or their own governments), regarded this influx as "Uitlanders" (literally outlanders or outsiders) and did little for them. The not unknown cry of "no taxation without representation" was raised without much result. Further grievances over education and police protection were added to the demand for the franchise. It is probable that President Kruger's government in Pretoria might have made concessions in due time, but on



December 31, 1895, Dr. L. Starr Jameson, a close friend and business partner of Rhodes (then Prime Minister of Cape Colony) led a small armed force over the Transvaal border with the aim of capturing Johannesburg and "liberating" the Uitlanders. Rhodes was probably implicated to some extent and resigned as Prime Minister after the ill-conceived raid had been ignominiously defeated by Boer commandos and its leaders jailed in Pretoria. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State concluded an offensive and defensive treaty as a direct result of the raid, and further pressure was put on the Uitlanders. This culminated in the Aliens Expulsion Act and various restrictions on the press and on public meeting, which caused continuous friction between Great Britain and the Transvaal. An attempt to heal the breach was made by the Bloemfontein Conference in May-June 1899, but this failed and, President Kruger's ultimatum to Great Britain being rejected, a state of war followed on October 12.

In brief, war came as the result of a series of incidents reflecting the Boer passion for freedom from interference by anyone and the British urge to expand and secure the Empire. The situation was aggravated greatly by the change from a pastoral economy to a sophisticated industrial society producing vast wealth from gold and diamonds. The change was a sudden one and the Boer could not adapt himself to it. He was in fact an 18th-Century man dragged unwillingly into the 20th, by the British expansion, which included the aim of securing a monopoly in gold and diamonds.

#### BOER ORGANIZATION

In 1899 both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were republics, each with an elected president (Kruger and Steyn respectively) and an elected assembly known as the Volksraad. Government was largely by agreement; and administration was minimal for two reasons--first the Boer's dislike of authority almost amounting to anarchy, and second his aversion to paying taxes. The courts functioned under the Roman-Dutch code, and the police force was confined to the few large towns. (Crime was almost nonexistent in the countryside.) There was no standing army (apart from an efficient corps of artillery), but every man from 17 to 70 was required to serve in his local commando in emergency, providing his own weapon, horses, and initial supply of food and ammunition. Wagons drawn by horses or oxen provided the transport for bulk stores (mainly ammunition, digging tools, and food). Forage for the horses was obtained by local



grazing, as was sustenance for the herds of cattle and sheep which accompanied the wagon trains during major moves or concentrations.

There were a few forts which acted as arsenals or depots, holding reserve arms and ammunition. Before the war began there had been an extensive arms procurement program. This had produced modern rifles (Mauser) and Krupp field guns from Germany, and a smaller quota of Creusot guns from France. Saddlery and horse equipment were produced locally, and uniform was not provided.

The commando system was extremely flexible. The size of a commando varied greatly, but all were mounted, generally with spare horses. The Boer was an experienced fighting man, who had fought both the British and the Bantu tribes on many occasions. He knew the terrain, was a good marksman, and was mobile. His military capacity was as seriously underestimated by the British as was the strength of his nationalism. The Boer leadership was intelligent, ruthless, and single-minded.

#### THE BRITISH ORGANIZATION

The British forces based in Cape Colony and Natal consisted of Regular troops from the United Kingdom and a substantial body of mounted police organized on paramilitary lines. The Regulars included cavalry, artillery, engineers, and infantry, but, being garrison troops rather than a field force, they were short of transport and logistic support. The intelligence system was rudimentary at the outset, and the general atmosphere was one of confident unpreparedness. The British army had not fought a major campaign for nearly 50 years, and the standard of generalship displayed in the early stages can only be described as poor. Some reinforcements had been sent from England in the period after the Jameson Raid, but the logistic side remained weak.

#### THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WAR

At the outset the Boers could field some 60,000 armed men--a force considerably larger than the British could deploy. The British forces garrisoning the towns of Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking were soon invested and on the defensive. A Boer sortie into Natal met with initial success, and serious defeats were inflicted on the British forces attempting to relieve Ladysmith.

By January 1900 the Boers believed they had won and expected peace overtures from the British government. Instead troop reinforcements poured into South Africa, and the invasion of the Boer republics drove forward under Roberts and Kitchener. The British forces suffered grave supply difficulties but were supported by a wave of patriotic fervor at home almost unequalled before or since. Kimberley was relieved, and the Boers were defeated on the Modder River in a hard and bloody battle. Then Bloemfontein, capital of the Orange Free State, fell to Roberts's army, but his further advance was checked for weeks by enteric and cholera epidemics. These put tens of thousands of soldiers in the hospital and spread to the civil population.

Both sides rested. The British waited for the supplies to build up to enable them to push north into the Transvaal, and the Boers hoped for outside intervention. Presidents Steyn and Kruger made peace proposals which were rejected. The Queen of the Netherlands asked the German Kaiser to support collective action, but he avoided the issue. Roberts issued an amnesty proclamation, which brought in 8,000 Free State Boers who handed in their rifles, took an oath of loyalty, and went home. The war was almost over, but the British could not advance, because of sickness among men and horses and shortage of supplies and transport. The Boers then carried out a number of raiding operations with some success, mainly under the able leadership of Christian R. De Wet. At this time the Boers were joined by a number of volunteers from France, Russia, and Germany, which raised further hopes of outside intervention.

By May 1900, however, Roberts was ready; and before the end of the month Mafeking had been relieved. Kruger and his government left Pretoria, and it seemed to the British that the occupation of the Transvaal capital would finish the war. In June it fell to Roberts and it appeared that the Boer Commandos were routed. Many had returned to their homes or surrendered around Pretoria.

To the Boers the situation seemed hopeless, but some 6,000 men now rallied round their new Commandant-General Louis Botha north of Johannesburg. They scattered in the face of the British superiority in numbers, and operating in small groups threatened or attacked key points on the British lines of communication. The success of these tactics, limited as it was, offered a glimmer of hope. From this time on the guerrilla phase of the war began, even though in September President Kruger had left the country through Delagoa Bay and taken ship for Europe. President Steyn remained determined, though "on the run," and Jan

Smuts had joined Botha and Jacobus de la Rey in the north. The Boers had lost their bases; and their farms were now their only source of supply. In August and September Roberts formulated and proclaimed the policy of "farm burning" to frustrate this sole alternative for the Boers. The farm-burning policy was intended originally to be both limited and selective, and its aim was to deny supply. However, it was difficult to control in detail and much widespread and random destruction was carried out by British troops, sometimes as unofficial reprisal for Boer raids and sniping.

### BOER AIMS

The war policy of the Boers at this time is difficult to define precisely. It varied from day to day, and difficulties of communication made it impossible to impose a single plan over the whole area. It is clear, however, that two leaders--Botha and Smuts--decided to continue the struggle with all the means at hand. Smuts had been left behind in Pretoria at Kruger's departure, and in October 1900 he met the other leaders, including the successful De Wet and de la Rey, north of Johannesburg. This was an important meeting, as it was decided to concentrate forces to attack and destroy the Rand gold mines and to invade Cape Colony. The opportunity for the first operation never arose, but Smuts never wavered on the second. He had earlier, in July, secured a position with de la Rey, which virtually made the two men a government of the Western Transvaal. Kruger was in Holland, but the government in exile was ineffective except for propaganda purposes, and it was impossible to refer to it for decisions within reasonable time.

Until December 1900 Smuts remained with de la Rey (as a sort of political commissar and second-in-command), learning the business of guerrilla war in the Magaliesberg (a range of jagged mountains north of Johannesburg) against the British columns trying to disrupt and trap the commandos. The hit-and-run tactics of the Boers were highly successful, but the Magaliesberg operations had to come to an end because they could no longer get support from the devastated countryside. The farm-burning policy of the British included driving off livestock and the removal of the women and children to concentration camps, so that the commandos could no longer find food and fresh horses. Ammunition and rifles were also becoming a problem, which could be solved only by capturing them from the British. This Smuts did in a notable action at Moddersfontein.

However, Smuts still fixed his mind on the invasion of Cape Colony, where it was hoped that the appearance of his forces would cause a general rebellion by the Boer half of the population. This hope was reinforced by reports of meetings and unrest there. The overall aim remained--complete independence for the two Boer Republics. In Smuts's mind there was also the idea of an independent United States of Africa, on which he had written a powerful tract some years earlier during the period of tension after the Jameson Raid. All his political thinking pointed to Cape Colony being the key to achieving the Boer aims, and he continued his political warfare intensively while also acting as an inspiring leader in the field. Underlying all Boer thinking was the hope of outside intervention by the great powers, which they felt must surely come in time. To this end Smuts wrote voluminously and continuously.

Soon he was to be presented with more propaganda material as the British farm-burning and concentration camp policy got under way. The camps were humanely administered, but the mass hygiene of the time was unequal to the load, and epidemics and disease affected the internees as well as the soldiers. Some 20,000 women and children died of sickness to which they had no immunity after generations of life on remote farms. The most was made of this "barbarism" by all available propaganda methods, and the issue was taken up in the capitals of the world. Great Britain at this time was by no means popular with the other great powers. Relations with France were still strained over Fashoda, and the Entente Cordiale was still in the future. Germany was openly on the side of the Boers, and the Kaiser's congratulatory telegram to Kruger on the failure of the Jameson Raid was more than symptomatic. Germany, however, did not intervene and provided only moral support. An important factor here was the overwhelming supremacy of the Royal Navy, which enabled the British government to cut off all outside support in the material sense and to deter any potential offer of support. In short, European support for the Boers remained, in British eyes, no more than an extremely remote contingency. The United States stood aside, being engaged in her own expansion and her own imperialist phase.

However, the Boers had a powerful ally in London--the left wing of the Liberal opposition in Parliament. Many Liberals had opposed the war fairly consistently, and the Boers had hoped all along for a change of government which would give them their desires. At one time, particularly in 1899, this had looked probable, and in 1901 it still remained possible. Also active in London and the European capitals was a body of skilled

propaganda writers which included Miss Emily Hobhouse and W.T. Stead. The conditions in the camps were fuel for the fire in any humanitarian campaign, and when the death rate rose to over 300 per 1,000 the situation became grave for the British government. So the Boers had some justification for their hopes, and political warfare was intensified, particularly by Smuts, who kept up a busy correspondence with the outside world. Rhodes and his associates waged a vigorous counterpropaganda campaign in London, but this was ineffective, and even counterproductive, because of his "big business" image and his suspected complicity in the Jameson Raid planning.

### THE BRITISH ATTITUDE AND ACTIONS

By all the normal canons of war the Boers should have surrendered when their governments had fled and their capitals had been occupied. The fact that they did not was a surprise in itself, but merely stiffened the British will to persist against an equally stubborn opponent. Roberts returned to England, believing that only "mopping-up" was required. The command devolved on Kitchener--the general who had never lost a battle--and he intensified the measures already put in hand. Farm-burning, however, took time to complete, and the Boers could still get supplies in remote districts. When they could not they captured them in a series of raids on British camps and field depots.

The possibility of a rebellion in Cape Colony was a serious contingency. De Wet had attempted an invasion, but been easily repulsed owing largely to the hesitancy and slowness of his subordinate commanders. The number of British troops in the country far exceeded the total Boer population, but the "drives" and encircling movements nearly always failed to round up the elusive commandos. Kitchener was an engineer and had another card to play--fortifications of a special type, the "blockhouse concept." The blockhouses were simple to build, consisting of two large iron water tanks, the larger surrounding the smaller and the whole made bulletproof by a layer of gravel and earth between the two skins. Each had a small infantry garrison and was placed within supporting distance of the next. Nearly always a barbed-wire fence ran between the blockhouses. The whole concept was entirely that of the Great Wall of China or Hadrian's Wall in Britain, with the difference, of course, in this case that the enemy was everywhere. The aim was to isolate the Boers from support by the combination of farm-burning and the blockhouse lines; and then to pursue the commandos with flying columns with the hope of surrounding them or driving them against the lines. The effort involved was immense; 5,000 miles of blockhouses and wire were built.

(For comparison it is 800 miles from Cape Town to Johannesburg.) In addition there were 40 isolated garrisons and troops stationed in all main centers of population. The blockhouse lines, broadly speaking, protected the British lines of communication as well as providing barriers against Boer movement and support. In one or two instances the blockhouse lines were breached by determined Boer attacks, but generally they were effective in the long run. They also made it difficult for the Boers to concentrate large forces without being detected by an increasingly effective intelligence organization.

By the end of February 1901 Kitchener had so tightened his grip as to feel justified in approaching the Boer Commandant, General Botha, with a view to peace talks. The two men met, and though the accounts of the talks are confused and conflicting it is clear that Kitchener favored some sort of negotiated peace, but the British government and its High Commissioner, Milner, were insistent on unconditional surrender. The negotiations broke down and the war went on.

The Boers, however, were in a near-desperate military situation and met to discuss the question of sending an envoy to Kruger in Holland. This idea and the question of asking for an armistice were firmly rejected by President Steyn, still "on the run," but still resolute. In June a Boer Council of War decided against any peace proposals which did not ensure independence for the republics or "satisfactorily provide for the case of our /Cape/ Colonial brethren." The only chance of making good this resolution lay in a successful rebellion in Cape Colony and outside intervention.

#### THE INVASION OF CAPE COLONY

Early in August 1901 Smuts and his men crossed the Vaal River. In a speech he told the little force of 340 that it was "a struggle for Right, for God. If they failed, God would fail too." Brave words indeed, but not ridiculous in historical retrospect. Smuts must be given credit for a true appreciation of the strategic possibilities. His invasion presented a very real threat to the security of the Colony and of Cape Town itself. Unfortunately for the Boers it was a case of too little and too late. Stronger forces employed a few months earlier might have been decisive. As it was, Smuts's force carried out an almost incredible foray of some 2,000 miles, through the Orange Free State first and then the entire breadth of the Cape

Colony. A number of successful actions were fought on the way, and by the end of the year he was established in the northwestern corner of Cape Colony, having either broken through or avoided the blockhouse lines. He opened communications with the "Deputation" in Holland through German Southwest Africa and reorganized and regrouped the scattered commandos which the British were rounding up one by one. But progress was disappointing to the Boer cause. Though the farm-burning policy was not applied in the Colony, the British had commandeered the horses and this prevented any effective recruitment of fresh strength. Smuts's force barely exceeded 600 men in the end, and he found himself virtually isolated in the wide open spaces of the northern Cape Colony. In January 1902 he wrote a long political tract addressed to W.T. Stead and intended to appeal to the conscience of the English people. It included a bitter denunciation of the wrongs inflicted on the Boers by the British, but ended with a plea for "a stable Commonwealth in South Africa, in which Boer and Briton will both be proud to be partners." Ten years later this idea was to be achieved, but now he and the other Boer leaders realized that they could not go on. The stage was set for the Peace of Vereeniging, which after several meetings was finally signed on May 31, 1902. It is unnecessary to go into the details of the settlement except to note that the British would not concede complete independence, but agreed to pay compensation for the burned farms and other war damage. This compensation was eventually on an extremely generous basis and enabled the Boers to rebuild their economy in the two republics, which in turn made possible the Union in 1910 of Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange Free State. The part which Smuts and Botha played in establishing the Union is too well known to justify further comment.

#### CONCLUSION

The years of the second phase of the war in South Africa may fairly be said to represent a classic case of guerrilla warfare. All the elements are present. An inferior armed force, unable to face its enemies in open battle, adopts hit-and-run tactics, hopes for outside intervention to tip the scales, and strives to gain it. The opponent, stronger in numbers and material, having won the initial and conventional campaign, is forced to continue the struggle (by political intransigence on both sides), and seeks to regain the initiative by isolating the guerrilla from his external and internal support, knowing that in the end victory will go to the big battalions.



To achieve the victory not only must the big battalions be big enough, but the guerrilla enemy must be deprived of support and defeated by force of arms. The Boers, from the outset in 1899, received no outside support in the material sense, and so were dependent on internal support alone. This form of support had to be eliminated--hence the farm-burnings, the concentration camps, and the blockhouse lines. This aspect of war has often been described as "counterproductive" in the modern idiom. So it is, in a purely political assessment; but political considerations can seldom stand alone. War remains an extension of politics, and though the devastated farms and the 20,000 dead in the camps have provided the bitterest memories of the war for the Boer, yet the policy was a military necessity.



## Bibliography

- Cloete, Stuart. Rags of Glory. London: Collins, 1963.
- Colvin, Ian D. South Africa. London: Jack & Jack, 1913.
- Hancock, W.K. Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870-1919. vol. I.  
New York: Cambridge, 1962.
- Jeppe, Carl W.B. The Kaleidoscopic Transvaal. Capetown: Juta  
& Co., 1906.
- Reitz, Deneys. No Outspan. London: Faber & Faber, 1943.
- Young, Francis Brett. In South Africa. London: Heinemann, 1952.

## France and the Guerrilla War in Vietnam: 1945-1954\*

by

Frank N. Trager

### INTRODUCTION

In order to offer a treatment of guerrilla war in Vietnam in whatever depth of background a reader may desire, modern French and current American experience are presented apart from the geographic and historical setting of these events. This material is gathered at the end of this volume in Appendix A, "French Experience in Vietnam: Geographic and Historical Setting." The reader's attention is particularly invited to the final section of that Appendix, entitled: "General Observations on French Counterinsurgency Experience and Practice Prior to World War II."

In the preparation of the study of modern French experience, 1945-1954, two different, although not mutually exclusive, sets of data were examined and assimilated--for the Viet Minh and for the French--neither of which was fully accessible. The Viet Minh data exhibited the singleness of purpose which gave coherence to its operations, as we have attempted to make clear. The French record, on the other hand, could not be restricted to the Vietnam scene; on the contrary, it could only be understood against the exhaustive backdrop of metropolitan politics and the personalities and instrumentalities through which political decisions filtered and interacted: parliamentary and ministerial committees, ministries, administrative and executive officials, financial interests, political parties, colonial authorities, Vietnamese political factions, and the military establishment. In fact, a special feature of this French record, and one which would also require a separate study, concerns the French military infrastructure,

---

\*This paper was prepared with the assistance of Marjorie W. Normand.

both at home and in Vietnam, the disintegration of its command and control leadership, and its increased isolation from the body politic. In a very real sense, both regarding personnel and failures, Vietnam presaged Algeria and contributed vitally to the military disenchantment which culminated in the attempted Putsch and the fall of the Fourth Republic. In losing Vietnam, then, France lost more than a parcel of colonial territory.

### NATURE OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT

#### Rise of the Viet Min.

The single most important factor contributing to the Viet Minh success in driving France from Vietnam was its ability to gain and retain leadership of the nationalist revolution, especially in the north, and thus to become the symbol of the national will to independence. None of this had much to do with refinements of political ideology, other than the pervasive anti-French colonialist temper of most elite Vietnamese. At the time, this effort was not publicly tied to Communist doctrine. The Communists in the late 1930s championed the Popular Front and its moderate program, and in fact nearly forfeited whatever popularity they had acquired as anti-imperialists by eschewing the drive for independence. While the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) was thereby following international Comintern policy, it was striving nonetheless to build a local image as the vehicle to express the inchoate aspirations of a disgruntled peasantry. Subsequent party literature has stressed its leadership of the 1931 peasant "revolts," thus laying claim to an unbroken history of revolutionary leadership.

It is a tribute to the organizational discipline and flexibility of the ICP that it was able to survive intact the French repressive policies following collapse of the Popular Front in 1938. Many of its leaders, along with other Vietnamese revolutionaries, fled into exile. At the outbreak of World War II, in line with Comintern policy advocating the formation of united fronts encompassing the widest possible spectrum of nationalist organizations, the ICP convoked a meeting in southern China in May 1941. Under the guidance of veteran Communist leader Ho Chi Minh, a front group was formed for the stated purpose of freeing Vietnam from foreign imperialist domination and achieving independence. Ho Chi Minh was named Secretary-General and Communists were given key positions in this coalition, named the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (League for the Independence of Vietnam),

better known as the Viet Minh. In order to rally Vietnamese of all political and religious persuasions and social classes, the Viet Minh program made no mention of the key Communist doctrines of social revolution and agrarian reform; instead it emphasized the ouster of both French and Japanese forces, national independence, and the formation of a broadly based government.

The Japanese coup of March 9, 1945, with the Emperor Bao Dai proclaiming Vietnam's independence under Japan's aegis, destroyed the façade of French (Vichy) authority in Vietnam and provided enormous impetus to the revolutionary movement. Prior to that time, the Viet Minh had concentrated on securing and enlarging a political base of operations in the Viet Bac area north and northeast of Hanoi, on spreading its influence among the masses by building up village cells, and on recruiting a guerrilla army. The military task was entrusted to Vo Nguyen Giap, a former history teacher and Communist agitator who went to China to study Mao's theory and practices of guerrilla warfare. By Giap's own admission, he started with a nucleus of 34 poorly armed men. However, recruitment was rapid. Before the Japanese take-over, his force had grown to 1,000 men and by the time of the Japanese surrender, it had increased to 5,000 men. Although Giap did not officially constitute his guerrillas as a Liberation Army (in Cao Bang province) until December 1944, his guerrilla forces had already extended their intelligence and reconnaissance network southward and had begun to infiltrate French-patrolled areas. The sudden disappearance of the colonial administration in 1945 facilitated the Viet Minh ability both to consolidate its political bases in the hinterland (especially in the Viet Bac region) and to increase its military penetration in the Red River delta. Viet Minh forces even transformed villages into "liberation bases" controlled by Viet Minh cadres and ruled by National Liberation Committees which combined administrative, political, and military duties. However, Viet Minh authority was spreading unevenly through the country. It was especially weak in Cochinchina, the area furthest from its stronghold, where nationalist support was fragmented and control dispersed among rival political-religious sects, as well as a strong Trotskyist movement.

Viet Minh leaders reacted with energy and initiative to news of the sudden Japanese capitulation. They determined to overthrow whatever government power structure still operated--both Vietnamese and Japanese--and to take over actual physical control of the administrative buildings in Hanoi and other centers from the existing authorities. In short, the plan was to move into a power vacuum and present the Vietnamese people with a fait accompli before opposition could arise either internally or internationally.<sup>1</sup> To this end a national congress of the Viet Minh was hastily

summoned on August 13, 1945. It approved a policy of insurrection and adopted a ten-point program of action authorizing the Viet Minh to seize power from the Japanese, proclaim independence, and welcome the Allies in the name of the Vietnamese people. Several days later, the Japanese officially handed the reins of government over to Emperor Bao Dai. Effective control, however, was passing into the hands of Viet Minh agents. Viet Minh soldiers moved into Hanoi and took over administrative control throughout the north. Faced with this determined and militant organization claiming to lead a national revolution, Bao Dai, on August 26, abdicated in favor of the Viet Minh-sponsored regime and urged his countrymen to rally to the cause of independence. He also accepted the post of Supreme Political Advisor in the provisional government, thus providing it with an important symbol of legitimacy and continuity. On September 2, Ho Chi Minh, as President of the provisional government, proclaimed the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to a vast crowd in Hanoi and officially repudiated all prior treaties with France.

The August insurrection succeeded in achieving for the Viet Minh the governmental power to which it aspired, but only in the north. In South Vietnam, the pattern of revolution differed sharply. Competing nationalist groups disagreed violently in their attitude toward France and the Allies and only reluctantly joined the Viet Minh in an uneasy united front, the Provisional Executive Committee of the South. The decision which sealed the fate of the Viet Minh in the south, however, and set the pattern for the future war, was taken not in Vietnam but in Potsdam in 1945. There it was decided by the victorious Allies that Kuomintang Chinese troops would reoccupy Vietnam north of the 16th parallel to disarm the Japanese, and British forces would do likewise in the south.

The British under General Douglas Gracey arrived in September 1945 and remained for approximately four months. During this time, they maintained order and permitted the French military in Saigon forcibly to wrest control from the Committee of the South and expel the Viet Minh from the city. General Leclerc, the French military commander, and Admiral d'Argenlieu, the newly appointed High Commissioner, proceeded to reimpose French military and political authority in South Vietnam, and Viet Minh forces withdrew to the countryside.

In the north, Chinese military authorities were neither so eager to leave nor so favorably inclined to facilitate French re-entry. The Kuomintang harbored political ambitions encouraged by 1,000 years of Vietnamese vassalage to China, and centering around the political fortunes of the KMT-sponsored coalition, the Dong

Minh Hoi (Viet Nam Cach Menh Dong Minh Hoi--Vietnam Revolutionary League), and the violently anti-French Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang--Vietnam Nationalist Party (VNQDD). To mollify the Chinese, the Viet Minh took both these nationalist parties into a reshuffled government and allotted them seats in a newly elected National Assembly apparently far in excess of their popular strength.

Actually, there are no objective data for estimating popular loyalties, only observations and guesses. Fearful of dissipating their energies fighting on a triple front--against the Chinese, French, and opposition nationalist groups--the Viet Minh, in a classical Leninist maneuver ("two steps forward, one step back ward," as illustrated by Brest-Litovsk), decided to come to terms with France. A preliminary agreement was finally signed on March 6, 1946, but it was satisfactory to neither side. France recognized the DRV as a "free state, having its own government, parliament, army and treasury, belonging to the Indochinese Federation and to the French Union"<sup>2</sup> but powerful voices both in France and Saigon were raised in protest against the "recognition" accorded the new regime. On the other hand, the Viet Minh, in undertaking to permit the return of French troops to Vietnam, risked alienating bona fide nationalists as well as extremists among their own followers.<sup>3</sup> (Parenthetically it should be noted that as soon as the Chinese withdrawal permitted, the Viet Minh struck the nationalists, primarily from the VNQDD and the Dong Minh Hoi. With tacit French permission they thus disposed of a source of competition for themselves and potential troublemakers for the incoming French authorities.) Two crucial issues were left for further negotiation: the status of Cochinchina and the distribution of functions and powers among the "free state," the Indochinese Federation, and the French Union.

Whether or not either side intended to honor all the terms of the March 6 accord is a moot point; there were elements in both countries with the will and power to sabotage peace in Vietnam and they ultimately won out. While Ho Chi Minh was leading a delegation to France to attend the Fontainebleau (July) Conference, at which details of the agreement were to be "ironed out," Admiral d'Argenlieu was proclaiming an autonomous republic in Cochinchina and encouraging separatist tendencies among the hill tribes in the high plateau region, in contravention of the March 6 agreement. If the Vietnamese delegation had its provocation, it also miscalculated the political temper in Paris. Rather than counting on the enlightened conservatives of the MRP (Mouvement Populaire Republicaine)<sup>4</sup> and among the Gaullists, who could afford to support their more moderate demands and were sympathetic to them, they openly courted the left wing, on the assumption that the Communists would soon form a government.<sup>5</sup>

But the Communists and Socialists (SFIO)<sup>6</sup> dared not risk alienating the electorate by supporting an anticolonialist cause, so the Viet Minh found themselves without a champion to guide them through the intricacies of French political maneuvering. The Fontainebleau Conference came to an end without making any progress on the two major points at issue--unification of Vietnam and definition of a "free state"--although Ho Chi Minh signed on September 14 a modus vivendi on minor points.

In view of the inability of the Viet Minh and French governments to come to any agreement on fundamental questions, and the extreme mutual mistrust displayed by various elements in both camps, it is not surprising that a series of military incidents ensued in November at Haiphong and Lang Son, culminating in the outbreak of large-scale fighting in Hanoi on December 19, 1946. This was the beginning of a war which would last for eight years and would turn a little-known area of the world into an international battlefield. And once fighting broke out, the Viet Minh problem of rallying Vietnamese of all political persuasions to its banner became simplified: the Vietnamese were given the choice of being pro-French or pro-independence, and there were few if any genuine nationalists among the Vietnamese who opted for the French in 1946.

#### Political Dynamics and Structure of Government

When they took to the hills in 1946, the Viet Minh claimed to possess two of the appurtenances of a modern democratic state: a written constitution guaranteeing fundamental individual rights and a National Assembly popularly elected. In reality, the constitution was more a propaganda façade than a working plan of government: it was adopted in 1946 when the Viet Minh were looking to the United States for support against France and therefore contained many features of--and even language from--the American constitution. The structure of government provided in the constitution was never put into operation, because of the wartime "crisis conditions"; the National Assembly was dissolved in November 1946, after it had approved the new government, and did not meet again until 1953. And although the Viet Minh had boasted that the national elections of January 1946 which had elected the National Assembly were free and democratic, they had controlled the results to such an extent that they could allot seats in the Assembly to rival political parties prior to the elections.



Effective legislative power, then, was lodged, not with the National Assembly as a whole, but with its Permanent Committee and with the executive branch. The National Assembly, on November 3, 1946, had voted Ho Chi Minh the positions of both President and Prime Minister. He thereby combined both executive and legislative powers and ruled together with a Cabinet (Council of Ministers) and the Permanent Committee of the National Assembly, most of whose members also held commensurate positions of importance in the Viet Minh Politburo, which had the effective decision-making power.

Regional organization was somewhat haphazard, especially during the early years of the war when the Viet Minh operated on a de facto basis. People's councils were supposed to be elected at all levels by direct universal suffrage, but they were often suspended, especially at the lower echelons. Instead, legislative, administrative, and even judicial functions were performed by unofficial "resistance committees" staffed by political appointees of the Viet Minh. They acted as channels to enforce governmental laws and decrees, linking the central authority with the smallest village or canton. At the provincial level and below, they were even charged with recruiting local defense and security forces and with conducting other military efforts. In 1948, Vietnam was divided into six interzones to coordinate military and administrative affairs.

Until 1950, the DRV leadership placed primary emphasis on the coalition nature of its government, a policy that permitted it to expand its popular base without relinquishing any actual political control. In fact, the Viet Minh had supposedly been superseded in 1946 by an even more inclusive organization, the Lien Viet.<sup>7</sup> The merger, however, had never been completed, and the popular organization of the masses remained the Viet Minh. Its influence extended throughout the countryside by means of a network of "grass roots" committees and organizations designed to mobilize popular support behind the national effort, and, perhaps more important, ensure that all segments of the population, all social classes, were involved in a group where they could be watched and controlled. The organizations to which they belonged represented a multiplicity of interests and identifications, social, religious, economic, and political. Behind this façade of diversity, political power was exercised by the Communist leadership in the Viet Minh Politburo and, later, the Vietnamese Workers' Party (Dang Lao Dong).

Although the Indochinese Communist Party was supposedly dissolved in 1945 in an effort to disguise the Communist affiliation of much of the Viet Minh leadership, subsequent Communist literature



has claimed for the Party an unbroken leadership of the revolutionary movement since 1931. So it is reasonable to assume that it merely went underground temporarily, its leaders sitting instead on the Viet Minh Politburo. A favorable international climate permitted it to re-emerge in 1951 as the Workers' Party and again to overtly assume command of the DRV. The February 1951 Manifesto of the Workers' Party proclaims it to be a "powerful, clear-sighted, determined, pure and thoroughly revolutionary political party,"<sup>8</sup> with Marxism-Leninism its theoretical foundation, democratic centralism its principle of organization.

The Workers' Party structure was highly centralized, extending down through zone to region, province and village, to the basic unit of organization, the cell group. Influence and control over the people was maintained by the Party's trained propaganda agents, or cadres (can bo), who lived in the villages as the chief spokesmen for government policies and influenced the people to be more receptive to government propaganda. In addition, they kept the government informed about public opinion and attitudes and entered into the activities of all organized village groups. Their influence varied in direct proportion to the government's control over the political and administrative machinery of a given village or region and so did their work. Sent out as propaganda teams to villages not yet completely secure, their role gradually evolved to that of developing front groups. Finally, as a village was brought securely into the Viet Minh camp, the cadres were instrumental in recruiting for local guerrilla forces and regional militia. For the primary concern of the Viet Minh, especially in the early years before 1950, was military survival, and all its vast political machinery was geared to the overriding goal of building an army and mobilizing the country for its support.

### The Military Establishment

The Vietnam People's Army (VPA) was conceived and used as a political army, a reliable and loyal instrument of government, and this political role remained constant and unchanging as its military organization developed and expanded. Under the guidance of Commander in Chief Vo Nguyen Giap, the VPA was shaped into a cohesive, disciplined, thoroughly professional fighting corps. In addition to the regular army (chu luc), Giap developed two additional forces, the regional troops and the popular forces or militia. Each of these had a different role.<sup>9</sup> At the base was the village militia, poorly armed and generally without uniforms, the proverbial "farmer by day and guerrilla by night." These people provided the basic village-level intelligence and screening services so crucial to guerrilla warfare, and performed much

of the manual labor usually reserved to machines in more mechanized countries. Those who performed well were graduated into the regional troops, which had more extensive military training and were generally charged with defending a particular locality. These soldiers also provided a protective screen for the regular army, both before and after battle, and often prepared the battlefield for them. The regional forces had the enormous advantage of fighting in home territory, where they could mobilize the population for intelligence and security and organize the deadly ambushes and hit-and-run raids that kept the French troops demoralized. At the apex of the military organization was the main force, fed by battle-tested regional soldiers, accorded the best weapons and the severest training, an elite corps whose ultimate task it was to crush the French expeditionary corps. The growth of the VPA in a sense paralleled the development of the war from small-scale guerrilla actions to massive operations. During the first years, the popular forces bore the brunt of the French offensives and were later joined by regional troops. Not until the regular army was reinforced by Chinese weapons and hardened by years of training and discipline did Giap hurl it against the French corps in a frontal attack. Even then, this proved premature, and the chu luc was again withdrawn and tactics modified until the propitious moment for a war of movement and, finally, a large-scale confrontation.

The armed forces were not merely politically oriented, they were in fact organizationally linked to the Workers' Party. Basic Party cells existed at all levels of the army's hierarchy, and Party committees were supposed to take the leadership at each echelon. The army also had its own political commissars, provided for in the VPA's enabling decree of March 22, 1946. They functioned as members of the regular army at all levels and shared decision-making powers with the military commander, even on the battlefield.<sup>10</sup> The commissar was also responsible for the political education of each soldier, and lessons in Marxist-Leninist ideology sometimes even preceeded military training. The basic technique for ensuring political conformity was that of self-criticism, and at daily sessions soldiers confessed fears, discussed each others' weaknesses, and evaluated the day's military activities. But soldiers were not only supposed to be disciplined and politically reliable, they also had an important role to play as propaganda agents among the population. For this reason, their relationship with the people upon whom they depended for so much support and protection was minutely and strictly regulated. One of the points of the ten-point oath regular army recruits took swore them "to respect and help the civilian population."<sup>11</sup>

For the peasant was of crucial importance to the soldier, not only for his physical security but also for his material well-being. The Viet Minh made a heavy demand on the population for services, and especially to help solve the thornier problems of logistics, including the carrying of supplies and food to the soldier in battle. Especially during operations which carried the Viet Minh forces far from their bases of operation--such as the invasion of Laos--the transportation of provisions and equipment was a monumental task, which fell almost entirely on the "auxiliary service" of local people. This portage by foot, and by the most primitive mechanical means, thus presented a serious manpower drain on the economy of the north throughout the war period.<sup>12</sup> The transportation system had some advantages, however. The long lines of porters, with or without their loaded bicycles, were easy to camouflage, so French planes could rarely interrupt the slow but steady provisionment of the Viet Minh army in action; furthermore, they could travel over all kinds of terrain, unlike their motorized counterparts in the French army, and were spared the necessity of transporting large quantities of gasoline, oil, etc., for motorized vehicles. After 1950, the Peoples' Army did acquire some transport trucks from China, especially American vehicles captured in Korea, and Soviet Molotovs. But on the whole, this was a most laborious and backbreaking--albeit effective--operation. General Navarre himself pays eloquent homage to the ceaseless labors of the Viet Minh peasant-porters during the battle of Dien Bien Phu, who not only transported the supplies and materiel, but also guarded the lines of communication from the Chinese border to the battlefield, patiently repairing the roads as soon as they were bombed, thus vitiating French efforts to disrupt the transportation system on which all Viet Minh logistics depended.<sup>13</sup>

Another troublesome aspect of logistics for the Viet Minh, especially acute before 1950, was the difficulty of obtaining arms and equipment. Initially, the Viet Minh captured or acquired enough Japanese arms to equip their meager guerrilla forces, supplemented by a small amount of American equipment channeled to them through the OSS. As the Peoples' Army expanded and the need for arms increased, local production attempted to meet basic needs, and the Viet Minh became especially adept in the manufacture of explosives, grenades, and ammunition.<sup>14</sup> The arrival of the Chinese Communists at the border of Tonkin facilitated the passing of war materiel directly to the Peoples' Army and, beginning in 1950, Communist Czechoslovakian and Chinese military aid to the Viet Minh increased significantly. The receipt of recoilless cannon, heavy mortars, and antiaircraft guns--many of them captured from the Americans in Korea--as well as machine guns, tommyguns, and bazookas, changed the complexion of the war for the Viet Minh and enabled the People's Army to open offensives

against the Expeditionary Corps. While estimates as to the amount and quality of foreign aid and equipment received vary, Bernard Fall avers that by the end of 1950, some 40-odd battalions had been entirely equipped by the Chinese with rifles, machine guns, and heavy mortars.<sup>15</sup> About 1951, the Viet Minh began to regroup their armored units into a "heavy" division, which later figured prominently in the battle of Dien Bien Phu.

### Political Ideology and Military Strategy

Possibly even more important than the material assistance and technical aid which the Viet Minh received from Communist China was a doctrine and strategy for waging a military-political war. A number of studies in English have examined in depth both Mao Tse-tung's theories and the use to which they were put in the Vietnamese war; in addition, key propaganda works by Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap, as well as by Mao, have been translated into English. Therefore, we will be limited here to Giap's improvisations and refinements. It is interesting to note that Vo Nguyen Giap has been reluctant to acknowledge the extent of his debt to Mao and instead has emphasized the "unique" aspects of the Vietnamese war of liberation, particularly that it took place in a colonial country, in a much smaller country than China both in territory and population, and was fought against "foreign imperialists."<sup>16</sup> He has presented himself as an original political theoretician rather than what he was in fact: a brilliant and inventive military strategist.

In On Protracted War Mao Tse-tung put forth the concept of a long-term struggle of resistance characterized by three phases of warfare: the first stage, when the enemy has overwhelming military superiority, is one of defensive action and struggle for survival; the second, a period of active guerrilla warfare, involves the constant harassment of enemy troops by auxiliary militia while regular armed forces are being built up; and finally, in the third stage, the military initiative passes to the revolutionary forces and they launch a general counteroffensive. Giap refined this theory as the war progressed and fit it to the situation in Vietnam. In 1950, with Chinese military assistance, he moved into Phase 2 and inflicted a series of disastrous defeats on the French expeditionary corps, forcing them to abandon their string of forts on the Chinese border. Even Giap was not immune to overconfidence, however, and predicted a general counteroffensive for 1951. De Lattre took up the challenge and defeated Giap's chu luc in battle, clearly demonstrating French superiority

in conventional warfare. Giap thereby reverted to guerrilla warfare and enlarged on its scope. He now saw guerrilla tactics as including many of the principles of regular warfare but within the framework of a war of mobility without fixed fronts, in which the regular army fought everywhere. This mobile warfare would be extended even into Phase 3, when it would be coordinated with many local counteroffensives and even conventional battles, aiming now at annihilating, rather than merely sapping the strength of, the enemy.

The strategy and tactics of the VPA can be understood only in the context of political doctrine. They adapted military strategy to their fundamental principle that they were fighting a liberation war, in which it was more important to win the minds of the people than their land. They paid the same painstaking attention to detail in planning propaganda campaigns--ranging from the training of hard-core, ideologically militant guerrillas to the broad indoctrination of the masses--that they did in planning military campaigns. And the goals were always the same: to win political allegiance and convert it into military support. The two were in fact inseparable in waging guerrilla warfare, for many of the military devices on which their guerrillas depended for success and survival required intelligence and reconnaissance services of the local population. These included ambush, surprise attack, espionage, sabotage, and advance preparation both for attack and retreat. One of their five principles of tactics, in fact, demanded the collaboration of the populace in all military actions.<sup>17</sup>

In fighting a political war, the Viet Minh had several factors in their favor from the outset. Their soldiers were native to the land, were used to the climate, knew the area in which they fought, and knew its people, their grievances, and discontents. They had been thoroughly imbued with the idea that theirs was a just cause, and one which would ultimately triumph. And perhaps one of their greatest advantages was the nature of the enemy. The French were waging war in an inhospitable climate, in a land covered with jungles, forests, mountains, and swamps, where they came as foreigners, as aggressors, as colonialists. They lacked a cause, an ideal to fight and die for, and a political-military organization capable of waging the kind of total war they were facing. In one sense, the French defeated themselves in Vietnam.

## THE COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

### Politics in France and Vietnamese Nationalism

The French policy in Vietnam from 1945 to 1954 was both a product and a prisoner of metropolitan politics--and the political games played in Paris, especially in the first years after World War II, merit close scrutiny because of their effect on the course of events in Vietnam. In brief, from 1945 to 1947 a succession of weak, unstable governments, composed of disparate elements and unable to formulate coherent policies or arrive at clearly defined goals, was powerless to prevent a strong-willed and highly motivated High Commissioner in Saigon from sabotaging any modus vivendi with the Viet Minh. And even after d'Argenlieu's removal, no viable alternative was offered Vietnamese nationalists. Paris's vacillating policies and, above all, the unwillingness of the generals and colonial administrators on the spot to transfer any substantial powers to Bao Dai's government, doomed it as a puppet regime from the start.

The extent to which France was ignorant of the turn of events in Vietnam in 1945 and the depth of nationalist sentiment in the countryside can be gauged by the type of readjustment in relations which De Gaulle, on record at the 1944 Free French Brazzaville Conference against the dissolution of the French Empire, offered the former colony; he proposed a Federation composed of the five states in Indochina, presided over by a French Governor-General whose powers would be enhanced at the expense of the ministries in Paris. This was a move toward local autonomy but woefully inadequate to meet an explosive situation in which the Vietnamese were already experiencing the taste of freedom and self-government.

The "August Revolution" of 1945 brought the Viet Minh to power in the north, where they soon had to contend with Chinese occupying forces and their Vietnamese "protégés." In the south, the French military took control of Saigon, with British help, and General Leclerc began the pacification of Cochinchina. Meanwhile, the newly appointed French High Commissioner, Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, former Carmelite monk and staunch Gaullist<sup>18</sup> supporter of France's oversea position, embarked on his campaign to conserve France's interests in Vietnam.

Having been entrusted by De Gaulle with the reconquest of Indochina, General Leclerc pondered the possibilities of re-establishing French authority in the north. He concluded that France would have to make a political accommodation with both

the Chinese occupying army and the Viet Minh or resort to large-scale war, which would necessitate a much greater military commitment than France appeared willing to make. Admiral d'Argenlieu was stricken at the idea of negotiating with a revolutionary government dedicated to achieving independence and sought to undermine Leclerc's position by labeling it "capitulationist."<sup>19</sup> But De Gaulle resigned from the French government on January 20, 1946, and French policy in Vietnam hung fire. A Socialist took over the presidency of the Provisional Government and Marius Moutet, also a Socialist, replaced the Gaullist Jacques Soustelle as Minister of Overseas France. For the moment, a "liberal" policy won out, and the French negotiated the Chinese withdrawal and an accord with the Viet Minh recognizing the DRV as a "free state." But expectations of a peaceful solution proved illusory, as d'Argenlieu achieved in Saigon what he could not attain in Paris. He ruined any possible understanding between the Viet Minh and France by encouraging separatist tendencies in Cochinchina. His "hard line" was supported in Paris by the Interministerial Committee on Indochina, led by Georges Bidault, an MRP leader who was conservative in colonial affairs and who figured prominently in formulation of policy for Vietnam until the Geneva Conference.

The French elections of June 2, 1946, had resulted in a victory for the MRP and strengthened the hand of Bidault and d'Argenlieu. While Ho Chi Minh was en route to France for the Fontainebleau Conference, which opened on July 6, d'Argenlieu unilaterally recognized the Republic of Cochinchina as a "free state."<sup>20</sup> The Fontainebleau Conference, the penultimate intergovernmental meeting between the Viet Minh and France, ended in failure and d'Argenlieu retained a free hand in Vietnam. He was aided once more by governmental instability in Paris. On October 13, the French people voted in a referendum to adopt a constitution for the Fourth French Republic, but the results were clouded by an inconclusive vote in which 8,000,000 abstained. In the elections for a new National Assembly, held the following month, the three major parties won more than 70% of the total vote. But this time the Communists edged out the MRP to regain their position as France's "first party," while the Socialists suffered a severe setback. Yet a deadlock over the formation of a three-party cabinet resulted in a temporary compromise solution: a one-party Socialist cabinet took office, headed by the venerable Leon Blum. It was too late to impose a Socialist policy on Saigon, however, for on December 19, 1946, the day after Blum became Premier, the conflict began in Hanoi and spread throughout the country. Blum failed to reopen negotiations and d'Argenlieu convinced Blum's envoy, Marius Moutet, that the Viet Minh threat could be crushed by military means. D'Argenlieu was not removed from office until the end of February 1947; his successor, Emile Bollaert, was not

instructed to reopen negotiations with the Viet Minh. Instead, the outlines of a new policy were beginning to emerge from both Saigon and the MRP.<sup>21</sup> Following the expulsion of the Communists from the French Cabinet in May 1947, the way was cleared for exploration of the possibility of coming to terms with Vietnamese non-Communist nationalists headed by the ex-Emperor Bao Dai.

French negotiations with Bao Dai, which dragged on for years, were characterized by the patent unwillingness of the government to concede any of the attributes of sovereignty and transfer any real authority to a Vietnamese regime, especially while there appeared the slightest likelihood of a solution by force of arms. In December 1947, High Commissioner Bollaert persuaded Bao Dai, who was then living in Hong Kong, to re-enter Vietnamese politics; and, following months of negotiations, he signed the Ha Long Bay agreements in June 1948. This agreement recognized Vietnam's independence, but so hedged it with military, political, economic, and administrative restrictions that many anti-Viet Minh nationalists were unwilling to enter a government based on it. Bao Dai subsequently renounced the accord and declined to return to Vietnam until France agreed to grant his government greater freedom in internal affairs as well as to unequivocally recognize Vietnam's unity. His moderate demands were finally met, and the Elysée Accords of June 1949 gave Vietnam at least some of the outward symbols of independence. Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina were at last to be recognized as unified, and Vietnam joined the French Union as an Associated State. The new Vietnamese government, now with Bao Dai as Chief of State, was permitted its own army and police force and took over many administrative functions. Yet no real transfer of power took place; the French military controlled the Vietnamese army, French nationals retained their privileged status, and their economic interests were protected by the agreement. Furthermore, fiscal policy continued in French hands, with the Vietnamese piaster tied to the French franc, and the Banque d'Indochine supervising the transfer of monies. Thus, the "Bao Dai solution" as a rallying point for non-Communist nationalists foundered on the rock of French intransigence. To compete with the Viet Minh, Bao Dai had to offer as much if not more than Ho Chi Minh, and this the French could not, or would not, grant. Unless France's military might was withdrawn from the country, real power would reside with the French, and the Vietnamese continued to view the war in terms of nationalism versus colonialism.



### French Military and Political Machinery in Vietnam

If the French political parties were unwilling to cede to the Vietnamese government that modicum of sovereignty and power necessary for its survival, they were equally unwilling to provide the military command in Vietnam with the means to achieve a military victory. One by one, France's most prestigious generals --Leclerc, Valluy, Blaizot, Carpentier, DeLattre, Salan, Navarre, Ely--left their reputations badly tarnished on that inhospitable battleground, unable to perform the miracle demanded of them: victory without cost. And in the end, they had to settle for defeat without surrender. The tragic confusion surrounding policy-formulation in Paris<sup>22</sup> was compounded by the absence of any clear-cut lines of authority from Paris to Saigon, from civilian to military command, even from one theater of operation to another.<sup>23</sup> In order to avoid the necessity of fighting an acknowledged war in Vietnam, in which draftees would have to be used, the government maintained the fiction that this was officially a pacification operation and therefore the job of a professional army. Furthermore, responsibility for overall military direction was entrusted neither to the Minister of National Defense nor the General Staff; instead, it was the Minister of Overseas France (changed in 1950 to that of the Associated States) who assumed direction of the armed forces in Indochina. He represented the Premier, although he acted under instruction of the government through the Committee of National Defense. What this meant in fact was that the Minister of Overseas France could exercise a reasonably autonomous power as long as he did not openly contravene the given policy of any particular government at a particular time. The Minister of National Defense served primarily as a channel to furnish troops and arms for the military effort in Indochina; his policy-making power was equal only to that of any other members of the Committee of National Defense.

Authority in Vietnam was divided between a High Commissioner --a civilian (or military man) representing the French Republic in Indochina--and a Commander in Chief, who was charged with executing operational plans. The military commander had little or no freedom of action, since he had to secure approval from the Ministry of National Defense for his strategy.<sup>24</sup> Only in December 1950, when faced with a serious military defeat and an atmosphere of panic, did the Plevan government agree to cede to one man--General DeLattre de Tassigny--the dual functions, but on his death, the civilian position was again separated from the military.<sup>25</sup>

In 1953, the French Expeditionary Corps was composed of approximately 175,000 regular army troops (54,000 Frenchmen; 30,000 North Africans; 18,000 Africans; 20,000 Legionnaires; 50,000 Indochinese), 5,000 in the navy, and 10,000 in the air force.<sup>26</sup> The Expeditionary Corps was a professional volunteer army, since French law forbade the sending of conscripts to Indochina. Ground troops were divided into some 90 to 100 infantry battalions, whose main task was securing and maintaining the major roads, lines of communications, and population centers. Thus only a small percentage were available for waging mobile warfare, although, as the war progressed, efforts were made to adapt the army to the needs of counter guerrilla warfare, and small units of guerrillas and commandos were formed. But Navarre claims that when he took over command only 10% of the forces were strategically mobile.

Beginning in 1950, when the tides of war turned against the French and the Indochinese situation was feeling the repercussion of international events, it was belatedly recognized that Vietnamese soldiers were far better equipped psychologically than Europeans to undertake the task of permanent pacification. One of the weaknesses of French strategy was that mopping-up operations were of necessity hit-and-run ventures, and there was no possibility of consolidating the gains made in the military field and turning them to political advantage. Thus a project to free French troops for military action by enlarging the size and responsibilities of the Vietnamese National Army was canvassed and accepted. It was projected that American arms would be forthcoming to equip these forces, now that the Korean War had brought the United States to the forefront of the Communist-containment policy. Not until May 1, 1952, however, was a General Staff for the Vietnamese army created,<sup>27</sup> although by January 1 of that year, the Vietnamese army supposedly comprised 150,000 men. Only in 1953 was the Vietnamese army given a separate mission; Vietnamese troops continued to be considered auxiliaries of French forces and were placed under the command of French officers.

Some attempt was made to put Vietnamese militia in charge of specific territories, and this was most successful in Cochinchina, where the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and a Catholic militia under the command of a Eurasian, Colonel Leroy, undertook to maintain security in their respective fiefs. Leroy especially was able to rally the population of Ben Tre Province to his cause and was a prototype of the kind of leader who could fight the Viet Minh on their own terms and win. According to his own account, Leroy not only had to contend with unsympathetic French officers, but also with jealousies among his Vietnamese colleagues.<sup>28</sup>

The year 1950, which brought the acquisition of power by the Chinese Communists, marked a turning point in the military situation in Vietnam, for after this time it is questionable that the French Expeditionary Corps, even with an enormous increase in commitment in Vietnam, could have imposed a military victory in Vietnam. Certainly, the additional Chinese support after the Korean cease-fire took effect made a French military victory most doubtful. The cold war arena had reached and embraced the Vietnamese theater of operations, and military assistance from Communist China and the United States changed the complexion of the conflict--and its possibilities. To understand the significance of this internationalization, it is necessary to recapitulate briefly the train of military events which brought Vietnam to this situation and to examine the key battles which would thereafter bring France to Geneva.

### The War: Strategy and Tactics

It took General Leclerc only four months to re-establish the French "presence" in Cochinchina in 1946, but the core problem of pacification remained: he had neither the men nor the means to plant political and military administration in the villages. When the Viet Minh took to the hills in North Vietnam, the French army rapidly cleared the Hanoi-Haiphong delta area and launched a mopping-up operation in Central Vietnam. But Leclerc recognized that it would take 500,000 men to liquidate the "insurrection."<sup>29</sup> Despite political boasts that "there is no longer a military problem in Indochina,"<sup>30</sup> the ease with which the French troops reoccupied territory depended to a large extent on the Viet Minh tactic of disappearing from the scene in the face of superior enemy concentrations. What the French found out later was that they were merely regrouping and awaiting a favorable situation to employ those guerrilla tactics at which they excelled, especially the ambush and surprise attack of French military convoys.

Another French offensive in the fall of 1947, spearheaded by paratroopers who were dropped into the strategic Cao Bang-Lang Son area at the Chinese border, also carried with it an illusion of success. The Viet Minh were badly mauled in their mountain stronghold and important military stores were destroyed. But once more the French army withdrew to the delta after a three-month campaign, without having delivered the final blow, and the VPA returned to take possession. This remained the pattern for the next two years, since the French government failed to provide the reinforcements needed to win the war by force of arms.

Mao's army arrived on the Tonkinese border in the late summer of 1949. Facing it was a series of dispersed French forts, manned by some 10,000 troops separated from the French delta strongholds by about 300 miles of Communist-held jungle.<sup>31</sup> A confidential report made in 1949 by General Revers, Chief of the French General Staff, had advised that the Red River delta area be strengthened, and that isolated French outposts such as Cao Bang and Lang Son be withdrawn because of tenuous lines of communication and the difficulty of reinforcing or supplying the garrisons if they were attacked.<sup>32</sup> But the Revers report was never implemented, because it was considered politically important to maintain a French presence among mountain tribes and because the report had been leaked to the French press and become involved in a French political scandal. So a major part of the French forces in Tonkin were tied to this static defense system when Giap decided, in October 1950, to move to Phase 2 of guerrilla warfare.

During the preceding year, Giap had steadily enlarged his main force to include just over 60 battalions. These were grouped into divisions of about 10,000 men, consisting of four regiments, each subdivided into three battalions of approximately 1,000 men. Despite the Viet Minh buildup, the French Cabinet decided--for internal political reasons centering around its unwillingness to send conscripts to Vietnam--to reduce General Carpentier's forces by 9,000 French soldiers.

When the rains ceased in October 1950, Giap began to attack the forts one by one. First to fall was Dong Xhe, where Giap deployed approximately four Viet Minh battalions, outnumbering the defenders by about eight to one.<sup>33</sup> On October 3, it was decided to evacuate Cao Bang, and its garrison of 1,500 tried to link up with a relief column of 3,500 and make it to Lang Son. The Cao Bang column was ambushed, and the relief column was likewise attacked and destroyed. When the dust settled, the French had lost over 4,000 troops--and in fact lost a total of 6,000 during the border fighting--and enormous stocks of ammunition, weapons, and vehicles.<sup>34</sup> The loss of Cao Bang breached the dyke. In a precipitous action, Lang Son was successfully evacuated, but the defenders had to leave behind their stocks of guns, mortars, ammunition, and food. This first large-scale Viet Minh victory reflected the insurgents' extreme mobility, precise knowledge of the terrain, and mastery of the surprise attack, as well as their advantages of numerical superiority and the benefits of Chinese materiel and training. Most of all, it was a tragic result of the French military tendency to underestimate the enemy and consider them incapable of assimilating modern methods of warfare.<sup>35</sup>

The French government was finally shocked into action: some reinforcements were sent, and on December 6, 1950, General DeLattre de Tassigny was appointed to head both the civil and military establishments, a unified authority which permitted him great freedom of action. He was able to halt the panic among civilians in Vietnam by the force of his personality; he countermanded plans to evacuate women and children to France, and instead drafted civilians to perform nonmilitary duties. And he stopped the Viet Minh push toward the delta by personally taking charge of a battle at a small post at Vinh Yen, on the route to Hanoi. DeLattre mobilized all available resources to defend Vinh Yen, bringing in troops from Cochinchina through a veritable airlift.<sup>36</sup> He also sent massive waves of planes using napalm bombs<sup>37</sup> against the enemy's infantry assaults, and finally forced them to break off the attack. The Viet Minh, using "human wave" tactics in a desperate attempt to overwhelm the garrison, had suffered enormous losses, reaching 6,000 killed and 500 prisoners.<sup>38</sup> Giap's offensive to gain Hanoi and push the French out of Tonkin had received a temporary but severe setback, and he decided to revert to his previously successful tactics of guerrilla warfare. The battle demonstrated that French airpower and firepower, when used in favorable terrain and in conjunction with a determined defense, could win out against Viet Minh numerical superiority. The story was to be different when, three years later, the Viet Minh would attack another entrenched camp. This time, the terrain would favor the attackers, and French air superiority would give way before Viet Minh superiority in heavy artillery.

DeLattre died on January 11, 1952, and the history of the French military effort in Vietnam became one of slow but steady withdrawals in the face of Viet Minh pressures. General Salan, who succeeded DeLattre, inherited his system of static forts to defend the delta, but instead of using them as points of departure for mobile warfare, as DeLattre had supposedly intended, Salan had the majority of his troops tied up in defensive positions. Salan's successor, General Navarre, who took over in May 1953, found some 100,000 French Union troops garrisoning the posts in the Red River delta. While the Viet Minh could field an operational force equivalent to nine divisions, the French Union forces had the equivalent of less than three divisions free, including seven mobile groups and eight paratrooper battalions.<sup>39</sup>

It is questionable whether, even with support from Paris, Navarre could have held the Viet Minh to a standstill in the north. In retrospect, however, it is clear that the military responsibility for deciding to fortify and hold at all costs the town of Dien Bien Phu does rest with him and that this was a strategic error of the first magnitude.<sup>40</sup> The military aspects of the battle have been

examined exhaustively elsewhere, sometimes skillfully, sometimes sensationally. But several points bear repeating. Dien Bien Phu was not the third--and decisive--act in the drama of war, but was rather the third-act curtain. France had lost the war and agreed to negotiations at Geneva well before the battle was joined. And the agonizing defeat served up to France at Dien Bien Phu was the more brutal for being avoidable. General Navarre actually courted an encounter with the Viet Minh there, although earlier experience clearly indicated the impossibility of holding a static camp in inaccessible mountainous country surrounded by hostile troops. But the overconfidence exhibited by the military command in 1947 --when they expected to eliminate the "primitive" guerrilla forces with ease--never dissipated even in the face of VPA victories, nor did the disastrous tendency to underestimate the enemy's military capacities.

But most of all, France's failure in Vietnam was political not military. When the war began in 1946, the Viet Minh in the north appeared to rally a near monopoly of the patriotism of almost all Vietnamese, as the anti-French, anti-colonialist organization dedicated to the cause of Vietnamese independence and hopefully capable of bringing it to victory. For more than a year, the Viet Minh had ruled in name over all of Vietnam, heading a government sanctioned by the ex-Emperor and recognized--however hedged in legalistic terms--by France. Although it would have served France's military interests to draw support away from this enemy regime, the government failed to establish a viable alternative. French dealings with Bao Dai demonstrated an inability, or unwillingness, to understand the upsurge of Vietnamese nationalism and to respond to it by granting real independence of action to a Vietnamese government which would include nationalists not committed to a French presence. The desire to maintain French hegemony also superseded the attempt to rally popular support around the military effort, and obtain intelligence and reconnaissance assistance from a sympathetic peasantry. Just as the politicians were wary of an independent policy, the military establishment was mistrustful of an independent Vietnamese army. Thus the war was lost, a war of colonial reconquest in the eyes of most Vietnamese. Neither Communist nor nationalist tears were shed when the French were at long last driven out of Vietnam.

## CONCLUSIONS

### Conceptual Considerations

Any comprehensive analysis of guerrilla warfare--its techniques, its potentialities, its limitations, and the reasons for

success or failure of particular guerrilla struggles--should include some systematic consideration of the socio-economic-political context within which guerrilla movements develop. Political context here includes the identities or similarities in the philosophies of social order and the theory and conduct of warfare held by the leading participants. There are enough similarities between the environments from which successful guerrilla movements (e.g., the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists) have emerged to suggest that a certain mix of social, economic, and political factors constitutes a necessary--though not a sufficient--condition for the emergence of a guerrilla movement that is to have any chance of progressing much beyond the stage of sporadic, more or less politically inspired, antipower activity. This thesis becomes even more persuasive when we consider that similar conditions were present in the case of guerrilla movements which, though not ultimately successful, were able to develop into potent forces and serious political threats (e.g., the ELAS movement in post-World War II Greece, the Hukbalahaps in the Philippines, and the Communist insurgents who created the 1948-1960 "Emergency" in Malaya). An important common denominator of these movements is their origin in or derivation from what has become a coherent body of doctrine created, or adapted, or adopted by Communists the world over.

In this realm, it is misleading to define, or think of, the guerrilla as one who is operating against "established forces of law and order." In any situation in which the forces of law and order may accurately be described as "established," one is unlikely to find a dangerous, let alone successful, guerrilla movement. Without some internally or externally induced breakdown in the scope, pattern, and effectiveness of "established" order, no guerrilla movement is likely to survive.

The French experience in Indochina is very much a case in point. From the turn of the century until, say, March 1940, French rule in Indochina could be fairly described as "established," that is, it had effective sovereignty or power. There was considerable political discontent and unrest during this period, but uprisings (e.g., the Yen Bay rising of the VNQDD and subsequent Communist attempts to set up "soviets" in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An) were abortive and put down by the French authorities with relative ease. The situation was entirely different when the Viet Minh made their long-planned, carefully prepared, and doctrinally based move in December 1946. Defeat in Europe and Japanese conquest in Indochina did irreparable damage to French prestige, damage which irrevocably shattered the French social order in Vietnam. The precipitate Japanese surrender of August 1945 and its confused aftermath, including the conflict of views over



colonialism, produced a collapse in central authority and a situation of near anarchy without which the Indochinese Communist Party probably could not have gained absolute control over the nationalist movement or readied itself for the struggle ahead. Indeed, when French forces first attempted to return to North Vietnam, the Viet Minh constituted "established authority," not the French. The Communist-led guerrillas of the Viet Minh, in short, were operating in a social, economic, and political context radically different from that which had prevailed when the VNQDD made its move at Yen Bay in 1930. This altered context is not the least of the reasons why the Yen Bay rising now rates but a passing reference in specialist histories, whereas the Viet Minh movement led to the expulsion of the French and the creation of a new political regime. And this in turn leads to the necessity for considering the Communist theory and practice--the old Leninist conjunction--of all types of warfare, including "guerrilla" warfare.

### The Factor of Terrain

The type of guerrilla movement that develops into a force capable of imposing its political writ and wishes on a significantly large piece of territory and body of people is vitally dependent on terrain considerations, particularly considerations that negate the guerrilla's adversaries' resources in modern weaponry and firepower (e.g., armor and air support). Even urban guerrilla activity (as in Ireland and Israel), is not independent of terrain. Urban geography, in a very real tactical sense, involves three-dimensional terrain (buildings, alleys, warrens, sewer systems, etc.) which the terrorist guerrilla can put to good use and which he ignores at his peril. Urban environments can provide a populace into which the guerrilla fighter can blend and certainly can provide a terrain setting in which the guerrilla's opponents find it difficult to gain the full benefit of superior weaponry.

Terrain was a crucial factor in the 1945-1954 Indochina struggle and significantly influenced that struggle's final outcome. The densely foliated and rugged areas of the Viet Bac and the T'ai Zone provided the Viet Minh with redoubts in which they were relatively safe from aerial surveillance and into which heavily equipped French forces could not penetrate with ease. When they did attempt such penetrations, the terrain greatly favored the guerrilla defenders rather than the French attackers. The paddy fields of the densely populated delta areas (in both North and South Vietnam) confined French armor to the roads and made it easy prey to ambush. The limited rail and road net of Indochina facilitated guerrilla sabotage and made successful interdiction



particularly damaging. Ambushes were easy to lay with good withdrawal routes for the guerrilla forces. The guerrillas could be confident that French Union relief forces had to come to the point of attack by one of a very few available relief routes and the routes, in turn, were susceptible to further guerrilla harassment. Terrain factors, including vegetation and foliage, minimized the risk of large guerrilla forces being caught in the open where they would be vulnerable to artillery, armor, or air strikes. The type of slashing, thrusting deployment of armor and motorized infantry by which the tide of battle could be turned on the plains of northern Europe was simply not physically possible in Vietnam. (During the crucial battle for Route 19 in the late spring of 1954, for example, Viet Minh troops were actually able to move faster through the jungle than Group Mobile 100 was able to move by road.) Generalization from one instance is a rightly suspect intellectual process; but in Vietnam, at least, terrain was crucial. The fact that the Viet Minh made better use of it than the French was not the least of the reasons why they won.

#### Terminological Problems

The current study addresses the general problem of "isolating the guerrilla." It approaches this problem through a series of case studies, including this one, which treats "Recent French Experience in Vietnam, 1945-1954." But here we must be careful, for the French experience is only in part a case study in guerrilla warfare. The Viet Minh started as guerrillas, but as early as 1950 it would have been, and was, an error to discuss or think of them as primarily a "guerrilla" force. (This is an error the French persisted in making and it cost them dearly.) The precise point at which guerrillas cease to be guerrillas and become something else--insurgents, say, or perhaps a rebel army--is impossible to define and not worth quibbling over. In 1947 the Viet Minh were primarily guerrillas; in 1951 they were not. Somewhere around 1950 they passed over this ill-defined but all-important line.

As early as February 1950 General Giap (the Viet Minh military commander) announced that the guerrilla stage of the struggle was over and the war of movement had begun. In May 1950, the French frontier post of Lao Kay was overrun by a coordinated five-battalion Viet Minh assault (roughly equal in scale to the largest operations the Viet Cong have attempted until 1965). In September 1950, Dong Yhe fell to a Viet Minh assault involving about 14 battalions in coordinated attack. In October 1950, a 6,600-man French Union force was decimated while withdrawing from Cao Bang

by a Viet Minh force of about 18,000 men. By 1951, the Viet Minh had more than three organic and operating divisions. In January 1952, a coordinated three-division Viet Minh assault compelled a French Union force of over 20,000 men to withdraw from the Hoa Binh area. By May 1953, the Viet Minh had seven regular infantry divisions, with independent regiments equivalent in aggregate strength to about two more (i.e., an operating equivalent of about nine divisions).

An insurgent force capable of mounting a coordinated 14-battalion attack can no longer be accurately described as a "guerrilla" force. A force which disposes of nine divisions certainly cannot be so described. The Viet Minh continued to use guerrillas effectively as adjuncts and auxiliaries, but by 1951 the Viet Minh itself was something more than a guerrilla movement. It had become a state at war, with allies, capable of mounting the kind of forces a state is capable of mounting.

#### The Factor of Isolation

All of the factors noted above bear on our central problem of "isolating the guerrilla," though the concept of "isolation" and its bearing on guerrilla activity both need some further conceptual refinement if the true lessons of the 1945-1954 French experience are to be clearly seen. There are really two types of isolation to consider: external and internal. Both affect not only a guerrilla movement's ability to survive, but even more importantly, its ability to grow and develop into something larger, an insurgent force capable of inflicting military defeats on its adversaries severe enough to force a political resolution favorable to the (initially) guerrilla movement's objectives.

External isolation (a concept which includes the problem of sanctuary) relates to a counter guerrilla force's ability or inability to deny a guerrilla movement support from beyond the political boundaries of the country or region to which the guerrilla movement is indigenous and within which it is competing for political authority. The Viet Minh and Viet Cong forces have always enjoyed such sanctuaries, which of course limits the concept of isolation.

Internal isolation relates to a counter guerrilla force's ability or inability to deny a guerrilla movement support from within the political boundaries of the country or region to which the guerrilla movement is indigenous and within which it is competing for political authority.

The notions of survival and growth, so far as a guerrilla movement is concerned, are obviously interrelated, but should not be confused. Survival involves a guerrilla movement's ability to transcend the harassment and disruption stage and become an insurgent force capable of coping with regular troops in positional battle and forcing a favorable political resolution. None of these terms are very precise, of course, nor are the concepts they label sharply differentiated. As suggested above, it is fruitless to quibble over the precise point at which politically motivated "bandits" become "guerrillas" or the point at which "guerrillas" become "insurgents." It is essential to realize, however, that by their very nature, guerrilla movements must possess a certain dynamism if they are to survive. Hence it is probably the case that survival over an extended period of time (say more than three years) is unlikely unless the guerrilla movement in question is able to grow. By the nature of the case, a guerrilla movement cannot last unless it is able to project and retain some aura of momentum which keeps up the morale of its adherents, cows its local adversaries, and induces the prudent to reinsure their future by giving it some modicum of support.

#### External Isolation--The French Experience

External support was of considerable, perhaps crucial, importance in the persistence, growth, and eventual success of the Viet Minh in its 1945-1954 struggle. This support came from various quarters and took various forms, including diplomatic and propaganda support from the Soviet Union (after 1950), propaganda assistance and some sympathetic action from throughout the world Communist movement (then reasonably monolithic), and assistance of various kinds from the French domestic left, including especially the French Communist Party. The latter was helpful in a variety of ways, including the exertion of political pressure on successive metropolitan governments, the conduct of unremitting overt and covert propaganda and agitation against continuation of the war, and the actual sabotage on the docks or at the factory of materiel destined for the French Union forces in Indochina. This kind of assistance and the political climate of opinion it helped to produce, coupled with more or less genuinely spontaneous sympathy for the Viet Minh's "nationalist" aspirations in many quarters of the world, including the United States, weighed heavily in the Viet Minh's political and strategic calculations.

The most significant and certainly the most indispensable support for the Viet Minh, however, came from Communist China (after 1949). In fact, it is extremely doubtful whether the Viet

Minh movement could have ever gone beyond the harassment guerrilla stage without Chinese Communist assistance. Even if there were not a wealth of other evidence, the mere temporal sequence of events highlights their causal connection. The Chinese Communists extended their writ to the Indochina border in late 1949; early in 1950 the Viet Minh military capabilities (as indicated above) began to increase in quantum jumps. In the spring of 1953, Peiping was largely relieved of the drain on its attention and resources occasioned by the Korean War; soon thereafter the intensity of Viet Minh military pressure began to increase noticeably and little more than a year later the Viet Minh had won a military position sufficient to impose a favorable political solution of the conflict. The Chinese Communists gave the Viet Minh sanctuary, facilities for recuperation, and the kind of extensive training necessary to develop regular forces. The Chinese provided instructors, advisers, and technical assistance of various kinds, including some specialist units (e.g., signals and artillery). They also provided considerable material assistance, including, eventually, all-important items such as heavy weapons and the artillery which sealed the fate of Dien Bien Phu. They did not provide large numbers of troops, but these the Viet Minh did not need and apparently did not want. (Evidence on this very important topic is sparse and not particularly reliable, but there are grounds for thinking that although some Viet Minh leaders, such as Truong Chinh, were anxious to employ Chinese troops, they were overruled by others, including Giap and Ho himself.)

The French obviously did not succeed in isolating the Viet Minh from such external support. In fact, they not only made no attempt to do so but, instead, wrote off the frontier region to their adversaries without attempting to hold or contest it. Once Communist control over China had been firmly established, the French High Command decided that the frontier was indefensible and made the strategic decision to withdraw toward the Red River delta. In the short run, this decision was the immediate cause of the French defeat at Lang Son and the debacle of Cao Bang--probably the worst military disaster in the whole history of French colonial warfare. Of themselves these battles were important because of their effects on the morale of the combatants and because of the rich store of supplies that were lost to the Viet Minh. Over the longer term, the strategic decision responsible for these disasters made it impossible for the French to crush the Viet Minh on the field of battle and hence in no small measure helped seal France's fate in Indochina. So long as the Viet Minh had relatively uninhibited access to Chinese sanctuary and succor, it is unlikely that any combination of luck or tactics could have enabled the French to win a military victory. With a French military victory rendered improbable, the eventual political outcome was almost inevitable.

### Internal Isolation--The French Experience

On the matter of internal support, the 1945-1954 French experience in Vietnam provides a virtual textbook catalog of errors to avoid. Throughout the 1945-1954 struggle, the population of Vietnam, particularly the peasantry, provided the Viet Minh with a constant and increasing source of recruits, labor (e.g., porters), intelligence, supplies (e.g., food), and concealment. Without this support from the Vietnamese people, the Viet Minh movement could never have survived. Along with Chinese Communist external assistance, this indigenous support was one of the prime ingredients of the eventual Communist victory. Not only did the French never succeed in isolating the Viet Minh guerrillas from these sources of indigenous assistance; basic French attitudes toward Indochina actually led to the adoption of political, strategic, and tactical courses of action that virtually insured a continuing close relationship between the Viet Minh movement and the people of Vietnam. To the end French colonial policy failed to understand how to provide some future for bona fide Vietnamese nationalism.

On the Viet Minh side, the importance of popular assistance was recognized in practice and constitutes the theme of a vast amount of doctrinal literature. The whole pattern of Communist strategy--i.e., the strategy of the Indochinese Communist Party which guided its take-over of the nationalist cause and its conduct of the struggle against the French--was based on the belief that an armed uprising against French colonial authority could not succeed without the organized support of a broad mass movement of peasants and urban "bourgeois." It was, in fact, this strategic concept which dictated the emphasis on "nationalism" and concealment of the true extent of Communist direction and control. The Viet Minh movement generated a mystique that drew its strength from the Communist leadership's success in identifying the Viet Minh (itself a "front" structure) with popular sentiments of a desire for independence and relief from specific grievances of French administration. Tactically, the Viet Minh laid continuing emphasis on organized participation in the Viet Minh cause by virtually the whole population. The keys here were both organization and participation. The organization went to the lowest level, including family groups in the humblest village. Participation touched all sectors of society and all age groups: little children reported intelligence or carried messages, youths served as guides or participated in local terrorism harassment forays, women tended the sick or acted as couriers, farmers provided food or served as porters, young men served in regular or irregular forces, students acted as informants, couriers, or part-time terrorists. Whole villages participated in the building of defenses, cutting of roads,

or laying of booby-traps. Total involvement--and hence total complicity--was the watchword. Viet Minh methods were thorough and, on the whole, successful.

Viet Minh methods were actually abetted, not hindered, by French behavior, from basic political attitudes to the detailed conduct of tactical operations.

In the political field, one could argue that the French lost Indochina at the Brazzaville Conference convened by the French Committee for National Liberation in January 1944 to lay down the principles that were to govern future relations between France and its overseas empire after the end of World War II. The essence of future French policy for Indochina enunciated by General de Gaulle was summarized in the preamble of that conference's political recommendations, which stated:

. . . the aims of the work of civilization which France is accomplishing in her possessions exclude any idea of autonomy and any possibility of development outside the French Empire bloc. The attainment of "self-government" in the colonies, even in the most distant future, must be excluded.

France never substantially altered this policy (which, indeed, continued to influence its relationships with the RVN even after 1954). French intransigence on even considering the possibility of ultimate Vietnamese independence made it impossible for France to forge an effective Vietnamese political counter to the Viet Minh and, for that matter, made the French prevent the Vietnamese from forming any truly nationalist anti-Communist political mechanism on their own. This attitude put anti-Communist Vietnamese nationalists in an agonizing and virtually untenable position. It handed the cause of Vietnamese nationalism to the Viet Minh, made the latter the symbol of political aspirations felt throughout broad segments of Vietnamese society, and helped cement the bond between the Viet Minh movement and the Vietnamese people. As much as any other single factor, this basic political attitude cost France the war.

In the realm of actual counterinsurgency operations, French strategy was defensive and French tactics were shaped accordingly. The French relied on the fort, the strongpoint, and the interlocking "hedgehog" of fixed positions. Accordingly, the Viet Minh had virtually uninterrupted access to the bulk of the Vietnamese peasantry, who did not reside in these forts or strongpoints. Such continued access gave the Viet Minh constant opportunities not only for proselytizing, but also for punishment of the recalcitrant or uncooperative. Even those who may not have wished to cooperate

with the Viet Minh were forced to do so; for French tactical practice made it impossible to protect the safety of villagers and farmers who opposed the Viet Minh or might have wanted to aid the French.

French political attitudes and strategic and tactical doctrine, in short, not only failed to "isolate the guerrilla," but virtually forced the populace into his arms. Under such circumstances, the Viet Minh movement was able to survive, to grow, and to win, particularly since its doctrine, message, and organization were all carefully tailored to take maximum advantage of such opportunities.



### Brief Chronology\*

#### 1945

- Mar. 9 The Japanese coup in Vietnam, taking over from the French.
- Mar. 24 France proposes an Indochina Federation for the five states of Indochina and a French Union to bind it to France.
- Aug. 14-  
Aug. 15 Bao Dai is granted independence of a unified Vietnam by the Japanese. Japan surrenders.
- Aug. 13-  
Aug. 16 Viet Minh Congress approves August insurrection, names Ho President of a provisional government.
- Aug. 24 Bao Dai abdicates in favor of DRV.
- Aug. 25 Committee of the South formed.
- Sep. 12 Vietnam declaration of independence.
- Sep. 12 British troops enter Saigon.
- Sep.-  
Oct. Chinese occupy Vietnam north of 16th parallel.
- Oct. French troops take over in Saigon from the British.
- Oct. 25 French offensive against Viet Minh in the south begins.
- Nov. Dissolution of the ICP and formation of Marxist Study Group.

#### 1946

- Jan. 6 Elections to DRV National Assembly: Viet Minh wins 230 seats.

---

\*Based on Allan B. Cole, op. cit., pp. 245-256.



1946 (cont.)

- Jan. 20 De Gaulle resigns as Premier.
- Feb. 28 French agreement with Chinese to withdraw by March 31.
- Mar. 2 First session of DRV National Assembly. Ho elected President.
- Mar. 6 DRV accord with France, signed by Sainteny and Ho Chi Minh. DRV a "free state" within French Union; French troops to return.
- Mar. 18 French troops enter Hanoi.
- May 27 The Vietnam National United Front (Lien Viet) is established.
- Jun. 1 D'Argenlieu recognized the "free republic" of Cochinchina.
- Jul. 6 Fontainebleau Conference begins.
- Sep. 14 Fontainebleau Conference ends and Ho signs modus vivendi with Moutet.
- Oct. 13 Constitution for Fourth Republic is accepted in referendum.
- Nov. 8 DRV Constitution adopted. National Assembly dissolves itself.
- Nov. 23 The French bombard Haiphong.
- Dec. 17- Fighting begins in Hanoi, spreading throughout Vietnam.  
Dec. 19
- Dec. 18 Leon Blum heads a Socialist government in France.
- Dec. 25 Moutet-Leclerc mission reports no negotiations with Viet Minh are possible.

1947

- Feb. 20 D'Argenlieu dismissed.
- Mar. 5 Emile Bollaert replaces D'Argenlieu as High Commissioner.
- Dec. 7 Bao Dai signs a preliminary agreement with Bollaert.

### 1948

- Jun. 5 Agreement between Bao Dai and Bollaert signed in Ha Long Bay.
- Oct. 20 Leon Pignon becomes High Commissioner for Indochina.

### 1949

- Mar. 8 Elysée agreement signed in Paris.
- Jun. 14 Bao Dai and Leon Pignon sign Elysée agreement.
- Dec. 16 Chinese Communist troops reach Vietnam's northern borders.

### 1950

- Jan. 19 The Peoples' Republic of China recognizes the DRV.
- Jan. 31 The Soviet Union recognizes the DRV.
- Feb. 7 The United States and United Kingdom recognize the State of Vietnam.
- Jun. Outbreak of the Korean War.
- Aug. 10 American war materials begin to arrive in Vietnam.
- Aug. 14 Decision of French Cabinet to reduce strength of Expeditionary Corps by 9,000 men.
- Oct. 3- Cao Bang evacuated, men ambushed in retreat, heavy  
Oct. 9 losses.
- Oct. 17- Lang Son evacuated in haste.  
Oct. 19
- Oct. The French abandon all posts along the Chinese border.
- Dec. 6 General DeLattre de Tassigny is appointed High Commissioner (replacing Pignon) and concurrently commander of French troops.
- Dec. 23 US military aid conventions with State of Vietnam.

### 1951

- Jan. 13- Battle of Vinh Yen checks Viet Minh advance on Red  
Jan. 14 River delta.
- Mar. 3 Vietnam Dang Lao Dong (Workers' Party) is founded.  
Viet Minh is merged into the Lien Viet.
- Nov.- Initial French success with offensive southwest of  
Dec. Hanoi but it is checked.

### 1952

- Jan. 11 General DeLattre dies.
- Jun. 3 Letourneau is made High Commissioner for Indochina.
- Oct.- Viet Minh offensive in Tonkin; French offensive in  
Nov. delta.

### 1953

- Apr. 13 Viet Minh invade northern Laos.
- May 8 General Henri Navarre becomes commander of troops in  
Indochina, replacing Salan.
- Jun. 26 A new government in Paris, headed by Joseph Laniel.
- Jul. 27 Korean Armistice Agreement is signed.
- Aug.-Sep. French military offensive in lower Tonkin in accord-  
Oct.-Nov. ance with the "Navarre Plan." It becomes bogged down.
- Nov. 20 French troops take Dien Bien Phu.
- Dec.-Jan. Viet Minh invasion of Laos.

### 1954

- Feb. 18 Big Four agree at Berlin to hold Geneva Conference on  
Korea and Indochina.
- Apr. 26 Geneva Conference opens.

1954 (cont.)

- Apr. 28      Joint Franco-Vietnamese declaration of total independence for Vietnam.
- May 8        Dien Bien Phu falls to the Vietnam People's Army.
- Jun. 3       General Ely is appointed High Commissioner for Indochina.
- Jun. 12      The Laniel government falls.
- Jun. 15      Ngo Dinh Diem becomes Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam.
- Jun. 17      Premier Mendes-France promises an honorable peace by July 20.
- Jun. 29      French troops begin evacuation of southern part of Red River delta.
- Jul. 21      Agreements are reached at Geneva.
- Oct. 9       The Viet Minh occupy Hanoi.

## Footnotes

1. Truong Chinh, "The August Revolution," Primer for Revolt: The Communist Takeover in Viet-Nam (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 14.

2. Text in Allan B. Cole, ed., Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945-1955 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 40-41. See also, The Vietnam Cultural Association for National Liberation, Factual Records of the Vietnam August Revolution, Hanoi, September, 1946.

3. For a detailed account of the fight led by Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap to secure support for the March 6th accord, see Philippe Devillers, Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 a 1952 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952), pp. 228-231.

4. The MRP or Popular Republican Movement was a Catholic political party formed in 1945. It rapidly became France's largest non-Communist political party; Georges Bidault was its principal spokesman.

5. Devillers, op. cit., pp. 291-292.

6. Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvrière, or French Section of the Workers' International, was the official name of France's Socialist Party. After the Liberation, it was the third largest party, behind the Communists and the MRP. It supported a "liberal" but vacillating policy in Vietnam.

7. Its purpose was to attract those who refused to join the Viet Minh because of its Communist base. Le Thanh Khoi, Le Viet-Nam: Histoire et civilisation (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955), p. 470.

8. Cole, op. cit., p. 99.

9. Jacques Dinfreville (Pseud.), L'Operation Indochine (Paris: Editions Inter-Nationales, 1953), pp. 44-45. Cf. Bernard B. Fall, Le Viet Minh: La Republique Democratique du Viet-Nam, 1945-1960 (Paris: Librairie Armand Cohn, 1960), pp. 185-189.

10. (Gen.) Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Under-developed Countries (New

York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 120-122. Giap writes, "officers were provided with handbooks, The Political Commissar's Book or Political Work in the Army."

11. Quoted in George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 60.

12. It has been estimated, for example, that one Viet Minh division in a simple operation required about 40,000 porters to supply its minimum needs. Tanham, op. cit., p. 71.

13. (Gen.) Henri Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine (Paris: Plon 1956), pp. 205-208.

14. Jean Chesneaux, Contribution a l'histoire de la nation vietnamienne (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1955), p. 288.

15. Fall, op. cit., pp. 195-196.

16. Giap, op. cit., p. 41c.

17. The other four principal tactics were: speed of movement, surprise, undermining enemy morale, and security of military forces. Tanham, op. cit., pp. 74-79.

18. Supporters of General Charles de Gaulle formed a right-wing "mass" movement, the Rassemblement du Peuple Francais (RPF or Rally of the French People) in 1947, under the leadership of Jacques Soustelle. It changed the balance of power in the National Assembly by drawing votes away from the MRP.

19. Devillers, op. cit., p. 212.

20. Ibid., p. 270.

21. Bollaert sent the able scholar-soldier Paul Mus on a negotiating mission to Ho Chi Minh in May 1947, but the preconditions for an armistice amounted to a Viet Minh surrender. Mus failed. Later, by September, the MRP had acquired in Paris effective direction of Indochinese policy. Any former notion of negotiations with the Viet Minh was securely stopped. See, Devillers, op. cit., pp. 389-390, and Lacoutre and Devillers, La Fin d'une guerre: Indo-Chine 1954, Paris, 1960, p. 21.

22. From 1945 to the Geneva Conference the DRV had a single President, Ho Chi Minh, and one commander in chief, Vo Nguyen Giap. During the same period, France had a succession of some 19 governments; there were 6 political chiefs in Indochina (d'Argenlieu, Bollaert, Pignon, DeLattre, Letourneau, Dejean) and 8 military chiefs.

23. A veritable maze of jealousy and competition among military commanders sapped the unity of direction of the military hierarchy. See Jules Roy, The Battle of Dienbienphu (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 153-154 and passim.

24. Dinfreville, op. cit., p. 54.

25. Navarre strongly protested these limitations on his freedom of action, op. cit., pp. 5-10.

26. Ibid. p. 46, n. 2.

27. André Francois Mercier, Faut-il Abandonner l'Indochine? (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1954), p. 185.

28. (Col.) Jean Leroy, Un Homme dans la Riziere (Paris: Editions de Paris, 1955), pp. 160-167.

29. Others were far more optimistic. General Valluy, who succeeded Leclerc as commander of the expeditionary corps on July 18, 1946, considered 130,000 men sufficient. Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, La fin d'une guerre: Indochine 1954 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1960), p. 25.

30. Declaration of Paul Coste-Floret, Minister of War, in May 1947, after his return from a mission in Vietnam. Quoted in (Gen.) Jean Marchand, Le Drame Indochinois (Paris: J. Peyronnet et Cie., 1953), p. 95.

31. Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy: Indochina at War, 1946-1954 (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole, 1961), p. 27.

32. Edgar O'Ballance, The Indochina War, 1945-1954 (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), p. 93.

33. Ibid., p. 115.

34. Fall, Street Without Joy, p. 28. He calls it one of France's greatest colonial defeats.

35. Marchand, op. cit., pp. 136-137.

36. Dinfreville, op. cit., p. 136.

37. A Viet Minh combatant in this battle vividly described his comrades' terror at their first sight of napalm, "the fire which falls from the sky." They thought it was the atomic bomb. Ngo Van Chien, Journal d'un combattant Viet-Minh (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1955), pp. 154-155.

38. Marchand, op. cit., p. 147.
39. Navarre, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
40. Joseph Laniel, Le Drame Indochinois (Paris: Plon, 1957), pp. 55-63.



## Bibliography

Chesneaux, Jean. Contribution a l'histoire de la nation Vietnamienne. Paris: Editions Sociales, 1955.

A general survey from antiquity to the contemporary period which stresses the economic factor in history sympathetic to the DRV. The author is regarded as friendly to the Communist cause in Vietnam.

Cole, Allan B., ed. Conflict in Indo-China & International Repercussions, A Documentary History, 1945-1955. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956.

A collection of some 100 documents pertaining to the Indochinese war during a crucial ten-year period with a brief historical framework provided for each section.

Devillers, Philippe. Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 a 1952. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952.

The best book written on modern Vietnamese history to date, especially comprehensive for the 1945-1950 period, and presenting with perception both the French and Vietnamese points of view.

Dinfreville, Jacques (pseud.). L'Operation Indochine. Paris: Editions Inter-Nationales, 1953.

A French officer writes with knowledge of the military situation prior to the Geneva Conference, the forces involved, tactics, and logistics.

Fall, Bernard B. Le Viet Minh: 1945-1960. Paris: Librairie Armond Colin, 1960.

This book is based on an earlier study, The Viet-Minh Regime published in 1946, and much of it also appears in the author's subsequent book The Two Viet Nams. A comprehensive study of government and politics in North Vietnam. It can be read with less concern for the author's elsewhere frequently expressed anti-US stance.

. Street Without Joy, Indochina at War, 1946-1954. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1961.

A highly personal and readable account of French military operations and the men involved in them, based on first-hand knowledge.

Hammer, Ellen J. The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954.

A comprehensive study on modern Vietnamese history and politics, an important and scholarly work.

Lacouture, Jean and Philippe Devillers. La fin d'une guerre: Indochine 1954. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1960.

A knowledgeable account of events in Vietnam during the period 1945-1954, focussing on the last year of the war and the negotiations at Geneva. Complements Devillers, Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 a 1952.

Lancaster, Donald. The Emancipation of French Indo-China. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

One of the most comprehensive studies of Vietnamese history, with short sections dealing with events in Laos and Cambodia.

Laniel, Joseph. Le Drame Indochinois. Paris: Plon, 1957.

Written by a former French Premier who headed the government at the time of Dien Bien Phu, it presents a vigorous rebuttal to General Navarre's book covering the same events, and interesting insights into the political climate in Paris at the time.

Leroy, Jean (Col.). Un Homme dans la Riziere. Paris: Editions de Paris, 1955.

A Franco-Vietnamese officer, given command of a Catholic militia in Cochinchina, pacifies a province and wins over its people.

Le Thanh Khoi. Le Viet-Nam: Histoire et civilisation. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955.

A thorough and knowledgeable history of Vietnam, especially valuable for early chapters on Vietnamese history. The later chapters are marred by the author's pronounced Marxist orientation.

Mao Tse-tung. On Guerrilla Warfare. Translation and introduction by General Samuel B. Griffith. New York: Praeger, 1961.

The classic study by Mao Tse-tung, specifically conceived with China's struggle against the Japanese, but elucidation on his thesis that this is a new type of warfare. The introduction contains a portrait of Mao as well as an analysis of the strategy, tactics, and logistics of revolutionary warfare.

Marchand, Jean (Gen.). Le Drame Indochinois. Paris: Peyronnet, 1953.

An important book by a senior commanding officer in Vietnam describing the military history of the French expeditionary corps in Vietnam from 1945-1953, placed within a political context.

Mercier, André Francois. Faut-il Abandonner l'Indochine. Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1954.

A French deputy's mission of inquiry to Vietnam, made in 1953, with an appendix of documents.

Mus, Paul. Sociologie d'une Guerre. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952.

An analysis of the sociological and cultural bases for the Franco-Vietnamese conflict, in a book difficult to read but important to understand.

Navarre, Henri (Gen.). Agonie de l'Indochine (1953-1954). Paris: Librairie Plon, 1956.

A detailed account of the last year of war in Indochina by the military commander in chief who planned and executed the battle of Dien Bien Phu. General Navarre lays the blame for France's defeat in Indochina squarely in the lap of the politicians, and he makes a good case.

Ngo Van Chien. Journal d'un combattant Viet-Minh. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1955.

Diary of a Viet Minh officer, the battles and events he participated in and lived through; a rare glimpse of the psychology of the Viet Minh partisan.

O'Ballance, Edgar (Major). The Indo-China War, 1945-1954. London: Faber and Faber, 1964.

A case study of guerrilla warfare in which the author reveals a greater knowledge of military tactics than political events.

Riessen, Rene. Jungle Mission. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1957.

A fascinating day-by-day account of his life as a leader of French-sponsored tribal guerrillas in the jungle hinterland.

Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dienbienphu. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.

A detailed, lucid, and popular book devoted almost exclusively to one battle in the Indochina war and the

personalities, famous and unknown, involved in it. Roy has a gift for firing the imagination and, as a French air force officer who spent time in Indochina, he knows what he is talking about.

Sacks, I. Milton. "Marxism in Vietnam," Marxism in Southeast Asia. Ed. Frank N. Trager. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959.

A well-documented examination of the development of the Communist movement in Vietnam, focussing on the pre-1954 period and the historic role of Communist leaders and Marxist ideology.

Tanham, George K. Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina. New York: Praeger, 1961.

A readable and expert analysis of the political, economic, and military aspects of the guerrilla conflict in Vietnam, and the role of ideological concepts in shaping the military strategy of the Viet Minh.

Truong Chinh. Primer for Revolt. New York: Praeger, 1963.

English translations of two major works by the leading Vietnamese Communist theoretician: The August Revolution, originally published in 1946, describes the character and significance of the Viet Minh takeover of power in August 1945; and The Resistance Will Win, a series of newspaper articles originally published in 1947, analyzing the characteristics of a war of resistance.

Vo Nguyen Giap. People's War, People's Army. New York: Praeger, 1962.

Originally a series of articles written by the Viet Minh commander in chief detailing his concepts of fighting a political war, this edition also contains a profile of Giap by Bernard B. Fall and an introduction by Roger Hilsman.

Werth, Alexander. France: 1940-1955. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1956.

A history of contemporary France which includes much stimulating material on the impact of the Indochina issue on French politics and vice versa.

The Republic of Vietnam and Communist Insurgency,

1954-1965

by

William A. Nighswonger

A BACKGROUND SKETCH

The progressive complication of political and military developments in the war in Vietnam makes it hazardous to attempt more than a tentative description of an ongoing war and even more hazardous to arrive at conclusions for this study. The principal effort in this paper has been to survey briefly the major programs and policies relevant to the general theme of isolating the guerrilla in the context of their political, military, and administrative milieu. Despite the recent massive American participation in the war, it is necessary to examine most of these programs as Vietnamese-administered, with Americans in advisory and support roles.

The Communist insurgency against the Government of Vietnam (henceforth, GVN) could not be meaningfully studied apart from the preceding Viet Minh-French ordeal of 1945-1954. The Communists' activity after Geneva was only a continuation of their efforts for victory against different opponents in a more limited arena of conflict: the southern zone. Although many observers believed that the Geneva Conference, with the subsequent bifurcation of Vietnam, would merely delay Communist control over all Vietnam, the partition almost immediately induced significant changes in the course of the war and in the life of the Vietnamese people in the north and south.

PARTITION

The division into the two zones was effected at the 17th parallel in Central Vietnam. South Vietnam starts at Quang Tri Province (insulated from the north by a narrow "demilitarized zone") and reaches west to the borders of lower Laos and Cambodia.

The main areas of South Vietnam are (1) the narrow coastal strip between the China Sea and the Annamite mountain chain; (2) the High Plateau reaching west of the Truong-Son mountains toward Laos and Cambodia, where approximately 500,000 tribal peoples live; (3) the predominantly jungle area north and east of Saigon, where rubber plantations are located; and (4) the rich Mekong delta below Saigon, which runs to the tip of the Camau Peninsula.

The rugged mountain and jungle terrain in the north and the mangrove swamps in the south combine with the uncontrolled Lao-Cambodian border areas to produce ideal guerrilla terrain. An abundance of food within the south is also a vital advantage.

A smaller stage, favorable for the new period of Communist insurgency, was set within the new borders. Laos, once part of a single arena for the French, had now become a separate problem. North Vietnam was--by the Geneva Agreement--safe from retaliation, while it served as a national base for support and control of future insurgency in the south.

A major economic adjustment was necessary by both zones after partition. The north had almost all the industrial resources of Indochina. With a highly concentrated population and an inadequate food supply, the economic interaction of Tonkin with the rice-surplus producing Mekong delta of the south had been a mutually beneficial reciprocity.

There were important social and political consequences of the partition. The movement southward of 900,000 refugees, mostly Catholic, presented enormous resettlement problems for the Diem regime and fostered new--and old--Catholic-Buddhist resentments. The newly arrived refugees needed and received assistance not proffered the average--usually non-Catholic--citizen. Choice land, for example, which sometimes had been denied citizens in the south, was provided the refugees. And the traditional northern feelings of cultural superiority and of inherent right to lead the nation created friction in government circles.

In the north, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam--first proclaimed in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender--now at last had a secure national territorial base, immune from French claims. Also in the north, Ho Chi Minh solidified the internal political system by destroying and "re-educating" non-Communist political elements. Even nationalists invited back by Ho from Paris were liquidated. The Dai Viets and the Quoc Dan Dang, both staunch nationalist parties, suffered the loss of main elements which were in the north and central areas. Ho, a Communist since 1920, wanted only Communist-controlled nationalism in his zone, with a

convenient façade of non-Communist parties empty of real power as his "loyal opposition."

The State of Vietnam, with the Emperor Bao Dai as chief of state, began its administration of the south under Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. For Diem there was almost no political organization or support. The only power centers were the quasi-political sects of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao and the Binh Xuyen gangster rulers of the Saigon area.

#### THE NATURE OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT

The Viet Cong (meaning "Vietnamese Communist") activity in the south--following a period of quiescence, 1955-1956, after Geneva--has operated as a continuation of the earlier Viet Minh campaign to gain control of Vietnam. Cadres that had gone underground or travelled to North Vietnam for further training resurfaced in home areas in the south to continue the conflict.

The Indochinese Communist Party had formed the Viet Minh as a united front of nationalist groups against the Japanese and, later, the French. Its wide nationalist, anticolonialist, appeal brought the Viet Minh and its founder, Ho Chi Minh, an enduring place in the political symbolism of the Vietnamese people. Such political parties as the Dai Viet, however, participated for a time in the Viet Minh, but were decidedly non-Communist.

The structure for Communist take-over in the south was fully prepared for the expected demise of Diem or the elections leading to unification. When neither of these events happened, the guerrilla war was renewed.

In essence, the struggle that has followed has been a competition for the support and control of the people. The Viet Minh heritage of the Viet Cong was exemplified in the thousands of political and military cadres from all over South Vietnam, their concrete experience in the governing of large areas, and the generally favorable and familiar image of Ho Chi Minh and his followers as great nationalist leaders. The only lack of the Viet Cong in the south was legitimacy. And legitimacy, plus the American-supplied power to claim it, was about all that Diem's government had (and even that legitimacy has been debated).

### Political Structure

In order to secure broad nationalist support, and to dissociate the southern campaign from its source of control in the north, the National Front for the Liberation of the South was announced by Hanoi as having been formed in December 1960. Its aims conform closely to the Lao Dong (Workers) Party, the Communist organ in the north. Its few non-Communist elements, included for window dressing, do not change the fact of its role as the agent of the Communist Party.<sup>1</sup> Other names had been used by insurgents in the south since 1954 to cover their political activities, but this was the first public organization to have the overt blessing of Hanoi.

The Lao Dong party rules the Liberation Front through its Committee for the Supervision of the South. There are two party zones: the Interzone 5 of Central Vietnam and the Highlands, and Nam Bo, covering the south and southwest provinces (including the Mekong delta). Each zone has committees for its special activities (training, espionage, etc.). Within each interzone there are four interprovince administrative areas, covering from three to nine provinces. Below these levels, the Viet Cong follows the organization of the Republic of Vietnam.<sup>2</sup> There are province, district, and village committees--often with a full retinue of staff, particularly where Communist control is complete. In such places, the Communists may be operating a full-scale local government providing education, medical care, taxes, justice, and the other activities that once may have been conducted by the South Vietnamese government. In other villages, where government control is stronger, the Viet Cong may have only a cell or an agent.

### Military Structure

The North Vietnamese army high command is represented on the Lao Dong party's Committee for the South, but the military role is subject to political controls typical of Communist states. There is a general in command of military affairs for each interzone. There are three levels of indigenous fighting units. The hard-core VC soldier of the regular forces is full-time, on salary, and moves wherever he is needed--which could be anywhere in Vietnam. Some of these soldiers were trained in North Vietnam.

Irregular forces, usually fighting on a part-time basis, while doing other work to live, are organized at the district level, but may range anywhere in a province for special operations. At the base of the military organization is the local



village guerrilla, who may be poorly armed with spears, machetes, and knives.

As the war has escalated, North Vietnamese army units have been identified in South Vietnam. Their presence (apparently in division strength) represents a completely new tier of forces on the Viet Cong side.

Although the various types of forces may carry out operations suitable to their strength, a major operation may draw in irregulars alongside regular troops.

### Training

Most officers, political cadres, and some guerrilla fighters were trained for many months in the north. Many served in the army of North Vietnam. Others have been taken to training bases in southern Laos. There are major training areas used inside Vietnam. The full-time regional or province level forces get about two-thirds military and one-third political training. District forces split their training about 50-50, and village units are more heavily politically trained 70-30 over military training.

Political cadres are always with regular troops, and cell activity keeps each soldier close to the party line perspective. Captured letters and diaries indicate the personal depth to which motivation training is carried. Self-criticism and cell group criticism of individuals are widely used. The extremely rigorous demands made on the full-time guerrilla are carefully prepared for by psychological preparation leading to the reorientation of the value system of the individual fighter to coincide with party values. This psycho-political preparation is the key to much of the success in human engineering practiced by the Viet Cong. Non-Communists who overlook the rigorous, quasi-religious, total character of Communist indoctrination have difficulty understanding Communist behavior.

### Logistics

Viet Minh arms were carefully stored at hundreds of locations in the south after the Geneva agreements. This was the beginning of what has become a substantial collection of firepower.

Before 1962, many VC village guerrillas fought with primitive, locally made guns, many of the latter coming from scores of weapons "factories" in the south.

Substantial quantities of weapons have been taken from South Vietnamese regional and local forces. Many other weapons captured from the French or given by the Russians or Chinese (which may have earlier been captured in Korea or from the Chinese Nationalists), have been moved in by boat, either by sea, or by the Mekong, or by the many trails through Laos and the Highlands.

The Viet Cong have recently begun to develop uniform weapons systems based on modern Chinese designs requiring special ammunition. Resupply of such ammunition makes regular external support essential.

Main VC bases are always located in remote areas involving the most difficult terrain. The notorious "Zone D" about 20 miles north of Saigon--in the jungle and plantation area--is a major stronghold. The mountainous area overlooking the coastal plain of Central Vietnam is a standard location for bases. And the mangrove swamps in remote parts of the Mekong delta are also favorite bases.

Food supplies are usually secured from local sources. Taxes are often collected in VC-controlled areas, payable in rice, a portion of which may be shipped to bases by a large and involved system of bearers. Large numbers of men and women, usually unqualified for positions as fighters and propagandists, are enticed or kidnapped to serve in the logistical system.

In remote mountain areas--where there is no population to tax--regular force elements supervise farming of rice carried out by tribal peoples under their control, or by lowlanders brought into the locale for that purpose.

Bases in lower Laos are a part of the well-known Ho Chi Minh trail. Housing and food stations are along the way. Elephants have been used in some parts of the trail to move supplies.

### POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

Vietnamese Communists--and all Vietnamese nationalists--have the ultimate objective of uniting Vietnam under one government. In the case of the south, it is generally understood that the Communists would allow a coalition government, resembling the National

Liberation Front, to exist apart for a time, but their goal is clearly the unity of Vietnam within communism. Larger objectives of North Vietnam appear to include at least a hegemonic role in relation to the Pathet Lao.

More immediate objectives of the insurgency in the south can be subsumed under a single concept: the popular isolation and/or destruction of the government of South Vietnam and the substitution of the Liberation Front, if necessary on a gradual official-by-official, hamlet-by-hamlet basis.

There has been a continuing campaign to identify the Diem government and its successors with the United States, and therefore as a tool of American imperialism. "My-Diem" (Americans-Diem) is a hyphenated word that was used incessantly to establish this notion. The corollary objective has been to obtain the removal of the Americans.

#### MILITARY OBJECTIVES

VC forces are being used to isolate government officials, services, and protective forces from the populace. The VC orientation is toward control of people vs. control of territory. As in the case of Dien Bien Phu, and several lesser victories in the south, the Viet Cong appears to choose objectives that have an unusually symbolic character, presumably with the intention of deriving political benefits. Apparently the VC thought the Americans might leave if the situation looked hopeless enough.

#### GEOGRAPHIC OBJECTIVES

The previously stated, overall objective of unity of the nation is, of course, geographic. Occasionally there has been talk of an effort by the Liberation Front to establish a provisional government in a liberated area, holding territory as identifiably occupied.

#### MILITARY TECHNIQUES

Obeying Communist guerrilla doctrine, the VC have avoided military actions where success was uncertain. Their selection of symbolic targets has been tactical as well as strategic.

Prior to a big propaganda push in an area, a local outpost might be levelled. In Quang Nam Province in 1964, for example, a thrust into hamlets below the Da Nang air base was heralded by destruction of headquarters in one of the most secure hamlets directly on Route 1. It was a symbolic gesture indicating capability. Current attacks on US installations indicate this type of political-propaganda intent in contrast to traditional military success.

Harassment and interdiction of transportation routes are widely and effectively practiced. Many outposts in Vietnam have long been supplied by air after the roads were cut by Viet Cong action. The disparity of VC and GVN power has driven the Communists to using their wits. Decoys of damaged helicopters, for instance, have brought rescuers to the scene only to encounter withering fire. And carefully spaced poles erected in open areas have hampered helicopter assaults.

### POLITICAL WARFARE

The general objective of isolating the government from the people, which is the destruction of control and the substitution of a Communist government, may involve delicate interweaving of military and politico-psychological techniques.

The first principle of the Communist approach is to identify with and understand the peasant. Propaganda content starts with his concerns: local issues. The Communist cadre who drives out the landlords and distributes his land to the peasants may well be getting at the "gut" of the issues of the particular village. One village is said to have been delighted when a required detour in a busy public pathway was straightened by overruling the will of the wealthy landowner who lost land by the new route.

Many local "liberation fronts" have been organized and oriented toward issues that are meaningful to a particular province or region.

Appeals may have little or nothing to do with Communist theory. Nationalist feelings are sometimes aroused by endless drumfire against the United States as interventionists and imperialists.

Traditional forms of communication are used. Drama teams and singing groups--often using the classic Vietnamese instruments and songs--purvey propaganda and pleasure in the same package.

The peasant and his entire family is involved as quickly and completely as possible in the Viet Cong mission or message. Cadres move into a village and organize interest groups for young men, young women, mothers, etc. Each person is given something to do. When a combat hamlet is constructed (similar to the government-sponsored strategic hamlet) each person, young or old, has a civil defense responsibility. Cadres returning from the north rely on their friends and relatives to reach into the community. And strong family ties are highly effective instruments of involvement in Vietnam.

Communists have different approaches to different areas, depending on their degree of control. In a government-controlled village, quiet and caution may be required. In a contested area, persuasion might be alternated with terror.

Revelations of corruption in government and exploitation of local grievances against the GVN is a favorite VC tactic. Demonstrations of force or terror illustrate to the wavering villager in a contested area that he cannot expect protection or justice from the government. In many hamlets, just before and after the death of Diem, VC cadres persuaded the squads of militiamen to turn their weapons back to the government and to resign from the militia.

After the influence and power of the government is weakened, active proselytizing begins. Special organizations to work on soldiers, youth, and government officials spring into existence.

Sometimes the involvement of peasants is blunt and sudden. Viet Cong agitprop (agitation-propaganda) teams have been known to throw rows of women and children between them and government forces to discourage government fire. Air attacks and artillery have been drawn to a village, where there are VC, putting the people in the middle. Although this use of hostages has hurt the Viet Cong, it has been used to good effect many times. Opportunities to exploit government mistakes in air and artillery attacks are rarely missed by the VC.

#### TERRORISM

The Viet Cong strategy of terror appears to encompass multiple objectives. The use of terror is closely related to the central objective of isolating the government from the people, first by cutting the capability of the government to function, and second, by discouraging the populace from participating in or assisting government efforts.

Perhaps the most serious destruction wrought by the VC has been the systematic assassination and kidnapping of district, village, and hamlet officials, health workers, and school teachers. The direct deprivation of thousands of key local leaders has hampered effective administration of government programs. Moreover, the high risk of these positions has certainly discouraged many potentially good men from accepting them. In some cases, the VC have entered into "gentleman's agreements" not to disturb government functions if the self-defense forces and village chiefs do not interrupt their activities.

Government programs have been hindered by terror applied to the citizenry. Peasants have been threatened for taking government loans, cautioned against moving into strategic hamlets, and threatened for buying land in the GVN reform program.

The Communists have also used terror and assassination against corrupt officials, to the delight of the peasants. But more often, the best district chiefs and school teachers are earmarked for death, as they personify good government and are a threat to the success of the Communists.

Attacks on American installations are probably not intended only to discourage American involvement (although the removal of American dependents was finally effected by the Viet Cong in 1964). Such attacks call attention to Americans as interventionists who do not belong in Vietnam.

As their fortunes have risen, the Viet Cong have employed terror freely. Once they have the military power, and the peasant elites have been trained, terror generally whips the remainder of the population into cooperation, although it can backfire. In Binh Dinh Province in 1965, for example, a Buddhist monastery was attacked and ten monks were killed; popular response against the action was vigorous.

#### REGIONALISMS AND RELIGIOUS TENSION

Although it is difficult to measure, VC agents have manipulated government and religious groups and issues wherever possible. Regional differences among northern, southern, and central groups have been exacerbated by the Viet Cong.

## ECONOMIC WARFARE

VC control over much of the delta rice lands and the roads and canals connecting them to Saigon have caused serious supply and inflation problems. Charcoal in some areas is taxed as much as 50%.

## DEMOGRAPHIC WARFARE

A comparatively recent tactic of the Viet Cong may be tentatively identified in the massive exodus of hundreds of thousands of civilians from combat areas. The refugee flow by September 1965 had passed the 400,000 mark. Some observers have suggested that the Viet Cong is deliberately burdening the GVN with the task of caring for refugees. Also, the flow provides an easy channel for infiltration. It should be noted that the stepped up pace of the war--involving increased air and artillery action --and the increased use of Viet Cong terror also accounts for the influx.

## LOCAL SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS

At the heart of the Viet Cong strength has been the Vietnamese peasantry, which comprises about 85% of the population of South Vietnam. Considerable numbers of the middle-class officials, army officers, and intellectuals went with the North Vietnamese regime, but the VC program is peasant-oriented, if not peasant-guided. The young villagers, needed by the Viet Cong as fighters, have been taken by enlistment and by force. The family ties of these young men have often induced neutralism, if not direct support, with respect to the Communist program.

Some tribal peoples of the highland areas have long been susceptible to Viet Cong efforts at enlistment. Viet Cong cadres, meticulously trained in the various tribal customs, have continued to work with many of the groups, often intermarrying, learning the language, and accepting the customs. Many tribesmen went north after Geneva and have returned to their home areas after careful training.

A remarkable example of the control held over some tribal groups can be found in Quang Nam, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien Provinces in Central Vietnam. In Quang Nam, the entire xenophobic Katu tribe was moved from its traditional areas deep into

the jungles, where they evidently assisted the VC by raising rice, serving as bearers and guides, and fighting. Other adjoining areas have been "cleared" of tribal peoples in massive jungle resettlement projects in the interest of the Viet Cong. An entire village previously resettled by the GVN was kidnapped within 24 hours in 1964.

Merchants, plantation operators, and owners of small industries assist the VC under duress. The substantial Chinese business community depends in part on the free flow of commerce, particularly rice, in areas of Viet Cong control.

### The Nature of Local Support

In listing the kinds of support given the Viet Cong, it is well to keep in mind that a great deal of the support provided is supplied under duress, and that "support" does not necessarily mean whole-hearted endorsement of the Communist cause.

Millions of peasants, caught between rising Communist pressure for cooperation and only sporadic government protection, have opted to assist the Communists. Long-time observers--Vietnamese and American--believe most peasants would opt for even a moderately effective non-Communist government if they had the protection that permitted a real choice. For most villages at present there is no viable alternative to some of the following measures of cooperation with the Viet Cong: (1) manpower--peasants and tribal peoples supply soldiers, watchmen, guides, bearers, informers, arms manufacturers, officials, political cadres, medical personnel, drama and entertainment groups; (2) commodities and materials--they also supply homemade weapons, booby traps, spike boards, food, cement, and other building materials; (3) money--the general population pays taxes, protection money, and road taxes at VC checkpoints; and (4) intelligence--perhaps most important, peasants, officials, and merchants give information about GVN troop activity plans and about who is telling the GVN about the Communists. Despite involved GVN efforts, VC intelligence on GVN military operations is almost always available in time to avoid encounter.

The ability of the Viet Cong to obtain food, intelligence, and recruits within South Vietnam demonstrates how very important indigenous support has been to the Communist cause. Unquestionably the present intensity and extensiveness of the insurgent effort could not exist without substantial local support.



## OUTSIDE SUPPORT

The most significant external supporting nation has been the very source of the insurgency: North Vietnam. Here are the trainers, managers, and major financiers of the movement, as well as the collectors and distributors of material assistance from other nations. Radio broadcasts in behalf of the Viet Cong emanate endlessly from the north. North Vietnam has also begun to commit its large regular army resources to duty in South Vietnam.

China has stood close to North Vietnam--probably uncomfortably close for Ho Chi Minh and others. Chinese assistance in the war with the French was important in terms of advice, training, and war materials. As the prime author and exporter of peasant revolutionary technique, China has had a great influence on Vietnam--over and above her traditional hegemonic influence. China's apparently limited offer of troop support through "volunteers" to drive out the Americans underscores the potential manpower resources that could stand behind the Viet Cong effort. The reluctance of North Vietnam to invite such participation is rooted in the memory of 1,000 years of Chinese imperial domination of the Vietnamese people.

Russian assistance in economic and military aid to North Vietnam has been substantial. Small arms from Russia are being widely used in the south, while antiaircraft missiles to counter US air attacks have been employed in the north. The world-wide diplomatic and propaganda mechanisms of Russia have assisted the Vietnamese Communists. A Russian trawler was spotted off Guam in position to relay early warnings of B-2 departures for raids on VC remote bases. The Russian ambassadors to North Vietnam and Cambodia are insurgency experts. Russian technicians and advisers in North Vietnam in the spring of 1965 are reported to have numbered 3,000--an increase of 2,000 from the previous month.<sup>3</sup>

Historically sensitive to the incursions of Vietnamese power, Cambodia has chosen to be selective in her resentment, opposing any crossing of her eastern borders by GVN forces, but harboring Viet Cong troops who use the areas as sanctuaries for withdrawal.

The southern "panhandle" of Laos is presently beyond the control of the Laotian government and mostly in the hands of the VC. Bases and staging areas, as well as parts of the Ho Chi Minh trail, are known to exist in this area. Most of the traffic from the north enters the south well below the 17th parallel--partly to avoid the appearance of invasion from the north.

Eastern Europe also has lent support. Czechoslovakia and Hungary, for example, have sent arms and medical supplies to the Viet Cong. And the Poles have been fully partisan on the ICC team--never voting to the detriment of North Vietnam.

#### The Relation of Outside Support to Events

The intimate and total involvement of the North Vietnamese obviously accounts for much of the Viet Cong success in the conflict up to now. The combined experience and skill of the North Vietnamese, gained from the long struggle with the French, has been buttressed by the even longer experience and classic successes of the Chinese and the Russian Communists. The vigor and breadth of support enjoyed by the Viet Cong can be traced to its Viet Minh heritage which blanketed all Indochina before Geneva. Thus, "external support" is of the greatest significance in understanding the sources of Viet Cong strength and growth.

The reserve strength of manpower from external sources is a matter of critical importance in studying the war as it develops. The 350,000-man army of North Vietnam may be increasingly committed in the south, via the usual routes of infiltration.

#### THE COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

When Ngo Dinh Diem was named premier of the State of Vietnam by Bao Dai on July 7, 1954, few observers gave his regime long to live. He was, many thought, taking the reins of a temporary regime presumably awaiting submersion into a united Vietnamese Communist state by the act of national elections. There was even doubt that his shaky child of Geneva could survive that long.

Diem's key task was to create a government from the splintered hodgepodge of politics inherited from the French and unclaimed by the Communists. His multiple foes appeared to hold the cards of power. The politically and militarily potent religious sects--the Hoa Hao and Cao Dais--threatened the order of the state and the life of his government. Saigon's security and its business were at the mercy of the Binh Xuyen gangster elements, covetous of their control of the police and their profitable rackets.

The first task, then, was not to defeat the temporarily quiescent Communists, but to build a nation where, indeed, only

a temporary building permit (the Geneva Agreement) existed at the moment. The success of the government in winning or destroying the power of the sects and the Binh Xuyen was closely followed by the remarkable preliminary "foot election," in which 900,000 North Vietnamese "voted with their feet" and elected to go to the south. Resettling these refugees in itself claimed enormous energies and resources from the Diem regime and the United States.

In these early years Diem was advised to get out among the people and establish himself and his government in the countryside. Virtually unknown himself, in the rural areas, Diem's obvious rival was the very real image of Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh as the legitimate parents of the new Vietnamese nation. Diem's task was to establish, in the minds of his constituency, the reality and worthiness of himself and his government. The legal legitimacy awarded his government at Geneva was only a "hunting license" to find the support essential for his political survival. Diem made many visits to rural areas in the early years and managed to establish his image in much of South Vietnam. (The Communists later helped him build his name, but the image they painted was somewhat different.)

The Vietnamese government set about the economic and social development with gusto. Elaborate plans for national development were laid. Heavy emphasis was placed on roads as a security requirement--anticipating the need to move troops and supplies quickly. Village schools were trebled in number within a few years.

By 1956, Diem had begun to talk about a national "formula," which was to be the heart of his nation-building enterprise: personalism. A social and political philosophy, personalism is derived from French Catholic thinkers and stresses the dignity and the worth of the individual and the role of the state in maximizing his potential. The paternalistic role of the state has been compared with the Confucian spirit of mandarinism.<sup>4</sup> Diem tried to utilize personalism as the ideological source of the social and political programs the government brought into being. However, on significant issues the personalistic preaching was sometimes remote from the actual government practices.

In the absence of political organization, Diem, with his brother and alter ego, Ngo Dinh Nhu, created it. They organized the quasi-secret Can Lao Party as the watchdog over administrators and the protector and extender of personalism in government. A mass political party, the National Revolutionary Movement was organized everywhere.

The Republican Youth was organized later for young men, or anyone old enough to bear arms. Ngo Dinh Nhu's wife, Madame Nhu, personally led the Woman's Solidarity Movement. There were also farmer's associations. And there was an organization for everyone which included a nation-building concept.

In his mass organizations and parties, Diem had copied the Communists. He was trying to weld the rural people--whose whole world had been their own village--into a nationally aware populace eager to support the revolution Diem talked about so much. Unfortunately, Diem copied the Communists in other ways. After destroying the military opposition of the sects, he imprisoned thousands of minority political elements just as the Communists had done in North Vietnam. By 1963, South Vietnam had most of the marks of a police state in its political life.

In sum, Diem inaugurated vigorous nation-building efforts necessary for the survival of any state. The first two years of his effort could be called "preventive counterinsurgency," the awakening of national awareness and solidarity, and the consolidation of power. His respite from overt Communist guerrilla activity, presumably based on the anticipation of their victory by election, was soon ended. After Diem refused to conduct the elections (an issue beyond the scope of this paper), the systematic Communist strategy of isolation and annihilation of his new government began.

#### DEFENSE POLICY

The earliest planning for the defense of South Vietnam apparently included a reduction of about 50% in the regular army and an emphasis on maintenance of internal order and dealing with Communist guerrillas. External aggression would be met by the Manila pact nations.<sup>5</sup>

At first, under the overall command of French General Paul Ely, 300 Americans were to train the Vietnamese army, with Lt.Gen. John W. O'Daniel, noted for his success in training the Korean army, the senior American officer in charge. O'Daniel is quoted as saying:

The army will be, above all, according to American ideas on the subject, a police force capable of spotting communist guerrillas and communist efforts at infiltration.<sup>6</sup>

The results of the first few years of this training did not bear out the prediction. The army of South Vietnam was reorganized from the rather loosely knit battalion units of the French period into regiments, divisions, and corps. The units were taught to operate in these larger groupings and it became increasingly difficult in later years for American advisers to get small unit operations at all.

Highly mechanized, the new Vietnamese army tended to keep to the roads on operations. Although the political role of the army among the people had been mentioned at the beginning of the training, the emphasis did not materialize in operations. By 1959, the regular forces were being readied for defending the nation in a conventional war.

From the point of view of senior US military advisers in Vietnam in early 1959, the Communist military threat as an internal problem had largely disappeared. It was, in fact, later in that very year that the gradually mounting assassinations and kidnapping incidents began to be paralleled by widespread larger military operations. By 1961, the army was permitted to go beyond its 150,000 ceiling to more than 200,000 in response to the emergency.

#### The Civil Guard (Bao An)

The Diem government inherited another layer of armed forces known as the Civil Guard. Ill-trained and ill-equipped, it was known as the dumping ground for undesirable officers from the regular army. According to its American civilian advisers, the Michigan State University Group (a contract group with the United States Operations Mission), the Civil Guard was to become essentially police in function. Its 70,000 members were to be lightly armed and to serve in small units as rural police.

Vietnamese officials and American military advisers disagreed with the MSU group, recommending organization and heavier arms like standard military units. The impasse which occurred resulted in little action to improve the Civil Guard and in the eventual US decision to accept the Vietnamese position. The MSU group refused to continue as advisers, and--after a period with USOM as advisers--US army personnel took over training and equipping the guard along the usual fashion of infantry units.<sup>7</sup> The escalation of the Civil Guard to military status contributed to a continuing vacuum in professional rural police that persisted until 1965.

### Self-Defense Corps (Dan Va)

The lowest level of armed forces, the village militias, had been in existence on a voluntary basis since early in the Diem regime. In 1961, 80,000 of these fighters were put on full pay and began to receive improved training and US assistance in arms and supplies. The SDC and Civil Guard have borne the brunt of Viet Cong action by patrolling and defending their own villages. Less well equipped or prepared, but closer to the village people, the SDC have been choice targets for the VC. In 1964, the SDC was renamed "Popular Forces."

### The US Advisory Role

As the emergency deepened, US advisory components were increased, who tried to instigate more aggressive action from the Vietnamese units. Advisers were placed, after earlier refusals by Diem, at lower levels--down to battalions. More night operations were encouraged. Ranger training--stressing small-unit, close-in fighting--was developed for the first time.

The mission in 1961, headed by General Maxwell Taylor, led to the introduction of helicopters, increased air support, and patrol junks to cut seaborne VC supply lines.

Difficulties in getting the Vietnamese army to operate with aggressive effectiveness were centered partly on the intricate system Diem used to keep his officers from gaining too much power. Most of the highest ranking generals were in special positions not involving direct command of troops. Furthermore, Vietnamese officers were excessively cautious in battle. A constantly repeated complaint was voiced in American advisory circles over the failure to move quickly to close the gap when guerrillas had been surrounded. Search and clear operations consistently produced insignificant results.

By 1962, the American Military Advisory Assistance Group was subsumed (later merged) under the Military Assistance Command, headed by General Paul Harkins, and American air support had been increased by US-supplied, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter squadrons.

## RURAL PACIFICATION

As the Viet Cong demonstrated its expanding presence in the countryside, it was apparent that more effective means for control and protection of the population were necessary in order to isolate the guerrillas and capture or destroy them. The Taylor mission had recommended broad democratic forms to make the regime more popular with the people. However, the pressures of the emergency led to a decision to delay pressuring Diem for the reforms until later. Careful study was given to the problem in the Staley report made late 1961. As a result, announcement was soon made of massive efforts in economic and social development, village radio communications, public works programs, and special attention to Highlanders' problems.

The successful Malayan experience was being studied by GVN and US officials. R.K.G. Thompson, a key British official in the Defense Ministry of Malaya, headed a team in residence at Saigon to study the Vietnam problem in the light of his nation's earlier experiences. Early in 1962 the results of these studies led the Vietnamese to launch the strategic hamlet program, involving resources and population control, resettlement, fortified, self-defended villages, social and economic improvements, propaganda, etc.

### Land Development

The GVN already had considerable experience in parts of this approach through its Land Development Program. Started in 1957 to resettle some of the northern refugees on untitled land, the program eventually was undertaken in 90 centers. Settlers received land, for which they paid over a long period, and they were assisted in most aspects of resettlement such as building schools and medical stations.

Although the program involved important economic and social aspects, its fundamental purpose was the strengthening of security in remote areas, placing, as Diem put it, "a living wall" before the Communists. In fact, the spreading of the centers into remote areas of the Highlands resulted in exposing the settlers to direct contact with main VC forces and Highland tribes who considered the settlers to be trespassers on their tribal lands, some portions of which had been individually owned by Highlanders. These incidents exacerbated the enduring traditional dislike and suspicion that has characterized Highlander-Vietnamese relations.

Because of excess haste and lack of careful planning for the settlers, the United States dropped out of the joint planning for the program at an early date. Diem's frequent use of former refugees insured the loyalty of these new communities. It was these persons who owed most to the government and liked the Communists least of all. In sum, it might be said that land development was an effort to secure areas by bringing "safe" people to inhabit them.

### Civic Action Directorate

From the first, the principal channel of government communication with village reform was the Civic Action Directorate. Cadres numbering 1,800 were trained to work in a nationwide effort at community development, anti-illiteracy campaigns, and social organization. They were charged with the building of inter-family groups in order to facilitate social reciprocity in times of personal need. The principal objective was to gain tighter control over the population so that Communist-leaning elements would be kept in line by the family leaders. Unfortunately, the civic action cadres were under great pressure to fulfill the goals of their superiors and ended up sometimes carrying out the unpopular job of collecting taxes.

Civic action cadres were ordered to the areas of special need, such as the land development centers. Later they bore the burden of establishing the unpopular agrovilles and, eventually, the strategic hamlets. Because of their inadequate numbers and their concentration on special areas, many hamlets rarely saw their civic action cadre and the benefits he brought. Perhaps the greatest handicap of all was the requirement to hold popular meetings to ballyhoo government programs and organize protests against the Communists. These are hardly the assignments to build confidence and affection in an already harassed populace.

### Agrovilles

The most direct predecessor of the strategic hamlet program was the agroville ("rural town"). The prime security problem in the delta area was the community pattern, with houses spread out and often lining canals for miles, instead of being tightly bunched together as in parts of central Vietnam. Such communities were difficult to control or protect.



The first resettlement effort transplanted two categories of families without economic and social benefits. Families thought to be Viet Cong, or sympathizers, were herded into "Qui Khu" centers. Reliable families were moved into "Qui Ap" centers. The latter was primarily to protect, and the former to control, the occupants. Often the "agglomeration centers," as they were called, were as far as six miles from the farmer's source of living: his paddy fields. The result was that hatred against the GVN developed among once friendly families and intensified among the VC sympathizers.

The plan of the later agrovilles was considerably improved, but still was largely based on the hard work of those being resettled. Too little allowance was made for relocating. Housing for animals was not provided. The well-meaning plans for community-owned orchards and fish ponds were lost on the people who had been forced to contribute many days of labor to prepare the site. Competent cadre, essential to the program, did not appear as planned.

Unfavorable responses from the peasants were easily exploited and amplified by great Viet Cong propaganda efforts which depicted the agrovilles as slave towns and prisons. The program, started in 1959, was abandoned at the end of 1961 in the face of the mounting plans for the strategic hamlet program. The results of the agroville effort were almost the reverse of its intended goal. The GVN, with the assistance of the Viet Cong propaganda, had scarred its own image once again. The program had put the GVN exactly where it had intended to place the VC--in isolation from the people.

#### The Strategic Hamlet Program

In March 1962, in great haste the Vietnamese government officially launched the strategic hamlet ("Ap Chien Luoc") program, although unofficially, some hamlets were being built before the end of 1961. While American advisers had been very much involved in the basic idea, Ngo Dinh Nhu had started the program apart from the substantial US assistance that followed later. As noted, the basic notion was to bring protection to the people, by their own efforts, and to destroy the Viet Cong cells and agents in the countryside. The mood of the movement was to be spontaneous enthusiasm of the peasants, springing from the theme of total revolution for the hamlet. The concept fitted the philosophy of personalism perfectly.

The plan was for all hamlets (some 12,000) to be fortified and all people to be enlisted, registered, cleansed of VC stigma, or appropriately quarantined politically. Victory would come by giving the peasants the means to defend themselves and the motive to do so through improved government services to the hamlet and free local elections. Denied contact with the peasants, the Viet Cong would starve, surrender, or be hunted down after being isolated from their source of sustenance: the people. They would be "fish out of water."

By the fall of 1962, the American military and civilian advisory groups had begun preparations to adapt their efforts to fit the grand strategy put into action the previous March by Counselor Nhu. A new system of advisers at the province level--the focal point of the hamlet program's administration--was devised by MAAG and USOM. Money and materials were being programmed; pilot efforts were undertaken. USOM was to be the US sponsor of the civilian-oriented programs and eventually send a representative to each of the provinces.

In 1962, MAAG placed sector advisers in each of the 42 provinces. Each sector adviser had a small US staff to supervise Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps performance, as well as the strategic hamlet campaign. MAAG strength had reached about 13,000 by this time, and US advisers were everywhere in the field at the battalion level among regular forces.

#### Strategic Hamlet Organization

As a committee of three, the Province Chief (who was nearly always both military and civilian commander in the province), the USOM representative, and the MAAG Sector Adviser jointly considered the plans and schedules normally presented by the province staff. American control extended only to the release of US-provided funds or materials. Hamlet construction cadres, young men of little education, were trained and sent out in six-man teams to guide the construction of the hamlets. (In the earlier period this was done by civil servants taken from other duties.) District chiefs, under the command of the province chief, directed the cadres.

#### Hamlet Defenses

A stockade was constructed around the hamlet. At first the donated bamboo of villagers was used, but US MAP (Military Assistance Program) supplies eased this heavy financial burden for the citizen by providing barbed wire and steel pickets produced in America. A steep moat was dug, with a fence on either side and

bamboo or steel spikes located in between. Theoretically, the fence would at least deter infiltration of VC agents and sympathizers, and even of small assault units if covered with a field of fire by the volunteer militia. Each hamlet was permitted one or two squads of "combat youth" volunteers, who received 14 days of mostly military training. The training was financed by USOM funds and reviewed technically by MAAG advisers.

MAP provided such items as carbines, shotguns, pistols, flares, flashlights, and field telephones for the militia in the hamlet. Militiamen were expected to remain in their hamlet, or flee if an overwhelming VC force struck. Later, in 1964, militiamen were made part of the Self-Defense Corps, or Popular Forces, and placed on salary.

Unfortunately, political training was weak. Weapons skill was often quickly lost because many militiamen had no weapon to use in the hamlet. GVN officials were reluctant to place arms in the remote or vulnerable villages where they were most needed.

#### Resettlement

The farmer living outside the walls of the strategic hamlet was assisted in relocating within. The government was to pay the cost of materials needed in moving his house. At times, materials were purchased and distributed as needed to the relocated peasant. Delays in payment irritated him. And moving of families by forced relocation--as had been done in the agrovilles--created hardship and resentment. After 1963 forced relocations were prohibited. There was no apparent attempt to segregate Viet Cong families. The budget of 20 relocated families average per hamlet was sometimes far exceeded.

#### Failure of the Strategic Hamlet Program

The principal deficiency in implementing the program was the failure to isolate and eradicate Viet Cong cells in the hamlets. The number of trained intelligence personnel and police was inadequate for this task. In many hamlets the quiescent Viet Cong cell simply waited its chance to return to action. The failure of population control measures, inadequate arms, and the inability to assure security of the villagers prevented any possibility of success. On top of this was a tendency toward careless and inflated reporting of results. In the pressure to record statistical victory,

more and more hamlets made the "completed" list in name only. The writer vividly recalls revising plans to allocate fertilizer to two "completed" strategic hamlets in Quang Tin Province after authorities declared they could not be safely entered with less than a company of armed men.

Police efforts in association with the hamlet campaign were not planned for except in the later Hop Tac defense plan around Saigon (see below). But the police role of population and resources control was vital to the success of the campaign. Identity cards for individuals had been previously developed nationwide. Family census-picture registration began in strength in 1964. Each family in the more difficult areas would be photographed, cataloged, and presented with the picture of the whole family on prominent display in the home. Truants who played the VC game could easily be spotted by a "nose count" against the photograph. The difficult job of isolating the Viet Cong from the population would be made easier by this technique. As yet it has a long way to go before being significantly useful. Always it requires a total population control program with which it can be associated.

#### Better Leaders

The high toll of GVN village leaders has forced great attention to the training of new officials for a ten-day period in their new duties. Specially trained administrative cadres--of high-level training and high pay--have been sent out to help govern the more heavily infested VC villages undergoing pacification until enough good men rally to the GVN side so that they can rule themselves.

#### Elections

Hamlet elections are required before listing a hamlet as completed. In areas not dominated by the Viet Cong, the elections have occasionally produced some interesting spontaneous results. In the days of Dien, these elections were carefully manipulated by Diemist party leaders. In some provinces, councils of notables to serve as advisers to the province chief have been elected. The possibilities of elections as a counterinsurgency tactic are encouraging only if it is demonstrated that the election is an honest expression of the real public.

#### Self-Help Projects

As grist for the democratic process in the hamlet, self-help project proposals were invited from the various completed hamlets.

Thousands of projects have now been carried out as a result of the expressed will of the people. During the Diem regime, officials deftly shaped the projects to fit what their own national ministry wanted. Having the hamlet as a whole group of voters mull over what they most want is a revolutionary idea. It has been well received where properly tried. Such cooperative projects, involving the choice and the labor of the villagers and the funds and materials of the province (courtesy of USOM), weld government and people into an ad hoc partnership that may take the form of a school house or dispensary.

#### Highlander Resettlement

After some years of Viet Cong success with Highlander peoples, the GVN and USOM outlined a special program to reach their economic and social problems. The GVN has tried to bring scattered Highlanders together for more defensible positions. Economic and educational programs were designed to parallel the resettlement. In Quang Tri Province about 15,000 Bru have resettled in the last seven years. Other areas have been less successful.

#### Economic and Social Programs

The existing technical services in the provinces (agriculture, education, public works, public health, etc.) have increasingly been integrated within the pacification programs. As a witness to the concern and effectiveness of the GVN, planning team projects and services for rural uplift have strongly affected some areas. Schools constructed have numbered in the thousands. Special livestock programs have brought new wealth, often to the poorest of families.

The result of the challenge of the Communist strategy to destroy the government presence in the countryside has been an explosion of hundreds of useful and desired programs reaching toward the peasant. The haunting spectre of rising insecurity has been the chief destroyer of the effectiveness of these programs. Their comparative insignificance in the face of the security problem does not detract from the programs, but only calls to mind that protection of the people is the bedrock of all pacification. The absence of protection reduces the most elaborate of programs to trivia. Protection, constant enough to be trusted, is what cracks the seamless façade covering the inner life of the village, where often everybody really knows who is the VC, but none dares to tell. Protection from the Viet Cong is that atmosphere in

which a man can freely elect to affirm is relation to the government, the single act which epitomizes the isolation of the VC and the strengthening of the nation.

### The New Life Hamlet Program

Since the November revolution (1963) classification of hamlets has been more rigorously controlled to avoid slips, and greater effort to synchronize police and military aspects has been made in order to guarantee protection, although current pacification efforts are far from thorough.

An example of the absolute necessity for properly orchestrated pacification was evident after efforts to pacify a five village area in Quang Nam Province (surrounding Da Nang) in 1964. GVN and American officials at the provincial level had devised a total of 25 programs in police identification, agricultural, educational, and self-help public works programs. Province technical services moved in, side by side with regular army troops, to pacify this strategic area very near the big air base. Suddenly, without warning, the division commander withdrew the supporting troops. Peasants who had begun to trust the GVN's promise of permanent protection, and who had just begun to disclose vital information about the VC network, were quickly dealt with by the VC units who were poised for a quick return to the important base area. A few weeks later the process was begun again, and the troops were again withdrawn. After three such ventures and subsequent retreats, the project was entirely abandoned. The area is now a troublesome hotbed of VC strength for the US Marines guarding the air base. And the example cited, typical of much of the pacification effort in Vietnam, is a simple reminder of the need for synchronization and consistency in the process of pacification. False tries and failures build higher barriers each time between the government and the people.

### HopTac

The campaign to pacify the area around Saigon is an example of a carefully coordinated effort at pacification. It involves the synchronization of military forces, police, and various other civilian agencies in a multi-province plan to limit access of VC to the hamlets and to control food and materials on their way into VC hands. Much of the area has been brought under control sufficiently to begin the family census-picture plan. The steady and

active support of the armed forces has kept large VC units from operating effectively in the area undergoing pacification. Hop-Tac may point the way to more extensive efforts at isolating the guerrilla and establishing an adequate government presence in the countryside. The best proof of success will be visible when it is demonstrated that police and Popular Forces can handle the VC threat on their own, permitting SVN main force elements to move out to more difficult areas.

HopTac demonstrates also the urgent need to pacify using the "oilspot" concept, working from secure areas outward to less secure ones. Many GVN failures in pacification eventuated from choosing heavily concentrated VC areas in order to show dramatic progress. The usual result has been abandonment or perpetual and expensive commitment of troops to protect the areas.

#### Elements in the Failure of the Strategic Hamlet Program

The strategic hamlet concept was rooted in the sound and successful Malayan experience. There were very different conditions in Vietnam, however, and these variations were not adequately allowed for. Nor was the Malayan plan per se faithfully applied.<sup>8</sup>

Protection was the key objective in the hamlet program, the sine qua non on which all psychological, political, and economic programs were necessarily based. In many places construction started in the least secure areas first, without regard for the lack of ability to defend the hamlets against attack from nearby secure bases. Many times the protection of the areas by regular troops during pacification was inadequate or was withdrawn from time to time. The absence of a rural police force was a serious vacuum, since there was no continuing police presence in the hamlets during or after pacification (except in the Saigon environs). The VC infrastructure usually survived in the hamlets, since systematic police intelligence methods did not exist. Hamlet militia were often unarmed, even though trained, because it was feared the VC would capture their weapons.

Intelligence flow, vital to counter guerrilla operations, was directly related to the public confidence in the adequacy and durability of government protection.

Economic and social programs were often effective--in that they reached the village level--but the economic gains in crops and materials were not usually adequately controlled to be kept

from the VC. Many economic operations were finally curtailed or abandoned in the face of inadequate security.

The hamlet program was unrealistically ambitious. The irrational confidence of Diem and Nhu was nearly always expressed in construction schedules and the reports of progress toward completion fed to Saigon from the field. "Completed hamlets" and a decline in incident rates were the grounds for optimism in both US and Vietnamese reporting. American agencies were usually in tandem with Vietnamese agencies and their own chiefs usually encouraged optimistic reporting. This was particularly evident in MAAG reporting.

Excessive demands in labor and materials were made on the peasants, particularly in the earliest period of construction. Diem's initial emphasis was on the peasants' moral obligation to do everything for themselves--even to fighting with sticks and stones. They were intended to be "self-help" (Ap Tuc Tuc) hamlets. The peasants, however, did not have the devotion, or the resources, expected or exemplified by the Ngo family.

The severity of the relocations and the failure to make adequate payment to many families, was particularly galling to the peasants. Corruption displayed in the misuse of pacification funds was not usually speedily punished, and sometimes there was no penalty at all. But local peasant communities knew when they had been cheated.

Thus, despite some signal successes in elements of the program (such as school construction, agricultural improvements, militia training, defenses construction, etc.) the lack of proper coordination, overambitious scheduling and reporting, unfair and unresponsive administration, and inadequate protection doomed the outcome.

#### Other Special Programs to Isolate the Guerrilla

The strategic hamlet and new life hamlet campaigns were conceived as comprehensive efforts to isolate the guerrilla from local support. Ancillary to these larger programs, more specialized efforts were begun.



"Chieu Hoi"--the "Open Arms"  
Surrender Program

The successful campaign by Magsaysay against the Communist Huks in the Philippines involved a two-pronged approach of "all-out force or all-out friendship." As uncooperative terrorists, the Communists would be destroyed. As ex-terrorists, willing to be rehabilitated, full assistance and encouragement would be given, including land, job training, financial assistance, etc.

Based upon this successful example in the Philippines, a national Chieu Hoi office was set up, involving close cooperation between the GVN, the USOM Office of Rural Affairs (which included men with long Philippine experience), and MAAG.

Diem announced a clemency offer on the first anniversary of the strategic hamlet program in the spring of 1963. The appeal was to the guerrillas' spirit of nationalism, love of family (to whom they could return), and unhappiness with the rigors of guerrilla life. The clemency announcement was a significant departure from previous hard-nosed treatment of most returnees by Vietnamese officials. Special "passes," or small leaflets, were dropped over VC-controlled areas, telling the would-be guerrilla where and how to turn himself in. VC families were visited and encouraged to contact their kin in guerrilla units. Testimonies of well-treated returnees were widely distributed.

By 1954, most provinces had set up rehabilitation centers in which the returnees live while being prepared to return to a normal life. Returnees also receive an allowance for clothes, food, and other small items.

The program seeks to reach not only hard-core Viet Cong --whom it is difficult to reach in the jungle--but primarily the borderline supporters who have involved themselves in part-time support as bearers, watchers, etc. The success of Chieu Hoi has varied from province to province, depending on the sensitivity and understanding of the province to its special spirit. Some provinces have received thousands of returnees, others relatively few.

The greatest effort--and success--has been effected around the traditional "Tet," the Chinese New Year, when Vietnamese are especially open to good will and the joys of

revisiting families and friends. The spirit resembles the Christmas season in the West, but Tet generally creates an even deeper emotional response among Vietnamese.

#### Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG)

The US Army Special Forces provided the backbone, beginning in 1963, of an effort to aid remote communities in defending themselves. A great deal of effort was given to the Highlands and areas on the periphery of jungles and swampland. Working as advisers--alongside their Vietnamese Special Forces counterparts--US teams of about a dozen men led in the training and operation of "strike forces" of 200-300 men. These units were designed to provide a mantle of protection to an area, with most of the men living at home near the camps, their families having been resettled, in many cases, in safe areas nearby. Special Forces teams carried out civic action projects--medical treatment and public works programs--as a part of their contact with the civilian population among whom they operated.

US Special Forces advisers have had considerable success among Highlander tribal groups, and the improvement of the security situation in the areas in which they work has usually been noticeable. The political character of the Vietnamese Special Forces, which was tied to Diem as a personal army, hampered the work until the end of 1963. Improper security screening during recruitment and moving of strike force personnel to posts far from their homes has created great difficulties and dangers for the Special Forces personnel involved. The basic motivation in the program is rooted in the willingness of Highlanders to defend their own home areas.

Improved opportunities and responsibilities for Highlanders have led to expectations not always consistent with the goals of the government. In September 1964, members of the Rhode tribe seized the radio station at Ban Me Thuot as an expression of desire for a greater participation in self-government. Through the efforts of US Special Forces leadership, the rebellion was resolved. But a potential source of trouble remains.

#### Force Populaire--The Ngo Dinh Can Program

As the strategic hamlet campaign was getting underway in 1962, an alternative approach to the program was being initiated by Ngo Dinh Can, youngest brother of Diem, and political boss of a dozen

or more provinces in Central Vietnam. Can was less educated and more peasant oriented than his brothers.

Can's idea was to place highly motivated and carefully trained peasants into the countryside to live and work among the peasants in a spirit of social fusion similar to the VC. These members of the so-called Force Populaire (Luc-Luong Nhan-Dan) were armed, but mainly for self-defense. They were not to seek out or attack the VC, but were to fight if the VC showed themselves. They were to be as inconspicuous as possible. Their role was to identify with the peasants and to build confidence that they would be around a long time. They were forbidden to engage in terror.

Selection of trainees was carefully made. Can insisted that all be volunteers and peasants. Members of the National Revolutionary Movement--Dien's mass party--were considered too decadent and not tough enough. Many recruits were sons of parents who had suffered at the hands of the VC.

Force Populaire members helped peasants at their normal chores of harvesting, woodcutting, weaving, hair cutting, and the like. They always paid their board so as not to be a burden on the villagers. They operated in company size, distributing themselves in villages of perhaps 4,000 people.

Training the Force Populaire was arduous and focussed on the development of esprit. Political activity was the major emphasis. Full and free discussion and self-criticism were a part of training. Instructors carefully engineered the absorption "in depth" of the instruction and the spirit of the program.

The pilot program was started in Thua Thien Province (location of the city of Hué). Later, cadres from the 17 Central provinces were trained and prepared to open training centers in their own provinces. By the time of the death of Dien, most of these province programs were operational. The early successes had encouraged Dien and even the strategic hamlet-minded Nhu. Dien had ordered the expansion of the program into the delta, and some of these cadres had been trained when the Dien regime was toppled.

Although there was a dilution of effectiveness when the province training centers began turning out their own units, the brief life of the Force Populaire stands as one of the best-conceived and -implemented programs attempted in Vietnam. Its close tie to the Ngo family doomed it after the November revolution. In essence, it was the intimate and protective expression of GVN interest in the life of the peasant, and the creation of

a viable and popularly attractive alternative to Viet Cong terror. It is possible that proper correlation of this program with the strategic hamlet campaign--with the Force Populaire serving as the spearhead in contested areas--might have achieved a doubly successful result. The acquisition of intelligence in the early stages of pacification--leading to identification of the Viet Cong supporters--is a delicate operation and requires the penetration of the outward "mask" of the village. This was to be a main objective of the Force Populaire.

#### Popular Forces (formerly Dan Ve) Motivation Training

In 1964, Frank Scotton, an employee of the United States Information Service began developing a training plan for village defenders markedly different in mood and results from conventional training systems. In Quang Ngai, working with GVN officials and other US advisers, he applied the basic principles of motivation training devised by Mao Tse-tung. Helping the fighter see clearly why he is fighting is fundamental in the training.

Nothing is taken for granted in training. Every key point is reviewed in the words of the listener, reconstructed in informal discussions after class. Trainees go to class as a unit. Communication with the instructor is through the squad leader. His mediating role enhances his position with his men, and reminds them of their image as a team, a close-knit fraternity. As with the Communists, it is emphasized that the fighter must be the protector and friend of the people.

Early results have been promising. As fighters, the specially trained units have performed well. One unit killed more Viet Cong in a month than the nearest government main force division in the same period. Intelligence from civilian sources has doubled where these units have been stationed. Many villages have requested units for their areas.

In 1965 these techniques were being extended to many provinces. The key success factors are quality and intensiveness of training, and communication in the process. As the psychologists might say: the training has been internalized.

Similar training programs have been initiated for smaller units to penetrate Viet Cong areas as prosecutors-executors for people's courts against known Viet Cong officials and terrorists.

### ATTEMPTS TO CUT EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Vietnam is sea and river oriented. The Viet Cong have made extensive use of sampans and junks. Since 1962, a government junk fleet--mostly of small sturdy wooden boats, both sail and diesel powered--has been searching coastal vessels systematically. Approximately 600 junks are in action in a four-region network. US Navy advisers work closely with the junk personnel.

Hundreds of thousands of searches each year have not produced large confiscations. One startling episode suggests possible slippage on the part of surface coastal patrols. A 100-ton junk was sighted by an American helicopter pilot in February 1965 off Phu Yen. After a fierce fight, GVN forces found a million rounds of ammunition and thousands of Communist-made small arms. On shore were 100 tons of military supplies. Documents on board clearly established the ship as having come from North Vietnam.<sup>9</sup>

Surveillance of coastal shipping has been substantially increased. The US Seventh Fleet has been actively patrolling the entire coastal area from Phu Quoc Island in the south to the 17th parallel. US Coast Guard cutters were also ordered to Vietnam for these duties in 1965.

### Special Forces Border Surveillance

Vietnamese and US Special Forces teams were assigned the responsibility of observation and harassment of infiltration routes in remote areas in 1964. No measurable effect on infiltration by this means has been observed, although steady small group infiltration elements have been repeatedly contacted. It is evident from recent press reports that, despite the increased involvement of US combat forces in South Vietnam, infiltration of troops and supplies from North Vietnam continues unabated.

### US and GVN Air Attacks on North Vietnam

In February 1965 air attacks were begun on military installations in North Vietnam. Elements of the supply system to South Vietnam have repeatedly been hit. As yet there is no clear evidence of critical impairment of supply or infiltration. A broader

purpose of the air attacks, of course, has been to induce a change in the North Vietnamese refusal to negotiate the war. In the larger sense the raids are efforts to pressure a general removal of support of the southern insurgency.

### Diplomatic Pressures

The United States has acted in behalf of Vietnam to discourage shipping of supplies to North Vietnam for use in the war. In 1965, West German shippers agreed to refuse to transport such materials to North Vietnam.

## ADEQUACY OF GENERAL AND LOCAL

### ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY

Diem inherited an administration largely French in character, but hardly in quality. His efforts to energize the government through the development of a political nervous system for the administration often ended in abuses of sound administrative practice. The "fonctionnaire" spirit of the average Vietnamese official has weighed heavily in resolving operational problems in insurgency.<sup>10</sup> Lack of imagination and initiative, rooted in the often justifiable fear of being punished for using such qualities, has hampered pragmatic solutions to key problems. The influx of military officers into many of the key posts at national and provincial levels has further opened a chasm between civilians unaccustomed to Vietnamese military methods.

Only a tiny stream of graduate (70 a year) proceeds from Vietnam's National Institute of Administration. Viet Cong assassinations and kidnappings create more vacancies than these graduates can fill in the lower echelons of government.

Political instability since the fall of Diem has fostered further administrative caution and inaction. The French gift for paperwork, buttressed by an American love of papers, has created almost unbelievable complexities in getting things done. Scores of copies of documents require several signatures on each.

The sheer size of the US financial role in the GVN creates binational complications and occasional frictions that slow administrative processes. Despite progress, translation is a problem, and day-to-day communication among Vietnamese and American

counterparts lacks the natural fluidity essential to the intimate involvement of the officials in common projects.

Corruption is well known to the peasants, particularly the cheating done by their own village, province, and district officials. Lack of punishment has tacitly encouraged more corruption.

The average Vietnamese official has learned, for the sake of self-survival, to look for inspiration to his supervisor and not to the citizenry. The government does not currently depend on the consent of the people nor upon their taxes. On the contrary, the general orientation of the official is away from the peasantry, facing up the chain of command. With this attitude, the best-designed humanitarian programs can be rendered worthless in building a worthy GVN image.

Political instability has caused a high rate of personnel turnover in key positions. USOM province representatives have worked with as many as four or five province chiefs in a single year. Coupled with American military tours of only one year, the personnel change factor may be critical to effective counter-insurgent administration.

Disparity between plans and performance is not a characteristic peculiar to Vietnamese administration but it is a serious factor in administrative failure. The tendency has been to plan too big and to push too fast, without adequate attention to the quality of the program. US advisers have not always been blameless in this characteristic of program implementation.

Ngo Dinh Diem's bold plans of 1955-1957 for South Vietnam, many of which (Land Reform, for example) would have been helpful against the Communist insurgency if properly carried out, in the end became a burden of broken promises. The exalted democracy and human dignity preached by the government officials in the name of personalism became less and less evident to the unhappy peasant. Despite substantial accomplishments, the government of Ngo Dinh Diem progressively isolated itself from the realities of popular will and expressed need. The nearby Communists were able to manipulate, articulate, and amplify these popular frustrations. Diem himself, of course, personified the isolation of his whole administration from the people. Increasingly, Diem trusted fewer people until, finally, he looked only to his own family.

Despite the instability of the post-Diem period, and the concurrent ascendancy of Communist power, great efforts have been made, both by the GVN and the US officials, to bring about improvement. It is too early to assess the results.

### Performance of the Police Function

An essential ingredient to pacification, heretofore lacking, is beginning to be available: village policemen. Only a fraction of the required force of well-trained village police was in service before 1964. Resources control plans were made at the top level, but could not be carried out. HopTac, the regional pacification effort around Saigon, has included the training and hiring of thousands more village people for the police.

With the advisory guidance of USOM's Public Safety Division, a nationwide telecommunications net reaching to the village level has been established. Unfortunately, increasing VC control has fragmented and shrunken the coverage at the grass roots where it is most needed. Radio warning is part of a complete rural pacification system.

Identity card and family census programs are still being extended, particularly in correlation with pacification operations. Checkpoints are operated in these areas. Harbor police keep watch for the movement of supplies in and out of Saigon.

A new 1965 development that has brought good results is the antiterrorist operation center in Saigon. Manned by GVN and US officials, payments up to 100,000 piasters (\$1,000) are being made for information leading to the arrest of terrorists.

Improvements in the handling of the Viet Cong detainees in "re-education" centers is being made. Some centers have released as many as two-thirds of their inmates by faster and more liberal classification and processing. Improved rehabilitation programs and better housing have also been introduced. An American adviser works closely with this program.

### Scope and Degree of Control

The Communist insurgency has obviously erased or crippled the GVN rural presence in most of the nation. GVN instability at the top, increased VC weaponry and manpower from the north, and greater local VC support have combined to deny many government services to the countryside. The degree of VC control, however, varies greatly in different regions.

Fluidity of security precludes any useful geographical comment here. An interesting and often typical phenomenon in rural



areas is a kind of condominium--by alternation. The GVN official may be in the village by day, but leaves to make way for the VC propaganda rally at night. Efforts to certify areas as "cleared" or hamlets as "completed" have tended to deceive analysts as much as to help them. Some observers use the "rate of incidents" as a gauge. This, too, can be very deceptive. Incidents may go down when overwhelming GVN forces come in and the VC lie low; or incidents may be low because tacit understandings may have been reached between the two sides; or maybe the VC have the area so completely under control that incidents are pointless.

#### DEALING WITH PUBLIC OPINION

Information and propaganda activities in South Vietnam were substantially under Diem. While Diem's propagandists did a great deal (without much success) toward selling the national formula, personalism, the deepening crisis increasingly changed the content to anticommunism. Diem's--and, to a lesser degree, his successors'--problems stem from the one-way character of the communication, and from the disparity between words and deeds, promises and programs.

The United States has made substantial contributions in the propaganda field. JUSPAO, the Joint US Public Affairs Office, centers the efforts of MACV, USOM, and USIS--under the aegis of the last--in one US organization. Better US coordination is, of course, only a small part of the battle, but the signs of determined effort are now manifested among the American agencies.

The lack of a political consensus personified in party members at all levels affects the foundations of information planning and operations. And while studies have clearly been made since Diem's classic failure in the Buddhist crisis, the government has yet to learn how to be a good listener--sensitive to what the people want, and to what they want to hear.

Although the GVN has shown little concern for external public opinion, American officials have been keenly sensitive--too often after damage has been done. The publicity attendant upon use of nonlethal gas and village burnings by American troops are examples of this sensitivity.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF SPECIFIC INCIDENTS,

### BATTLES, OR OPERATIONAL CAMPAIGNS

The widely reported Buddhist crisis and subsequent downfall of Diem are great landmarks of current Vietnamese history, neither of which was related directly to the Communist insurgency (although the Communists exploited each as much as they could).

Perhaps the most sensational incidents have been attacks directed at American installations. The rise of anti-American terror in 1965 significantly influenced the American community, as evidenced by the withdrawal of dependents. This undoubtedly had its impact on the Vietnamese, but presumably this has been offset by the greater US military involvement in the war.

Successful VC raids against Bien Hoa and Da Nang did not materially effect the war but may well have boosted Viet Cong spirits.

Raids by air on the north and B-52 raids on the south are 1965 innovations whose results have not been fully determined. Press reports indicate a salutary effect on South Vietnamese morale.

Perhaps the most meaningful discussion of specific incidents and symbolic victories centers on the tactic of minor incidents by the Viet Cong in local communities. A Viet Cong show of strength may be out of all proportion to its normal presence in an area, but the psychological impact can be great. In Quang Nam Province, for example, the village headquarters, two miles from the province headquarters (and on the main road), was destroyed by the VC. The portent of this incident was not lost on the surrounding hamlets.

## DETERMINATION AS RELATED TO INDOCTRINATION;

### MORAL AND ETHICAL ATTITUDES

Traditional Vietnamese ethical attitudes include both the nonviolent pacifism of classical Buddhism and the patriotic devotion to village and homeland associated with Confucianism. Vietnamese nationalism is deeply rooted in the history of their many struggles against the Chinese, the Mongols, the Khmers, and the French.

However, the official birth of South Vietnam was not initiated by the Vietnamese and did not stem from traditional heroism or institutions or national self-awareness. As noted previously, the Viet Minh had captured nationalistic tradition for themselves.

The nation-building mission of the new government under Ngo Dinh Diem included the development of determination or will in both leadership and citizenry as a whole. Without a pre-established political base, Diem--guided by his brother Nhu--attempted to create a national elan with personalism as the philosophical touchstone. Despite an enormous effort--through the various party indoctrination sessions at all bureaucratic levels--the creation of a "national formula" failed.

The many changes of leadership following the demise of the Ngos have demonstrated both the absence and the need of a political and ideological rallying ground for leadership at all levels.

There are signs of non-Communist revolutionary developments in South Vietnam today.<sup>11</sup> The vital question is whether these new forces--among the Buddhists, the Army, and the students--will form a confluence of interest for progress or clash with each other with disastrous results, leaving no alternative but communism.

The exhilarating revolutionary pledges of the Diem regime and its successors, as measured against their tawdry performances in meeting the promises, have seriously impaired morale among many Vietnamese leaders. By 1965, the fundamental crisis of motivation against insurgency still remains unsolved in South Vietnam.

Yet there is enough evidence of spirit and potential accomplishment to provide some hope for the future. The local successes of the Popular Forces training program, and the interrupted Force Populaire program of Ngo Dinh Can, have shown that proper motivation training in a local situation will work.

## Footnotes

1. The claim of the control of the Viet Cong will not be debated here. The reader is referred to the US Department of State's white paper, A Threat to the Peace--North Vietnam's Effort to Conquer South Vietnam (Department of State publication 7308, in two parts; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December, 1961). Although the measure of control by the north has been debated among competent observers, the sum of judgments appears to be that the control is almost total. Individual participants at the lowest level, however, may be unaware of the Communist character of the movement. The Peoples Revolutionary Party is the direct arm of the Lao Dong party, working within the National Liberation Front, at all levels, as the openly Communist part of the NLF truly southern.

2. Ibid., pp. 18-19. This publication, and a subsequent study, US Department of State, Aggression from the North (Department of State Publication 7839; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February, 1965) are the main sources for Viet Cong organization in this study. The latter gives estimated troop strengths of VC main force units as 35,000, up from less than 20,000 in 1961. Part-time guerrillas are estimated at 60,000-80,000, p. 23.

3. Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, "Russian Guerrilla Experts in Asia," Oakland Tribune, May 13, 1965. The rise in Russian technicians would probably in part be attributed to the installation of anti-aircraft missiles.

4. The best commentary in English on Diem's personalist philosophy is provided by John C. Donnell in Problems of Freedom; Vietnam Since Independence, ed. Wesley Fishel (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), chap. 3.

5. Attributed to General J. Lawton Collins by Mark S. Watson, Baltimore Sun, February 1, 1955. Also see "Accord Reached on Vietnam Army," New York Times, January 21, 1955.

6. "O'Daniel Starts Vietnam Training," New York Times, February 13, 1955.

7. A discussion of the MSU position on the Civil Guard can be found in Robert Scigliano and Guy Fox, Technical Assistance in Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 11-12. See also Scigliano's South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 163-167.

8. A useful comparison of the Malayan and Vietnamese programs can be found in Milton E. Osborne's Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam: A Survey and Comparison (Data Paper No. 55; Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, April 1965). Osborne discussed the failures of the Vietnamese program.

9. "Aggression from the North," op. cit., pp. 15-17.

10. An interesting discussion of Vietnam's administrative heritage and problems in Nguyen Thai's Is South Vietnam Viable? (Manila, P.I.: Carmelo and Bauerman, 1962).

11. For a valuable analysis of the current socio-political convolutions in South Vietnam, see George A. Carver, Jr., "The Real Revolution in South Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, 43, No. 3 (April 1965), pp. 387-408.

## Bibliography

In addition to the works listed below and in the notes, numerous newspaper and magazine articles, government documents, personal notes, and records of interviews were used in this study.

- Atkins, E.H., Jr. The Police and Resources Control in Counter-insurgency (A Training Manual). Saigon: US Operation Mission, 1964.
- Browne, Malcolm W. The New Face of War. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
- Cross, James E. Conflict in the Shadows. The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1963.
- Fall, Bernard B. The Two Vietnams--A Political and Military Analysis. New York: Praeger, 1963.
- Fishel, Wesley R. (ed.). Problems of Freedom, South Vietnam Since Independence. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.
- Giap, Vo Nguyen. People's War, People's Army. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Halberstam, David. The Making of a Quagmire. New York: Random House, 1965.
- Hendry, James Bausch. The Study of a Vietnamese Rural Community. Saigon: Michigan State University, Vietnam Advisory Group, 1959.
- Hickey, Gerald Cannon. Village in Vietnam. New Haven: Yale, 1964.
- Jordan, Amos A., Jr. Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Lindholm, Richard W. (ed.). Vietnam--The First Five Years. Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959.
- Mecklin, John. Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the US Role in Vietnam. New York: Doubleday, 1965.

Montgomery, John D. The Politics of Foreign Aid, American Experience in Southeast Asia. New York: Praeger, 1962.

Osborne, Milton E. Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam: A Survey and Comparison. (Data Paper No. 55). Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, April, 1965.

Scigliano, Robert George. South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1963.

\_\_\_\_\_ and Fox, Guy H. Technical Assistance in Vietnam, The Michigan State University Experience. New York: Praeger, 1965.

Vietnam, Republic of. Communist Aggression Against the Republic of Vietnam. Saigon: Republic of Vietnam, 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_. Eight Years of the Ngo Dinh Diem Administration. Saigon: Republic of Vietnam, 1962.

Warner, Denis. The Last Confucian. New York: Macmillan, 1964.

## The Chinese Civil War, 1927-1949

by

S.M. Chiu

### BACKGROUND

When the monarchy was overthrown in the revolution of 1911, China's hope to achieve political stability and complete independence was shattered by the emergence of divisive war-lordism. Known historically as Tuchuns, these war lords vied with one another for control of Peking; whoever occupied that city was recognized by foreign powers as the legal government of China. As the Tuchuns appeared to have nothing but their own selfish interests in mind, the only cohesive force with a progressive program--the Nationalist Party led by Sun Yat-sen--soon became the rallying point for all nationalists and antimonarchists. But Sun's party possessed neither military strength nor a disciplined organization, and despite the leader's constant efforts to strengthen his movement, it remained a mere pawn in the factional struggles, with its position largely dependent upon the whims of local commanders.

The destruction of China's centuries-old ideology--Confucianism--in the World War I years and after left an intellectual vacuum which a group of Westernizing iconoclasts sought in vain to fill with alien ideas. Leaders of the Chinese "Renaissance," symbolized by the May Fourth Movement, provided a great impetus for China's cultural transformation but no political direction. In the midst of this confusion and uncertainty, China suffered one humiliation after another at the hands of foreign powers, beginning with Japan's Twenty-one Demands in 1915 and culminating in Chinese frustration at Versailles.

Of the Western governments, only the newly formed regime in the Soviet Union showed any sympathy for China's plight. Dazzled by the early success of the Russian revolution and attracted by



the Marxist theories that inspired it, Chinese intellectuals began to organize socialist study groups in Peking, Shanghai, and other cities. In mid-1921, under the auspices of the Communist International and with the leaders of those study groups as nuclei, the Communist Party of China (CPC) held its first Congress in Shanghai, with 12 delegates representing about 50 members. The early leaders, such as Chen Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao, were middle-class intellectuals whose temperament was unfit for the task of violent revolution as envisaged by Communist doctrine. The members belonged to the intelligentsia, for the labor movement was yet in its infancy. In the three years that followed, membership grew only very slowly--to about 300 in 1923.

### CPC-Kuomintang Alliance

The political situation in China was highly complex. Sun and his Nationalist (Kuomintang) followers had attempted to set up an independent government in Canton in 1917 with the support of a local war lord. A delegate from the Communist International, Maring, had met Sun and felt that he and his party stood the best chance of leading a successful campaign against the war lords to unify the country. In 1922, Adolf Joffe, who was one of the ablest Soviet Russian diplomats and had participated in the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, was sent to China with a dual mission--to establish diplomatic relations with the Peking government and if that failed to see Sun, who was then in Shanghai, having been forced out of Canton for the second time.

Rebuffed by the Western powers, Sun was in a receptive mood. The result of the Sun-Joffe meeting was a joint declaration in which the Russian assured Sun of Soviet support. Shortly afterward, Sun returned to Canton, his hopes renewed. A delegation, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, was sent to the Soviet Union to study the Soviet political, economic, and military systems. In return the Soviet Union and the Communist International sent Michael Borodin, a professional revolutionary par excellence, to Canton as political adviser to Sun and the Kuomintang. The latter, hitherto a loosely organized party, was reconstructed on the model of the highly centralized Soviet party. Sun became its Director-General, and members of the CPC were admitted to membership. The CPC had, in its Third Congress in 1923, voted to allow its members to join the Kuomintang on an individual basis while retaining their identity as members of the CPC, the rationale being that at that particular stage of the Chinese revolution, the Kuomintang, which was regarded as the representative of the Nationalist-bourgeois class, was the leading party.

The objective of the CPC was twofold: (1) to expand while working under the banner of the Kuomintang and (2) to wrest eventually the leadership in the revolution from the latter. The effect of the entente was felt almost immediately. In 1924, three Communists were elected full members and six were elected reserve members of the Kuomintang's highest governing body, the Central Executive Committee. Membership in the CPC itself had risen to about 1,500 by 1925, a 400% increase in less than two years. Besides, through the influence of Borodin, Communists were appointed to key positions in all eight departments under the KMT Central Executive Committee.

The strategy of the Communists was based on the premise that the KMT was not a political party in the normal sense, but was rather a coalition of many parties and factions representing basically different philosophies temporarily amalgamated for the immediate purpose of national unification. As a member of this coalition the CPC would and could pursue a policy designed to seize control of the KMT by "allying with the KMT left-wing and moderates to isolate and defeat the right-wing." Thus, despite their minority position in KMT councils the Communists were able to muster enough support to expel the so-called Western-Hill faction, the group of conservatives who had opposed the alliance with the CPC in 1924. Following this, the former moderates headed by Hu Han-min became the new right wing to be eliminated. By 1926, Chiang Kai-shek, who was considered a member of the KMT left wing in 1924, had become the new right and was referred to with increasing frequency in Communist propaganda as the new war lord. Had the Communists succeeded in removing Chiang, they would have come to control the KMT in collaboration with the KMT left wing.

While they were gaining control of the KMT, the Communists also strove to dominate the peasant movement, infiltrate the revolutionary army, and assume leadership in the government which was founded in 1925. Mao Tse-tung, besides being secretary in the propaganda department of the KMT, was head of the Peasants' Training Institute in Canton, which turned out and sent large numbers of cadres to the Hunan countryside. There Mao, on an inspection tour, found peasant distress and discontent in explosive proportions. By the end of 1926, more than half a million of these poor peasants without the minimal means of living had been agitated and organized by Communist propagandist-agitators. Their uprisings, preceding the KMT's northern expedition in the latter part of that year, contributed significantly to the rapid progress made by the army. However, the Communists in the end failed to capitalize on the aroused peasantry, and when they belatedly adopted a radical land program in 1927 they in turn

alienated those army officers (mostly from the land-owning class) who might have been willing to do their bidding.

In the government, Communist influence grew apace following the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925. In late 1926, the left-wing dominated government moved to Wuhan, the tri-cities in central China where the labor movement was strong because of the location there of ironworks and munitions industries. Opposed to the removal of the government to Wuhan, some of the conservative KMT leaders consulted with Chiang Kai-shek, who was then in Nanchang with the army. He refused to go on to Wuhan, thus signalling the beginning of the end of the uneasy CPC-KMT alliance.

Perhaps CPC influence was strongest in the revolutionary army. The younger officers were all graduates of the Whampoa Academy, which had been founded in 1924 and of which Chiang was commandant. Besides the many Russian advisers, the instructional staff included many known Communists. Chou En-lai was at one time acting head of the political department. The political officers in the units were mostly Communists. Given the personal nature of Chinese armies, the Communists, by working on the commanders, could conceivably gain control of the army. But their radical social and economic policies and the conservatism of the army officers in the end proved to be irreconcilable, and before the CPC-KMT split only one division of the revolutionary army was controlled by the CPC.

### Failure of CPC Strategy to 1927

Among the many highly complicated factors contributing to CPC failure in the 1920s, the following seem to be the most important:

1. In the last analysis CPC failure in China was the failure of the Communist International, whose policy from the beginning was double-edged: to help reorganize and strengthen the KMT and at the same time to help the CPC subvert it. Should the KMT become a centralized and disciplined organization it could not be easily subverted. On the other hand, the growth of CPC strength would certainly mean the concomitant radicalization of its social and economic policies, which would clash with the interests of the KMT moderates and conservatives, especially the officer class. In the latter eventuality the CPC would stand to lose, as demonstrated by Chen Tu-hsiu's telegram to the Communist International in mid-June of 1927 and by the wave of anticommunism led by military officers in the units supposedly under Communist control.

2. The most glaring failure of the CPC lies in the fact that it met with little success in gaining control of a significant part of the revolutionary army. Although Communist political officers were active in all eight armies, the officers and men were largely impervious to Communist propaganda. The high-ranking officers, like Tang Sheng-chih and Li Tsung-jen, joined the revolutionary movement only for personal gain, and even if they could have been persuaded to support the CPC for a time, they most certainly would have changed their minds, as they did time and time again later in their careers. The armies were "personal" armies, the origins of which go back to the Taiping Rebellion of the 19th Century. In order to have control of any army, the CPC would have had either to control the commander or to create one from among the peasants whom they had aroused.

#### Armed Uprisings

The end of the CPC-KMT entente came in 1927. Faced with a left-wing dominated KMT in Wuhan headed by Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek and the more conservative elements set up their own party central organization in Nanchang and, after its capture, in Nanking. The Wuhan KMT continued to work with the CPC until July, when it too purged the party and government of CPC members. The termination of the alliance threw the CPC into considerable confusion. In the next several years, the party, carrying out instructions of the Communist International, experimented with one policy after another, searching for the right formula and changing the Chinese leadership after each failure. The first new policy was adopted at the time of the Fifth Party Congress, held in May 1927. It belatedly recognized the importance of harnessing the revolutionary strength of the mass of peasantry. However, before the Communists could launch their "agrarian revolution," their suppression by both the Wuhan and Nanking KMT forced them prematurely to stage the Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927. In Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi Province, Communists had long been active. In 1927, the city and its environs were garrisoned by two loyal KMT armies under the command of Cheng Chien and Chu Pei-te and units of Chang Fa-kuei's famed Second Front Army which, however, were either under Communists such as Ho Lung and Yeh Ting or known to be sympathetic to the Communists, such as the division commanded by Tsai Ting-kai. All told, five undersized divisions plus two of Tsai's regiments, totalling about 21,000 men, participated in the uprising. Although plans had leaked to the loyal forces, the Communists had little difficulty in disarming the larger loyal garrisons in a few hours, before daybreak of August 1.

It is interesting to note that the Nanchang Uprising was staged in the name of the KMT. The Communists believed that both the Wuhan and Nanking factions of the KMT had deserted the revolution because "the classes they represented had played out their roles." They therefore claimed to be the logical heirs of the revolution.

As soon as the rebels had control of Nanchang, a meeting of KMT party representatives (those who sympathized with the uprising; mostly selected by the CPC) was held there to form a Central Revolutionary Committee of the KMT of China, replacing the old Central Executive Committee as the highest organ of political power. Most of the 25 members chosen for the new committee were indeed non-Communists, but most of them were not even in the city and those who were there were Communists. Under the committee were subcommittees for party affairs, workers' and peasants' affairs, propaganda, finance, plus a secretariat, a military staff group (headed by Liu Po-cheng and Chou En-lai), a political department, and a political security bureau. Under the committee was the army, using the name of the Second Front Army, with three armies (Twentieth, Eleventh, and Ninth), under the overall command of Ho Lung.

The ultimate objective of the uprising was to take Canton in the south and to use it as a base for a new revolution. On August 5, the entire force moved south, averaging 20 miles a day over mountainous terrain. Hunger, desertion, sickness, and intra-army squabbles took a heavy toll. When the army captured Swatow in the latter part of September, only one-third of the original strength remained, and shortly thereafter the drive toward Canton fizzled when the Communist force was badly defeated by superior loyal KMT troops in eastern Kwangtung. Peasant uprisings which the Communists had expected did not materialize. The only survivors of any consequence were the 1,000 men under Chu Teh who made their way to northern Kwangtung, and in May of the following year, at Chinggangshan, joined Mao's remnants of another uprising.

While the Nanchang rebels were making their way south, the CPC on August 7 convened an emergency meeting which (1) ousted Chen Tsung-shan as party secretary, and (2) reaffirmed the policy calling for peasant uprisings to turn the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a social revolution.<sup>1</sup> Mao was instructed to revive the fortunes of the CPC in his native Hunan Province and to organize the peasants for the "Autumn Harvest Uprising." Meeting with little success, Mao took with him a few hundred riotous miners to Chinggangshan, where he was joined by Chu Teh and his 1,000 men the following May. The survivors of the two uprisings, totaling not more than 2,000 men, were to become the nucleus of the future Red Army.

## THE INSURGENTS

With the failure of the policy of armed uprisings, the CPC was bifurcated, with most of the party leaders taking refuge in the foreign settlements of Shanghai while a few, led by Mao and Chu, remained in the rural areas of eastern Hunan, southern Kiangsi, western Fukien, and northern Kwangtung. The latter group, with its armed bands, was the only visible strength of the party during the next few years. Contact between the two groups was at best infrequent. Mao and Chu therefore were free to pursue their own policies in building a base in southern Kiangsi, expanding the army, and carrying out their own social and economic programs with or without the party center's approval. In two years, Mao clearly emerged as the most powerful Communist in Kiangsi Province, and by 1931 he was in a position to challenge the Shanghai party leaders for control of the entire party.

### Guerrilla Base

The first base of operations of Mao's army, if it can be called such, was Chinggangshan, one of the mountains in the Lo Hsiao range striding the two provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi. The entire base area had a circumference of 100 miles, accessible only through five easily defensible trails. Far from any towns, the Chinggangshan area had only a handful of village communities, with a total population of less than 2,000. However, the base was just as easily cut off as it was defensible. In the summer of 1928, for example, government troops captured all the towns on its periphery which the Communists had been raiding periodically for supplies. Thus Mao's army was deprived of even those distant sources of supply and was placed in difficult circumstances. Mao found it hard to pay the soldiers their per diem of five cents for oil, fuel, and vegetables. This forced Mao to lead his army out of the base that winter and march through southern Kiangsi and western Fukien to replenish his supplies by capturing stores from KMT troops and by exacting contributions from the local population.

By 1930 Mao had come to control a much larger area in southern Kiangsi and parts of western Fukien with a total population of some 3,000,000. This then became the main Soviet area until the Communists were dislodged in the later campaigns undertaken by Chiang Kai-shek. The entire area is hilly, especially Fukien. It is economically among the poorest in China, where most of the

rural populace were what Mao classified as poor peasants without the minimal means of making a living. Being much larger in area, the base was much less vulnerable to effective blockade than the earlier Chingkangshan base. The Communists in fact maintained an underground communication system with the outside through Swatow and Hong Kong. Like Chingkangshan, the southern Kiangsi base also straddled provincial boundaries. This is significant because of the tendency of the Chinese armies, all personal armies, to refuse to fight on "alien" soil.

As soon as the Kiangsi base had been consolidated, other "guerrilla bases" were established around the main base to serve as a protective shield and as bases of supply for guerrillas operating in the areas around them, which Mao called "guerrilla zones." When the enemy was cleared from such an area, the "guerrilla zone" was turned into a new regular base. In the guerrilla bases, all able-bodied males and females were armed to serve as auxiliaries of the guerrillas and as reserves. The people were educated politically. The same principles were the basis of the "liberated areas" during the war against Japan and of the bases that Mao ordered established in Manchuria in 1946.

#### Political Structure

After the uprisings of 1927, several "Soviet" regimes, all short-lived, were established: by Mao at Ch'aling (Hunan), Peng Pai at Kaifeng and Lufeng (Kwangtung), and Peng Teh-huai at Pingchiang (Hunan). During the Canton uprising in September 1927 the Canton Commune existed for a few days. It was not until May 1930, when the Communists were in stronger control of a relatively permanent base, that the CPC decided to erect a regular political structure. This decision by the Shanghai party representatives' conference was confirmed by the Central Committee in January 1931. An All-China Congress of Soviets was held in November 1931 in Juichin, capital city of the Kiangsi base. The Congress adopted a constitution establishing formally the Chinese Soviet Republic with the Central Executive Committee as its highest governing body. Mao was elected chairman of the committee and Chang Kuo-tao and Hsiang Ying were vice chairmen. Under the committee was the Council of People's Commissars. Chu Teh was appointed commander in chief of the Red Army. Anticipating the later constitution, the Juichin document declared a democratic dictatorship of peasants and workers, guaranteed political rights to the "toiling people," and assured the national minorities of the right of self-determination.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, a radical land law was passed confiscating lands owned by landlords and rich peasants.

Later, when other Soviet areas were formed, similarly structured governments were set up.

Following the "Long March," and after the rapprochement with the KMT in 1937, the Communist regime in Shensi was recognized by the national KMT government as the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Government, presided over by Lin Tsu-han with a People's Political Council headed by Kao Kang, then a local power. The form of the government in all Communist-held areas was not dissimilar to KMT governments or at least was acceptable to the KMT. Shortly after 1937, for example, in order to maintain the new entente with the KMT, the Communists who established the 19 "liberated areas" generally refrained from seizing outright political power even in those areas. Rather, broad-based "coalition" regimes were the rule, although there is no doubt that the Communists, by controlling the army and monopolizing the media of communication, were the unquestioned masters. This cautious attitude of the Communists remained until the new civil war in the 1940s. When the Communists were on the verge of final victory over the KMT, they called a meeting in Manchuria in 1948 of representatives of other political parties and of nonpartisan groups "preparatory to the convening of a new Chinese People's Political Consultative Council" which would then inaugurate the new government at Peking. Be it noted that in Communist theory the political structure reflects the actual conditions, and therefore the political structure is erected only when the "actual" conditions --social and economic--warrant it.

Over the governmental structure, of course, was the ubiquitous party organization. The party's Central Committee controlled the government, and in fact all the leaders in the government were party leaders as well.

#### Military Structure

As in the political structure, the command structure has been changed several times in the history of the Chinese Communist revolution in accordance with changing conditions. Under the limitations of the insurrectionary period, 1927-1945, the high command was simple. There was something like a high command in the Kiangsi period, with Chu Teh as chairman of the People's Military Council under the Central Executive Committee. Chu was also commander in chief of the Red Army, but his effective command reached only those units in the central Soviet area, while others, such as those under Ho Lung and Chang Kuo-tao, remained relatively independent. At central headquarters were six



departments: general affairs, service and supply, operations, intelligence, education, and medical service. This simple organization continued until the period of the war against Japan, when the Communist armies were technically placed under the National Military Commission in Chungking.

After 1945, the vastly expanded army and the occupation of more territory necessitated a reorganization of the high command. From 1945, the Communist field operations were directed by a headquarters of the People's Liberation Army with Chu as commander in chief. Under headquarters were 11 departments, including a general staff, a rear services department, a training department, an adjutant's office, a department of operations, a liaison department, and an air force department. Despite the elaborate organization, it is doubtful that headquarters had regular contact with the field armies, each of which was commanded by a senior officer and operated in areas far from the Communist center. By the end of 1948, when the Communists assumed the offensive, the designations of the Communist forces became more formal: the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Field Armies, each in turn composed of two or three armies. The system of divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads followed closely the KMT armies. Departures from this conventional organization occurred in some special areas during the war against Japan when, probably because of difficulties in communications, there were a number of independent columns and detachments, as there were also in guerrilla forces not yet raised to regular army status.

Another exception to conventional organization was the New Fourth Army, composed of survivors of the Kiangsi campaigns left behind at the time of the Long March. When the war against Japan broke out, these emerged from their hiding places, and at the insistence of the Communists were recognized by the Chungking government as the New Fourth Army consisting of 12,000 men under the command of Yeh Ting. After the so-called New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941,<sup>3</sup> in which the Communists met a disastrous defeat at the hands of the government army, the New Fourth was reorganized on a regular basis with Chen Yi replacing the captured Yeh Ting as commander.

A unique feature of Communist military organization is the hierarchy of political officers, representatives of the party, that exists alongside the military personnel. At each level of the Red Army command structure was a party committee down to the battalion level, and a party branch and party cell at the company and squad levels respectively. Attached to each unit was a political commissar (called party representative before 1930). Usually

the political commissar served as secretary of the party committee at the same level. His job was to supervise the carrying out of policy determined or transmitted by the party committee. More often than not, he had precedence over the commanding officer of the unit. In some units, where the commanding officer was a faithful party member, the two posts might be held by one man. It appears that in addition to his control functions, the commissar and the party committee (he alone in the early army) performed also the functions of staff officers. At the headquarters of each unit command was a political department, besides the other functional departments. This department was responsible for the implementation of party policy, cultural activities in the unit, and other activities for control purposes. The director of this department was often concurrently the commissar, making the latter the most powerful man in the unit. The department usually had an organization section (to keep records of personnel), propaganda section (for propaganda and cultural activities), security section (intelligence and investigation), and civilian relations section (discipline and civilian mobilization). Organization of the department in larger units (such as army or division) might be much more elaborate, with sections for such activities as youth work.

In addition to the regular military structure described above, because the Communist-held areas were highly militarized, there were always numerous paramilitary organizations. One of these was the militia organization, which was extremely important to guerrilla warfare. It symbolized the "people's" participation. In the Kiangsi and early Yen-an periods, the militiamen were called Red Guards. Practically every member of a peasant association was a Red Guardsman. Given some quick training in the fundamentals and some weapons the regular army could spare, they aided the regulars as scouts, messengers, and saboteurs. After 1937, the Red Guards were renamed the militia (Min Ping) for obvious political reasons. They provided a reservoir of manpower, and if need be militia units could be sent to the regular units as replacements or as "combat teams." By 1945 the number of militiamen had reached 3,000,000. These militiamen formed the lowest of three levels of the Communist military establishment, the others being the guerrillas and the regulars.

#### Logistics and Training

Throughout the Kiangsi period, the entire Communist movement was rural oriented. P. Mif, who had been the representative of the Communist International in China in 1931, wrote that in 1927,

53.8% of the CPC members were from the working class, whereas in 1934 only 8 out of 821 delegates to the Second Soviet Congress in Juichin were workers. This ruralization of a party which claimed to be the vanguard of the proletariat was reflected in the army. In 1930, Mao's army was made up of 40% Hunan peasants, 20% prisoners of war, 20% survivors of the earlier uprisings, and 20% new recruits. The last three categories were, of course, predominantly of peasant background.

Mao has written that these men needed at least six months of training before they could be used in actual combat. However, the almost continuous fighting in the early years rendered even the most basic drills impossible. They therefore had to gain combat experience through fighting, and whatever training there was had to be done during infrequent respites. Supplies were unknown, at least until after 1931. The army lived off the country --expropriating landlord property, capturing stores from the enemy, and taking forced contributions from the population. The men were lucky to own one uniform for all seasons. Their weapons consisted of a variety of muskets, shotguns, and red-tasseled spears, all of ancient vintage. In general, one out of every two carried firearms, and the Communists consoled themselves by saying that unarmed men would have more incentive to disarm the enemy.

After the founding of the Soviet regime at Juichin in 1931, some efforts were made to improve the logistical situation. A supply and services department was created at headquarters. The Red Army Academy was founded with Liu Po-cheng as president, and military schools were opened in all Soviet areas, producing such future officers as Hsiao Hua.

The new recruits in the early Red Army were mostly impressed into service, while the prisoners of war were mostly mercenaries who might have been fighting for the war lords for years without feeling any sense of loyalty to anyone or any cause. Mao was troubled by the "banditism," and "anti-discipline" mentality of these men, and outside observers (Nation, June 13, 1930) called them just "roving bands" and doubted that they had any revolutionary organization.

After the founding of the Juichin government, "mobilization" technically replaced coercion as the method of recruitment. "Kuang Chun" (army expanding) movements were launched periodically to persuade those of military age to join the army. Efforts were made to improve the image of the soldier. The land law provided, on paper at least, all army men with a plot of land to be cultivated for them by the government. A resolution passed by the first Soviet Congress in 1931 accorded army personnel many

additional privileges, including free entertainment, free education for their children, rent-free housing for their families, and discounts at government-operated stores. By these measures, the Communists were able to increase their army to 300,000 men by 1934. The same method of recruitment remained Communist practice through the next two decades. (A military service law was adopted only after the Communists had achieved power on the mainland.)

### Doctrine and Indoctrination

Mao's military ideas have been discussed by many writers. They may be summarized here briefly. His strategic concepts start from his definition that war is "the highest form of struggle to solve the contradictions between classes, between nations, and between states, which has existed since the beginning of private property and economic classes." Understanding this concept of the nature of war is necessary for an understanding of the "laws" of war. Like politics, of which war is a continuation, wars have their particular laws which can be known. Once known, the strategy for a particular war can be planned; and with the strategy so planned, any war can be won. Conditions in China led Mao to the following dictum:

Strategically, fight a war of attrition; tactically, strive for quick decisions; fight no positional war, but insist on war of movement; aim not at the repulsion of the enemy, but at his annihilation. Never strike a two-fisted blow, but always attack with concentrated forces; establish small territorial bases near the enemy; maintain a minimum unified command.

Tactically, too, Mao is certain there are laws that can be determined by military leaders, by observing the behavior of the enemy and the habits of their own men. An army can win even without modern weapons, according to Mao, because war is not a match of arms alone, but more importantly, a match of human and psychological factors; weapons must be used by men.

In the early years, when the Red Army was still far inferior to KMT armies, Mao summarized Red tactics by using 16 Chinese characters which said:

When the enemy advances, we retreat;  
When he rests, we harass him;

When he is weary, we attack him;  
When he retreats, we pursue him.

The running tactics of Mao naturally entail the loss of territory. But to Mao time is gained by giving up space. Therefore this is only the first of three stages in a protracted war. When the enemy has extended to the maximum limit (inevitable in the case of a small country, like Japan, invading a large country, like China), the second stage--stalemate--is reached. The main form of struggle should then be guerrilla war, with the regular army held in reserve preparatory to the third stage, which is the general counteroffensive. Guerrilla war, to Mao, is basically offensive war. The guerrillas must not only seek to destroy the enemy, but must also try to expand, to improve, and eventually to become regularized and be able to fight conventional war. The correct policy, according to Mao, is:

Offense in defense; quick decisions in tactical battles while the over-all strategy is to wage a protracted war; coordination with regular forces; establishment of guerrilla bases; gradual transformation of guerrillas into regular units, and transformation of guerrilla war into a war of movement; correct leadership.

To attain maximum effect, guerrilla leaders should be alert and retain the initiative at all times. According to Mao, there are three requirements in handling guerrilla forces: the ability to bring them together in concentration, the ability to disperse them when faced with adverse conditions, and the ability to change the position or the area of operations without unnecessary waste of time. Even in modern war, the importance of guerrillas is obvious. They are substitutes for artillery, by threatening the enemy deep in his own lines; they serve as the eyes and ears of the regular forces by their bold--and undetected--sallies into the enemy rear.

Mao has always insisted upon flexibility. His changing strategy during the civil war is an example. There was greater parity of strength of the two sides during the civil war, particularly after 1945, than Mao's earlier dicta envisaged. Therefore instead of the earlier postulates of a three-stage war, Mao elevated each of the three stages, so that the first stage became that of mobile warfare, the second stage that of limited offensives, and the third stage that of general offensive. But tactical concepts remained the same as before: strike first at isolated and scattered enemy forces, capture small towns and rural areas before attacking urban areas, the aim is to eliminate the enemy and not to occupy territory, muster absolute numerical superiority, and encircle the enemy in every engagement. In a directive to the party in late 1947, Mao said:

We must not fight any campaign for which we are unprepared, or which we cannot win. . . . We must be courageous in combat, be unafraid of sacrifice, and never refuse wearisome, uninterrupted combat. . . . Replenish ourselves by capturing all the enemy's weapons, and most of his manpower. . . . Carry out land reforms in all liberated areas. . . .

In his earlier writings Mao paid particular attention to retaining the initiative in war. He said: "In any war, the two sides struggle for the initiative on the battlefield." Initiative, according to Mao, is the freedom of movement without which troops are faced with annihilation and defeat. The best way to retain the initiative, he said, is systematically to confuse the enemy and attack him by surprise. "To make the enemy think that every tree and shrub along our line is a soldier is one example," he said.

By 1948 the tide in the civil war had turned in favor of the Communists. Mao enjoined the party:

In the past, because we had to fight a guerrilla war in rural areas, we permitted the party organizations and army leaders in various localities to remain largely autonomous . . . producing undisciplined . . . conditions. . . . The present situation demands that we do our utmost to overcome these . . . conditions . . . so as to facilitate the transition from the guerrilla form of war to regular war.

In early 1949, when Mao no longer expected any more serious fighting, he directed that the army be gradually transformed into a "work team," to participate in taking over and managing urban centers, in leading and organizing labor unions, and in operating schools. Indeed, the army itself was looked upon by Mao as a school. He said in early 1949: "The 2.1 million-man army is the equivalent of thousands of universities and high schools. The army itself must fill the need for cadres."

To fight Mao's kind of war requires complete control by the high command of both officers and men. Hence the political control system throughout the army described above. The system, which had existed in the revolutionary army of the 1920s, began in the Red Army in 1929 as a measure to combat the bandit tendencies of the army. Controls were exerted through many channels: education (both political and cultural), entertainment (recreational activities with political dosages), accusatory meetings (arouse the soldiers to hate the enemy), small group

discussions (usually platoons to check on the thinking and attitudes of soldiers), review meetings after battles (criticism and self-criticism of performance). The political control system also aimed at heightening the morale of the officers and men by fostering a feeling of a common goal, common danger, mutual confidence, and a recognition that progress was being made.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the army was and is considered part of the governmental machinery, and as such it was integrated with other sectors of political-state activities. It was required to "study" government policies, express support of multifarious party-manipulated campaigns, and participate in economic activities such as farming and reclamation. The work of Wang Chen's brigade at Nanniwan near Yen'an during the war against Japan has been much ballyhooed. The result of all these, despite many abuses, was that "orders given to the leaders of the Chinese Communist armies . . . and passed down to subordinates never were questioned . . . they were fulfilled to the letter. . . . This was achieved through indoctrination and control."<sup>5</sup>

### Techniques

While no nation can claim a monopoly of martial virtues, the quality of a fighting man is the product of his social environment. C.H. Wu has remarked:

Who has ever cared for the Chinese soldier--neglected and despised in his own country and ridiculed abroad? Who has ever cared for the Chinese army--defeated in so many wars, and until recently, engaged in mutual strife bringing China to the verge of ruin.

Yet there are others who think that the Chinese soldiers are the most malleable material and can be turned into good fighters. This was proved again and again by the American-trained armies that fought in Burma. However, the same armies acted quite differently later in Manchuria. We have to conclude therefore that the decisive factors are external to the soldiers themselves--factors such as leadership.

Chinese soldiers are known to be able to stand terrific physical punishment and still walk a considerable distance on an empty stomach. During the civil war in the '40s, large numbers of Communist soldiers, lying motionless, were strafed by government planes at low altitude time and time again until the trenches were strewn with dead bodies and drenched with blood. According

to the government pilots, there was never any slightest movement on the ground during the entire attack.

Guerrilla techniques are characterized by deception, surprise, and mobility. Night marches are the rule (although during the war years Chinese soldiers were known to have difficulty seeing at night because of vitamin A deficiency). Some examples of techniques used are these: planting nails and sickles on roads they knew the enemy would pass; depositing cubes of sugar in fuel tanks of enemy trucks, causing carbonization in cylinders that may cease to function unexpectedly at any time; and on occasions dynamiting enemy industries by stuffing coal with explosives.

Noncombat techniques have been used effectively by the Chinese Communists from 1927 on. These included direct infiltration of enemy ranks, writing letters to acquaintances in enemy units, and front-line propaganda by means of loud-speakers. In 1948 and 1949, cities like Peking, Nanchang, Changsha, and others fell to the Communists in rapid succession as a result of defection or surrender without fighting. Earlier, in the mid-1930s, Communists sent political workers to the high ground close to the lines of the Manchurian army facing them to sing patriotic songs and shout to the men under Chang Hsueh-liang, telling them that the Communists did not want civil war but only wanted to fight the Japanese as the northeasterners did. The result was that the Manchurian army was demoralized. Shortly afterward, Chang Hsueh-liang held Chiang Kai-shek captive for two weeks in the celebrated Sian Incident, after which another KMT-CPC entente was effected.

Terroristic methods have been used only sparingly by the Chinese Communists. Political assassinations and wanton killing of civilians and captured enemy troops as means of reprisal or intimidation were practiced in the earlier period. Probably later realizing that by killing one man they could make many more enemies, the Chinese Communists have generally refrained from terrorism since 1930. Gradually, from the 1930s, they even adopted a policy of giving preferential treatment to prisoners of war, a policy first used by Mao at Chingkangshan. Captives were given rousing "welcomes" and medical care if needed. Officers would be subjected to two or three weeks of indoctrination and given a choice of remaining or going back to their own side. If they chose to return, they were bound to sow seeds of dissension among their own men. The Communists even treated Japanese POWs in this manner. Some of the Japanese POWs worked effectively as propagandists for the Chinese Communists.



### Local Support

Mao Tse-tung has called his army the "people's army," and has said that the army without the support of the people is like fish without water. In areas occupied by the Communists, the Communist regimes have always adopted social and economic policies designed to win the support of the majority of the population. On the other hand, in those areas the people had no choice but to do as told.

In order to win civilian support, or probably more truly to create the impression that they have local support, the Communists in 1942 made "civilian relations" one of the most important tasks of the army's political departments. For days during the Chinese New Year season, meetings were held in which army representatives pledged their love of the people, and in turn the civilian representatives of local civic organizations promised to support the army. Such meetings were followed by exchange visits with appropriate gifts and by social festivities. Oaths were taken by the army collectively to abide by the Three Disciplinary Rules and Eight Points of Attention which were laid down by Mao in 1928, enjoining the army not to disturb the people in any way. There is no doubt that these symbolic acts of the army and the people were stage-managed, as are mass rallies in support of government policies of a later day.

### External Support

It is difficult to determine the amount of external support given to the Chinese Communists. There is evidence that during the first years of the CPC's existence the Communist International sent a monthly subsidy of \$30,000, besides the direct advisory assistance and the training given to Chinese Communists in Russia. After 1927, contact was undoubtedly maintained between Moscow and the party organization in Shanghai. But Mao, in relatively isolated Kiangsi, probably had no direct communications until 1931, and then only by radio. Russian support, therefore, was indirect and was in the following forms:

1. The Russian Soviet system of government and army organization were prevalent in the Communist areas. Many of the Chinese Communist leaders were trained in Moscow's Sun Yat-sen University, founded in 1925 specifically to train Chinese revolutionaries; in 1926 there were 600 Chinese students there.

2. Foreign Communists probably worked in the Chinese Soviet areas at one time or another. A German Communist, with the Chinese name of Li Teh, was reported living in Juichin.

3. In the Soviet areas there was a Sino-Soviet Friendship Association with mass membership and some Russian participation and support. It never failed to express support of Soviet foreign policy.

4. Although there is no hard evidence that the Russians actually gave direct assistance to Yen-an, the Russian occupation of Manchuria in late 1945 clearly aided the Chinese Communist entry into Manchuria.

5. The Soviet Union had agreed to evacuate Manchuria three months after the surrender of Japan. But they refused to let the Nationalist armies land at Dairen in October 1945 and again near Yingkow. Immediately thereafter, Chinese Communists began to operate in the area. Also in Manchuria the Russians turned over all Japanese arms to the Chinese Communists under Lin Piao, who in a year forged a new army from the guerrillas and Japanese arms.

Throughout the war years, aid from the outside continued to trickle into Communist areas. The Canadian Dr. Bethune worked and died in the "liberated areas." Indian medical missions contributed significantly to the improvement of health facilities.

How much the American effort to mediate in China in 1944-1947 contributed to Communist strength is conjectural. Possibly Chiang's unilateral cease-fire, on advice of General George Marshall, in the spring of 1946 in Manchuria gave the Communists a respite in which they regrouped north of the Sungari River and later emerged as a well-drilled army.<sup>6</sup>

#### Political Strategy

As internal war is essentially action to isolate and defeat the existing government, it is not necessary that it be carried out by violent means. The Chinese experience shows that if the civil war had been a contest of arms alone, the Communists would have long since perished. The Communists have claimed that their success in the civil war was due to three things: their party organization, their independent army, and their policy termed the united front (UF). The importance of the first two is obvious. However, it may be recalled that even when they

boasted an expanding army and a burgeoning party organization, the Communists met with scant success in the total civil war situation until after 1937, when they developed their political strategy, the UF, to supplement their military action. The UF, according to Mao, is a process in which the CPC forms an alliance with as many groups of the population as possible against one enemy at a time, using methods and forms of struggle determined by the specific circumstances. The UF was later institutionalized in the form of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. (In other places, it may be a national liberation front, or a people's party, or a national salvation association.) In this alliance, the Communist Party would try to assume the leadership overtly or covertly, the principal enemy at a particular stage would be determined, the main form of struggle (military, political, or identitive) would be decided upon, and the principal and secondary allies would be won over by a common program. After the elimination of one enemy (never more than ten per cent of the population in a given situation), a new program would be formulated requiring a new alliance against a new enemy who was an ally previously. This process would go on until the Communists were clearly in control. When the struggle was going on, the CP would try to "raise its allies to its own political level" by "ideological" campaigns, so that while the allies were helping to eliminate a common enemy they themselves were being converted into active supporters of Communist policy, not realizing that they themselves might be eventually eliminated or transformed. This UF operation could be conducted on the national level or local level or on all levels simultaneously. Even when the main form of struggle chosen was a military one, as in China in 1946 and 1947, the UF constantly played up those characteristics of the KMT in opposition to which the CPC and the liberal-moderate groups were united. As a result of such tactics the Democratic League went over to the Communist side in 1948, thus further isolating the weakening government.

#### Relation to Events

The Chinese Communists clearly benefited from external events. When they were at the end of their resources, during 1927-1930, the KMT government was faced with much more ominous challenges from the war lords in both the north and south. Several times when the government troops were closing in on the Communists those troops had to be redeployed for use against the war lords, allowing the Communists to recuperate and grow.

When the war lords were temporarily pacified, China was threatened by the Japanese in Manchuria and then in North China. This not only forced the KMT government to send its best troops to areas farther away from the Red bases, but also afforded the CPC an opportunity to win the sympathy of all patriotic elements by clamoring for immediate resistance to Japanese aggression. This the government steadfastly refused to give, on the ground that the country must first be united and better prepared. The government was undoubtedly alienated from large segments of the intelligentsia, particularly the writers and students, who became effective propagandists for the Communist cause. When the Sino-Japanese War finally broke out in 1937, and when the Communists finally agreed to a détente, they gained considerable freedom to expand their army and extend the territory under their control.

### COUNTERINSURGENCY RESPONSE

#### Political and Ideological Background

The KMT under Chiang Kai-shek nominally unified all China by military means in 1928. The capital was moved from Peking to Nanking. The government was supposed to be based upon the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen who had envisaged a period of political tutelage (KMT party rule) in which the people were to be educated in the processes of democracy before constitutional government was inaugurated. But the Nanking government was not a totalitarian government, and in fact the KMT itself never succeeded in welding its vast membership into an integrated party. Chiang Kai-shek himself, who consolidated control of the party and government in 1931, was more of a balancer of many groups than a personal dictator.

The ideology of the KMT consists of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People--Nationalism (Min Tsu), Democracy (Min Ch'uan), and People's Livelihood (Min Sheng). The concept of Min Tsu was originally limited to the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. After the revolution, when Sun became disillusioned with the Western powers, his nationalism acquired a new meaning, embracing anti-imperialism in China, to some extent, as well as abroad. This concept of nationalism assumed equality of the five major races in China, and Sun seemed to imply that he favored such equality. The concept was negated, however, by his own chauvinism--Chinese assimilation of other ethnic groups. Although his successors paid lip service to racial equality and

self-determination, the minorities in fact were directly ruled by Nanking through such agencies as the Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs Commission, in contrast to the Communist official insistence upon the right of the national minority to secede from China. The welfare of the minorities was neglected, and their own cultural heritages were suppressed.

Democracy was envisaged by Sun as the ultimate goal of the revolution. It encompassed the exercise by the people of the four powers of election, recall, initiative, and referendum. The government was an "all-function" government, vested with five functions--executive, legislative, judicial, control, and examination--in contrast to the traditional three in the West. The functions corresponded to the five divisions in the Nationalist government. Sun also "cast aspersions on the idea of natural rights . . . [which] has given rise to a school of interpretation [justifying] the disregard, if not suppression, of popular freedoms, and the emergence of an irresponsible and dictatorial, if not also totalitarian, government."<sup>7</sup>

The third principle, People's Livelihood, has often been called Sun's communism or socialism. Sun's own statements sometimes confused the problem. What this entailed is simply equalization of land ownership and regulation of capital. To carry out both, Sun rejected the class struggle and violence. For the former, he proposed that the "unearned increment" of land value accrue to the state (an influence of Henry George), and the latter was to be accomplished by state ownership of principal industries. This is a progressive idea, and if carried out, might have been the answer to China's social and economic problems. Unfortunately, neither the equalization of land ownership nor the regulation of capital was adopted as public policy until the KMT government had moved to Taiwan, leaving the Communists to claim that they were the political heirs of Sun Yat-sen.

Following the termination of the CPC-KMT alliance in 1927, the KMT purged many Communists and many educated youth suspected of having Communist sympathies. This not only weakened the CPC, but also deprived the KMT of a group of militant workers. According to Chien Tuan-sheng, the foremost Chinese political scientist, the exit of the militant elements from the party tended to encourage the incoming of the conservative and even reactionary elements of Chinese society. Thus the KMT became not only conservative but also complacent. It did not bestir itself to adopt a broad social and economic reform program until after 1945 when it was brought face to face with militant communism. But by then it found itself lacking in men of vigor to carry through such a program.

## Clique Politics

Like the CPC, the KMT party structure was, and is, pyramidal. The highest organ of authority is the National Congress, the membership of which was elected by the Congress of the next lower level (province), and the provincial congress was elected by the district (county) congress. A district was divided into areas (Ch'u), which elected delegates to the district congress. The party organization, comprising the executive and supervisory committees, was elected at each level by the congress of the same level, except in the case of the Ch'u organization, which was elected by all the members. There were special party organizations formed among seamen, railway-workers, and the armed forces, all placed directly under the central organization. As was the case with its Communist counterpart, the National Congress was too unwieldy, with a membership of some 600. It rarely played a significant role in making party policies--a function which devolved upon the Central Executive Committee which it elected. The most powerful group was the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee. This too grew in size to 50 in 1945.

During the lifetime of Sun Yat-sen, that founder of the party was the single most powerful leader, with precedence over the entire party organization. After his death in 1925, the Second Congress of the KMT declared that he would remain forever the leader. This made it virtually impossible for anyone else to aspire to the leadership without being considered irreverent. Moreover, there were few who commanded party-wide respect, except Hu Han-min (who died in 1936), Wang Ching-wei (who deserted to the Japanese in 1938), and Chiang Kai-shek, who held actual power by controlling the armed forces. But in the exigencies of war, the Extraordinary Party Congress in 1938 amended the party statute to establish the new post of Tsungtsai or director, to which Chiang was elected. In this post, Chiang became the arbiter of party affairs, had the veto over all Central Executive Committee decisions, and generally achieved an unchallenged position.

An all-powerful party leader did not, however, preclude the existence of factions and cliques within the party. These cliques were all loyal to the leader. In general there were three main factions:

1. The "Organization" Group. This group, headed by the Chen brothers (Li-fu and Kuo-fu), is so called because it continually controlled the Organization Department of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT; the most important party office. With control over the party rank and file, the group gradually

extended its influence to education. Members of this group were generally conservative in social and economic matters. They were intensely anti-Communist, but only to perpetuate their own power.

2. Army Group. This group has been known as the Whampoa clique because its leaders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. This clique share the aims of the Organization Group. As China became increasingly militarized in the early 1930s this group became a real challenge to the other factions for control. Most of the army and division commanders belonged to it.

3. The Political Study Group. This group included civilian leaders of the party who were mainly interested in cementing their control over the country's industries, business enterprises, and banking interests. During the war against Japan some of them controlled provincial governments (Chang Chun, for example). By and large, members of this group were always more mature and slightly more enlightened. They were more tolerant of democratic procedures, and therefore more critical of the arbitrariness of the first two groups.

Alongside these groups which vied for power in the center, there were numerous minor cliques, represented by local commanders like Li Tsung-jen in Kwangsi, Feng Yu-hsiang in the north, and the Moslem generals in the northwest. Although nominally under Chiang's command, these generals, with their small but usually well-trained armies, remained in practice independent of Nanking control. Most of them adopted their own--usually quite forward-looking--social and economic programs for their own domains and were loath to fight Chiang's wars, be it against the Communists or Japan, unless their own position was at stake.

#### Rural Economic Conditions

China during the decade after 1929 suffered from long years of war. The countryside was desolate. Drought and famine struck North China, affecting an estimated 20,000,000-25,000,000 peasants. Many were driven to banditry. One writer estimated that there were 5,000,000 armed men--soldiers and bandits--living off the countryside and costing \$1 billion a year. The rural population further suffered from soaring prices and, in one province, 44 different kinds of taxes. Even in normal times, the life of the rural population was marginal, especially for the tenant farmers who might have to surrender as much as 80% of their crops to the landlord.

The most serious problem in the countryside was that of land tenure. Although Sun's economic ideas anticipated a gradual redistribution of land and the KMT government had passed a land law, nothing was done to carry it out, primarily because most of the members of the party had the greatest interest in maintaining the status quo. This and the concomitant problems of illiteracy, marketing, and medieval farming methods were largely left to enterprising individuals with the assistance of foreign, mainly American, missionaries. The best example of the former was Dr. James Yen, a Yale graduate, who launched his Mass Education Movement near Peking in the 1920s. Despite some early success which brought him international fame, his gradualist approach ran into the vested interests of local powers, allied with the military elements and gentry-controlled secret societies. At any rate these and other efforts in rural reconstruction were cut short by Japanese invasion in 1937.

#### Local Government and Control

The Chinese political system has been called "an autocracy imposed on a social democracy." The most conspicuous feature of Chinese local government from the 11th Century to the 20th was the pao-chia system. When it was first adopted by Wang An-shih in the Sung dynasty, it had a purely military function. Later it became an administrative system, and in 1932 when Chiang re-instated it in Kiangsi Province it was primarily for purposes of social control and mobilization in the campaigns against the Communists. A decade later, the pao-chia units became units in local "self-government."

The lowest unit was the hu (household), with the oldest member as head. Ten hu made up one chia (headed by an elected chief); ten chia formed one pao (chief elected); several pao constituted a hsiang (village); and several hsiang formed a hsien (district). In the 1930s, all the chiefs of chia, pao, and hsiang were appointed by the hsien government. At the chia level, the chief simply carried out instructions handed down from the pao chief who, with the aid of a pao troops commander, similarly carried out instructions from the hsiang. The pao's responsibilities consisted mainly of tax collection and filling military service quotas. The latter could be carried out by "buying" substitutes from some outside area. This was illegal but always accepted. Very often a hsiang's quota was filled in this way without going to the various pao. This gives a clue to the quality of KMT soldiers. There was little, if any, contact between the people and the agencies above the hsiang. Local politics usually



centered around the secret societies (most conspicuous in southern China was the Ko Lao Hui) controlled by the local gentry. The KMT existed on paper, but only at the hsiang and hsien levels.

During the anti-Communist campaigns in Kiangsi in the early 1930s, Chiang launched a "ch'ing hsiang" (clean-up-the-village) movement by periodically sending officials to the pao and chia to register and check the residents of every household. Anyone found to be a nonresident would be a Communist suspect. This did not succeed, a KMT handbook on Communist suppression admitted, because the census officials could not check every chia and pao simultaneously, and the Communists could move just ahead of the officials. Later, the responsibility for keeping tab on Communists was shifted to the chiefs of pao and chia, who were to report the presence of nonresidents. This again failed because these chiefs were so intimidated by Communist reprisals that they were reluctant to cooperate with the authorities. According to the KMT, the prerequisite for successful social control was to provide the people with maximum security by organizing an effective local militia. This was done with some degree of success in 1934.

#### External Support for the National Government

Soon after Chiang's break with the Soviets he found a new source of assistance. Dr. Max Bauer of Germany took the place of General Galen as Chiang's military adviser. Bauer, a former aide of Ludendorff, had served in advisory roles in Russia and Spain, and when appointed by Chiang brought 46 other Germans with him to China, thus beginning a decade of close Sino-German relations. As the revolution was ended in 1928, Bauer's job was mainly to help establish an intelligence system and improve military training. The most important and the best known German adviser to Chiang was General Hans von Seeckt, former Chief of the General Staff, who was first invited to China in 1933. On his first mission, he spent three months in China, at the end of which he submitted a memorandum to Chiang on army reorganization. He emphasized the building of a small army as a nucleus to be staffed by an elite officer corps. After a brief tour of duty by General Wetzell, von Seeckt returned in May 1934. Shortly thereafter, he was replaced by General Falkenhausen, who served until 1938.

That German influence was felt in the Chinese army cannot be doubted. Chinese soldiers began to wear German-style uniforms and to use German arms. A beginning was made in building an elite army of 12 divisions, which came to be known as the "central

army" and was controlled by Chiang. It seems certain, however, that the significance of German influence was confined to the following:

1. Training and advice given to the KMT army were an important factor in Chiang's defeat of southern Chinese rebellious generals in 1935. These German contributions were important in the war against the Communists only insofar as the Communists in the later campaigns turned to positional warfare.

2. A significant contribution by the Germans was the establishment of a KMT military organization emphasizing the centralization of command and independence from political control.

### Military Response to the Insurgents

Army building was slow until after 1937, when the exigencies of a national war compelled the KMT government to increase the army to more than 300 divisions (mostly of about 5,000 men each). These were poorly equipped and inadequately fed. In 1944, reforms were begun with US assistance; the division was brought up to 10,000 men equipped with a battalion of light artillery. By the end of the war, 39 divisions had been partially trained and equipped by the United States, although only the New First and New Sixth Armies were battle experienced.

Although it played a limited role in the civil war, the navy had considerable power compared to Communist naval capabilities. It had a light cruiser, the Chungking (a British gift, formerly HMS Aurora), and 131 landing craft in 1945. The air force was the pride of the KMT government. It was born in 1931 when the air force academy near Hangchow was founded with Italian assistance. In 1936, some US planes were added; after 1938 Russian craft were received. The air force grew tremendously after 1941, with American General Claire L. Chennault the principal guiding force. In addition to Chennault's American Volunteer Group (the "Flying Tigers"), a Sino-American Composite Wing was created as part of Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force in 1943, with American P-40s, B-25s, and C-47s. Late in the war, the Chinese Air Force boasted five fighter groups, two medium bomber groups, one heavy bomber group, and two transport groups, totalling 500 planes. It had monopoly of the air during the civil war in the 1940s.

Faced with the Communist insurgency after 1927, and under the circumstances described in the preceding pages, the KMT government chose what it believed to be the easiest way out--

military suppression. From 1927 to 1930, minor expeditions--usually by local troops--were sent against the Communist strongholds in Hunan and Kiangsi without appreciable results. From December 1930 to September 1931, the government conducted three "bandit suppression" campaigns in Kiangsi. The relative strength of the two sides was unquestionably in favor of the government. The Communists evaded stronger government forces and concentrated all their troops against smaller Nanking units. None of the campaigns was conclusive. Beginning with the third campaign of June 1931, Chiang sent in his "personal" armies totalling 300,000 men under his trusted generals. When the Communists were hemmed in near the Fukien-Kiangsi border, they eluded the government encirclement by persuading two government brigades to defect. In this campaign the Communists captured 10,000 rifles. After a brief interruption caused by Japan's invasion of Manchuria, the campaign resumed in mid-1932. This time, Chiang turned first to the Soviet areas on the periphery of the main Communist base. All districts near the Soviet areas were ordered to form local militia (min t'uan). Chiang himself organized a Special Work Force composed of selected young army officers whose duties were to round up strayed Communists, investigate transients, supervise the army postal service, and generally help enforce an economic blockade of the Communist areas. This blockade was quite effective. The Communists were hit hard by the shortage of cloth and salt. It was such a campaign that dislodged Chang Kuo-tao and his army from the Hupei-Honan-Anhwei Soviet area. In the fifth campaign, which followed almost immediately, against the central Soviet area, Chiang added new tactics. A Handbook on Bandit Suppression referred to the following:

1. Combat effectiveness was heightened by enforcing the system of joint responsibility: if a squad withdrew against orders, the squad leader would be executed; if a platoon withdrew against orders, the platoon commander would be executed, and so forth.

2. Methods used included the following:

- a. Roads, fortifications, and pillboxes were to be built around the Communist areas;

- b. In advancing along narrow trails and mountain passes, the vanguard must be strong;

- c. Preparations in breadth and depth: in movements, use units of 2,000 men; not more than 30 miles should separate different units; have ample reserves.

d. Ambush: it is not easy to ambush the Communists in their own areas, but be alert for their ambushes; in non-Communist areas, ambush should be used more often.

e. To fight guerrilla war: use nonuniformed personnel to spy on the Communists; move quickly; maintain secrecy and agility; march at night and attack at dawn. Do not fire freely, make every bullet count; take cover when the enemy cannot be seen or reached; be patient and wait for opportunities; be able to exist on little.

### 3. Tactics:

a. The main objective is to annihilate the enemy. Maintain discipline in order to win popular support; maintain the initiative.

b. In the march, keep supplies in the middle of the column.

c. When attacking, pick the enemy's weak points; pay attention to the flanks. It is rebel tactics to attack at one point, and then use large forces to intercept our reinforcements.

d. Relentless pursuit.

e. Defend points rather than a line.

f. When occupying an area, organize teams to round up Communists; use one-third of our force for defense; use two-thirds as guerrillas to clean up the area. Send regular army officers to organize and lead local militia; infiltrate rebel areas and forces with officers in disguise.

The handbook went on to say why the earlier campaigns had failed. The main reason, it explained, was that the army had failed to catch the enemy. The Communists could split into groups of three or five and scatter far and wide. The regular army could not afford to break itself up into small groups to follow the enemy, since the very idea of an army is to fight together as a unit. Even a cooperative populace could not report on the scattered rebels. Therefore, the breaking up of the enemy meant the failure of the army. The handbook further said that the militia had even greater disadvantages in that it was for the most part stationary and could not pursue or parry. Besides, militia training was inadequate and the militia was often easy prey for Communist propaganda. Thus, encircling the enemy and preventing his dispersal was essential.

The fifth campaign lasted a whole year. Eventually the Communists were forced to break out of the tightening encirclement and start on the celebrated "Long March" to Yen-an. The march covered about 6,000 miles through south and southwest China and some very forbidding terrain in Szechwan and Sikang. Sometimes the Communists were without food for days. Thousands collapsed. Many more deserted. Starting with 90,000 men, Mao reached Shensi in late 1935 with only 7,000 men, and together with the Communists already there (under Kao Kang and Liu Chih-tan), the total Communist force was less than 30,000 men.

The failure of the government to annihilate the Communists in the Kiangsi campaigns and during the Long March may be attributed to the following reasons:

1. The Communists evaded government pursuit by marching almost exclusively at night.
2. The Communists chose a route of march through territory that lay between the domains of two or more local war lords, or through the territories of those the Communists knew would not fight on Chiang's behalf.

By 1936, the Communists had established a new base area, with Yen-an as the new capital. This area, like the Kiangsi base, is located in an infertile loess-covered region, which in the case of Yen-an lies within the northern bend of the Yellow River. To the east was Yen Hsi-shan's domain, Shansi. To the west was General Ma Hung-kuei's Ninghsia Province. Neither would fight if the Communists left them alone. To the north was the dessicated area extending into Mongolia, and here was an escape route should the Communists find it necessary to vacate Yen-an. Only in the south did the Communists have any worry, for Chang Hsueh-liang had just been appointed by Chiang Kai-shek as deputy commander in chief of bandit suppression in the northwest. The "Young Marshal" was in command of the huge Manchurian army that had withdrawn from the northeast in the face of Japanese invasion. As has been mentioned, the Communists, by using political means, succeeded in neutralizing this army and turning Chang himself against Chiang.

As a result of the rapprochement in 1937, the Communists were legitimized, and in the name of fighting against Japan, they moved into Japanese-occupied territory. In the first two years of the war against Japan, the Communists did fight the Japanese, but even the Communists themselves admitted--and Mao himself so directed his lieutenants--that they fought in order to strengthen their forces. They established their own regimes in their "liberated"

areas, captured Japanese arms in small engagements, and fought KMT troops if they were in the way.<sup>8</sup> The KMT government at first was kept busy moving the government and industries to the interior and neglected guerrilla warfare against the Japanese until 1938. When it began to send guerrilla units into the Japanese rear after that year, a confrontation with Communists was inevitable. Therefore, skirmishes between the two were reported with increasing frequency. By occupying more and more territory and by organizing armed units wherever they went, the Communists increased their armed strength yearly until 1945, when they claimed to have a total force of 1.3 million regulars.

At the end of the war in 1945, civil war loomed on the horizon. The government was faced with many problems: a people tired after eight years of war, an economy that was badly dislocated, a political and party machine that was demoralized; an intelligentsia seething with discontent. When negotiations broke down and civil war was renewed in mid-1946, all these problems were aggravated. The Communists infiltrated into Manchuria, waged a war of movement during the first year of the war, launched limited offensives in the second during which they captured Manchuria and drove to Peking and Tientsin, and finally launched a general offensive in the third year. Chiang Kai-shek himself stepped down from the presidency in early 1949 in the hope of negotiating a settlement. But without him the crack troops of the government disintegrated. The Communists swept across the Yangtse at Nanking in April 1949. Outflanked, a big army in central China under Pai Chung-hsi retreated south. The governors defected one after another; cities surrendered without a fight; many political parties switched their support to the Communists. The Communists achieved victory two years sooner than they had expected.

#### Political Response--Attempts to Isolate the Communists

After the Long March, the government belatedly shifted its emphasis from military action to political programs designed to deprive the Communists of their seeming monopoly of such virtues as democracy, economic construction, and patriotism. In early October 1938, the KMT called an emergency meeting in Hankow. Among other things, the meeting decided to widen participation in the government by instituting a People's Political Council, which opened in Chungking in July of the following year with representatives from all political parties and independent groups. Far from a popular assembly, it nevertheless was an important step toward establishment of a link between society and government.

The KMT also promised an early termination of its one-party rule through inauguration of a constitutional government. Because of the war, this was postponed until 1946.

At the end of the war, with the help of the United States, the KMT agreed to call a Political Consultation Conference in Chungking to be attended by all political groups. The conference was to discuss problems of peace and national unification, thus showing the country its willingness to solve outstanding problems by peaceful means. It was hoped that guilt for obstruction would thus be placed on the Communists.

In the end, all these measures failed to achieve the intended results because they came too late and because of the pressures exerted by ultraconservatives in the party. It should be remembered too that the Communist strategy of the United Front contributed to the government's gradual isolation.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. The Communists came to power after an insurgency of 20 years. Though it was often interrupted by periods of nonviolence, the insurgency was regarded by the Communists as a continuing process. The Communists, in the process, perfected their military, political, and psychological weapons. These were sometimes used simultaneously, depending upon the circumstances.

2. The KMT erroneously viewed the insurgency as a purely military problem. Even when the Communists were isolated physically, as in Kiangsi, they survived by capitalizing on social and economic problems facing the government.

3. The KMT government was always faced with too many problems at one time. And it made the mistake of tackling all of them simultaneously with divided attention.

4. The KMT government's efforts to isolate the guerrillas from sources of support were few, generally ineffective, and almost entirely limited to military action. The government was able, by encirclement, to cut off the Communists' means of supply for their Chingkangshan base in the late 1920s and force Mao to make sorties for capturing supplies. Toward the end of the suppression campaign, in 1934, the government urged encirclement of guerrillas as a military tactic to prevent their dispersal and disappearance into the countryside. Some unsuccessful efforts to separate guerrillas from the local population in Kiangsi through

use of the pao-chia system were made in the early 1930s. In general, however, the government did not think in terms of isolating the guerrilla.

5. The KMT by and large failed to identify itself with the majority of the people and found itself fighting against more and more enemies and against more and more popular issues. Instead of isolating the insurgents, it was isolated by them physically, politically, and morally.



## Footnotes

1. The delegate of the Communist International was present at this meeting. Meanwhile, all foreign Communists who had been attached to the KMT were dismissed and sent home by Chiang, including Borodin and General Galen. Chiang's government severed all relations with the Soviet Union until the early 1930s.

2. Although there were some 60 minor nationalities in China, this concern for the ethnic groups was clearly for propaganda purposes, as these minorities mainly inhabited the border areas in the southwest and west. According to the Communists, the Lolos on the Tibetan borders aided the Communists during the "Long March." This early nationalities policy was probably an imitation of that of the Soviet party. Be it noted that after 1949, self-determination was replaced by mere autonomy because, according to the Communists, there was no longer any need for self-determination in the new society where there was no exploitation of one group by another.

3. When the New Fourth was operating against the Japanese in 1940, in the Shanghai-Nanking area, which the KMT was loath to abandon to the Communists, Chungking ordered redeployment of the New Fourth to northern Kiangsu and southern Shantung. Government units attacked the New Fourth in southern Anhwei on grounds that it had disobeyed orders. Several thousand Communists were killed including the deputy commander. After this incident, skirmishes between the two sides took place and increased in intensity through the remainder of the war, interrupted by abortive negotiations, sometimes under US auspices.

4. A. Pennington et al., The Psychology of Military Leadership (New York, 1943), p. 248.

5. General Mark Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York, 1954), p. 88.

6. Marshall's subsequent withdrawal of American aid from the Nationalists (July 1946) unquestionably indirectly aided the Communists and was perhaps the single most decisive psychological event of the civil war.

7. Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Harvard University Press, 1950), ch. 8.

8. The Communists used the strategy and tactics described earlier. It would be redundant to discuss their role in the war against Japan. There is little information on their activities, and even Japanese army and navy archives largely ignored them. It is therefore reasonable to assume that they devoted much of their effort, and support received from the United States, to preparing for the subsequent civil war.

### Bibliography

Books in English. Among many others, the following:

Barnett, A. Doak. China on the Eve of Communist Takeover. New York: 1963.

Brandt, Conrad, et al. A Documentary History of Chinese Communism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.

Chassin, Lionel Max. The Communist Conquest of China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Chinese People's Liberation Army. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1951.

Clubb, O. Edmund. Twentieth Century China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.

Liu, F.F. A Military History of Modern China. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956.

North, Robert C. Moscow and Chinese Communists. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952.

Rigg, Robert B. Red China's Fighting Hordes. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1952.

Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland. Stilwell's Command Problems. Washington: Department of the Army, 1946.

Snow, Edgar. Red Star Over China. New York: Modern Library, 1944.

Department of State. U.S. Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949.

Wilbur, C. Martin, and Julia Howe, eds. Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956.

Chinese-language material published by KMT and Communist governments

Books in Chinese written by nonpartisan writers

Periodicals in English including the following: Foreign Affairs, Pacific Affairs, China At War, Far Eastern Survey, China Weekly Review, Political Science Quarterly, People's China, and Pacific Historical Review

Newspapers including: The New York Times, Hung Ch'i Chou Pao (Red Flag Weekly; microfilm in writer's possession) 1931-1933, and Jen Min Jih Pao

## Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgent

Efforts in Greece, 1941-1949

by

Gunther E. Rothenberg

### WORLD WAR II

Like Yugoslavia and Albania, Greece provided an excellent setting for guerrilla warfare during World War II. Rugged terrain, a national tradition of guerrilla fighting, and a fierce hatred of foreign invaders greatly strengthened the Greek insurgents. The situation met Clausewitz's other requirements for successful guerrilla operations: the war was carried on in the interior of the country; the war did not hinge on a single battle; and the extent of the theater allowed the guerrillas scope for evasion and regroupment.

### Topography of Greece

Mountains cover some two-thirds of the Greek mainland and are the home of over 40% of a population of some 7,000,000. The remainder of the population is concentrated in cities, with about 1,000,000 living in the Athens-Piraeus area. There are no large towns in the mountain areas, but the land supports small villages.

The Pindus range, extending from the Albanian frontier southward to the Gulf of Corinth, forms the central core and largest area of sparse population. The next massif is the Mount Olympus region, a semicircular arc running up the eastern coast of Greece to Salonica. The third major mountain area is the Rhodope range in Macedonia, with access to Bulgaria. The mountains offer good terrain for guerrilla operations and do not lend themselves to

compartmentalization. By contrast, southern Greece, the Peloponnesus peninsula, could easily be compartmentalized, had no international frontier, and maritime traffic could be controlled with a relatively limited patrol force.

Interior communications in Greece were primitive. Railroads existed north to the major cities and to international lines. There were few railroads in the interior. The road network was equally primitive and became heavily damaged by war, resistance, and civil war.

The climate of Greece has certain extremes, especially in the mountain areas, which make maintenance of guerrilla bands difficult, especially in the winter. Greece is also a food-deficit area, which complicates the guerrilla's supply problem. These drawbacks were counterbalanced during the civil war by proximity and easy access to international frontiers offering support and sanctuary.

In balance, in its topography and general physical geography, Greece is a good, though by no means ideal, country for guerrilla warfare.

#### Local Support for the Guerrillas

##### Classes and Areas Involved

With a relatively homogeneous population and a collaborationist government, Greece did not pose as difficult a problem for its occupiers during World War II as did Yugoslavia. The average German had some respect for the culture of ancient Hellas and was better disposed toward the Greeks than toward the Yugoslavs, whom he regarded as Slavic barbarians. Then, too, the economic situation in Greece, unable to raise enough food to sustain its population even in peacetime, did much to keep Greece quiet under the control of the occupation forces and the puppet regime.

After Greece was overrun in 1941, it was occupied by troops of three powers. The greater part of the country was held by the Italians; the Germans occupied Crete and the Evros province on the Greek-Turkish border. They also had garrisons in Salonica and Athens. The Bulgarians held Eastern Thrace and Macedonia. Although the Greeks disliked all three occupiers, probably the Bulgarians the most, the resistance movement flagged. The defeat of the Greek army had also been the defeat of the Metaxas royalist dictatorship, which had had many enemies. This feeling the

Axis powers were at first able to use to their advantage. However, the Germans exploited the country's few resources and made but few provisions to feed the conquered. As a result there was famine in Athens and the surrounding area during the winter of 1941-1942. The starvation of that winter created bitter hatred against the occupiers, especially in the towns.

Unlike the Yugoslav guerrillas, the Greek guerrilla forces undertook no important operations in 1941, but spent the year recruiting personnel and leaders of enough stature to command respect and win support of the population.

The organization best fitted for active resistance was the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Like other Communist parties it had opposed the "imperialist" war until the invasion of Russia. Then it began to organize a Popular Front to oppose the Axis. In September 1941 the National Liberation Front (EAM) was established. It included the usual Popular Front program of national independence, democratic liberties, and resistance to the enemy. Included in the front were three Communist-controlled groups as well as two socialist and agrarian parties. As for individuals, the EAM numbered in its ranks 6 bishops, several hundred priests, virtually all labor leaders, 30 university professors, and large numbers of ordinary citizens. Estimates of total membership range from 500,000 to 2,000,000 members. Whichever estimate is accepted, EAM was a major force in a country of 7,000,000.

EAM put forth a program of civil and armed resistance--strikes, sabotage, noncooperation, and guerrilla war. The last was an old Greek tradition. During 1942 armed bands, provided with arms hidden when the army had surrendered, came into being in central Greece, and in December 1942 ELAS, the EAM's military arm, was established. From the outset ELAS differed from other Greek resistance groups in that it was definitely subordinated to the parent political organization. It was and remained the largest of the guerrilla groups, comprising nearly 30,000 men.

Other Greek guerrilla groups each functioned loosely around a military leader. A socialist group, allied to ELAS but not Communist controlled, was known as EKKA. It was led by a Colonel Psarros and operated in central Greece. The guerrilla group adhering to the royal government in exile and most favored by the British was led by a Colonel Zervas and was known as EDES. EDES received considerable British aid and at times cooperated surreptitiously with the Germans and Italians against ELAS. Nonetheless Zervas was never able to match EAM and its ELAS forces in popular backing and military strength. He was confined to a small area in the Epirus and never had more than 8,000 men.

EAM and ELAS thus became the mainstay of Greek resistance. Although, like the partisan movement, they were committed to a national rather than a purely Communist program, they nonetheless were under Communist leadership. The Communist Party provided most of the cadre for EAM leaders and had much experience, acquired during the Metaxas dictatorship, in underground organization. Although actual command of the military branch, ELAS, was vested in a non-Communist regular army officer, Colonel Stephanos Saraphis, ELAS was always closely controlled by the political EAM organization. When active operations started, ELAS was strongest in central and northern Greece, and it soon gained control of the mountainous Pindus and Olympus areas.

### The Guerrilla Organization

Authority in ELAS extended from company through division, which also acted as area command, to ELAS headquarters, which was comparable to army headquarters. At each level of command there was a military commander, a political representative, and a kapetanios. This last official was responsible for supply and morale, the military commander for the conduct of operations, while the political representative was the real chief of the whole force. Nationally, ELAS was clearly subordinated to EAM, whose Central Committee exercised full executive control over the military branch. EAM was highly organized. The village was the base. Village committees, usually Communist directed, elected district committees, and those in turn elected regional committees. From the regional committees a Central Committee of 25 delegates was chosen. The method of election further buttressed Communist leadership. In the spring of 1944, when EAM controlled about half of the country, elections were held for a National Council to provide even wider popular support.

### Nature of Support

From the outset ELAS had a surplus of manpower and a shortage of arms. While the Communist bands committed a number of atrocities which alienated support, ELAS still profited from its National Front propaganda, as well as from a genuine reluctance of all classes to return to prewar conditions. Many people feared a return of the old regime and joined ELAS. It is significant that many students and young teachers were among the second-rank ELAS leaders.

Originally the armed groups had been equipped from arms and munitions hidden when the Greek army had capitulated. Some weapons



had been flown in, but not until the Italian capitulation in 1943 did ELAS obtain enough arms to equip battalion-size units.

Sustenance and other nonmilitary supplies were obtained from EAM. The commissariat branch, ETA (Epimelets tou Andarte) collected taxes throughout Greece. The levy was based on the principle of no taxation on a specified minimum quantity necessary for sustenance and progressive taxation on the remainder. About 20% of the proceeds went to general EAM uses, the remainder into ELAS depots. Thus ELAS, after the initial phase, did not have to resort to unorganized and indiscriminate requisitioning which would have antagonized the peasants.

#### Relation of Support to Events

As indicated above, guerrilla bands were operating in the fall of 1941, but not until after the disastrous famine of that winter did they receive large-scale popular support. After that winter the Greeks felt very bitter about the continued German and Italian exploitation of their country and the general misery contributed most powerfully to the support of the guerrilla movement.

Support of the guerrilla movement was relatively steady and did not fluctuate even when the differences between EDES and ELAS became more bitter. Then, too, the British missions tried their best to bring about a measure of cooperation among the guerrillas. In the summer of 1943, when the British were eager to tie up a maximum number of Axis troops in order to ease opposition to the Sicily landing, general agreement, albeit short-lived, was reached between all groups. This broke down after September 1943, when ELAS, having received heavy equipment from the capitulated Italian forces, proved less and less amenable to British control and direction. The British now increased their aid to Zervas, the EDES leader, and a civil war between ELAS and EDES followed.

During this first Greek civil war, October 1943 to February 1944, ELAS saw itself challenged in its plan for postwar domination and suppressed opposition unhesitatingly, and often very cruelly. This led to some decline in popular support, but did not greatly affect the outcome.

By 1944 the Germans merely tried to maintain control of the larger towns and transportation routes, and in mid-summer of 1944, due to the Russian breakthrough into the Balkans, the Germans began to evacuate their forces, generally leaving ELAS in control of the freed areas. Only in the Epirus did EDES maintain a small

enclave. With the German evacuation the guerrilla campaign came to an end.

### Outside Support for Guerrillas

#### Sources of Outside Support

Greece was considered within the main British sphere of influence, and support for the guerrilla movement was furnished by Great Britain. In addition, the Greek government in exile, established in Cairo, provided a certain amount of support, exclusively to EDES. It is perhaps noteworthy that the exile government was able to draw on the resources of the Greek community in the Levant, many of whom had retained Greek citizenship and thus provided a tax and manpower basis.

#### British Relations with the Guerrillas

In the autumn of 1942 a party of British liaison personnel was dropped in Greece and made contact with the incipient ELAS and EDES groups. The British were in favor of a combined effort and in November 1942 persuaded both groups to cooperate in attacking an important bridge over the Gorgopotamos River. This was an isolated effort, however, and within a few months the Greek resistance movement divided along political lines.

The commander of the British mission during the first year was Brigadier E. Myers, succeeded during the second and final year by Colonel C.M. Woodhouse. Both officers, as well as the government they represented, favored EDES over ELAS. In part this was for purely military reasons, because from the early spring of 1944 on ELAS became less and less concerned with fighting the Germans and more and more concerned with eliminating their political rivals. On the other hand EDES, the minority group, could not hope to play any postwar role without British help and so was eager to gain British gratitude.

Behind these military reasons for friction lay deeper political reasons. The Communists hated Great Britain as the greatest imperial power. In turn, while individual British soldiers and officers might get on well with individual Communists, the British government could not favor the establishment of a Communist, Russian-influenced government in the eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, Britain had obligations to King George II of Greece.

The king had decided to continue the war on Britain's side after the Germans had intervened and after many Greek conservatives had wished to surrender. The British government, and Mr. Churchill in particular, felt honor bound to see the king returned to Greece after the war. Opinion in Greece and among the Greeks of the Levant, however, strongly favored a republic and even some EDES leaders were not convinced of the wisdom of forcing the monarchy on a reluctant people. The British nonetheless continued support of the royalists and EDES, and when, after September 1943, EAM-ELAS seemed to gain the upper hand, the British increased their supplies to EDES. Even so, the British government was undecided quite how far to go, and there was divided opinion among Conservatives and Labor. In the end, the British missions negotiated in February 1944 the Plakas Agreement, which ended the civil war and allocated territorial zones to each side. But by this time ELAS was implacably opposed to the British, setting the stage for the second Greek civil war. On the eve of German departure from Greece, the British introduced a regular Greek army combat team, the Greek Mountain Brigade, to strengthen EDES.

#### Forms of Support

Kinds of support were somewhat more limited than those rendered to the partisans in Yugoslavia. British personnel in Greece never exceeded 100 of all ranks. They included liaison and signal personnel who were in contact with British Middle East Headquarters (Cairo) and arranged for drops of light arms, explosives, and other combat materials. The British arranged for the evacuation of certain key individuals and also reintroduced trained personnel, especially explosives experts, into Greece. The British also provided facilities for the various Greek groups to keep contact with the Greek exile government, to try to thrash out the political problems.

In the Greek islands the British operated a number of commando groups, called the Special Boat Service, which cooperated on occasion with Greek guerrillas, mainly ELAS. Despite the political friction, individual relations between the British and the Greeks were far better than between the British and the Yugoslav partisans. This may well be an important consideration in operations of this kind.

## The Counterinsurgent Response

### Attempts to Cut Local Support

The Germans reacted to guerrilla attacks along the same pattern as in Yugoslavia. At first the attacks were considered as a police problem and were met with a search, attack, and reprisal policing. Reprisals against villages suspected of guerrilla activity were heavy, while in their zone of occupation, the Bulgarians expelled large numbers of Greek civilians. The results were on the whole entirely counterproductive and by early 1943 there was, in part due to British stimulation, a considerable increase in guerrilla activity.

More important and useful was the arrival of first-rate troops, the First Mountain Division (German) in April 1943. This force soon gained a decisive victory over a major EDES group and from that time on EDES ceased all active operations against the Germans. The ELAS, however, proved much tougher. This was especially true after the surrender of Italy. Several major Italian units, the Pinerolo Division and the Aosta Cavalry Regiment, went over to ELAS. However, when the Italians proved unwilling to carry out certain operations they were disarmed, though individuals joined the guerrillas.

In any case, the defection of the Italians left the Germans very thinly spread on the ground, and they therefore recruited three "security" battalions of Greeks (700 men each) to fight ELAS. The quisling government of Rallis, premier since April 1943, concentrated its efforts on anti-Communist propaganda. Moreover the civilian part of EDES collaborated with the security battalions. Whether Colonel Zervas himself ever collaborated with the Germans remains uncertain.

The Greek collaborationist government and the Germans tried to whip up enthusiasm for the security battalions by propaganda about the Slavic-Communist danger. However, the activities of the Bulgarians in Thrace and Macedonia left very little scope for the anti-Slav argument, while the Communist danger did not appear serious to many Greeks desirous of a new postwar society. Indeed, the Bulgarian activities were blamed by the German commanders for the growing Greek guerrilla activities. The Bulgarians not only used extreme cruelty against guerrillas and suspected guerrillas, but they also armed Bulgarian minority groups in German-occupied Greece who in turn used these arms to persecute their Greek neighbors.

More helpful to the Germans was the popular support which the Greek security battalions received as a result of Communist

atrocities. By late 1943, however, the trend of the war was so evident that few Greeks ventured to enlist in these German-sponsored units. Finally, despite their intention of exploiting the Greek manpower potential, the German field commanders persisted in the mass execution of hostages, often in the ratio of 100 Greeks for every German killed. This policy also proved highly counterproductive. The German situation was further complicated by a steadily worsening economic situation, with hunger and destitution again widespread. As in the case of Yugoslavia, many Greeks, Communist or not, came to consider EAM-ELAS as the only chance for personal and national survival.

#### Attempts to Block Outside Support

After September 1943 the Allies held air superiority over the Greek islands and southern Greece, and German planners proposed to abandon the southern part of the Balkan peninsula. Hitler, however, would not permit this, and in fact German reinforcements were able to take over Rhodes, Cephalonia, and Leros from the defected Italians, who had been reinforced by British units. Recapture of the islands was deemed essential as a countermeasure to a feared major invasion, as well as a blow against seaborne reinforcements for the guerrillas.

However, with one major exception, no major seaborne reinforcements came to the guerrillas. The exception was when EDES in July 1944 abruptly reopened hostilities against the occupation forces and seized some six and one-half miles of coastline in the Epirus. This allowed the British to land some 4,000 royalist troops who had been trained in Egypt and who represented a considerable increase in the EDES fighting strength. The operation, however, was really a move to strengthen EDES in the coming war with ELAS.

Except for German attempts to recapture the islands, largely successful in September 1943, and for routine naval and air patrols, which increasingly were challenged by growing Allied air and sea superiority, the Germans undertook no major operations to prevent the guerrillas from obtaining outside aid. And when finally in the fall of 1944 Bulgaria and Rumania entered the war against Germany, the guerrillas obtained large quantities of arms direct. By this time the British had landed in the Piraeus and the second civil war was soon to begin.

## CIVIL WAR, 1944-1949

### Historical Sketch

#### The First Round, September 1944- February 1945

As early as 1943, the British government contemplated the use of British troops to prevent an EAM take-over after the war. As the war neared an end, the British made efforts to create a government of "National Unity," in which the KKE would participate. In September 1944 Britain signed an agreement with this government (the Caserta Agreement) in which ELAS as well as EDES were placed under the joint control of the Greek government and the British military authorities. Finally, on October 9, 1944, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin worked out a "spheres of influence" agreement on the Balkans which left Greece in the British sphere of influence.<sup>1</sup>

The Germans began to evacuate Greece in September 1944 and on October 17, the Greek government, headed by its middle-of-the-road premier, George Papandreou, returned to Athens. In addition, British troops under Maj. Gen. Sir Ronald M. Scobie, consisting of a paratroop brigade, an armored brigade, a number of commando units, and a Spitfire squadron, were sent to Greece.

On arrival, the Greek royalist government attempted to disarm the resistance forces. This led to a dispute involving between 40,000 to 50,000 men in ELAS, some 10,000 to 15,000 in EDES, as well as the regular royalist troops of the Greek army. After considerable discussion, negotiations deadlocked. General Scobie now intervened and late in November ordered both EDES and ELAS to disarm. On December 1 he issued an order for the disbandment of all guerrilla forces by December 10. EAM decided to resist this move and fighting broke out on December 3. The suppression of the insurrection fell mainly upon British troops and two additional divisions had to be diverted from Italy before ELAS was put down. Athens and its environs were precariously secured, but the British and Greek royalist forces were unable to secure the rest of the country, and a solution was found only when Mr. Churchill flew to Athens in person to arrange for a political solution. The return of King George II was deferred and a regency under Archbishop Damaskinos was installed. Damaskinos appointed the republican General Plastiras as Premier. These changes paved the way for the Varkiza Peace Treaty of February 12, 1945.

The principal provisions were that ELAS should surrender a specified amount of arms (41,500 rifles and a proportionate number of other weapons) to British officers; KKE and EAM were to be recognized as legal parties; elections and a plebiscite on the question of the monarchy were to be held within the year. Prosecution of those implicated in the uprising was to be confined to violations of criminal law (there had been executions of several hundred people by both sides) and the army, police, and bureaucracy were to be purged of those who had collaborated with the Germans.

Thus ended the first round of the Greek civil war. After 33 days of fighting with 11,000 persons killed, Churchill had secured Britain's position in Greece, and Greece was to be on the side of the West during the Cold War.

#### The Second Round, 1945-1947

Between the first and the second rounds of the civil war various interim governments strove ineffectually to reduce the chaos, political as well as economic, into which war, occupation, resistance, and civil war had plunged the country. But a stable political solution could not be found. The striking fact of the Greek political scene after liberation was the lack of anything that could be called a center. There were many people who disliked both the intolerance of the left and the reaction of the right, but they had neither organization nor a program. Soon it became evident that the KKE had no real intention of abiding by the Varkiza agreement, and the right, taking its revenge for war and civil war sufferings, also violated its terms. In the country districts a white terror supplanted the violence of the left, and even in Athens, where conditions of law and order prevailed more or less, extreme rightists of the "X" organization committed murders in working class districts.<sup>2</sup>

By the summer of 1945 public order was breaking down. In southern Greece rightist bands continued to harass leftists, while in northern Greece leftist bands remained in the area of Mount Olympus and in northern Macedonia. In the elections of March 1946, the royalists obtained a slight majority, and in September a plebiscite, albeit not without intimidation at the polls, returned George II. Even before the restoration of the monarchy there had been a marked acceleration of Communist-led guerrilla activity. After the royalist election victory, the KKE increased its efforts to establish additional bands, hoping to reestablish a guerrilla force such as ELAS had been. Most alarming to the government, there was evidence that some of the

bands received support from Yugoslavia. Strong measures were taken. Special gendarme detachments, equipped with automatic arms and under orders to take no prisoners, began to operate in July 1945 and met with temporary success. By September, however, the scale of leftist band activity, now openly under KKE auspices, had increased again. Units of the reconstituted Greek National Army (GNA) were called into action. British troops, although they remained in Greece, took no part in these operations.

During 1947 the guerrillas conducted small-scale operations, concentrating on recruiting and organization. By the end of the year Communist-led guerrillas in Greece approximated 23,000 armed troops, some 20% women, with about 8,000 replacements training in neighboring Soviet satellite countries--Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Great Britain provided considerable support and equipment, as well as military missions, to the GNA, while a police mission, largely drawn from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, attempted to form a new national police force.

The tactics of the GNA were at first inefficient. Although the Peloponnese was cleared during 1947, in central and northern Greece the GNA adopted a defensive attitude, holding towns, villages, and strongpoints, but leaving the countryside at the mercy of the enemy.

At this point Great Britain, in one of its periodic postwar economic crises, declared that it could no longer bear the economic burden. The United States then assumed the main burden of the fight (Truman Doctrine, March 1947), and to provide coordinated operational and logistic support and direction to the Greek Armed Forces, a Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) was established in December 1947. At the same time, the guerrillas declared the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Government in the mountains.

#### The Final Phase, 1948-1949

General Papagos, later to assume overall command of government forces, called the results of the 1947 operations "disheartening." Though the progress of the bands had been checked, the threat was by no means ended. Indeed, in the winter of 1947-1948 the guerrillas reorganized their forces, received increased supplies from neighboring countries, and prepared to meet new attacks by the GNA.

The number of guerrillas at this point still remained at about 23,000, with 8,000 additional men in transborder training and rest



camps. Against this the government mustered, exclusive of police, gendarmery, and home guards, some 182,000 troops, supported by two fighter squadrons.

The low ratio of government troops to guerrillas revealed the seriousness of the problem, but actually the final result was never in doubt from 1948 on. Despite a record of poor and corrupt political administration and inept military tactics by the Greek government, the Communist insurrection was doomed by its failure to reach "critical" popular support, estimated as at least 20% fighters and some 40% sympathizers among the total population.<sup>3</sup> Political, social, and ethnographic factors limited the potential for popular support, and faulty tactics by the guerrillas, including terror and murder, further reduced their popular appeal. The Communist leaders also made major strategic mistakes. Given proper leadership and equipment, the Greek civil war could thus be dealt with almost by military means alone.

### Nature of the Guerrilla Movement

#### Guerrilla Organization

Political and Social Antecedents. The guerrilla movement during the 1945-1947 period differed in many ways from that of ELAS and EAM. Though EAM remained in existence as a legal party until 1947 it lost its broad spectrum of adherents. This was even more true of the guerrillas in the hills. In 1944 ELAS had the respect and help of a considerable number of supporters; the guerrillas of the postwar period, numbering perhaps 23,000 at their peak, had a very much smaller number of active supporters.

The core of the guerrilla leadership was supplied by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), which ordered some of its adherents to the hills in the spring of 1946. However, by this time bands of guerrillas were already in existence. These bands had come into being in part because of the extreme bitterness between the left and the right. Persecution drove many into the hills, as did extreme economic want.<sup>4</sup> Dislike of the many former collaborationists in postwar government ranks, as well as government action against all leftists, including some anti-Communists, provided additional recruits.<sup>5</sup> Close ties of kinship brought more members. Even so, despite the undoubted mishandling of the situation by the government, and despite the existence of genuine grievances, the guerrilla movement lacked a cause strong enough to win it wide popular support.<sup>6</sup>

Political and Military Structure. The guerrilla organization was dominated politically after 1945 by the KKE which, at least initially, enjoyed a fair degree of support.<sup>7</sup> However, in contrast with EAM, the KKE could not maintain this popular appeal, and after the Socialists and Liberals withdrew from EAM it no longer could pretend to be a united front of the entire Greek people.<sup>8</sup> Political direction was in the hands of the Central Executive Committee of KKE, in communication with the Cominform agencies.

In the field, political direction of the effort was undertaken by a Political Commissar, Nicolas Zachariades. The KKE made considerable efforts to build up in the areas it controlled permanently or temporarily what Bernard Fall has termed "parallel hierarchies," i.e., an apparatus supplanting the established governmental authorities. In this it had limited success. While in certain areas, especially in the northwestern mountain regions, there was support for the guerrillas<sup>9</sup> it never became general, and often the KKE had to resort to terror measures to intimidate the villagers.<sup>10</sup> At the end of 1947 the KKE made strenuous efforts to establish a "free Greek government in the mountains."

Failure to build up a wide popular base forced the Communist guerrillas into commando-type operations and until 1948 greatly limited the scope of their enterprises. After their initial defeat in early 1945, the guerrillas operated in lightly equipped and armed bands, 50-100 in strength, scattered throughout Greece. In the winter of 1946-1947 the various smaller units were gradually concentrated in larger bands, but not until the summer of 1947 did the guerrillas attempt to operate in battalion-size units.

During 1948-1949 the KKE leadership underwent considerable internal stress which showed in its overall strategy and conduct of operations. The KKE became involved in the Tito-Cominform struggle which erupted in 1947. Following negotiations between the Greek Communists, Tito, and other Communist leaders, the decision was taken to establish a "Provisional Democratic Government" in a "liberated" area of northern Greece. On December 23, 1947, the guerrillas announced through their radio station, located either in Albania or Yugoslavia, that such a government had been established, with Markos Vafiades as Premier and Minister of War. Markos had been chief political commissar of ELAS during World War II in Macedonia and was generally oriented toward Titoism. Within the movement Markos was checked by pro-Soviet elements led by Moscow-trained Zachariades. Despite Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948 Markos remained in control. Since Yugoslav support was vital for the Greek guerrilla

movement, Moscow prevailed in the end. In January 1949 Markos was relieved of his posts and succeeded by Yoannis Joannides and Zachariades. The shift in leadership also brought about a change in guerrilla strategy which is discussed below.

As a corollary to the attempt to establish a government, the guerrillas temporarily succeeded in converting their bands into regimental, brigade, and even understrength divisional establishments. Brigades numbered 600 to 800 men, divisions consisted of two or three brigades, and a corps of two or three divisions. During the winter of 1947-1948, the main guerrilla strength was concentrated in a heavily fortified area in the mountainous Grammos-Vitsi region near the Greek-Albanian-Yugoslav border. Small bands continued to operate throughout the country.

The guerrilla combat forces were aided by so-called self-defense units or cells (YIAFKAs) in the populated areas. These cells, in addition to gathering recruits and supplies, were mainly used to provide intelligence. At the end of 1947 such cells were estimated to have some 75,000 members,<sup>11</sup> a number which seems much too large.

Logistics. Personnel replacements were supplied from KKE volunteers, from persons driven into the underground by government reprisals, from the Slav-Macedonian ethnic minority groups along the northeastern border, and, significantly, by forced recruitment of villagers.

Weapons were at first available from stocks hidden in defiance of the Varkizas agreement. Although ELAS surrendered actually more than the stipulated quantity of arms, they were mainly of old types. Some of their best weapons were hidden. In addition, many weapons were seized from the police, from hastily organized village guards, and in similar ways. Replacement of weapons, reequipment with standardized types and heavier weapons, and above all replacement of ammunition, came largely from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Moreover, from late 1945 on, these Communist satellites also provided training, medical, and other facilities.

Undoubtedly a good percentage of ammunition and weapons were obtained locally by the guerrillas, aided by the YIAFKAs. In addition, mule pack trains moving at night brought supplies from the frontier areas to the Greek interior. However, such operations were difficult because of the terrain, distance, and possible interception by the GNA and gendarmes and were most efficient in areas immediately adjacent to friendly frontiers.

The period from 1948 to the end of April 1949, when Tito began to close down his supply operations, saw an increased flow of supplies to the guerrillas from the neighboring Soviet satellites. In general, supplies were moved overland across the frontier areas held by the guerrillas; there were some seaborne supplies brought in from Albania. Mule trains moving by night carried small stores into the interior of the country.

The type of supplies also changed. During the first period they had largely consisted of small arms and ammunition, as well as some medical stores. Now heavy weapons--some field artillery, heavy machine guns, and mortars--as well as such engineering stores as mines and barbed wire, were delivered. The weapons came from captured German army stocks held by the satellite countries. Some weapons continued to be captured from the government forces. Late in 1948 there was an increase in more modern weapons, including arms of Soviet and Czech manufacture.

During 1948 the guerrillas changed their recruiting policy. They began to abandon attempts to force peasants into their ranks and used terror to intimidate the population into denying intelligence to the government forces. Recruits now were largely drawn from the ranks of the convinced Communists, mainly from the YIAFKAs. An especially fertile recruiting ground was the Slav-Macedonian ethnic minority group. The guerrilla "government" promised the establishment of a federated and independent Macedonia in the event of victory, and this promise had a certain appeal in this area, long the object of strife between Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Thus, despite severe losses, the number of active guerrillas remained stable, about 23,000.

Doctrine, Training, and Indoctrination. The Communists conducted their propaganda with considerable skill. The main theme of Communist propaganda was that the government was one imposed by force on the people, that it was corrupt and brutal on occasion, and that only a "united front of all progressive elements" could reverse the trend toward monarcho-fascism. Excesses committed by the government forces tended to give point to this propaganda. During 1948 and 1949 there was less talk about a coalition with other "democratic" forces, and the Communist Party became more openly the primary agent in the guerrilla war. The antigovernment propaganda was never entirely effective or persuasive and the government was able to counter it with effective means.

There appears to have been little definite indoctrination among the guerrilla bands. The Andartes, the common name for

leftist guerrillas, either belonged to the hard-core KKE or had been driven into the hills by government or right-wing excesses. In this case they needed no additional indoctrination. If they were pressed peasants, they generally had to be kept in line by threats and deserted frequently.

Training varied considerably. Many of the Andartes were veterans of the resistance, others received rudimentary training in the hills and acquired experience during actual operations. From 1947 on, training schools existed in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, and later training revealed a much higher standard, due in part to the experience of survival and in part to the training received in the transborder training centers. Specialists, especially in the handling of heavy weapons and communications equipment, showed considerable proficiency.

### Objectives of the Guerrillas

Political Objectives. The professed objective of the guerrillas was the restoration of "liberty and democracy in Greece." Their real maximum objective was the establishment of a Communist state in Greece. There is some evidence that they would have temporarily settled for less--a coalition government, banishment of the king, and a restoration of the KKE to legal status.<sup>12</sup> In the last phase (1948-1949), the aim to establish a Communist state was affirmed openly, with the promise of an autonomous Macedonian federation as a subsidiary aim.

Military and Geographic Objectives. During the fighting of December 1944-February 1945 the main military objectives of ELAS were to prevent disarmament and to maintain its predominant position within the country.

The early bands of 1945-1946 were largely motivated by a desire for self-preservation. On orders from the KKE, from May 1946 on the military goal was to demonstrate that the government could not maintain law and order and was unable to run the country.

After some successes, from 1947 on the aim became to liberate certain areas. Finally from 1948 on the aim was to maintain an area adjacent to the friendly frontier as liberated territory, including an urban center to use as a "capital." Greek sources claim that had this aim succeeded the guerrillas would have received recognition from the Communist countries, followed by open military aid.<sup>13</sup>

## Techniques

Military Action. During the fighting of December 1944-February 1945 ELAS made its first attempt at regular position warfare and failed against the superior firepower of a modern army. Even so, the paucity of British-Greek government resources prevented a clear government victory.

During the period January 1946 to December 1947 the guerrillas, in the main, operated along hit-and-run lines. Usually moving at night, they attacked their objectives while other detachments provided cover against the arrival of reinforcements. Following a successful attack the guerrillas blew up installations, ransacked stores and depots, and executed known enemies. Guerrilla attacks were usually backed up by sabotage squads operating against the lines of communication. The raids created a tremendous refugee problem, which was one of their aims. Some 700,000 people left smaller towns during the civil war and crowded into the larger, better-defended centers.

During the last phase (1948-1949), hit-and-run tactics continued, but defense of the base area near the frontier became increasingly important. The defended areas were held by an inner and outer ring of mutually supporting machine-gun nests, protected by mine fields. Artillery was often placed in such positions that counterbattery fire would be likely to fall into neighboring countries, something which the GNA, on the advice of the JUSMAPG, tried to avoid. In support of the defended area, guerrilla saboteur squads operated in the rear of GNA lines, mining roads and rail communications, destroying bridges, and harassing supply columns.

The guerrilla strategy changed after the ouster of Markos in January 1949. Markos had favored the retention of small-unit operations, while Zachariades believed that, despite the apparent success of the small-unit operations, time was working against the Communists and insisted on large-scale conventional actions. Early in 1949 the Communists launched a strong offensive against Florina, a town in northern Macedonia. This conventional attack, supported by artillery, led to their downfall. The GNA was able to rout them and by September the war was over. As Cyril Falls remarked, "Ambition led to their downfall. They certainly could have maintained the fight for longer on guerrilla lines."<sup>14</sup> With the determined support given to the government by the United States, however, the guerrillas had no real chance of establishing a Communist regime.

Political Warfare. An important element in the success of the guerrilla tactics was their careful planning based on a sound intelligence network. The YIAFKA units, some 50 to 60 strong, provided not only the necessary intelligence, but also one of the most effective means of political warfare. Their presence, often even after an area had been nominally secured by the GNA, served to intimidate opponents of the guerrillas and provided the most substantial basis for the establishment of an alternate shadow government within a community. The hit-and-run raids had a political warfare aim--to show the Greek people that the government could not protect them from attack.

Terrorism. Terrorism was one of the weapons of the Andartes. It was used to intimidate the enemy, to convince the population of the impotence of the government, and to impress recruits into their ranks. The value of these methods, at least in Greece, was very dubious. Terror succeeds where the terrorists enjoy the support of the great mass of the population. In places where support is half-hearted or confined to a minority, the guerrillas are forced to dissipate their energies and to employ terror to keep their nominal supporters in line.

### Support for the Guerrillas

#### Local Support

Classes, Ethnic Groups, and Areas Involved. In the long run, the limited degree of popular support received by the guerrillas proved to be a major weakness. Indeed, in the opinion of some observers it proved to be decisive.<sup>15</sup> Estimates regarding the exact amount of popular support vary rather widely. One estimate gives the number of YIAFKAs at the end of 1947 at about 50,000 with some 750,000 sympathizers behind them.<sup>16</sup> On the other extreme is the contention that the guerrilla "infiltrating units had to hide from the population when they could not cow it."<sup>17</sup> The truth lies between the extremes but suggests that even considerable numbers of activists can eventually be eliminated by purely military means, if they do not enjoy the support of the population to an overwhelming degree. Greece thus becomes the model for the purely military solution. It must be stressed, however, that Greece was a special case. The absence of a "cause," the lack of a really burning issue, as well as a number of factors favorable to the government, enabled the counterinsurgency response to be almost entirely limited to military means.

The Greek Communist-led guerrillas did not have and failed to develop popular support of the degree required to sustain their operation, much less to gain momentum for a major revolutionary war.

In general the pattern of support varied regionally. By the end of 1944, ELAS undoubtedly had gained considerable support, but following the Varkiza Agreement a marked regional pattern developed. In the south, especially in the Peloponnese, the right gained almost unchallenged control. In central Greece the left remained much stronger. While many villages passed under right-wing control, the Communists retained some influence in the small towns. Northwest, in the Epirus, the nationalist followers of EDES dominated the region. Western and Central Macedonia, however, remained strongly influenced by the left and here the guerrillas found their main support. Eastern Macedonia, on the other hand, which had been occupied by the Bulgarians during the war, was extremely hostile to the Communists, who were regarded as allies of the hated Slavs. The only exception to the general hostility here was the Slav-Macedonian minority.

In the larger cities of Greece--Athens, Piraeus, Salonica, Patras, and Volos--the guerrillas could count to some degree on support that had its base in class distinctions. The urban proletariat tended to support the guerrilla movement, while merchants and small capitalists were solidly in the right-wing ranks. Intellectuals could be found on both sides. However, class distinctions and antagonism in Greece are less important than nationalism, and in the end the alignment, nolens volens, of the guerrilla with Greece's Slav neighbors led to a marked decrease in the level of support.

Nature of Support. Here again the evidence is contradictory. One observer flatly states that the guerrillas had little or no popular support after 1944,<sup>18</sup> while another observer noted substantial voluntary support by both the rural and the urban population.

Local support for guerrillas means above all food, shelter, intelligence, and the denial of such intelligence to the government forces. Secondary factors are recruitment of fighters and specialists. Smothers found that the guerrillas, in eastern Thessaly at least, found these necessities from the population and obtained them without undue terror. "As for food," one guerrilla leader maintained, "our main source is the peasants who supply it willingly."<sup>19</sup> In addition, food and other supplies were smuggled out of towns, and even from Greek army dumps. This latter



contention is supported by General Papagos, Commander in Chief of the GNA from late 1948 on, who claims that communism had considerable support within the population, the administration, and even the army.<sup>20</sup> Apparently the guerrillas did enjoy support, but not so much as to convert the movement into a true revolutionary war. In any case there was not enough to sustain it once events had turned against the guerrillas.

Relation of Support to Events. The above contention is borne out by the marked decline in support experienced by the guerrillas after reverses. There was a striking loss of popular support following the defeat of ELAS in 1944-1945,<sup>21</sup> and in fact whenever the government secured an area and maintained law and order, it was able to rally the great mass of the population. In this connection it is worth noting that the early excesses of the right-wing volunteer bands and National Guard units during the period 1945-1947 did much to swing support to the guerrillas. The better discipline and control of regular troops solved this problem.

#### Outside Support

Supporting Nations and Their Relations with the Guerrillas. During the Greek civil war the Communist-led guerrillas received various types of support, both direct and indirect. Direct support was provided by the then Russian satellites Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania; indirect support by the Soviet Union and various other states of the Soviet bloc.

Relations between Russia and the Andartes were initially strained by the Russian refusal to back ELAS in 1944. After 1945, however, party discipline prevailed within the KKE, until the Titoist-Stalinist issue split the party.

The relationship between the Slavic states supporting the guerrillas and the recipients of the aid was compromised by the territorial claims of these countries on Greece. Bulgaria demanded a slice of eastern Macedonia and an outlet to the Aegean; Albania and Greece disputed a portion of the Epirus, and Yugoslavia claimed western Macedonia and indeed during 1945 supported autonomous Slav bands in that area. The claims proved an acute embarrassment to the KKE. Indeed, many Greek Communists strongly objected to any cession of Greek territory.<sup>22</sup> To avoid a debacle Zachariades met with Yugoslav and Bulgarian party leaders in January 1946. Although the ultimate disposition of Macedonia was apparently not decided, the question was definitely played down. Instructions

were given to the local Slav bands to cooperate with the Andartes and to deter any propaganda concerning the political future of the area until victory had been achieved.

The question of Macedonia, however, became one of the main factors leading to Tito's breach with the Kremlin. Tito aspired to form a South-Slav federation consisting of the six Yugoslav republics, Bulgaria, and Macedonia. In this setup Tito would have been dominant and would have been able to withstand Russian interference even better. These plans, as well as other Yugoslav assertions of national independence, were ill-received in Moscow.

The fermentations in the Communist camp had repercussions on guerrilla warfare in Greece. The Tito-oriented group under Markos was willing to cede northern Macedonia to the proposed federal structure, but Moscow's opposition prevented any action. Then, following the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform in June 1948, the Greek guerrilla government was reconstructed in January 1949. The new guerrilla government proclaimed in favor of an autonomous Macedonia, to include Yugoslav Macedonia, under Bulgarian sponsorship. Meanwhile Moscow could not make up its mind. To endorse the cession of Greek Macedonia to Bulgaria would gravely weaken the guerrilla movement and deprive it of its dwindling popular appeal. On the other hand, much of the hard core of the guerrilla forces in the defended areas was composed of Slav-Macedonian elements. There was indecision in the Kremlin. Then Tito, who had been slowly diminishing his support, announced on July 10, 1949, that he had closed his frontiers with Greece. Shortly thereafter the level of support across the Bulgarian and Albanian borders began to decline as well. The Soviet leaders evidently decided that it was no use throwing good money after bad.

By August 1949 the GNA assumed the general offensive and drove the remnants of the guerrilla forces into Albania and Bulgaria, where the Greek Communist leadership announced in December 1949 that it had resolved to suspend further operations "in order to bring peace to Greece."

#### Forms of Support.

Moral Support. Moral support by means of propaganda, both at home and abroad, was given by the Soviet Union, its satellites, and friends. The Greek government was attacked as not representing the free will of the people, and as dominated by former collaborators and fascists.

Political Support. Although British action against ELAS in 1944 had been met by widespread criticism, Stalin had kept his agreement with Churchill and had not interfered in any way in the counterinsurgent measures taken at that time. After 1945, however, and especially from 1946 on, the Russian and satellite governments attempted to apply pressure on the Greek government. At the Paris Peace Conference Russia (as well as England and the United States) opposed strongly any Greek demand for territorial changes. Toward the end of August the Russian and Yugoslav Ambassadors left Athens to go "on leave," and in August 1946 the Ukraine attacked the Greek government's policies in the Security Council as a threat to world peace.

On the other hand the Soviet Union agreed to an on-the-spot UN investigation of charges by the Greek government of interference by Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria in the guerrilla war (December 19, 1946). However, when the commission found that the charges were indeed correct, the Soviets used five vetoes to forestall any action by the Security Council. When in August 1947 the question was brought before the General Assembly, the Soviet Union, again supported by its satellites, refused to take part in any international action aimed at providing a solution to the Greek civil war.

Technical Support. Since 1943 liaison had been established between Tito's partisans and the ELAS forces. The level of technical proficiency on the Greek Communist side was high enough so that no technical aid, other than the provision of some medical-surgical help, was required.

Military Support. No organized military units from the satellite states crossed into Greek territory. Military support included sanctuary for guerrilla bands and the provision of medical and training facilities, and of equipment. After the Varkiza Agreement some 3,000 to 4,000 ELAS men crossed into Yugoslavia, from where they returned early in 1945. Smaller numbers were received by Bulgaria.<sup>23</sup>

From the spring of 1946, both countries, as well as Albania, offered refuge to bands that were hard pressed by GNA or police units. Wounded guerrillas were treated, some 6,317 in Yugoslavia alone;<sup>24</sup> others were reequipped and reinfiltrated into Greece. A training school for guerrilla officers was established in Yugoslavia in 1947. Permanent refugee camps for proguerrilla villagers were set up in all three countries.

Military equipment and other supplies were delivered in small quantities only. The absorptive capacity of the guerrilla bands for such equipment was, at first, severely limited. Undoubtedly, guerrilla bands operating in close proximity to the friendly frontiers benefited more than those operating further south. Until the end of 1947, moreover, military materiel support consisted largely of ammunition. Toward the end of 1947 some heavier weapons were delivered, but until the guerrillas held large contiguous areas along the frontier, bulk prevented large-scale support. Toward the end of 1948 newer types of weapons were provided. At Vitsi the GNA captured rifles, mortars, and ammunition of recent Soviet and Czech manufacture.

Relation of Support to Events. During 1944 the Soviet Union respected its zone-of-influence agreement and furnished no support or encouragement to the insurgents.<sup>25</sup> This changed considerably late in the following year. Support continued at the levels indicated during 1946 and until the fall of 1947. Late in the fall of 1947 Tito's plans for a greater Communist Balkan Federation led him to give more massive support to the guerrillas. Inter-Balkan rivalries, Tito's Balkan ambitions, and the ascendancy of the Stalinist wing within the guerrilla movement resulted finally in Tito's stopping aid to the Greek guerrillas and closing the Greek-Yugoslav border.

### The Counterinsurgent Response

#### Attempts to Cut Local Support

When the Germans withdrew from Greece, they left vast areas of the country under EAM administration. Although the national government appointed regional governors (nomarchs), these actually found themselves powerless. Only in the Peloponnesus and in some areas of the Epirus was the government able to exert some influence, and then only by making use of EDES and other right-wing bands. Employment of these bands and their ruthless action against leftists often complicated the picture further.

The ill-advised ELAS revolt of December 1944 cost EAM and the KKE a good deal of support. After the Varkiza Agreement the government was able to create new national forces to maintain law and order and to uphold the authority of the government (see Appendix A for a summary of Greek antiguerrilla forces). The first was a National Guard (NG), which originally was formed during the

battle for Athens in December 1944. As British units fanned out in February to take over the country from ELAS, the new units followed slowly, but it was not until May 15, 1945, that National Guardsmen had spread the power of the national government to all parts of Greece. As the NG battalions advanced, new units were raised from the local inhabitants by calling up a single class of the army reserve. The Athens NG battalions served as a sort of advance party, occupying new areas progressively and moving on after the formation of local battalions.

This, in theory, ought to have provided the government with reliable forces, well acquainted with the locality and not considered hostile by the local population. The trouble was, however, that the Athens battalions had originally been recruited from fanatical rightists, not very well disciplined and unwilling to abide by the letter of the law.<sup>26</sup> They freely disregarded civil liberties and took reprisals against ELAS men suspected of wrongdoing without much regard for evidence or procedure. The British looked with considerable disapproval on this behavior and in general exerted a moderating influence. Still and all, as the NG spread out through the countryside a sort of miniature counterrevolution followed in its wake. On the whole, conditions were not too oppressive, and as the central government began to operate more freely it proclaimed a series of amnesties which cleared the prisons of most of the persons who had been incarcerated. But vengeance is still a strong motive in Greece and by the summer of 1945 small leftist bands were again in the hills, augmented by some Communist die-hards who had never demobilized.

Normally the Greek countryside had been policed by a military gendarmerie, and as soon as possible this body was reestablished and dispatched to the provinces to relieve the NG of police duty. Gendarmes who had served during the occupation formed the core of the new force; only a few hundred were refused reinstatement. Retraining of the gendarmerie was carried out by the British police mission, largely drawn from the Royal Ulster Constabulary. By May 15 gendarmes were on duty in most provinces, and the NG became merely a frontier police, with the exception of a dozen battalions that remained as a central reserve to deal with disorders too great for the gendarmes to handle. In general, the reorganized gendarmerie made a better record, as far as behavior was concerned, than the NG. Although it contained many rightists and no person suspected of left-wing leanings was accepted, the gendarmes on the whole observed legal process and committed fewer acts of illegal violence.

Progress toward law and order was destroyed by the reappearance of Communist bands in the summer of 1945. The government

replied with the use of special counterband tactics. Groups of selected gendarmes, as well as volunteer groups of the right, hunted down these bands. However, as one observer pointed out, such operations tend to be somewhat self-defeating.<sup>27</sup> They usually involve counterterrorism and "terrorism is a source of disorder, which is precisely what the counterinsurgent aims to stop." Indeed, these activities appear to have been counterproductive, and when in early 1946 the KKE began its guerrilla war in earnest, the numbers in the hills had risen considerably. It is noteworthy that until 1948 many of the guerrillas claimed, not without some justice, that fear of government and government supporters had driven them to join the Andartes.<sup>28</sup>

The next stage was that of defensive warfare. In 1946 the troops of the GNA and the gendarmes were largely dissipated in small groups throughout the country and committed to the static defense of towns and villages. These tactics have been attacked as being due to interference by politicians who wanted their home districts protected and the result of bad British advice.<sup>29</sup> Actually, while these tactics did not bring victory, they staved off defeat and were at that time necessary since the GNA was still in the process of reorganization. Originally it was little more than a brigade strong; the GNA contained a number of Communist and antigovernment sympathizers in its ranks, and was not entirely reliable.<sup>30</sup> By denying the bands access to the main areas of population, the defensive warfare tactics performed a useful function. Greece, especially the mountain districts, is a food-deficit area and control of the villages and towns allowed a measure of food control. Although the Greek government and administration continued to be plagued by instability and inefficiency, static defense prevented any large ground swell from developing and contained the guerrilla movement.

During the winter of 1946-1947 plans were laid to break the hold of the guerrillas over mountain areas by offensive operations. Although the GNA was growing, it still did not have enough troops for simultaneous action throughout the country. It was now decided to close on certain guerrilla-infested districts, in the hope of forcing the guerrillas into battle and exterminating them. Then the bulk of the forces would move on, leaving a small number behind to deal with guerrilla remnants. Hopefully, the plan assumed, there would be gradual progress from south to north. The plan had only limited success, working best in the Peloponnese where the terrain and the population favored the government. In central Greece the clearing operations merely pushed the guerrillas into adjacent areas, while in the north the guerrillas sought transborder sanctuary. In short, the 1947 offensive petered out and during this year the guerrillas not only made good their

losses, but actually increased in numbers from around 13,000 to about 20,000.

There were a number of explanations for the apparent failure. For one thing, the guerrillas did not lose their popular support, in many cases given out of fear, because the local inhabitants believed that the guerrillas would return once the clearing operation was over. Therefore they did not provide the government with much help. The use of armed peasant militias to hold the cleared area also proved ineffective during this stage.

Simultaneously with the clearing operations, the government started a drive against Communist sympathizers and other leftists in the cities and the small towns. The results of this operation were also disputed. There is one body of opinion which holds that this action drove many people to join the bands in the hills, and another body which believes that it was a long overdue police measure. At the same time, the GNA also attempted to clear out unreliable elements from its ranks. Since these had to be kept in internment camps, a number of troops had to be diverted from hunting the bandits to guarding the army's own suspects.

Taken all in all, the stepped-up activities during 1947 were ineffective. At the same time, however, the guerrillas made no great progress, though they began to mass for the first time in larger units. If this seems a contradictory statement, perhaps it could be better formulated as follows: the government forces were not winning the war but the guerrillas were not either, because they were unable to attain the required degree of popular support to reach a truly insurrectionary revolutionary stage. By the end of 1947 a standoff position had been reached. The government forces, now numbering about 182,000, were unable to deal with the guerrillas, numbering some 20,000. Neither side had gained popular support to a large degree. But failure to gain this popular support was, in Greece at least, less vital to the government than it was to the guerrillas.

The Greek command changed its tactics in 1948. The army was to concentrate against the Communist defended zone in the Mt. Grammos massif, in the hope that the guerrillas would be forced to give battle there. Also, this was supposed to cut the supply lines by which the guerrillas in the interior were maintained. Because the ratio of government forces to guerrillas (roughly 6:1 exclusive of police and gendarmery) was held to be inadequate, the army was much enlarged. In addition, especially in southern Greece, peasant home-guards, commanded by regular army officers, were organized. While the army was to concentrate against the

7

defended guerrilla area, home-guards, gendarmery, and armed peasants were to conduct clean-up operations in southern and central Greece.

The plan, however, failed. Although by late spring 1948 the main Communist forces had been driven from Mt. Grammos into Albania, they reentered Greece further north in the Vitsi area, where they stood off heavy GNA attacks. Moreover, later that year, they re-occupied their old positions in the Mt. Grammos massif. Meanwhile, the pacification of the interior had also failed, though by the end of 1948 operations in the southern Peloponnese, always a stronghold of rightist sentiment, showed some signs of success. The year 1948 must be considered as a failure. Concentrating the army against the Communist defended bases had simply allowed the guerrillas to extend their activity in the interior.

Even more serious was the fact that, although the Communists lacked mass appeal, three years of indecisive warfare had led to a profound feeling in many Greek circles that a compromise solution might become necessary. To counteract this trend a new government was formed, and General Alexander Papagos, the respected and popular victor of the 1940-1941 campaign in Albania, was recalled from retirement and appointed commander in chief. A new plan of action was drawn up with the aid of the US mission. The plan distinguished between two different objectives. First, there were the Communist defended areas in the Grammos-Vitsi region which could be contained and eventually destroyed by orthodox military offensive action. Secondly, there was the problem of the roving bands in the rest of the country. To deal with the bands it was necessary to pursue them relentlessly by day and night so that they would either give battle or disperse. At the same time, the YIAFKA cells that provided them with intelligence and recruits would have to be destroyed. The GNA command realized that its forces were inadequate for carrying out both missions at once. It was decided, therefore, to contain the Grammos-Vitsi area and to spread pacification northward from the Peloponnese. Here, one district after the other was cleared and then garrisoned by the armed peasant units first organized in 1948. The YIAFKA cells were broken up and a great number of persons were detained. Even within the GNA all personnel under suspicion were interned.

The plan succeeded extremely well. As soon as the population was assured that the Communists would not return to wreak vengeance, support of the government increased. Information and intelligence regarding guerrilla agents became available and many areas were completely pacified. The key to success was that sufficient forces, mainly semimilitary in nature, were left behind to prevent any re-infiltration by the guerrillas. Moving on a broad front from south



to north, the army reached the Communist fortified areas by July 1949. Already earlier that year the Communists, fearing that time was running out, had attempted to mount a strong diversionary attack against Florina, but had been driven back after some hard fighting. Now the GNA went on to a conventional offensive and by early August the guerrillas were driven into Albania. During this final phase of the fighting the Greek air force played a useful role, bombing guerrilla positions and concentrations. On September 6, 1949, the Greek Prime Minister declared that the war was over.

#### Attempts to Block Outside Support

Closing an extensive border is a military undertaking of enormous dimensions and may not be feasible in certain types of terrain. It certainly was beyond the capabilities of the GNA in 1946-1947. Therefore, diplomatic attempts were made to put pressure on the adjoining Soviet satellite states to cease, or at least reduce, their support of the guerrillas. In these endeavors the Greek government had the support of Great Britain and the United States.

As early as late November 1946 the Greek government brought this matter to the attention of the United Nations. The Soviet Union did not use its veto, despite its opposition, and on December 19, 1946, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution establishing a Commission of Investigation to ascertain the facts regarding the alleged border violations in northern Greece. The commission published its report on June 27, 1947, substantially endorsing Greek charges, but for the moment Soviet vetoes in the Security Council prevented any real action.

The report of the commission was nonetheless not without value. The British general elections of 1945 had ousted Mr. Churchill and brought Labor to power. Unlike Mr. Churchill, the Laborites were generally unsympathetic to King George and believed that his partisans were out-and-out reactionaries. Although Labor equally disliked the Greek Communists, the unquestionable brutality, corruption, and inefficiency of the Greek government lost it many friends in Great Britain and gave the guerrillas additional moral support abroad.

The reports of the UN commission, which substantiated at least a limited foreign aggression, were of considerable value in preserving British support for the Greek government. Great Britain carried the burden for another year, and when early in 1947 it announced that it would have to retrench, the UN reports

aided President Truman in gaining public and Congressional support for his decision, announced March 12, 1947, to extend aid to Greece.

The pronounced and clear intention of the United States to aid Greece also had some effects in the Communist countries. Stalin, it is reported by Djilas, cooled off in his intentions to support the Greek Communists. Realizing the firm western commitments, he decided to back off. To be sure, Stalin's remarks must be read in the light of the coming Yugoslav-Moscow split. Nonetheless, they were another straw in the wind. Moreover, within Greece the United States enjoyed a very high reputation, both on the right and with the moderate left, and US support of the Greek government gained the adherence of many still uncommitted.

The closing of the Yugoslav frontier was perhaps the most important factor in cutting off outside support during the war's last phase. In part this was made possible by the policy of restraint urged by the JUSMAGP advisers on the Greek government. Although the guerrillas were clearly given refuge, rested, re-equipped, and aided to reenter Greek territory, the advisers restrained the Greek government from undertaking reprisals against Albanian, Yugoslav, or Bulgarian territory. When the guerrillas positioned their artillery so that counterbattery fire was likely to stray across the frontiers the US advisers urged the utmost restraint. It seems likely that this policy paid good dividends, because crossing into satellite territory might have prevented the development of the rift between Moscow and Tito.

At the same time the continued efforts of the Greek government and its friends at the UN had certain salutary effects. The responsibility of the satellites for supplying the guerrillas was clearly established, and world opinion generally supported the Greek government despite its many defects. And when in the fall of 1949 the last remnants of the guerrilla forces took refuge in Albania and Bulgaria, those governments announced that the refugees would be interned and not allowed to retain their arms, thus relieving the Greek government of considerable anxiety.

Geography, while it aided the guerrillas, also hampered their foreign supporters. In the initial stages the guerrillas required only small amounts of infantry weapons and communications equipment, and this could be smuggled in over the mountain areas. However, heavier equipment proved more difficult to introduce through the mountains. Virtually the only other supply route was by sea, and once the Greek navy possessed modern equipment, it could fairly easily intercept major supplies sent in that way. Port control remained difficult, but no major quantities could reach the guerrillas by this route.

### Adequacy of General and Local Administrative Machinery

Performance of Police Function. Much blame for the long duration of the war must be placed on the inefficiency of the Greek administration. Essentially from 1944 to 1949 Greece had the prewar type of Balkan regime with a civil war superimposed on it. Contrasts in wealth, an irresponsible ruling class, and a corrupt bureaucracy persisted. Ministers changed with great frequency, stakes for gaining office were high, while at the bottom the petty bureaucrats were miserably underpaid and could only support their families by increasing their pay from irregular sources. The great increase in the cost of living after the end of the war made this traditional problem even more acute. In April 1949 there was a strike of civil servants in southern Greece caused not by Communist machinations, but by pure economic misery.

A second evil was overcentralization. Even minor decisions were referred to Athens, where frequent changes in cabinets were followed by changes among top administrators, seriously interfering with the work of government bureaus.

A third difficulty was the almost complete lack of supplies and, at first, transport. In 1944-1945 even the simplest items, such as paper and pencils, were lacking, to say nothing of typewriters and files. This greatly hampered efforts to establish population control. It was not possible to issue identity cards (already introduced by the Germans but destroyed on instructions from ELAS). Taking a census and other such measures were practically impossible. These material problems were slowly ameliorated during the civil war by foreign aid.

At the same time, in spite of charges that the government was dictatorial and fascist, there was at first no serious government effort to deal with the KKE, which was allowed to function, especially in the major cities, until the autumn of 1947. In the provinces, to be sure, Communists were often arrested, and some were mistreated or even murdered by right-wing elements, but nothing was done in Athens until the summer of 1947. In July 1947 there was a wave of arrests. The arrests did not always hit the right people; indeed, the police were flooded with denunciations and the indiscriminate arrests brought some new recruits to the Communist-led bands.<sup>31</sup> As the government swung too far from leniency to repression, even right-wing sources admit that "some people were forced to join the bands . . . because of these measures."<sup>32</sup>

Throughout the period of the civil war the regular law courts remained active, although offenses involving help to the rebels were dealt with by courts martial. The fact that any Communist activity was permitted as late as a year after the party had resorted to armed rebellion against the legal government is proof of truly remarkable tolerance on the part of the Greek government.

The last stages of the war saw a definite improvement, albeit only temporary, in the top level of the government. From 1946 to 1949 rivalry among the party bosses had hampered the effective prosecution of the war. In January 1949, however, there was widespread feeling that better top leadership was required. In January the Sophoulis cabinet was reshuffled and General Papagos was entrusted with the position of commander in chief and given wide powers. Departmental rivalries were overcome by the creation of a War Council of senior ministers, and it was under its direction that the war was brought to its victorious conclusion. As for the police and gendarmery, they had been brutal before the war and improved very little during the hostilities despite the efforts of the British Police Mission. As anti-Communist an observer as Professor Seaton-Watson observed that the police indulged in unnecessary brutality, listened to malicious accusations, mistreated suspects, and generally indulged in "much unnecessary and inexcusable victimisation and tyranny." He concluded that "the bitterness which it created supplied for three years a stream of recruits to the rebels."<sup>33</sup>

An associated problem was the inability of the police and administration to offer effective inducements to the guerrillas to surrender. Amnesties were offered more than once, with small results. The guerrilla rank and file feared vengeance, and experience revealed that they had reason. Though the government might have sincerely wished to pardon those who surrendered, once they got back to their villages and towns the local people who had suffered from the war were less tolerant.

Scope and Degree of Control. Given the circumstances cited above, the scope and degree of control exercised over political opponents, population movements, and finally food control, varied. In some localities rightists did indeed establish a stern regime, not unmingled with terror. In other localities government representatives were more lenient. Everywhere there was a high degree of arbitrariness and inefficiency. To some degree this was due to the conditions of war, occupation, resistance, and civil war; it was also typical of Balkan administration.

The task of the government was also complicated because of two agencies which exercised considerable influence over functions normally handled by the central administration. In economic matters UNRRA, guided and, to some degree only, controlled by Greek government officials, and in military matters the Greek General Staff, supported by the British Military Mission, achieved a marked degree of independence. The distribution of food by UNRAA might have given the government considerable control over the food supply in a food-deficit country, but initially the government exercised only limited control over the agency.

The military gained some of their independence through the efforts of the British Mission to free the army of "politics." To be sure, the Military Mission did not have the powers of the Police Mission. The latter had mandatory powers which permitted it to veto promotions and transfers within the force, but the British Military Mission also achieved considerable influence. In practice the beneficiaries of its influence were moderate royalist officers, and this favoritism alienated many conservative and anti-Communist officers. There was also some friction between the British Mission and the Greeks in general, which impeded the efficiency of the GNA.

There were thus many conflicting parties vying for control in Athens, with the British, and later the US, missions trying to exert a moderating influence; there was galloping inflation and the lack of even basic supplies during the first few months; there were bitter memories of war, resistance, and civil war. With all these factors affecting government operations, the scope, degree, and effectiveness of administrative controls in Greece was always far from perfect.

#### Dealing with Public Opinion.

Public Opinion in Greece. Here, without a doubt, the government scored its greatest triumph, or it is perhaps better to say that the Communists were unable to make sufficient headway despite the undoubted mistakes and shortcomings of the national government. The first mistake made by the Communists was that during the rising of December 1944 ELAS practiced extreme violence against its enemies. People's courts were established to try persons accused of various crimes allegedly committed during the occupation; torture and mutilation were not infrequent; and several hundred persons were thus killed. Another psychological mistake was the insurgents' decision to take hostages. When ELAS was forced to evacuate Athens it took with it about 15,000 hostages,

of whom 4,000 perished due to lack of clothing and food, or were shot out of hand. These cruelties turned many former sympathizers against ELAS, and the Communists. Old-line republican leaders who had stood with ELAS during the resistance turned their backs on the left.

The second factor turning popular opinion against the KKE and its guerrilla war was the alliance between the Greek Communists and Greece's traditional national enemies. With Balkan national feelings running high, such associations did much to destroy any appeal the guerrillas might have had. The government was able to exploit the two themes, the bloody terrorism of ELAS and the associations of the KKE with the national enemies, in its propaganda. The result was that despite the mistakes of the government, the guerrillas could never gather that degree of popular support required to become a real revolutionary movement.

Public Opinion Elsewhere. Initially, the guerrilla movement enjoyed a certain support abroad, not only in Communist countries, but also in Great Britain, France, and the United States. The British intervention of December 1944 had been widely condemned in democratic countries, and the British Labor Government was by no means well disposed toward the rightist and royalist factions. Only gradually, under the impact of the Cold War more than as the result of any government propaganda, did Western public opinion change. The reports of the UN Security Council Commission also did much to bring a change in public attitudes.

#### Psychological Effects of Specific Incidents

As indicated above, there were a number of turning points. The insurrection of December 1944 with its attendant atrocities did much to divorce the moderates from the extreme left. The association between the left and Greece's Slavic neighbors, openly acknowledged by 1947, further damaged the appeal of the left.

The identification of the United States, with its considerable Greek immigrant population, with the anti-Communist struggle gave the government considerable appeal.

On the other hand, the heavy-handed methods of the government, as well as counterterror methods such as those practiced initially by the NG, or by official or semiofficial armed bands, or by right-wing terror organizations such as Colonel Grivas's "X" group, were often counterproductive.

Tito's defection clearly had a most damaging impact on the guerrilla movement. It overshadowed in importance the rifts within the movement's leadership and the replacement of Markos. On the government side, the appointment of General Papagos did much to restore confidence and to combat willingness to compromise.

#### Motivation and Indoctrination

On the guerrilla side morale was uneven. In the territories which they controlled the rebels forced unwilling peasants into their ranks and inflicted horrible punishments on those who tried to desert. But many of the rebels fought neither from fear nor from sordid ambition. Many were veteran Communists, while others fought for what they believed was freedom and independence.

On the government side there was also a mixture of motives. On the whole, the government, as has been repeatedly remarked, was able to profit from the nationalist, even xenophobic, hatred of the Greeks against their Slav neighbors. Late in 1948 unreliable soldiers were interned and given special reeducation. General Papagos testifies that rehabilitated men were formed into special units, some of which distinguished themselves in action.

#### Outcome of the Revolution

By the end of 1949 only a few small, starving, and desperate guerrilla bands were left in the mountains, trying to survive. The guerrilla government announced that it had ceased operations to save Greece from destruction. A clear military victory had been achieved.

In Greece victory was achieved almost exclusively by force. There were, however, very special circumstances. These included the inability of the Communists to gain the support of a critical segment of the Greek people, due in part to their association with the national enemy, and in part to their resort to rapine, extortion, arson, murder, and terrorism. Their attempt to move from the petite to the grande guerre in 1949 and the closing of the Yugoslav frontier sealed their doom. Sustained by the United States, supported by an intensely nationalist population, the government was able to win the civil war without political concessions, but rather by military means alone.

And yet, perhaps it is too early to call the Greek civil war a closed chapter. The war broke out, in part at least, as a reaction against the evils of the past, yet the war made them worse. The economic and political problems of Greece have not been solved, the royal crown is not safe, and the same political bosses still maneuver for power and the spoils of office. The outcome of these problems is still in doubt. In the perspective of the late 1940s, however, the KKE failed in its bid for control in Greece and the country remained in the Western camp. The Truman Doctrine saved Greece from communism, but with three Communist countries on its border the nation is still vulnerable to Communist infiltration. Discontent within the country, fed in part by the ineptitude of the royal family, has given the domestic Communists fresh ammunition and at the time of writing the future of the royal throne, indeed the stability of Greece, seems once again in doubt.



## Appendix A

### GREEK ANTIGUERRILLA FORCES, 1945-1949

Operations against the Greek Communist guerrillas during this period were conducted by air and naval forces, as well as ground forces. The bulk of the operations and the main burden fell, however, on the ground forces. The organization and the nature of these forces is discussed below. In the period 1945-1949 these included the Greek National Army, the National Defense Corps, the gendarmery, police, and armed civilians.

#### The Greek National Army

When the Greek government returned to the country in 1944 it possessed only one understrength brigade and the "Sacred Squadron," a unit of some 700 officers. Initially, Great Britain undertook to train and equip a new army of 100,000 by 1948, a goal revised upward to 120,000 in 1947. Eventually the strength of the army was raised to 147,000 effectives. In late 1948 General Papagos, who then was offered the overall command, demanded that the total strength be raised to 250,000, but the defeat of the guerrillas made this further increase unnecessary.

At the outset of operations the standard unit of the army was the division. Two types of divisions, mountain and field, existed. Neither type had supporting arms as organic components. Armor, engineers, and other branches were rather attached when and where needed, subject to the control of the various directorates of the general staff. The division consisted of little more than headquarters, infantry, and signal elements. A mountain division was normally reinforced by a squadron of cavalry, a machine-gun company, and a regiment of pack artillery. The field divisions had attached armored cavalry and field artillery. The real difference between field and mountain divisions lay in strength and transport. The mountain division had 8,500 men and animal transport; the field division had 10,500 men and motor transport.

Late in 1948, on the urging of the JUSMAPG, a standard division, containing as an organic part of its organization

artillery and engineer components, was adopted. The new standard divisions, of which there were six, had a strength of 9,300 men and included an engineer battalion, a scout company, and a battery of 75mm. pack howitzers. Also in 1948, the army began to replace British with US equipment. There was an increase in light automatic weapons throughout the army. British equipment was concentrated in two divisions and in the National Defense Corps.

During the early antiguerrilla operations an important part was played by some 40 commando units, formed in 1947 and organized in 4 groups of 4 companies, some 625 men each, in 1948. The commando groups, carrying only light weapons and a somewhat heavier proportion of automatic arms than the regular army units, were used on most operations. In time, they seemed to gain a monopoly on operations, to the detriment of the fighting spirit of the rest of the army. Therefore, beginning in 1949, Papagos used them mainly as a strategic reserve and for special enterprises.

The army possessed its normal complement of military police and intelligence units on the British model. A field security section was attached to each division, and local area commands had an intelligence unit attached. Overall direction of army intelligence was by the Directorate of Intelligence within the General Staff; the Directorate of Intelligence also maintained liaison with the gendarmery, which came under the Ministry of Justice.

#### The National Defense Corps

This organization was established in October 1947 to replace the National Guard, an outfit hastily formed in the wake of the Athens fighting of December 1944, which had been poorly controlled and guilty of many excesses. The National Defense Corps was to consist of 40 battalions of 500 men each, and to be used as territorial defense units. In theory it was supposed to be a militia, with the men living at home but instantly ready for action in their own localities. The total number of battalions was raised to 100 in January 1948. About half of the 97 units actually formed were absorbed into the regular army and employed as standard infantry battalions. The National Defense Corps did some useful service guarding cleared areas against reinfiltration by the guerrillas, but the regular army was never too happy with this organization.

### The Gendarmerie

An armed body under the Ministry of Justice, the gendarmerie served outside the limits of towns having municipal police forces. It had extensively collaborated with the Germans and during 1945 it had to be reconstituted. Nonetheless, most of the prewar and wartime members of the force were readmitted after some perfunctory screening. The force was established at 32,000 and used in military operations during 1946-1947. It was not a success. The great usefulness of police and gendarmerie in counterinsurgency work lies in its familiarity with the local area and its population. Used in large bodies outside their home areas the gendarmes did not do well. After the NDC was formed the force was reduced to 25,000. It then performed in a satisfactory manner.

### The Police

The local police played only a minor role in counterinsurgency operations.

### Armed Civilians

During the December 1944 emergency the government had armed and employed some right-wing civilian groups, essentially remnants of EDES and the even more extreme right-wing "X" led by Colonel Grivas. These had proven unsatisfactory, given to excesses, undisciplined, and in general counterproductive. The fact remained that the need to defend civilian areas from guerrilla incursions tied down over 50,000 troops. Therefore, in 1948 certain areas of the Peloponnese and the Epirus were allowed to form civilian home-guard units, usually trained by officers and noncommissioned officers detached from the regular army. The total number of armed civilians is unavailable. They appear to have functioned satisfactorily in the areas in which they lived, but were almost useless for anything but static defense.

### Footnotes

1. L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York, 1958), pp. 818-820.
2. W.H. McNeill, The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath (New York, 1957), p. 241.
3. Leo Heiman, "Guerrilla Warfare: An Analysis," Military Review, July 1963, p. 27.
4. F. Smothers et al., Report on the Greeks (New York, 1951), pp. 31-41, 152-154.
5. Ibid., p. 153.
6. David Galula, Counter Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York, 1964), pp. 18-19.
7. E.R. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946-49: A Case Study," Modern Guerrilla War, ed. F.M. Osanka (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 219.
8. McNeill, p. 201.
9. Smothers et al., pp. 167-169.
10. Galula, p. 19.
11. Wainhouse, p. 233.
12. Ibid., pp. 169-171.
13. Alexander Papagos, "Guerrilla Warfare," Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Osanka, p. 237.
14. The Art of War: From the Age of Napoleon to the Present Day (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 91.
15. Galula, p. 19.
16. Wainhouse, p. 223.
17. Galula, p. 19.

18. Galula, pp. 18-19.
19. Smothers et al., pp. 159-168. The quotation is from p. 159.
20. Papagos, p. 234.
21. McNeill, p. 196.
22. McNeill, p. 267.
23. McNeill, p. 197. D.G. Kousoulas gives a much larger estimate in The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939-1953 (Syracuse, 1954), p. 149.
24. Kousoulas, p. 177.
25. Ismay, Memoirs, p. 369.
26. McNeill, p. 198.
27. Galula, p. 74.
28. Smothers et al., pp. 41-43.
29. Kousoulas, p. 164; Wainhouse, p. 222.
30. Papagos, p. 236.
31. Smothers et al., pp. 34-39.
32. Kousoulas, p. 165.
33. Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York, 1951), p. 336.

### Bibliography

- Chandler, G. The Divided Land: Anglo Greek Tragedy. London, 1959.
- Galula, David. Counter Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York, 1964.
- The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay. New York, 1960.
- Kousoulas, D.G. The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939-1953. Syracuse, 1954.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party. New York, 1965.
- Leeper, R. When Greek Meets Greek. London, 1950.
- McNeill, W.H. The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath. New York, 1957.
- Myers, C.W. Greek Entanglement. London, 1955.
- Papagos, Alexander. "Guerrilla Warfare," Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. F.M. Osanka. New York: Free Press, 1962. pp. 228-241.
- Papandreou, G.A. The Third War. Athens, 1948.
- Sarafis, S. Greek Resistance Army: The Story of ELAS. London, 1951.
- Seton-Watson, Hugh. The East European Revolution. New York, 1951.
- Smothers, F. et al. Report on the Greeks. New York, 1948.
- Stavrianos, L.S. The Balkans Since 1453. New York, 1958.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity. Chicago, 1952.
- Taber, Robert. The War of the Flea. New York, 1965.
- Thayer, Charles W. Guerilla. New York, 1963.

Wainhouse, E.R. "Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946-49: A Case Study,"  
Modern Guerrilla War, ed. F.M. Osanka. New York: Free Press,  
1962. pp. 217-227.

Wolff, E.L. The Balkans in our Time. Cambridge, 1956.

Woodhouse, C.M. Apple of Discord. London, 1948.

Interview with Professor William McNeill, author of work cited  
above and former intelligence officer.

## Malaya, 1948-1960

by

Riley Sunderland

In suppressing the Communist insurrection of 1948-1960, the government of the Federation of Malaya, as it was called during most of the campaign, was finally able to isolate the Communist guerrillas from the actual and potential sources of their support. An idea of how this was done, and of the course of the campaign, must include an appreciation of the peoples and terrain of Malaya. First I must note that in writing of the episode I have excluded the island and city of Singapore. The Singapore base did give invaluable and essential logistic support to the government's armed forces, the people of Singapore were an intelligence source (through family and business ties), and there were also Communists among them. The campaign, however, was fought on the mainland.

In 1948, Malaya was inhabited by 2.4 million Malays, 1.9 million Chinese, a few hundred thousand East Indians, and a statistically insignificant but politically and economically powerful group of British subjects. Malaya was the homeland of the Malays. Reflecting this, land titles and posts in the Civil Service (with a few exceptions at the top, of which more later) were reserved to them. Here lay a Chinese grievance. The Malays were Muslim farming folk, or fishers, riverine rather than jungle dwellers. They were easygoing and appeared indolent to Western eyes. They seemed most unwilling to be obliged to compete with the Chinese in trade or government. That they were of a people with a tradition of violence, and Muslim, deserves to be kept in mind. The guerrilla leadership kept in mind that provoking the Malay community beyond a certain point might bring on reprisal massacres of the Chinese community.

The latter point is relevant because the Communist guerrillas, or terrorists, were 95% Chinese. The Chinese community as of 1948 was in Malaya, but not of it. Before the war it had



been largely self-policing through its families, clans, and secret societies. It had held aloof from the government and had been tacitly encouraged in this. This had its consequences, such as that in 1948 there were but 250 Chinese policemen in Malaya--from a community of almost 2,000,000.

The picture was complicated, and the background set for insurrection, by the squatters. So much land was not suitable for rice that Malaya in the 1940s was a food-deficit area. The situation became acute in World War II. To get food and to escape Japanese mistreatment, some 400,000 or 500,000 Chinese became squatters and set up their holdings on the jungle fringe. Here they were completely outside the structure of public administration. Indeed, in some areas, the Communist Party supplied what administration there was.

The land of Malaya in 1948 was 80% jungle. No point of importance was more than a few hours' walk from jungle cover. The soil of Malaya is fertile, and gardens can be quickly set up on cleared land. Most of the jungle is primary, and passage off-trail and off-road, though slow, is perfectly practicable. The jungle offered the possibility of sanctuary to the guerrillas.

The government of the Federation of Malaya was, as the name suggests, a federal one. In 1948 it had certain objective weaknesses. The police were 2,000 under strength. Many had been compromised by collaboration, others were simply inexperienced. The heart of the old pre-1941 government had been the elite Malayan Civil Service, some 250 graduates of the great British universities, mostly British subjects, and so carefully chosen they were locally known as "the heaven-born." Some had been killed in World War II, many would never shake off the effects of Japanese captivity. There was widespread malnutrition and tuberculosis among the population, while there was in 1948 as much common-law crime in a month as in a whole prewar year. Labor unrest was serious, and many unions were led by Communists (as demonstrated when their officers took their treasuries and fled to the jungle when the insurrection began).

### THE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION

#### Political and Social Antecedents

The change in overseas Chinese society that followed on migration was perhaps fundamental to the development of the guerrilla

movement. Much of the stability of Chinese society depended upon the authority of the old. In Malaya, a new world of many differences from mainland China, what the old knew and thought was heavily discounted. To the restless young Chinese came the Communists offering answers and also offering new ways of winning approval from the peer group. To many young Chinese, the Communist Party seemed to offer a way to rise quickly in the state and in society, in ways and at a pace of which their fathers had never dreamed. The attraction of something new, different, modern, and sophisticated was a powerful one, much more powerful, it may be suggested, than the abstractions of Marxist economics.

The Communist Party of Malaya was organized in the 1920s and underwent the schisms and vicissitudes of those days within the Communist movement. During the war, Southeast Asia Command sought to organize a guerrilla force among and from the Malayan Communist Party. Arms for 3,500 guerrillas, 1,500,000 pounds of supplies, and 510 instructional and liaison personnel from Force 136, a part of the British clandestine warfare organization, were airdropped to guerrillas who made no secret of their Communist affiliations. Added to what the guerrillas salvaged from the battlefields of the Malayan campaign, this made a most effective armory. Its effectiveness was increased by the instruction in jungle and guerrilla war given by Force 136.

There was a brief interregnum between the end of the war and British occupation of Malaya in which the Communists may have missed their chance to seize the country and offer a fait accompli. The British forced demobilization on them and they went through the motions of acquiescing. However, demobilized guerrillas enrolled and kept active in a veterans association, while in the jungle others kept intact the skeleton of a formidable guerrilla force. In the jungle there were training camps, workshops, depots, and schools, i.e., a workable system of bases for insurgency.

In the winter of 1947-1948, the economic position of Europe, and of course Britain, was very bad. The dollar earnings from Malayan tin and rubber played a part in what support the United Kingdom could then find. Early in 1948, there was a large Communist conference at Calcutta, attended by senior Party members from the USSR and Asia. There may well be a causal relationship between this and later happenings. Certainly some well-informed students believe so. In any event, that summer revolts flared all over Southeast Asia, and terror, e.g., assassinations, in Malaya reached such a pitch that the government had to arm itself with extraordinary powers by proclaiming an emergency.

### Political Structure

The geographic structure of the Malayan Communist Party somewhat resembled that of the Federation government, in that there was a committee for each state and colony and a central committee with Federation-wide powers. District committees shared the boundaries of the government's districts, while branch committees were in or near population centers. These four levels of committees were linked organizationally, in that the Central Committee was drawn from the membership of state committees, and so on down. Communication was a real problem, since the Party lacked radio links. The normal mode of communication was by courier. When penetrated by police intelligence (known as Special Branch in Malaya and so to be named hereinafter), the courier system was dangerously vulnerable. Its couriers could also be ambushed. To the Communists of that year the slowness of the system was its obvious flaw; they sought to compensate by decentralizing and letting the several committees retain considerable initiative in executing broad directives.

### Military Structure

The Party's armed forces from 1948 on were called by them the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). In form, they paralleled the political structure. That is, each state committee was also the command and staff of a regiment, while the Central Committee acted as the armed forces' high command. Regiments, however, more nearly resembled task forces than what the Westerner thinks of as a regiment, with its formal organization. The Malayan Communist regiment was a headquarters immediately over a variable number of independent platoons. Each platoon was in turn commanded by a district committee, in that its commander would also be the district committee chairman.

On almost all occasions, the Communist terrorist (CT) was uniformed as a Chinese soldier of the 20th Century. He wore a cloth cap with red star, Khaki shirt and breeches, and rolled leggings. The MRLA tried to give the impression of a smart, professional force. It was true that the guerrilla could take off his uniform to double as an assassin, but terror, food lifts, intelligence, reconnaissance, and security outpost duty tended to be, and in the beginning were, the work of specialists, outside the MRLA.

The strength figure for the MRLA in 1948 was more than 12,000.<sup>2</sup>

Logistical support for the MRLA was provided by the Min Chung Yuen Thong, commonly known in Malaya as the Min Yuen. These were the active sympathizers for the guerrillas among the outside population. They provided information on plans and movements of soldiers and police; food, cash, cloth, drugs, paper, ink, flashlights, plastic sheets; replacements and recruits. They also conducted propaganda. While they could and did extort, violence was left to the MRLA. The Min Yuen initially numbered more than 20,000.<sup>3</sup> If to this one adds the 12,000-plus of the MRLA, one can get an idea of the numerical aspects of the problem facing the 11 peace-strength infantry battalions and 10,000 police in Malaya in 1948.

One must also underscore the functional importance of the Min Yuen. The guerrillas could no more operate without them than an army could without its logistical base. Indeed, the basic guerrilla LOC was the paths taken by the food supply parties of the Min Yuen. This LOC was as vital as any in the world, and was also as vulnerable, once the soldiers and police had learned how to find and cut it.

#### Doctrine, Training, and Indoctrination

The MRLA sought to apply the teachings of Mao Tse-tung on guerrilla war to Malaya. Whether they were correct in trying to imitate him may be doubted, since the Communist rebellion was so closely identified with the Chinese alone, but that they did try cannot be questioned and explains their policies and procedures. Greatly summarized, Mao's doctrine of guerrilla war in the underdeveloped nations calls for the effort to be made in the countryside. The model of such a conflict has three stages. In the first, the guerrillas by ambush and terror seek to drive government personnel out of areas which they then convert into so-called liberated areas. In these they form organized forces, which in the second stage sally out to link up liberated areas. In the third stage large, conventionally organized forces operating from liberated areas fight regular large-scale battles with the government's forces and overthrow it. In 1948, the guerrillas thought that in some parts of the country they were ready to begin on the second stage, given their authority among the Chinese squatters and explicitly assuming that the British forces were no more able to operate in the jungle than they had been in 1941-1942.

The Malayan Communists planned to attack first a series of small targets, such as police stations, rubber plantations, and railway bridges. When they had destroyed these in an area, then they would build larger forces within that area and move on to bigger targets, including military camps. In their operations, they expected reconnaissance of the most painstaking sort to show them soft targets. If the target were too strong, they would break off action. Here was a major weakness, for as the insurrection went on, far too many Communist attacks were not pressed home, and soldiers and police learned that to meet an ambush by an immediate counterattack, or to attack on any contact, was the best tactic, for the guerrillas would almost always conclude their information had been faulty and retreat.

The guerrillas appreciated that success would take time and called such an insurrection, or a civil war fought in such a manner, "protracted conflict," saying that they sought it.

Training was given to members of the MRLA in jungle training camps. Until government pressure made itself felt, these were well-designed, well-built training centers hidden in the sheltering jungle. They had hutments, rifle ranges, and classrooms. Training followed a carefully thought-out schedule and provided all the skills necessary for jungle war. Political training was an integral and most important part of the curriculum. Following graduation from the training center, the guerrilla received continued political instruction in his unit. Self-criticism and group criticism were familiar features. A system of points for good and bad performances was taken with utmost seriousness. Discipline was strict and men were executed for serious infractions.

Within the Min Yuen, training and indoctrination proceeded within the party cell or organization group for the case in which there would be only one or a few Party members. In group study sessions, in home study, the Min Yuen poured over the Chinese Communist scriptures, and here too group and self-criticism was a normal feature.

The end product, as far as the MRLA was concerned, was a highly disciplined, well-trained, highly motivated individual, who was not easily replaced if he was killed or captured, or if his mental set changed and he defected.

## Logistics

Guerrilla logistics in Malaya should be seen in the light of the terrain and the geographic situation. To the north was Thailand, on either side the sea, and to the south was Singapore Island. Some money and a few recruits may have come north from Singapore, but the causeway and the strait were too easy to watch. Little if any aid seems to have been smuggled ashore. For one thing, the Royal Navy was present in strength; for another, the fisher-folk were largely Malay, with a built-in antipathy to anything the Chinese might attempt, and so ready to see and report. Thailand was non-Communist, while the sheer physical problem of smuggling anything down from Northern Vietnam or Communist China across Thailand seems to have been regarded as insoluble. As it happened, Malayan Communists could and did flee north across the border to shelter in the Thai jungles, and then slip back again, but this was a very different matter from drawing logistic support from Thailand. In practice, the Malayan Communists had to depend on what they could get from within Malaya, plus a trickle from Thailand and Singapore.

Initially, the MRLA and Min Yuen seem to have viewed their logistic problems with equanimity. The Malayan Communist Party was 95% Chinese and the Chinese diet of rice with some vegetables, fish, or meat lends itself well to guerrilla war. A woman's silk stocking will hold a week's supply of rice and be very easy to carry, in sharp contrast to the Western soldier's bulky rations. The Chinese squatters could supply rice in any desired quantity; vegetables and bits of meat were no problem. The rice was easy to transport and store. For weapons and ammunition, the guerrillas had their initial stocks, almost entirely of British manufacture, and confidently expected to seize more from soldiers and police as a result of successful ambushes and attacks. As noted above, provision of rice and other supplies was the task of the Min Yuen.

## OBJECTIVES

### Political

The formal objective was to set up a Malayan Peoples' Republic. Nominally, it would include all communities, i.e., peoples, in Malaya. In practice, given the racial composition of the

party, it would have been a Chinese government. The party was marked in practice by the most virulent racism, and anti-European and anti-Western slogans far antedated the Sino-Soviet split.

This racial bias was perceived in Malaya and was a real handicap to the Malayan Communist Party. Anti-Western slogans might be thought irrelevant to the Malay. However, Chinese clan-nishness, Chinese dietary habits, and Chinese religious practices too faithfully matched Muslim ideas about pig-eating infidels to let the Malay watch the growth of a militant Chinese faction or the establishment of a Chinese Malaya with any great equanimity.

### Military

The Malayan Communist guerrillas sought by raids and ambushes to drive out soldiers and police from a selected area and thus shatter public administration there. Initially, they believed that the British forces could not operate in the jungle and took it as given that the jungle would be a sanctuary for them. From it they would strike; into it they would retreat; and on its fringe they would build their forces until these could meet the British troops in open battle. In practice, this meant that raiding parties of guerrillas would attack police posts and rubber plantations while parties of assassins would kill individuals or families. At the beginning of the episode, they raided isolated villages and small towns and, overestimating their strength, attempted to hold the village of Pulai, in Kelantan. They set up a "liberated area," recruited the locals, dug trenches, and occupied the village for several weeks. On August 7, 1948, they were driven out by troops of the Malay Regiment with tactical air support. The attempt to hold ground was a rare episode, not repeated thereafter.

### Geographic

The basic geographic aim of the Malayan Communist Party was to dominate the countryside. It does not seem possible to say that they regarded any one part of Malaya as of more strategic importance than another. Where there were many Chinese squatters, where there were no police or local administration, there initially the guerrillas were strongest. Given the difficulty of cross-country transport of food, massing guerrillas was physically difficult, while the fact that the police and army could and did patrol

industriously within the jungle made it likely that any such concentration would be spotted. Even the massing of several hundred guerrillas was quite a feat, and this in turn limited the guerrillas' ability to select targets. In practice, as they recognized as early as the winter of 1948-1949, the British forces were more mobile than they were. This meant they could not yet attempt warfare and had to drop back on the scale of conflict to terror. The terrorist would seek easy targets.

## TECHNIQUES

### Military

In executing raids and ambushes, the Malayan guerrillas stressed the importance of the best intelligence and most careful reconnaissance. For both they made extensive use of Min Yuen personnel. These were expected to give the raw data on troop and police movements and deployment, fortifications, fields of fire, personalities, unit identifications, and so on. Since time was not a constraint, the most painstaking care went into these tasks. When contact had been made, the guerrillas would, if the situation indicated, make use of battle drills that they had been taught in 1944-1945 by SEAC's instructors. Their marksmanship was not good.

Their great advantage in the period of about 1948-1952 lay in their jungle craft. The guerrilla was more lightly equipped than the soldier and could outrun him. The soldier was weighted down, especially by his rations, and the guerrilla would seem to disappear. Moreover, the guerrilla once out of sight knew all the tricks of hiding his tracks that the American Indian had known, and used them. For his part, the soldier in the years 1948-1952 would simply stare at the ground without seeing the telltale marks. Or, if the terrain permitted, instead of running for any distance, the guerrilla might simply take cover in the jungle and let the soldier walk on past.

The guerrillas also developed some of the abilities of wild game. In the early days, soldiers in the jungle on patrol would smoke, talk, use hair oil, and wash with soap. The guerrillas for their part would boast that they could tell Gurkhas from British by the scent of their tobacco. Sound would carry far in the jungle. Soap film drifting downstream would tell its own story.



All this together meant that the guerrilla of 1948-1952 would, as the press loved to put it, simply disappear into the jungle. The soldiers, for their part, by sweeping the jungle, would keep the guerrillas from massing or moving freely, but the sweep was no counter to terrorism or subversion.

### Political Warfare\*

This very important branch of activity in isolating the Communists was handled by a small but carefully selected Psychological Warfare (PW) section, whose aim was to use planned propaganda in order to reduce the enemy's will to fight. PW was regarded as an offensive support weapon (like artillery, air support, engineers, etc.) and used as such--both strategically and tactically. Its main strategic tasks were to foment distrust in the Malayan Communist Party leadership, to instill lack of faith in victory, and above all to induce surrenders. The "surrender rate" was the key to accurate intelligence and consequently to successful ambushes and other operations in the jungle. It was found that there was a direct relationship between the monthly surrender rate and the monthly rate of killing terrorists.

In conducting psychological warfare against the enemy (similar operations to ensure the active support of the people were equally important and are described below), it was found best to pick a main theme, a truthful and credible one, and to stick to it. As an example of this, in 1955 when the first general election was planned, it was decided to pump into the jungle by leaflet, by rumors, and by voice aircraft, the theme written in a letter by a surrendered CT to his friends in the North Pahang Regional Base: "You cannot expect the people to support the [Communist] armed struggle when they are being given what they want by constitutional means." This theme, that independence for Malaya was being granted by the British and not by the so-called Communist "liberators" and that Tunku Abdul Rahman had come to power after elections that were not a "British trick," was steadily borne in on the Communist guerrillas by every possible means until their will to fight was finally broken.

On the tactical side, PW was carefully tuned in to the detailed requirements of the particular tactical operation concerned. Repeated personal messages in the voices of their friends to the Branch or District leaders still in the jungle, telling them that the fight was hopeless, that the friends speaking had been fairly treated and reunited with their loved ones, sometimes

---

\*This subsection has been contributed by General the Lord Bourne, GCB, CBE, CMG.

had a quick effect. Pictures of happy family reunions and promises of money rewards for bringing an automatic gun or a friend out of the jungle gradually wore down the morale of the toughest of the terrorists. In one district more than 40 CTs were persuaded to surrender in a period of eight months, although there were no troops at all in the area.

In short, political warfare played a very important part in reducing the guerrilla's will to fight. It was second only to the main weapons of food denial and the constant fear of ambush by well-trained soldiers. It was an essential weapon, and a great deal cheaper than shooting.

### Terrorism

Some idea of the scale of terrorist activity is given by the figures in the Annual Report of the Federation of Malaya for 1956. To December 31, 1955, over a time-span of 90 months, a monthly average of 26.8 civilians were killed and 14.9 wounded by the guerrillas. From a monthly average of 55 in the last half of 1950, the worst period, the figures fell sharply in the last six months of 1952 and first half-year of 1953, to 16.7 and 6.2 respectively. In the last six months of 1956 the monthly average of civilians killed was 2.

There are a number of factors involved here. The Malayan Communists gave the impression of being puzzled by the correct use of terror as a technique. They sought popular support and depended heavily upon the Chinese community. If they killed civilians, and in conformity with their earlier practice this included the torture and mutilation of women and children, would they not lose this support? They seem to have decided they would lose it and so their killing probably became highly selective; without access to Special Branch records, one cannot know.

A case in point are the nurses brought in to Malaya in the mid-1950s by the government. These women in their little Ford ambulances drove all over the countryside ministering to the Chinese community. They were absolutely defenseless, yet none was ever harmed. Another factor in the Communist dilemma was the possible reaction of the Malay community. On occasion, early in the insurrection, Malays had suffered atrocity, and Malay reprisals on the nearest Chinese had been immediate and savage. The guerrillas had strong local roots in the Chinese community and it was not impossible that such reprisals would fall on their families and friends.

Whatever the exact nature of the guerrillas' reasoning, on October 1, 1951, and in conformity with a Cominform directive the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party issued a directive that the Party would shift from terrorism to subversion. The directive indicates what had previously been the practice: "... burning new villages, attacking public utilities, derailing trains, throwing grenades in crowds, wounding innocent by-standers, and burning churches and ambulances." They were now to be avoided.<sup>4</sup> Corpses were not to be mutilated nor their gold teeth extracted. Given the fact that this directive had to be hand-carried by courier over Malaya, some time lag in its implementation is understandable. The civilian casualty rate in the first six months of 1952 shows little change from the preceding six months, 40.5 as against 42, but then it drops to 16.7.

It must be emphasized that the party directive noted above did not exist in a vacuum. The guerrillas were under severe military and police pressure, and the resettlement program was putting 500,000 squatters and 650,000 tappers and miners under police protection. It was therefore not as easy, physically, to kill as it had been. Even so, there remains the conclusion that the use of terror had not been profitable, for the October 1 directive was issued when the Communists were still killing civilians at the rate of 40 a month.

When terror was used as a technique, some targets do seem classifiable. The British planter and his family, the mining superintendent and his family, were obvious targets, and, indeed, were explicitly excluded from the October 1 directive. They were attacked as part of the process of taking over the countryside. By the nature of their occupation, rubber tappers were exposed. The resemblance of guerrilla tactics and banditry had been noted, and so tappers who would not submit to extortion for the Party were killed, families included. The same pressures were applied to wealthy Chinese, to Chinese shopkeepers, and so on. These were old, familiar secret-society techniques now being used for the good of the Party. The informer, the unsympathetic, were also targets.

Then there were the attempts to paralyze the economic life of the countryside, by derailing or firing on trains, holding up buses and killing their passengers, destroying rubber trees, and blowing up water pipes, electric lines, etc. Destruction of rubber trees would seem a method to which Malaya was terribly vulnerable. The guerrillas tried it and stopped. One can only assume they feared loss of popular support, i.e., food, drugs, information, recruits.

## SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS

### Local

The guerrilla movement in Malaya was 95% Chinese. A few Indians and a few Malays took part, presumably being Party members or sympathizers, or having had bandit ties. But the movement may be described as Chinese. It is not far-fetched to say that a few British civil servants, Gurkha, British, and Malayan soldiers, Malayan police and civil servants, had to deal with a Chinese insurrection. Its supporters were to be found in all classes of the Chinese community, but the key element was the 500,000 Chinese squatters living in the jungle fringe. From the beginning of the insurrection this fact was appreciated by the Federation government.

It must not be thought that the Chinese community was united in support of the guerrillas. A number of the secret societies were anti-Communist and could supply leadership in fighting for the community's allegiance. There was also widespread anti-Communist sentiment within the Chinese community. In February 1949, eight months after the Emergency began, this led to the founding of the Malayan Chinese Association. Some observers thought this was the first organization that could fairly claim to speak for the community. By mid-1949 it had about 50,000 members; by year's end, 100,000. The Communists tried to stop its early growth by terror, but failed.

### The Nature of Support

This has been indicated above; food and information were the critical items.

### Relation of Events to Support

Two events had a marked effect on the course of the insurrection. That only two can be so regarded will not seem puzzling if one reflects that the Emergency was not marked by dramatic clashes, but was rather a prolonged series of small episodes--of "contacts" in which soldiers or police acted first, and of "incidents" that the guerrillas precipitated. The first

of these events is perhaps two intimately linked happenings, the Communist victory in China in late 1949 and British recognition of Communist China in January 1950. Despite the Communist victories in China, surrenders by Communist guerrillas in Malaya were running at a good rate, with 66 such in December 1949, well above the average for the period of 28.7. Then came recognition of Communist China, and surrenders fell from 66 in December to 5 the next July, with the average for the intervening six-month period 7.5 a month. Meanwhile, the number of guerrilla-caused incidents nearly tripled. In the later opinion of the Federation government, not only were the guerrillas encouraged, but a large part of the Chinese community decided it had better, in the Federation's phrase, "insure" itself with the guerrillas lest its property and families in China suffer at the hands of the Communist government there.

The Briggs Plan of resettlement and effective command and control, and the dynamic leadership of Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, were needed to restore guerrilla surrenders to the pre-recognition rate; these surrenders would seem a good indication of guerrilla morale and popular support for the guerrillas.

The second episode was the 1953 peace in Vietnam. Following on the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, this might have been thought a blow to the Federation government. On the contrary, psychological warfare seized on the event to point out that since there was peace in Vietnam no Chinese or Communist armies would be marching south to Malaya. The surrender rate went from 24.8 the previous year to 32.5, and police and army casualties were almost cut in half.

#### Outside Support

No direct outside support, in arms or personnel, is known to have come to the Malayan guerrillas. To write this is not to exclude the occasional Party courier from People's China, but in the long run paper messages, however well phrased, are not support. Neither the Soviet Union nor China helped the guerrillas; the space-time problem may have been insoluble, while Maoist doctrine does not regard such support as essential.

There was a little support for the guerrillas from within the British Commonwealth. This was not expressed in arms, supplies, or volunteers but rather in sporadic and ineffective attempts to spread alarm and despondency, to lower morale, and to rouse public

opinion to demand an end to the use of British and Dominion armed forces in Malaya. Within Britain, anonymous telephone calls harassed the wives of senior officers.<sup>5</sup> Some sections of the London press combined criticism with defeatism. Academic figures also denounced the conduct of antiguerrilla operations in Malaya and viewed the future with deep alarm--for example, Victor Purcell, in his Malaya: Communist or Free, published in 1954.

### THE COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

In beginning consideration of the counterinsurgent response it may be useful to look once again at the nature of the guerrilla movement in Malaya. It can be seen as a state of mind whose intensity, and not any statistics, is the real measure of the strength of the movement. There were three great categories of membership: the full-time uniformed guerrillas, the part-time Min Yuen, and a large number of sympathizers. These last would give money, food, and information, with more or less conviction. If their enthusiasm cooled, and if it was safe to do so, they might cut their contribution or even report the collector to the Special Branch. The Min Yuen member might become a double agent. The terrorist might defect, or become a double agent. On Home Guard duty, the wavering sympathizer might shoot to kill. If smuggling out food, he might wink at the inspector, and end up as a double agent. No good figures could be kept of the whole process, but guerrilla surrenders, guerrillas killed, and the drop in incidents would tell the story.

Measures that cut guerrillas from local support in Malaya may be divided into two classes: measures which had the unintended effect of isolating the guerrillas, and those taken with that end in view. The element of personal judgment in the grouping of items into the first class is apparent. The second class reflect the steady growth of knowledge and sophistication among those controlling and directing the counterinsurgent effort, over and above the firm grasp of some basic principles that existed from the very beginning of the Emergency.

### Measures with Unintended Result

First among these, and fundamental in importance, was the fact that the Commonwealth forces in Malaya were combat effective in the jungle. In large part, this combat effectiveness came from

their being mobile in the jungle and in no sense road-bound. This they owed to the routine use of air supply. Developed in Burma in World War II as a means of countering the Japanese tactics of encirclement, ambush, and roadblocks, air supply gave troops using it in the jungle an independence of the road net that surprised their Communist adversaries. Moreover, it greatly reduced the possibility of the latter's ambushing their opponents, for it is difficult to ambush troops who normally move off-trail and off-road.

Operating in the jungle throughout the year, patrolling and sweeping it by day, ambushing by night, the military made it impossible for the guerrillas to set up a liberated area anywhere within Malaya. Since the guerrillas could not set up a liberated area, in turn they could not appear as probable winners to enough people to set the tides of popular support moving toward them. In their most powerful years they could attract and command a good deal of support, but they could never get the band wagon rolling. Or, put in terms of their own doctrine, they could not maintain their operations at any level higher than the first stage.

Second among measures that had the unintended effect of isolating the guerrillas may be listed those aimed at rounding-up both guerrillas and sympathizers. In the early days of the Emergency the techniques of registration, detention, and cordon and search were extensively used to round up guerrillas and sympathizers as a thing too obviously good in itself to need further defense. However, in retrospect it may be suggested that one result was seriously to handicap the Min Yuen and thereby interfere with the functioning of the mechanism that was to link the guerrilla to his sources of support among the people.

Registration was begun in September 1948 and aimed to give each individual over the age of 12 a card bearing his or her photograph, thumbprint, registration number, name, sex, age, race, language, birthplace, occupation, permanent address, father's birthplace, and food ration card number (it will be recalled that food was very scarce in Malaya in the early postwar years, and so was rationed). The Communists appreciated the importance of this step and confiscated cards by the tens of thousands.

Despite this Communist reaction, completion of registration by the end of March 1949 was most helpful to soldiers and police. It was then possible to get an idea of who belonged in any given area and who did not. The most effective means of checking this was cordon and search, and the next step was detention. Cordon and search meant that with speed, surprise, and secrecy, an appropriate operational area was cordoned off by troops and police.

Its inhabitants were then checked off one by one to make sure they could be accounted for. One variation on this procedure was to pass the locals before a screened booth in which sat a police informer. He or she would then tick off individuals for further action.

This further action was most probably detention. Declaring a state of emergency in June 1948 empowered the Federation government to order anyone to be detained without trial for up to one year. By the end of 1948, 5,097 had been so removed. Treatment in the detention camps aimed at converting the detainees into loyal and active supporters of government. Later informed opinion thought the venture a success, noting that some of the camps even had associations of graduates.<sup>6</sup> The great drawback to this and other measures was cost. In the early years of the Emergency, until the Korean War sent up the price of tin, sheer lack of money to take measures was a real constraint.

Founding of the Malayan Chinese Association, mentioned above, probably should be classed among measures consciously intended to separate the guerrillas from the people. Anything that offered rival leadership to the Malayan Communist Party, anything that tended to end the isolation of the Chinese from other communities, acted to cut the guerrillas from the people. This organization was sufficiently sophisticated in concept and in action to suggest that its organizers saw it as a move toward isolating the guerrilla. It offered a legal, peaceful avenue for the expression of Chinese wishes and the redress of Chinese grievances.

#### Measures with Intended Results

The first place among measures taken with the intended result of isolating the guerrilla, because of its fundamental importance as a technique in affecting the course of the Emergency is resettlement of Chinese squatters, together with the regrouping of plantation and mine labor. As noted above, the principal source of support for the guerrillas in food, information, and recruits was the 500,000 Chinese squatters. Living in their own small villages along the jungle's edge, they were outside the public administration of Malaya. Even assuming the language barrier could somehow have been broken, there were still no police at hand to receive information, to observe, or to protect. Absent too were all the functionaries, all the services, that make up public administration, and which it would be tedious to list. The squatters were a society, but independent of Malaya. This was an opportunity which the guerrillas exploited.



The functional relationship of the squatters to the guerrillas was appreciated as the Emergency was being declared. As early as September 1948 resettling the squatters into villages that could be policed and administered had been recommended to the several Malayan states, but nothing was done until 1950. The delay is regarded by one student as having resulted from simple unwillingness of the Federation government to underwrite resettlement. The several Malay states did not have the money; the Federation government's proposals were highly unrealistic. Their justification, that land title was involved, and that land was a state matter, in retrospect shows a curious perspective.

By March 1950 the worsening of the Emergency since the decision to recognize Communist China had brought a new feeling of urgency and a new willingness to take bold measures. Among these was the decision to bring a retired general officer, Sir Harold Briggs, to Malaya to take over the new post of Director of Operations (as a civilian, in order to meet what then seemed constitutional requirements). As noted above, resettlement was an old idea, as was also that of a network of committees to direct the antiguerrilla effort. Briggs quickly combined the two into what was at once dubbed "The Briggs Plan," but it is resettlement that concerns us here.

An official publication of the Federation of Malaya wrote that the Briggs Plan had four aims: (1) to dominate the populated areas and to build up a feeling of complete security which would in time result in a steady and increasing flow of information from all sources; (2) to break up the Communist organization within the populated areas; (3) to isolate the bandits from their food and supply organizations in the populated areas; and (4) to destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack the security forces on their own grounds.

In resettling, the squatters would be placed in new villages. These would be within barbed-wire fences to control traffic, surrounded by a clear circle that would be flood-lit at night, and guarded by police posts. It must be emphasized that these were in no sense defended villages as known in Vietnam. The wire was a fence, intended only to force the guerrillas into an observable effort to pass it. The police force would control traffic, watch the fence, and give the alarm if there were a major guerrilla effort. The safeguard against that major guerrilla effort was the continual aggressive patrolling of the army within the jungle to spot and break up concentrations, the nightly army and police ambushes along trails that led to the villages, and the Special Branch intelligence to give early warning of any such guerrilla plans.

Money for resettlement was made easier to find by the Korean War. Beginning in June 1950 it raised the price of tin. Malaya, in large part, finances itself by export duties on tin. Revenues therefore increased sharply, and the program could be carried out without any need for deficit financing; indeed, in those years the Federation had a budgetary surplus.

In carrying out the program, the Federation was careful to respect the needs of the settlers. First may be mentioned land provision. Land was bought at market prices, of from \$200 to \$330 an acre, and resold to the settler for \$4 to \$5 an acre. Each settler thus received a plot of 1/6 acre within the new village for his house and garden, and a three-acre farm within a two-mile walk. He received aluminum roofing for the new house, about \$20 in cash, and a subsistence allowance for six months.

In most cases, notice was given, but if necessary the physical movement of the settlers was conducted as a military operation, with surprise and speed. Medical and administrative teams were present. What could not be moved by truck was appraised and paid for on the spot. Police screened everyone, as a first step toward weeding out the Min Yuen. The soldiers showed every kindness, by carrying babies and parcels, helping the old, and providing gallons of tea.

Once the village was set up, then General Briggs had what was called an "after care" program, for it must be recalled that the goal was a viable village complete with the amenities. The "after care" program supplied schools, clinics, community centers, Boy Scouts, agricultural agents, and similar services. In all, there were 480 new villages.<sup>8</sup>

The central administrative figure was the resettlement officer. The original plan was to provide a Chinese-speaking Britisher with a Chinese assistant. As soon as the latter was qualified, he was to take over. Even though the Forestry, Game, and Mine and Survey Departments of the Federation almost closed down, not enough such Britishers could be provided. However, one result of the Communist take-over in China was to drive out numbers of British missionaries. Many of these in turn offered to act as resettlement officers. Malayan Chinese assistants were thought to be, in many cases, members of anti-Communist secret societies.

Any given new village was thought a success when its people began to inform on the guerrillas.

Success for the program would be found in the opportunity it would give to cut the movement of food, recruits, and information

from the villagers to the guerrillas. Traffic had to pass through the gates, and here was the chance to search people, vehicles, and packages. At night, the fences could be watched and patrolled. Paths leading to the villages, which were the guerrilla LOCs were ambushed.

As regards rubber estate and mine personnel, these were in almost all cases already provided with estate housing, so that what was done was in most cases to provide fences, floodlights, and police, and in some cases actually regroup the people. Once this was done, the remarks above apply.

The cost of the resettlement program was:

1950	\$ 2,310,000
1951	11,220,000
1952	6,270,000

Federation-wide food control accompanied resettlement. Foods, drugs, and publication supplies (e.g., paper and inks) were declared restricted articles. They could not be moved by truck between 7 P.M. and 6 A.M. Trucks en route could not stop on the road, could not depart from their courses, could only unload at their destinations. Manifests had to be carried. Private cars could be stopped and inspected. Buses, cars, and trucks could be checked at control points and had to undergo surprise spot checks.

By 1952, resettlement and food control were combined into an operational concept which in turn led to the food-denial operation, perhaps the most effective single operational concept of the Malayan Emergency.

After weeks of secret planning and rehearsals, and without previous warning, a selected area would be declared a food-denial area. Soldiers would surround the area with roving patrols, ambushes, and check points. The rice ration would be cut, and teams of police and administrators would move from house to house searching for supplies of rice. When found, all above the allowable stock would be purchased on the spot. All people entering or leaving the village would be searched by male or female search personnel as required. The guerrillas would be ingenious in their devices; the police had to be equally perceptive and ingenious. Attempts at smuggling drew jail sentences.

Central cooking of rice, introduced in the mid-1950s, was a great improvement in food denial. It exploited the fact that

cooked rice quickly spoils in jungle heat. Consequently, kitchens were set up in the food-denial area in which all rice was cooked for all people and from which rations had to be drawn. In one operation, 26,000 meals a day were so provided.

The guerrillas' counter to this was to hope that their rations would see them through. In general, they seemed able to stock no more than six to eight weeks' supply. When this was gone, they had to run increasingly desperate risks to get rice and were then most vulnerable to ambush. Jungle gardens were no answer because they could easily be spotted from the air and were then either defoliated by chemical means or exploited as ambush bait.

An example of the food-denial operation was APOLLO, whose mission was to destroy the guerrilla organization in the Kuala Lipis west district. Lasting from June 1954 to January 1955, it required a battalion of infantry, 18 police area security units (a platoon each), several groups of reformed guerrillas (two or three more platoons), and some Home Guards. By December 31, 1954, there were 32 kills and 31 surrenders. In early 1955 the guerrillas were judged to have been eliminated, and all restrictions on civilian life were ended, i.e., Kuala Lipis was declared a "white area."

Describing the device of the "white area" may serve as a transition to the topic of psychological warfare. If a geographic entity showed a steadily dropping level of guerrilla incidents that gave promise of approaching the nuisance level, the Federation government might tell its people that if there were no incidents, restrictions on the movement of people and goods, such as curfews, would be removed and kept off so long as this incident-free state was maintained. One way for the inhabitants of an area to keep their neighborhood incident-free was by reporting unusual events and suspicious people to the police, and by the mid-1950s the people of Malaya were well aware of this. Consequently proclamation and later maintenance of a "white area" would demonstrate that in it the guerrillas had been isolated from the people and could no longer shelter among them. Deprived of food, information, and security, they were in a hopeless position that could only be resolved by flight, surrender, or death. The last, it may be surmised, would result from information given by a defector, by one of the people of the area, or in an ambush as the guerrilla desperately sought food. By the late 1950s, area after area of Malaya was being proclaimed "white."

Propaganda activity to separate the guerrilla from the people began in Malaya almost immediately after the Emergency was declared. It will be remembered this was June 1948, and with war-time experience the importance of public relations and psychological warfare was still fresh in the minds of senior personnel within the Federation. Interestingly, the term psychological warfare was not used until 1950. Until that date, the term was public relations.

Initially, in 1948, the physical dimensions of the effort were modest. In the last six months of 1948, 30,000,000 leaflets and 540,000 copies of simple, vernacular newspapers were distributed, in a nation of some 4,000,000. Twelve public-address trucks were used. In the years 1948-1950, experience led to a distinction between public relations, directed at the people, and psychological warfare, directed at the guerrilla. It is primarily with the former that this paper is concerned.

The mechanical devices used in public relations stayed the same through the years, but the scale broadened. Initially, there were but 12 public-address trucks for the whole Federation. By 1951, there were 63, one for each governmental district, and in 1953 there were 90. They were then estimated to be reaching 1,000,000 people a month. Radios were put into outlying villages in 1951, some 500 of them. By December 1953 there were 946, with an estimated 97% always operable.

The publication program had come a long way by 1953 from the half million or so newspapers of 1948. There was now a Tamil weekly (for the South Indians), a Malay weekly, and two Chinese monthlies, over and above booklets and leaflets. These publications went to 105,361 addresses. Here then were ample means for telling the people of Malaya. What they were told was something else, and of fundamental importance.

Several themes may be seen in the words and acts of the Federation of Malaya and of the government of the United Kingdom, though without access to official records one cannot know how much is a pattern that is clearer in retrospect than it was at the time. These themes are independence, progress, and victory. Together they were a potent message and with daily demonstration were able to outdo Communist propaganda, thus removing popular support from the guerrillas.

The steps toward independence, each highly publicized, may be quickly listed in chronological order:

March 1951--Each of the 11 departments of government was placed under a responsible minister, a member of the Legislative Council.

February 1952--On becoming High Commissioner and Director of Operations, Field Marshal Sir Gerald W.R. Templer proclaimed that in due course Malaya would become a self-governing nation, with a common citizenship (i.e., for both Malays and Chinese).

May 1952--Elected village councils were introduced. Civil service posts were opened to Chinese.

September 1952--1,100,000 Chinese were given full citizenship.

April 1954--An elected Legislative Council was announced.

December 1954--Lord Bourne, as Director of Operations, introduced Malay, Chinese, and Malayan leaders as members of State and District War Executive Committees. Leading politicians were also placed on the Director of Operations' Committee (at the top of the organizational pyramid).

July 1955--The first general election with universal franchise was held.

November 1955--It was announced that Emergency at the current level was no bar to independence.

January/February 1956--London conference on transfer of power was held.

August 1957--Malaya independence was proclaimed.

These successive steps toward independence, together with the pressure of military and police measures, resettlement, and similar measures, had their effect on the Malayan Communist Party, which found its propaganda being steadily undercut. Consequently, in June 1955 it offered to negotiate a settlement. The offer was refused. In September 1955, the government offered an amnesty to surrendering Communists. The offer was markedly unsuccessful, but three months later, in December, the Communists again sought talks. The government of Malaya, then under Tunku Abdul Rahman (and note that independence had been promised the month before), would not amnesty common-law crimes, and in effect demanded

unconditional surrender. The government would not negotiate its terms, and the talks, held at Baling and involving the Communist leader Chin Peng, lasted only two days.

There was also steady activity in the field of social reform, introducing into Malaya the social gains which the working class in Europe and North America had won long before: rates, terms, and contracts of money-lending were controlled; the government undertook to provide land for Indian farm laborers; the number of cooperatives jumped from 18 in January 1951 to 174 in May of 1952; hours of shop labor were controlled; employment exchanges were opened; water was piped to Malay villages, as part of a vast irrigation and reclamation scheme; labor unions grew rapidly with government favor and encouragement.

In the field of government itself, careers in civil service were opened to clever people who might not have university degrees. Several dozen young Malaysians were posted to Sandhurst. Other young Malaysians were seconded to British legations and embassies as the start of a foreign service. Careers thus were opened to talent.

Behind this bustle of activity must be imagined the patient diplomacy of senior British and Malay officers, civil and military, persuading the sultans and their chief ministers, persuading the great Chinese merchants, smoothing over rough spots, coping with the inevitable emergencies, and as it were oiling the gears of progress.

Always after 1952 they could point to a third theme beyond independence and progress, and this was victory. In the Emergency there were no battles, but rather a steady succession of small-unit encounters, and these recorded a steady wearing down of the guerrillas. This wearing down must be taken as the result of the efforts to cut local support.

#### ADEQUACY OF GENERAL AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY

##### General Machinery

At the beginning of the Emergency there was on hand in Malaya the overall structure of government. There were the departments of government, the Malay states, etc., but there were grave weaknesses.

Because of the recent Japanese occupation an appreciable number of civil servants had been killed or made invalids and had not been replaced. Many departments were under establishment strength. As noted before, the state of the police was especially bad. They were 2,000 understrength and had only a few hundred men who spoke Chinese. There was a cleavage between civil servants who had left to continue the fight and others who had stayed and suffered.

The Federation government of 1948 was a new structure. Its organization had not yet shaken down. No one quite knew how the constitution would operate.

Organization to conduct counterinsurgency was inadequate. Initially, general charge of matters relating to the Emergency was given to a senior civil servant, the Chief Secretary of the Federation. Conduct of operations was nominally entrusted to the Commissioner of Police, W.N. Grey. Mr. Grey had been Commissioner of Police in Palestine when it was under British mandate and had had experience in guerrilla war. It seems to have been thought that he would give a lead to the military and show them what to do and how to do it.

In practice, this vague organization with undefined powers did not yield results. Coordination of effort between police and military was absent. Grey could not give orders to the military when their support was needed; the military did not get intelligence from the police. Thanks to the organizational habits of the English-speaking peoples, a pyramid of committees with military, police, and civil membership sprang up but with no procedure, no chain of command, no organizational relationship. They and the direction of the counterinsurgency just floundered until the arrival of General Briggs in April 1950 and the institution of the Briggs Plan.

#### Local Administrative Machinery

As noted above, the 500,000 Chinese squatters were outside administration. Once they had been grouped into the 480 new villages, they and the rest of Malaya were squarely under an effective, disciplined, honest, and responsive local administration, with all that it implies.



### Control and Direction after Briggs and Templer

Briggs introduced the distinctive system of War Executive Committees. At every level of government, from the Federation down to the lowest police unit, there was an executive committee of police, military, and civil official, with the civilian in the chair. The committee was supported by an operations room (comparable to the familiar S2/S3 setup) and gave orders, actual operational orders, sometimes in regular 5-paragraph form, to all military and police within its boundaries.

At the Federation level, the highest level, was the Director of Operations' Committee (called the Emergency Operations Council when Tunku Abdul Rahman became its chairman), which issued twice-yearly directives. Conduct of operations was very largely in the hands of the State and District War Executive Committee (DWEG). The State Committee (Malay chief minister, infantry brigadier, British adviser, senior police officer, State Secretary for Chinese Affairs, and so forth) would lay down directives. Day-to-day work was done by the DWEG. This would be the district officer--that is, the senior civil servant of each of the 63 districts into which Malaya was divided--the senior police officer of what was locally called a police circle, and the senior soldier (a battalion commander sometimes, perhaps his adjutant, perhaps a company commander; normally, a battalion covered several districts). These three ran the food-denial operations, proposed and executed civic action projects, did the work of the Emergency. Their operations room fulfilled the functions of a battalion headquarters in combat and also provided a meeting place for civil and military, police and battalion staff.

At the lowest level of all, the company commander put his CP next to the police station, and with the police ran a joint operations room.

Though Briggs set up the system, it did not work with full efficiency until Templer took over. Briggs was only Director of Operations and did not have the power to touch the internal organization of either army or police, to say nothing of the several departments of government. Templer took over as both High Commissioner and Director of Operations, and so there was no departmental playing-off of military against civil. The posts were split again under his successors but by then lessons had been learned and habits formed. Templer also enjoyed the explicit full support of the then new Churchill Cabinet, so that personnel and equipment came pouring out in a flood his predecessors could only wish for.

### The Police

As noted, when the Emergency began the police were undermanned and lacked vital language skills. Their importance was recognized at once, and their numbers (quality was another matter) increased at once. Special constables were recruited for point defense on mines and plantations, and auxiliary police were recruited as part-time volunteers to supplement the efforts of the professionals. When Templer took over, he began a most rigorous training program to turn the police into an elite professional force. This in turn made possible a sharp drop in the numbers of the police: (data as of 31 December)

	<u>Regular</u>	<u>Auxiliary</u>	<u>Specials</u>
1948	16,459	16,966	28,719
1949	17,871	46,673	30,000
1950	16,040	68,172	34,053
1951	26,154	99,000	39,870
1952	27,729	3,041	41,312
1953	26,033	-	32,481
* * *			
1956	19,971	-	24,018

It should be noted that as of 1951, only 5,000 regular police were on full-time counterinsurgent duty. This figure slowly decreased thereafter.

The military, therefore, did not have to act as police. On the contrary, in 1949 there were formed 235 police jungle squads. They were volunteers from all races and communities, both regular police and special constables. Each squad was in effect a rifle platoon, armed as such. They performed normal infantry missions of jungle war. An expedient, they decreased in numbers with the increasing mastery of police and army over the guerrillas.

As important as the provision of an adequate number of professionally qualified police was a division of function between military and police that was not merely workable but also a positive contribution toward isolating the guerrilla. This was, first, the decision that intelligence was to be the sole responsibility of the Police Special Branch and, second, the decision that the police were primarily responsible for controlling the movement of people and goods.

The first decision meant that though troops would of course continue to gather information, its processing into intelligence was the responsibility of the police, who were also solely responsible for its gathering by clandestine means. The second decision meant that physically cutting the links between the people and the guerrillas fell in larger measure on the police. Not only would Special Branch identify the links, but the police were primarily responsible for watching the gates of new villages, checking people and parcels, spot checks of vehicles, routine traffic checks, and the other myriad details of controlling the movement of people and goods. In the event of a food-denial operation, when these procedures were carried out with the most ingenious and complete thoroughness, the police effort would be reinforced by soldiers detailed for that purpose, but it would remain a police effort.

It should be noted that the two police missions described above were mutually supporting. Checking the movement of goods and people supplied information on the guerrillas; Special Branch intelligence made it easier to perform these checks.<sup>9</sup>

#### Determination as Related to Indoctrination

Battalions posted to Malaya, after the haste of the early days, were put through instruction in desired behavior. They were instructed in local customs, and the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the people was thoroughly stressed. One battalion commander told the writer that when on one occasion one of his men got into a fight with a Chinese villager, his mates had apologized to the villager, given him a cash collection, and beaten up the offender, all before the matter reached the commander's desk. It should also be noted that the Malay soldier saw himself as defending his country and people, that the Gurkha was a long-term professional, and that the British soldier who had been sent to Malaya gave the impression of enjoying jungle service as a welcome change from army routine.

Troop morale was also sustained by professional competence. When the Emergency began in 1948 it was possible to commit battalions with recent experience of jungle war in Burma. Thereafter, both unit and individual training were conducted for all units and for key personnel at the Jungle Warfare Training Center at Kota Tinggi. With the steady growth of the Malay Regiment, British officers and noncommissioned officers were given thorough

and intensive language courses before they joined their units.<sup>10</sup> The combat effectiveness displayed by the Commonwealth forces against the Communist terrorists would indicate that this training accomplished its mission.

### Moral and Ethical Attitudes

The government forces in Malaya were at great pains to be able to contrast their moral and ethical attitudes to those of the Communists. Torture was unknown. Teams of Surrendered Enemy Personnel were formed to tour the villages and put on skits mocking the Communists. Since the latter told their people they would be tortured if they surrendered this had a most salutary effect on the surrender rate and also undermined the credibility of the Communist leadership.

In their dealings with the several communities of Malaya the soldiers and police were carefully controlled. Anything confiscated was paid for at once. Any searching of women was done privately, by women. No captured guerrilla was executed save for common-law crimes and then after trial by jury. Executions in fact were rare, and no surrendered guerrilla, whatever his past, was executed. The government made it easy to surrender, hard to fight.

Government, soldiers, and police were honest. While graft and corruption may be assumed to have existed, they did not interfere with operations.

Discipline and morale were excellent throughout the Emergency. Units fought well whatever the odds and never hesitated to act aggressively. There was a steadily growing consciousness of their superiority to the guerrilla.

### Outcome of the Insurrection

The outcome was a success for the government. Following mass surrenders by the guerrillas in 1958 and 1959, guerrilla activity so diminished that in 1960 the government could proclaim an end to the Emergency. What remained of the guerrillas took refuge in Thailand, from which to date they have been no more than a border nuisance.

## CONCLUSIONS

Isolating the full-time guerrilla from food, information, and recruits is a most effective way of reducing insurgency to a level less than a primarily military problem. Food is perhaps the guerrilla's most vulnerable spot in that he cannot reduce his intake below a certain level. If he must make food his primary concern, his combat efficiency suffers accordingly. Much of his time must be devoted to raising, or procuring, or transporting food. These activities are incompatible with wide-ranging mobility or ambitious military plans.

The techniques used in Malaya to isolate guerrillas require effective local administration and police. They demand patient attention to detail, persistence, and honesty. Such an administration is, however, well able to deal with the guerrilla when he has been reduced from a military to a police problem. It is probable that such an administration also requires a stable, progressive economic base to provide and to support the administrators and police. Providing or moving toward such a base also acts to remove the deeper causes of guerrilla war.

Isolating the guerrilla cannot be undertaken apart from the broader aspects of counterinsurgency. "The lawful government of a country, in addition to operating its security forces (army, air force, and police) with intelligence and efficiency, must at the same time govern in a way demonstrably superior to that offered by the insurgents. If this is not done, no amount of force will ensure victory."<sup>11</sup> A competent, honest, capable administration will find that moves to isolate the guerrilla are a most powerful and effective technique in counterinsurgency, serving to pull other, subordinate techniques, e.g., personal registration, into a mutually supporting complex working toward the goal of cutting the guerrilla from his support within the society.

## Footnotes

1. Frank N. Trager, ed., Marxism in Southeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 266.
2. General the Lord Bourne and Major General Frank H. Brooke, "Comments on Sunderland Ms.," hereafter cited as Bourne and Brooke, Comments.
3. Bourne and Brooke, Comments.
4. Riley Sunderland, Ms, "The Communist Defeat in Malaya," The RAND Corporation D-9803-ARPA, p. VI-13.  
Bourne and Brooke, Comments.
5. Interview, R. Sunderland with Major General Frank H. Brooke, CB, CBE, DSO, May 1965.
6. Bourne and Brooke, Comments.
7. Kernial Singh Sandhu, "The Saga of the 'Squatter' in Malaya," Journal of Southeast Asian History, March 1964, p. 155.
8. Sandhu, op. cit.
9. Bourne and Brooke, Comments.
10. Bourne and Brooke, Comments.
11. Bourne and Brooke, Comments.

## Bibliography

Save as otherwise noted, the material in this study is taken from an unclassified RAND Corporation manuscript, Riley Sunderland, "The Communist Defeat in Malaya," D-9803-ARPA.

Of the sources consulted in writing this manuscript, the most useful were:

Annual Reports, Federation of Malaya, 1948-1956.

The series ended with Malayan independence. Although official publications, and contemporary, they are candid, and contain a great variety of useful information.

Henniker, Brigadier M.C.A. Red Star Over Malaya. Edinburgh and London, 1955.

Miers, Brigadier Richard. Shoot to Kill. London, 1959.

Robinson, J.B. Perry. Transformation in Malaya. London, 1956. This was written by the man who catalogued the files of the Federation of Malaya in preparation for the writing of an official history, and so had a singular opportunity to know of what happened behind the scenes.

Most of the books consulted were published in the middle or early 1950s. Little has been published in the later years. However, so far as is known, the techniques as described in this study did not change appreciably in the latter years of the Emergency.

Recently published, and drawing upon official sources, is a most interesting study of resettlement:

Sandhu, Kernial Singh. "The Saga of the 'Squatter' in Malaya," Journal of Southeast Asia History. March 1964.

## Guerrilla Operations in South Korea, 1945-1953

by

Riley Sunderland

and

Marshall Andrews

### KOREAN BACKGROUND AND TERRAIN

Korea has three neighbors--China, Russia, and Japan. At any one given time in the last 200 years, the odds are that two of the three were great powers. All are stronger than Korea, all are rivals, and each sees advantage to itself in dominating Korea. Korea, thus, is a buffer state. During most of this period, China, which has the longest land border with Korea and has had a polity and a society which have been markedly absorptive, has been the dominant power as far as Korea is concerned, but Russian and Japanese rivalry have been keen. From the Russo-Japanese War to 1945, Korea was Japanese. Since 1917, the several forms of Korean communism have been in the service of Russian and Chinese policies.

Geographically, Korea is a peninsula. To the north, it has China along its border for about 250 miles and the Soviet Union for 11. It is 600 miles long at the farthest point, but its hourglass waist is only some 90 miles across. In all, its area is 85,000 square miles. There is a hot, damp summer with a monsoon season, followed by bitterly cold winters. The topography is mountainous. A major mountain chain runs down the eastern side of the peninsula and its spurs dominate the rest of the land. Only 20% of Korea is arable, and most of this is in the south and west along the coastlines and river bottoms. In South Korea this arable land is among the most heavily populated spots in the world, while the barren uplands have few settlers. There are no wide alluvial plains, so Korea is a land of mountains, ridge lines, mountain valleys, rather narrow river valleys, and narrow coastal plains. There has been some deforestation. The major crop is rice.



## KOREAN PARTITION

After Japan's surrender a line was drawn across Korea at the 38th parallel to divide the Soviet and American zones of what the Americans believed would be a brief joint occupation before the creation of a Korean government. The line corresponded to no economic or geographic reality. The Soviet Union then proceeded to create a Communist People's Republic north of the line. This puppet regime in turn furnished leadership, guidance, training, personnel, propaganda, sanctuary, and supplies for a Communist guerrilla effort in the southern Republic of Korea.

## NATURE OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT

### Political and Social Antecedents

Though some sources claim that the Japanese virtually eliminated communism, the strength of the Party in the Republic of Korea as of 1948, estimated at 140,000 of whom 20,000 were activists, and its creation of a guerrilla force of 5,000, would suggest that Japanese success should not be appraised too generously. Infiltration from North Korea was also most important. And the Communists were helped with their recruiting and propaganda by the economic distress that followed the separation of agricultural South Korea from the industrial North, the loss of Japanese markets, Korean national desires for unity and perhaps for affiliation with a forceful, dynamic, new political movement, whose self-assured power was markedly evident to the north.

In social origin, captured guerrillas were: workers and artisans, 40%; students, 20%; peasants, 28-30%; ex-municipal employees, 5%; ex-police or provincial employees, 5-7%. The preponderance of workers and students is noteworthy and suggests that the guerrillas did not have their roots in the South Korean countryside.

### Political and Military Structure

Communist and guerrilla organizational practices were such that the two structures cannot be discussed independently. Fragmentary evidence available in open sources suggests that before the 1950 invasion, the South Korean Labor Party--the Communist

cover organization--was organized in a cell or committee structure of which some groups were overtly acting as guerrillas, while others were concerned with propaganda, recruitment, espionage, and comparable activities, and both types were under the Party's Central Committee. The structure was pyramidal, with county and town committees under province committees. It must be noted that the same higher echelon controlled both guerrilla and less violent Party activities.

After the shock to the Communist plans of the Inchon landing and the violent repulse of the invasion, the Communist structure in South Korea was rationalized. A guerrilla guidance bureau was set up directly under Kim Il-sung, the North Korean Communist leader. The chain of command passed down through three lower echelons (for military and political liaison). The lowest of these, Southern Corps Division /sic/, located in North Korea, was intended to have under it six numbered branch units. Of these six, only numbers 4 and 5 succeeded in becoming operational.

Each at its formation had immediately below it an area command, which in turn controlled several (three each in February 1952) so-called divisions. Divisions in turn had varying numbers of units denominated regiments. As operations continued, and in a manner very reminiscent of the Imperial Japanese army in World War II, unit names changed and would at different times be numbers, or a leader's name, or a slogan, or an area. Unit strengths varied widely with the fortunes of war.

Missions suggest the mixed politico-military activity of the guerrilla:

<u>Political</u>	<u>Military</u>
1. Strengthen Party cells	1. Divert UN forces
2. Propagandize	2. Destroy materiel
3. Undermine the government	3. Gather intelligence
4. Spread hatred of UN forces	4. Interdict LOCs
5. Weaken government controls	5. Attack rear area installations
6. Infiltrate the government and its services	

In any given unit, the second in command was usually the political officer, or political commissar. Troop indoctrination, propaganda, and Party policy were his particular responsibilities. Independently of the military leader, he kept in touch with the

Party structure, and so exercised great, occasionally decisive, independent authority. This arrangement is Russian, not Chinese. Immediately below him were guerrilla officers who were specialists in agitation and propaganda and charged with control of those phases of guerrilla activities.

On the ground, the guerrillas were very largely concentrated in the mountain ranges of Cholla and Kyongsang provinces in southwest Korea, as shown by a UN intelligence report of December 1951:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Armed</u>	<u>Unarmed</u>	<u>Total</u>
Southwest Korea	3,179	2,556	5,735
Taebak San	110	50	160
Pusan area	90	60	150
Cheju-do	35	30	65
	3,414	2,696	6,110

Available sources are neither clear nor satisfactory, but they indicate that, at least during the period of their greatest effectiveness, the guerrillas were a heterogeneous force among whom four types of personnel can be identified:

1. The trained, dedicated full-time Communist. These furnished leadership and were the most reliable fighting men and terrorists.
2. A varying number of locals who were sympathetic to the guerrillas and who acted in a variety of roles, for example, as part-time fighters, agents, porters, scouts, and lookouts.
3. Bandits of no fixed political conviction. Banditry had long been endemic in certain parts of Korea under the Japanese occupation, and the bandits, much as they had in China and Malaya, joined forces with the Communists.
4. Women and children. Women might be in category 1 above or with their children might be the families of men in categories 2 and 3. They would, with their children, provide various services of intelligence, security, and logistics.

#### Doctrin , Training, and Indoctrination

The doctrine, training, and indoctrination of the guerrillas were Soviet Russian, not Chinese Communist. Chinese Communist

training seems to have been confined to those Korean soldiers serving in the Chinese Communist forces who had been transferred to the North Korean army to prepare it for the invasion. The Soviets, on the other hand, seem to have spent years in training Korean Communists to return to their homeland and there re-enact the role of Soviet partisans in the Russian civil war. Whether the Russian experience was mechanically transferable probably was not questioned, since this was the Stalin period of rigid central control and adulation of all things Russian.

Prior to the June invasion, a systematic training program for guerrillas was carried on in North Korea at a school just outside Pyongyang. Conducted by the North Korean army, it operated on a fairly large scale. Some of the students were from the north, but most were from below the 38th parallel. They had been recruited by the Korean Labor Party, smuggled across the border, then after graduation had made their way back across what seems to have been a poorly guarded frontier. At least 1,000 returned before the invasion, and the number may have been twice that. This in turn would imply that, at a minimum, from one-seventh to two-sevenths of the guerrillas' preinvasion strength were trained cadre.

The general pattern of Communist guerrilla activity in South Korea, which suggests something of doctrine, was one of raids launched from mountainous areas. These latter were strongholds which the guerrillas would fight to defend. Thus, bands of men of largely urban origin based themselves in mountain areas, put their agents in the countryside, drew supplies and information from the countryside, and raided in and through it. Notably, however, they did not shelter in the villages but in the mountains.

The language of the guerrilla directives shows them as aiming to weaken government by (1) infiltrating their members into the bureaucracy, army, and police, and (2) concurrently creating such turmoil that significant numbers of soldiers would have to be sent to deal with them. Infiltration was to help with espionage, sabotage, and intelligence, and would help create the proper atmosphere for interdiction of communication lines, assassinations, kidnappings, hold-ups, and raids on sensitive points. Meanwhile, work would proceed on building both the Party and the guerrilla force itself.

### Guerrilla Logistics

Logistics was emphatically a weak point and represented a never-solved problem. At no time did the guerrillas have weapons for more than half their strength. Further, their practice of basing themselves in the mountains meant that food was a constant problem to them, and a great deal of planning and physical effort had to be devoted to the collection, transport, and distribution of food and clothing. Guerrillas so occupied cannot simultaneously engage in large-scale operations against their opponents, and the combat effectiveness of the guerrillas dropped accordingly. Moreover, the need for a steady flow of people carrying food from the villages into the mountains forced the guerrillas to establish a line of communications that in the event proved subject to interdiction.

### Political Objectives

The guerrilla objective was to support Soviet and Communist designs to reunite Korea, under Communist rule. Their methods were not only political infiltration and propaganda, but inculcation of terror and weakening of resistance by military means.

### Military Objectives

These may perhaps be divisible into objectives before and after the invasion of June 1950. Before the invasion, the military objective apparently was to create a force that could play an appreciable part in supporting invasion. For the rest, the Communist leadership in North Korea would probably be guided by events. The guerrilla emphasis would be on preparation.

After the invasion, the military objective was to weaken the South Korean defenders so as to assist in their military defeat. In the summer of 1950, events moved so fast that the guerrillas did not affect them. When after Chinese intervention the line was again stabilized across the peninsula, the opportunity to attack the rear of the UN forces was there, and the ambitious plans to establish six branch units, each in turn commanding several units named divisions, suggest that the North Korean leadership aimed at a major guerrilla effort. The ultimate military targets of this effort were to be UN lines of communication and rear area installations. The immediate targets were the

civilian population within striking distance of the guerrilla mountain strongholds, presumably to reinforce the carrot of political agitation with the stick of terror.

### Geographic Objectives

It seems probable that before the North Korean invasion the North Korean guerrilla objective was the establishment of an operational base in southwest Korea. During the summer months of 1950, this was successfully accomplished. The guerrilla force in being moved out from this base in close cooperation with the North Korean army, to help the invasion as its operational needs indicated, e.g., by interdiction of UN and ROK lines of communication, intelligence, reconnaissance, and security. After the Inchon landing and the break-out from the Pusan perimeter, the mission of maintaining the preinvasion base area reasserted its importance. The initial success in attaining this geographic objective gave elements of the North Korean forces, which had been by-passed or ordered to remain, a haven in which to join with existing guerrilla forces. By November 1950, the total from these two sources was estimated at 40,000, in contrast to the estimated 7,000 of June.

### Guerrilla Techniques

#### Military Action

The fundamental guerrilla military technique was to exist as an organized force with the capability of offensive military action. That is, the first task was to create and maintain a force in South Korea. To do so required solving the problems of recruiting, supply, intelligence, and security. Forced enrollment and persuasion were combined, and bases were created in the mountains. The force was to avoid open combat and, by undertaking widely scattered guerrilla raids in classic pattern, force the widest possible dispersion of UN forces. In such offensive operations, the guerrillas were directed to (1) infiltrate army and police units for espionage, agitation, sabotage, and terrorism; (2) secure funds by robberies; (3) kidnap or assassinate political opponents; (4) create mass unrest by agitation; (5) interdict railroads, telephones, and telegraph lines; (6) gather intelligence by aggressive small-unit action against enemy soldiers and policemen; and (7) attack air bases, ROK offices, police stations, and supply installations.

The guerrillas made a number of attacks against numerically inferior government forces, with the police a preferred target. In such operations, they tended to simulate frontal attacks while moving quickly to envelop the flanks. These attacks would be followed by a quick dispersal and reassembly in the base areas.

Despite the language of the basic directives, with their clear bent toward harassment of the UN forces, a great deal of guerrilla activity, under whatever pretext, was directed at civilians. This took the form of robbing travellers, robbing homes of food and clothing, and kidnapping. To the extent that the initial response of countryfolk to the presence of soldiers was one of cowed, alien silence, these techniques were successful, but they are far removed from Maoist teachings of the proper relation of the guerrilla to the people.

There was surprisingly little destruction of railroad right of way. Isolated unguarded bridges were rarely attacked. When railroads were attacked, in eight of ten cases it was by ambush of trains rather than by damage to rights of way. There was occasional sabotage of Korean military vehicles.

#### Political Warfare and Terrorism

The physical volume of the guerrillas' propaganda was impressive. Newspapers, leaflets, handbills, and posters were found all over South Korea. Because their strongholds were in well-timbered mountain areas, the guerrillas were able to make their own paper.

Propaganda of the deed was stressed in guerrilla training literature. The guerrillas were urged to act so that they would never be underrated and so that people would realize that they existed despite government countermeasures, that they could recognize opposition (or "traitors") among the population, and that they could act and retaliate.

In action, propaganda of the deed included kidnapping civilians, keeping them for a while, then returning them unharmed; assassination; burning the homes of actual or assumed opponents; industrial sabotage; and the operation of public kitchens. Of these acts, arson was surprisingly common and widespread, while guerrilla public kitchens were rare.

Staging some variety of incident immediately after a governmental antiguerrilla operation was habitual and was designed to show the public that the government's efforts were ineffective and that the guerrillas were still a force to be reckoned with.

If propaganda by word and deed was an important guerrilla technique of political warfare, another was infiltration of agents and sympathizers into army, police, and South Korean communities. In the early stages of the guerrilla movement the guerrillas were very successful at inserting men and women into target communities. One must assume that the infiltrators were able to establish livelihoods and identities; and that their Communist masters were able for some years to protect them from denunciation by virtue of a generally assumed certainty of reprisal.

These infiltrators in turn manned widespread guerrilla intelligence and communications systems, a good example being the communications net in the town of Masan. Led by a locally well-known newspaperman, it operated for nearly two years and some of its members were friends of local government officials.

#### Local Support for the Guerrillas

The social classes involved in supporting the guerrillas were largely workers, artisans, and students, and their area of greatest activity was southwest Korea. This local support took the form of recruits, food, and clothing. Recruits were plentiful until large-scale, effective counteraction was undertaken. Food and clothing were obtained by contribution or forced requisition. The guerrillas' intelligence and information diminished once antiguerrilla operations were under way for there were few if any civilian sympathizers left to gather information after the police began rounding up inhabitants of guerrilla-infested areas. The guerrillas' problem was accentuated by the fact that their base areas were largely in uninhabited mountains where there had never been many civilians to call on. When the North Korean forces had the initiative and were operating in the south, intelligence for both guerrilla and regular Communist forces seems to have been excellent.

Information at hand does not permit any statement about the impact of events on local support. The data does not support even cautious surmise.

#### Outside Support for the Guerrillas

The nations involved in outside support were primarily the Soviet Union and the North Korean People's Republic and, in a rather different role, the People's Republic of China. In the



territories of the first two states, guerrillas were trained and indoctrinated and propaganda was manufactured and disseminated, and from them constant diplomatic and political support was forthcoming. Communist parties all around the globe chorused support, arms were smuggled in from North Korea, cadres were smuggled across the 38th parallel, and an active headquarters functioned in North Korea. All this was faithfully reflected in the principles and practices of the guerrillas, which seem to have owed nothing to China. However, when the resources of North Korea proved inadequate and when the Chinese Communists claimed that US ambitions extended beyond the Yalu, then Chinese divisions moved swiftly and effectively into Korea. By extension, this was support for the guerrillas, but the support was a by-product of the intervention, not its goal. Consideration of the guerrillas' activities leaves the impression that they were acting for and on behalf of Soviet Russia and North Korea rather than Communist China.

The relation of Soviet Russia and North Korea to the guerrillas was one of command. Directly under Kim Il-sung, the North Korean leader who probably received guidance from the Soviet ambassador, was the 526th Guerrilla Guidance Bureau. In sequence below it were: Pyongyang Liaison (Central), Southern Corps, and Southern Division, the latter being the lowest echelon of command in North Korea. Immediately below it and south of the 38th parallel were intended to be six branch units, of which only two became operational.

Chief of the 526th Bureau was Bae Chol. In late spring of 1951, he and his masters sent Lee Yong Sang, who had been the North Korean ambassador to Seoul, below the 38th parallel to command. In the Taebaek area, in the east of Korea, the guerrilla commander was Maj. Gen. Lee Ban Nam, a professional soldier of the North Korean army. Lee Yong Sang remained in overall command until he was killed by a South Korean patrol in September 1953.

## THE COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

### Attempts to Cut Local Support

Attempts to cut local support took various forms. The single most important, perhaps, was the rounding up of all inhabitants of the mountain areas in which the guerrillas sought to establish their bases. The directors of the counterinsurgent effort knew that among these civilians were the carriers of food and information to the guerrillas, as well as active guerrillas posing as

local civilians. Interning, interrogating, and screening them not only interrupted the guerrilla line of communications but also uncovered numbers of guerrilla agents. It seems probable that the guerrillas' inclusion of a preponderance of workers and students aided screening and that trained and experienced interrogators learned to pick up the mannerisms of speech and behavior that betrayed the townsmen.

The effectiveness of this technique under Korean conditions is suggested by the fact that in "Operation Ratkiller," winter of 1951-1952, about 10,000 persons were taken into custody, of whom 5,700 were found conclusively to be guerrillas or guerrilla sympathizers. This particular operation was only the first of a series, similar in terrain, targets, and methods, which swept and reswept the Chiri mountain area until all but a few hundred guerrillas were killed or captured.

For several years before the invasion, psychological warfare measures to separate the guerrillas from the people gave American observers the impression of being a small-scale, low-priority operation. Not until December 1948 did the Ministry of Defense open an Information and Education Bureau and give it the formal mission of encouraging cooperation between the people on the one hand and the soldiers and police on the other. The bureau's resources, however, were then committed to a propaganda effort along the 38th parallel aimed at North Korea.

A few months earlier the Republic of Korea outlawed communism, so that the police had a legal weapon to use in cutting the links between the people and the Communist Party. A vigorous round-up of sympathizers followed. About a year later, in October 1949, the government offered an amnesty to repentant Party members and sympathizers, but without result.

When in succeeding years, both before and after the invasion, the army and police would sweep an area, psychological warfare specialists would accompany them and, by literature and speeches, seek to win popular support for the government and take it from the guerrilla. Initially, these efforts were on a very modest scale, but after the stabilization of the front in 1951, American techniques, material support, and encouragement put these efforts on a different level.

"Operation Ratkiller" illustrates the scale and techniques of the later and more effective years. In planning the effort, the staffs concerned explicitly assumed that if they could shift civilian support from the guerrilla to the government, that is, isolate the guerrilla from the people, the guerrillas' cause

would become hopeless. For psychological warfare in "Operation Ratkiller," the Korean army contributed an information and education battalion and put a loudspeaker company in direct support. The United States maintained and operated a mobile radio broadcasting station at the operation's task force headquarters, and leaflet dropping and air voice missions were flown by the US Fifth Air Force. The US Forces furnished most of the material and printing.

General supervision and coordination of the effort was performed by the Psywar Division (G3), Eighth US Army in Korea, through two US officers attached to task force headquarters. The Korean Army's Psywar Division contributed advice and propaganda themes, aided by Korean staff officers and interpreters. American NCO specialists supervised the Korean loudspeaker company.

In the course of the operation, some 10,000 mimeographed newspapers were distributed daily. Leaflets dropped numbered 12,170,000. There were 14 hours of voice broadcasts and 400 hours of radio programs. Finally, 19 information centers in the operational area provided daily contact with the people--and with guerrillas who sought to surrender.

The propaganda stressed that the ROK soldier sought only to restore law and order so that the people might be at peace. These words were matched with the deeds of the soldiers, who had been instructed to be on their best behavior and to cultivate good relations with the people.

A second theme was a factual flow of news about the course of the war. In planning the propaganda effort it was assumed that information was flowing from the people through guerrilla sympathizers to the rank-and-file guerrilla, and these last were thus somewhat insulated from the news. Consequently, an abundance of news was programmed. These assumptions were later confirmed by captured guerrillas, who stressed the morale impact of factual news in sharp contrast to the previous news diet of fabricated Communist victories.

After psychological warfare and widespread detention, a third technique in general use in all major operations against the guerrillas was the institution of rigid controls on the movement of individuals and information. The ROK government would declare a state of martial law and cut telephone communications between villages. Controlling the movement of individuals was a powerful weapon against food suppliers and couriers, while curfew violations were strong evidence of Communist sympathies. Controlling telephones helped cut the warning times to the guerrillas on troop

movements, and the general interference with this information flow was of technical interest to ROK and Eighth Army intelligence as well as a matter of immediate practical importance. The impact of these particular efforts on the Korean guerrillas cannot be measured by information available for this study.

It may be helpful to indicate the scale and duration of the major antiguerrilla operations during the period 1951-1954. The first was unique in that the forces committed were primarily Americans supported by South Korean security forces. This was the Pohang Guerrilla Hunt, conducted by the 1st Marine Division, January 18 to February 15, 1951. It eliminated (i.e., killed or captured) 304 guerrillas for a loss of 16 marines dead and 10 missing.

There then came "Operation Ratkiller," which was followed by four other operations similar in concept and execution. These are summarized as follows:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Initial Date</u>	<u>Force Strength</u>	<u>Eliminations</u>
"Ratkiller"	December 1951	two divisions reinforced	16,700
"Ferret"	March 1952	division equivalent )	3,000
"Mongoose"	July 1952	two-division equivalent )	est.
"Bloodhound"	August 1952	division equivalent )	
"Trample"	December 1952	two-division equivalent	1,000 est.

It is interesting that during "Operation Bloodhound" the guerrilla leader in South Korea was killed by a patrol, while at the end of "Operation Trample" only a few hundred guerrillas, fragmented and leaderless, remained in the field.

#### Attempts to Block Outside Support

The stabilization of the front automatically provided a heavily guarded border zone which in turn tended in ever greater degree to cut the guerrillas from their support in the north. The phrase "ever greater" is used on the assumption that with the passage of time the area of the front was better fortified, and that its terrain, roads, and telecommunications were better known. The coast and offshore traffic were subject to surveillance by US and ROK warships.

The steady shrinkage in the numbers of guerrillas believed to be in South Korea would indicate that neither infiltration from the north nor recruitment in the south could come near to

replacing personnel losses, while the statement made earlier that at any given time only half the guerrillas were armed implies that it was not possible for the North Koreans to smuggle arms across the front or over the beaches.

#### Adequacy of General and Local Administrative Machinery

Some information is available on the police force of the Republic of Korea. In 1945, the US authorities in Korea organized a national police force and a constabulary, the latter a paramilitary force. The two forces recruited independently and there was at the beginning a bitter rivalry between them. Initially, their professional quality was low, they were poorly paid, and their dealings with the public were unfortunate. In 1948, when the republic was formally established, the police totalled 45,000 men in eight divisions and the "constabulary" was a 50,000-man, lightly equipped force that became the South Korean army.

Between 1948 and 1950 both police and army devoted much activity to antiguerrilla operations, in the case of the army so much as to seriously affect training schedules and thus lessen combat effectiveness. Both police and army were widely deployed and conducted antiguerrilla sweeps, generally pursuit after overt incidents, in the vicinity of their posts.

In these prewar years the police proved well able to deal with strikes and demonstrations. In regard to the guerrillas, the army was able to keep the level of hostile activity within tolerable limits.

In January 1950, the Republic of Korea adopted a plan to form 22 combat police battalions in effect, a constabulary. On becoming operational, they would release army units from anti-guerrilla duties. By mid-June, 14 such battalions had been formed and had taken their position, and some army units had been accordingly freed to resume training.

From that date on, police battalions and army security units assumed much of the day-to-day burden of antiguerrilla operations. In so doing, they tended to blur any distinction between army and police functions in counterinsurgency. Available sources show that as late as the winter of 1951-1952 the police had separate and completely independent information channels, and that intelligence would pass up to the highest police echelon in the area,

then over to the task force commander, and then finally down the army channel to the unit commander, a costly and time-consuming procedure.

### Indoctrination

In retrospect, the indoctrination of soldiers or police in the attitudes and behavior most helpful in antiguerrilla action was significantly neglected by the government. By late 1951, when "Operation Ratkiller" was carried out, the effectiveness of antiguerrilla procedures was recognized at least locally, and participating troops were instructed in suitable attitudes. However, the fact that during the whole period of counterinsurgent operations no special training was given to Army units suggests that this effort should not be appraised as more than partial recognition of, and inadequate response to, this need.

### Moral and Ethical Attitudes

Moral and ethical attitudes of soldiers and police were on a number of occasions counterproductive. Stationing of poorly trained, underpaid police in communities, and these police sometimes of questionable loyalty, had an adverse effect on local sentiment during the early days of the regime. As for the military, the occasional killing or imprisoning of innocent people had its adverse effect on local opinion. However, the success of the government forces and the suppression of the guerrillas, despite the pressures of a major conflict, would suggest that such episodes though deplorable were not of a number nor character to affect the antiguerrilla campaign.

### OUTCOME OF THE GUERRILLA EFFORT

The guerrillas' effort to assist North Korea and the Soviet Union in uniting the Korean peninsula as one Communist state failed. Moreover, antiguerrilla operations do not seem to have diverted combat units from the front. When the needs of the front dictated, the UN Command repeatedly left the guerrillas to be contained by the police and security battalions mentioned above.

### Bibliographic Note

The principal source for this study was a privileged, unclassified work. It may not be identified, so the authors must issue the caveat that responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation the reader may find are solely theirs.

Appendix A

FRENCH EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM: GEOGRAPHIC  
AND HISTORICAL SETTING

by

Frank N. Trager

Introduction to Vietnam. . . . .	267
Vietnam: The French Intrusion and Conquest to the 1880s . . . . .	275
French Rule and Vietnamese Struggles for Inde- pendence, 1885-1925 . . . . .	289
French Rule and Vietnamese Struggles from the Mid-1920s through World War II. . . . .	315
General Observations on French Counterinsurgency Experience and Practice Prior to World War II . . . .	321
Bibliography . . . . .	327



## Introduction to Vietnam

by

Frank N. Trager

If use is made of standard racial categories, such as Mongoloid, Negroid, and Caucasoid, the Viet, the indigenous name for the majority people who inhabit the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DVRN) or the Communist North Vietnam, and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) or South Vietnam, belong to the Mongoloid race. That is, the Vietnamese are a people who originated in what is now called China, migrated southward and by conquest and mixture absorbed and displaced an aboriginal group (Melanoid) and the Malayo-Indonesian groups who apparently preceded them on the Indochinese Peninsula. Together, before 300 B.C., they gave rise to Bronze Age culture, called Dong Son after a village in Central Vietnam.

The name Viet is a reading of two Chinese characters (Yue), probably given to lands "beyond" or "far-away" in relation to the ancient Chinese seat of power, hence to lands somewhere south of the Yangtze River. At some time before the end of the 3rd Century B.C. local rulers in this general area appear to have reached the borders of North Vietnam, perhaps as far south as the Red River. One such, known as General Trien-Da (Tch'ao T'o), emerges as a Chinese king over a land called Nam Yue or Nam Viet, but this kingdom's capital is supposed to be near Canton and is generally not regarded as part of Vietnam today. Trien-Da's dynasty, which was conquered by the Han Chinese in a year usually cited as 111 B.C., may or may not have extended its boundaries to North Vietnam. In any event the Han Chinese did so and named the area the province of Giao-Chi, which means "meeting," or splayed, "toes." Giao-Chi under the Han Chinese included what is now Hainan Island and North, and part of Central, Vietnam.

Vietnam as a name disappeared until the end of the period of Chinese domination in the 10th Century A.D. But the Viet peoples struggled throughout the first millenium A.D. against their Chinese overlords, creating legends out of the efforts made by

those who, however temporarily, succeeded in throwing off Chinese imperialist rule. Among these heroes are the Trung Sisters (floruit 39-43 A.D.), who became generals and queens until their defeat. They were "honored and worshipped . . . on the sixth day of the second month of the lunar year" in commemoration of their effort, as are another group from the Early Ly dynasty in the 6th Century A.D. whose founder, Ly Nam De (Ly Bi) (floruit 544-548), is sometimes regarded as the true leader of the first Vietnamese dynasty in what is called today North and Central Vietnam. They, too, as others before and after, were put down by the Chinese masters.

By the end of the 10th Century A.D. the majority people of the peninsula were successful in eliminating Chinese rule. Though there were later, and in the end successful, struggles against Chinese powers strong enough to attack the land--the Mongols, the Ming, the Manchus--the Viet people always fought to retain their independence. They called their country Dai Co Viet (Great Viet State) or Dai Viet (Viet State with nationalist overtones) or, by official proclamation in 1802, Vietnam. The Chinese, however, after suppressing the Early Ly revolt, called the territory Annam, the pacified south. This derogatory name, applied to Central Vietnam and continued in use by Westerners, has never been employed by the Vietnamese themselves.

Thus it may be said that in the 10th Century A.D. when the Dai Viet or Vietnam state emerged from Chinese imperialist rule, the Viet people had clearly broken political ties with the land from which they had emigrated. They had displayed throughout the millenium of their poorly recorded history a determination to be free from foreign or distant domination. This is probably a somewhat romanticized view of their history. One might say, with some truth, that what we find is one set of more or less feudal chieftains, lords, and masters, striving against a more distant and--until the yoke was finally thrown off--more powerful group of feudal lords and masters. Power and wealth were at stake, and the winner gained both. But some facts, some good guesses, and some imponderables must be considered.

The facts are easy: here is a people who derive from what is now called China; who used Chinese characters until the 17th Century to write their language; who followed Chinese Confucian, Mahayana Buddhist, and Taoist traditions--and to a great extent still do; who honor the memory of at least two First-Century A.D. Chinese governors or mandarins who are recorded as having taught them "morals and ritual" (i.e., Confucian ethics) and also the "use of farm implements" (Governors Tich Quang and Nham Dien); and who, in comparison with the two other great migrations

southward into the Indochinese Peninsula, those of the Tibeto-Burman and Shan-Thai-Lao peoples, remain today the most Sinicized of all Southeast Asian members of the Mongoloid race.

The guesses are also fairly easy. We are frequently guilty of what philosophers have called the "pathetic fallacy" of reading back into time our present feelings, attitudes, and thought. The people who inhabit the land of China and nearby areas may be all Mongoloid by race, but within any major section of this vast geographical area, they have been or are as varied, as friendly or unfriendly, and as peaceful or warlike toward their neighbors as their counterparts among the Caucasoids and Negroids. (A moment's reflection on the history of the warring tribes of Europe, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere should make clear that proposition's firm foundation.) In this sense, the variations within the great Mongoloid Asian area are at least as significant as the identities. The Han Chinese, as the Mongol, Ming, Ching, Republican, and Communist Chinese, have not hesitated, when strong, to try to impose their power on their near non-Han, non-Mongol, non-Manchu, or other Mongoloid neighbors and ethnic siblings and cousins. And in this sense, the Viet people, absorbing what they wished from their more powerful kin, nonetheless wanted --in the sense of that word which cannot be quantified but which is visible after the event of its expression--to be free of their powerful neighbors.

This type of event, to which today we unhesitatingly give the name of nationalism, or zeal for independence and patriotism, or love of country, surely existed in some form in earlier periods. For loyalty to one's countryside, however big or small it may be, is a fact in human experience of great age and condition. To use such words as "surely existed" is one of the imponderables of history. We do not know what we would like to know about the past. We cannot prove its existence. But we cannot disprove its possibility. How else can the fact be explained that, for ten centuries at least, a Sinic people called the Viets took repeated action of some kind to become an independent, differentiated regime in its own arena? And as we shall see, though they succumbed once again to another imperium, they found the instruments and the institutions of that later time to throw off the yoke of foreign domination.

Vietnam--as two words in the Vietnamese manner, or as one word--tended to disappear in Western languages, certainly with the beginning of the European explorations in the East. Tonkin (or Tongking), the Chinese name for Hanoi ("capital of the east") --a name which according to one authority did not exist in the Vietnamese language prior to the 20th Century--came to stand for

North Vietnam. Annam, as indicated, was used by non-Viets for Central Vietnam, or that area roughly from the 19th parallel to the 16th parallel and including the imperial Vietnamese capital at Hué. Cochin China (or Cochinchina), a name of obscure, possibly Portuguese origin, came to be applied to South Vietnam. And the central mountains became known on the maps as the Annamite Chain. The Vietnamese seldom if ever use these Westernisms. For them the mountain chain is called Trong-Son, and the parts of the country are designated simply as North, Center, and South, Bac, Trung, and Nam, with the additional word Ky or Bo to mean domain or region.

The Vietnamese, who number about 31,000,000 today (a little more than 50% live in North Vietnam), and who have come to be an 85% to 90% majority in the eastern section of the Indochinese Peninsula, were by no stretch of the imagination a docile, peaceful people. As they moved southward they came into contact with earlier arrivals whom they successively conquered or displaced or absorbed as they gradually imposed their rule on the land. In a 1954 study, Connaissance du Viet-Nam, the authors, Huard and Durand, give us a map which dates the march south of the Viets from the northern border to the tip of the Cambu Peninsula.\* By the 15th Century, after centuries of intermittent warfare, they had conquered the Malayo-Indonesian Chams, who occupied Central Vietnam and who for at least a millenium represented the most Hinduized of the Southeast Asian states. Remnants of the Chams still live in Central Vietnam, which once was theirs, but today they number some 35,000 and are divided into several sub-tribal groups, a number of whom have been converted to Islam. The Viets also displaced or otherwise confined to the uplands the earlier Malayo-Indonesian arrivals whom they stigmatized as the Moi, or the savages. The French were to call them the Montagnards, a polite term for "hill-billy," and today it is estimated that they number between 800,000 and 1,000,000. By the mid-18th Century, the Viets had conquered the Khmers or Cambodians, whose once great empire had earlier extended from the Bay of Bengal on the west to the China Sea. But in South Vietnam today remain perhaps as many as 400,000 Cambodians whose brothers on the other side of the border remember their great past glory and still harbor resentment, if not enmity, toward the Viets on their east and the Thai on their west, who also helped to bring about their decline. By the mid-18th Century, the Viet people dominated the land called Vietnam from the China border to the southeastern tip of the peninsula.

---

\*Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, p. 33.

## THE INDOCHINESE PENINSULA

The ancient Greeks, at least from the time of Pliny the Elder (First Century A.D.), had a word for it. They called it the Chryse Chersonese, the Golden Peninsula. In time, this second, smaller land mass--the Indian subcontinent is the other one--descending from the eastern rim of the Himalayas into the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, came to include the pre-European kingdoms or empires of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. (Technically, one should also add Malaya--the "tail" to the Indochinese "kite.") Vietnam occupies the eastern lines of this peninsula as an "S"-shaped curve. Its north-south axis extends for about 1,000 miles, narrowed at the waist to an average of 40 miles. Its width, in the two main river deltas, the Red River in North Vietnam and the Mekong in South Vietnam, extends from 250 to 300 miles. These deltas are its rice baskets. In between these two rice-producing areas there is the long central mountainous chain, whose peaks near Dalat reach to about 6,500 feet, and a narrow, heavily populated coastal plain divided by massifs and hilly spurs which slice to the long coastline of the China Sea.

These four major geographical features, the two river deltas, the inland central spine, and the coastal plain have conditioned the lives and fortunes of the Vietnamese for 2,000 years. Their land (about 126,000 square miles), slightly larger than New Mexico, is situated to receive the southwest and northeast monsoons, the earth-sustaining rains (50" to 120" per year) which help to create the two main tropical seasons, hot-dry and hot-wet.

The Vietnamese are essentially a lowland people. Their sedentary food-producing habits (wet-rice cultivation and fishing), the remnants of their animistic myths and superstitions which cause them to fear the hills and mountains, their good sense about the malarious character of the highlands, all combine to keep them as a lowland people and hence inhabitants of the deltas and coastal plains. The uplands, plateaus, and mountains are for the minorities, or those displaced and downgraded in the southward march of the Viets, and those, who, like the Muongs, the Man, Meo, and the Thai are later arrivals. The ethnic Chinese, another major group, also arrived later. Perhaps as many as a million live today in Vietnam, mainly in urban areas. They have remained for the most part, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, a self-separated group, the "overseas Chinese."

The Red River Valley and delta of the north is one of the two most densely populated areas in Southeast Asia (Java exceeds

it). Some 1,500 persons per square mile live there, while the Mekong in the south, ending its course as the tenth longest river in the world, supports an average density of 250 persons per square mile. The mountainous central area of Vietnam constitutes about 90% of the total land of Vietnam but contains not more than 10% of its total population. Here the tribal and non-Viet peoples tend to practice "shifting," in contrast to the "sedentary" agriculture of the lowland majority.

There was and is a historical logic for calling this peninsula Indochina. Today, as yesterday, it represents a confluence and further evolution of two great cultural strains which came respectively from India and China. But while saying this, it is also important to note that the evolution of these cultures in each of the states of Indochina has resulted in genuine indigenous or naturalized adaptations.

The Viet people who entered and ultimately conquered their part of the peninsula found there Hinduized and Buddhist kingdoms and societies which they incorporated or assimilated with their own Sinicized cultural patterns. These absorptions influenced their own cultural baggage, which included the northern Mahayana variety of Buddhism. The mixture has given rise to such Buddhist groups as the current General Association of Vietnamese Buddhists, which claims 1,000,000 members in the south, and to the Buddhist-influenced southern sects known as the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, which claim as many as 2,000,000 members.

(The Buddhist tradition is normally tolerant and absorptive of other elements, yet Buddhist leaders were sufficiently aroused to challenge the Roman Catholic minority who dominated the government of Ngo Dinh Diem. The issue between them was perhaps more political than religious.)

The Chinese influence came with the Viets and was certainly imposed upon them by the 1,000 years of Chinese suzerainty over Vietnam. The Vietnamese emperor, like his Chinese counterpart, held the "mandate from Heaven." Ancestor worship was and still is almost everywhere practiced in Vietnam, even by Buddhists and to some extent by Roman Catholics. The Vietnamese script was written in Chinese characters until the 17th Century, when it was romanized by a French missionary. The civil service was the Chinese mandarin system, based in principle solely on education and examinations.

Both the Chinese and Buddhist cultural patterns strongly reinforced the central role of the hierarchical family and the communalized or autonomous village system with its elements of

prescribed ceremony, respected authority, cooperative effort, and general indifference to, if not actual antagonism for, the central authority. This central authority, the government, was viewed as the source of power, taxes and other forms of levies, restraints, and inhibitions upon the cylindrical, relatively self-sufficient life of the village and villager.

By the time the French arrived in Indochina and in Vietnam, the latter appears to have been an indigenously integrated Confucian-Buddhist Vietnamese society. There was domestic conflict to be sure--especially between strong northern and southern Viet families seeking ultimate power. Conflict for 150 years between the Trinh family group of the north and the Nguyen family group based at Hué helped to prepare the way for ultimate French power. (There actually was a dividing wall built at the 19th parallel.) The French backed the Nguyen and aided its leader to become the founder-hero of the last dynasty to rule a united Vietnam. Emperor Gia Long reestablished the unity of his country and proclaimed its independence as Vietnam in 1802 at the royal capital of Hué. (The last representative of this dynasty who held the position as head of state was Bao Dai, who was used as a puppet-emperor by the French after World War II and was deposed as head of the State of Vietnam /South Vietnam/ after the country was partitioned at the 17th parallel by the Geneva Agreements of 1954.) There are cultural differences, including dialect, pronunciation, and even dress, between North and South Vietnamese which have continued to today.

The society as a whole, however, prior to the final French conquest in the second half of the 19th Century, represented a convergence of political and religious power, vested in a sovereign emperor or ruler, assisted by a mandarin bureaucracy, and dependent upon Buddhist monks for religious sanction; all these were related intimately to an ancestral family system, and a village commune, or cooperative and autonomous village structure. The totality had "magical" properties which were not to be lightly violated; it provided minutely for every aspect of individual life, which was always subordinated to the group, the family, the clan, or the tribe.

This in broad strokes represents Vietnam, its people, its land, its place in Indochina before the intrusion and conquest of the French.

Vietnam: The French Intrusion and Conquest  
to the 1880s\*

by

Frank N. Trager

A brief glance at the European intrusion in Southern Asia reveals the fact that the French were the last to arrive and to found an empire which they were able to retain until the mid-20th Century. Like other Europeans they came in search of treasure and trade and to save "heathen souls." French nationals as missionaries were originally under the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic archbishops of Lisbon and Goa, for the Portuguese (and the Spaniards) had preceded them to the East Indies, and Pope Alexander II's Papal Bull of 1493 had placed missionary efforts in Vietnam under the Portuguese archbishops. In the 17th Century, France initiated its own missionary movement.

The Jesuit Fathers' work in Asia, especially beginning with the mission to the Japanese founded by Saint Francis Xavier in 1549, had led to their prominence in Asia as learned Europeans. The closing of the Japanese mission at the beginning of the 17th Century made several distinguished Jesuits available for other missions, and Vietnam attracted a number of them, beginning in 1615. Father Alexandre de Rhodes appears to have been the most gifted of these until his death in 1660. It was he who translated the catechism into Vietnamese and who perfected the efforts of his predecessors in converting that language from an ideographic Chinese script into a romanized alphabet, Quoc Ngu, which is still the written language of the country. And it was he who convinced the Papacy and the French Crown to engage more seriously and effectively in missionary labors in Vietnam. His plan for training indigenous priests and for replacing Portuguese control

---

\*This paper was prepared with the assistance of Marjorie W. Normand.



by French-led effort was sanctioned in both Rome and Paris shortly before his death.

Thus, in the second half of the 17th Century, France began its own missionary movement, aimed at replacing waning Portuguese religious and political influence (the Dutch had defeated the Portuguese decisively at Malacca in 1641), and simultaneously sought to limit the extra-French controls of the Jesuit Order. In 1659 the French founded the *Société des Missions Etrangères*. The *Société* began, three to four years later, from its field base in Ayuthia, capital of Siam, to send missionaries into Cambodia and the three regions of Vietnam--Tonkin (North Vietnam), Annam (Central Vietnam), and Cochin China (South Vietnam). When, after four attempts, the French succeeded in creating their East India Trading Company (*Campagnie des Indes Orientales*)(1664), the stage was set for a vigorous combination of religious and mercantile expansion in the Indochinese Peninsula.

These events coincided with one of the weak periods in Vietnamese history. The reigning Le dynasty "was permitted to exist as a semicorpse but not allowed to die." Actual power rested in the hands of two powerful families, the Trinh in the North (Tonkin) and the Nguyen in the Center-South (Annam). Their struggles for power punctuate the history of the 17th and 18th Centuries and were not resolved until the beginning of the 19th Century with the eventual triumph of the Nguyen, aided by French missionaries.

Most, if not all, students of Southeast Asian history agree that European commercial relations with Vietnam began with, or became more profitable after, the establishment of missionary influence. Religion, trade, and political interest remained "closely allied," despite a ruling from the French under Louis XIV that missionary activity was not to be carried out for such purposes. French bishops and apostolic vicars, especially François Pallu and Pierre de la Motte, who succeeded Alexandre de Rhodes, advanced the cause of the *Société des Missions Etrangères* "in all questions which from near or far touch on the advancement of the missions and on the progress of French influence."\*

But this "double current of ideas" did not fulfill in the 18th Century the optimistic beginnings of the 17th Century. Conflict between the missionary orders, at least until the suppression of the Jesuits in 1774, the anticlericalism of the French Revolution which affected the roles of the Church (and its missions)

---

\*Abbé Adrien Launay, Histoire Générale de la Société des Missions Etrangères, Paris, 1894, vol. 1, p. 186.

in France, Italy, and Spain, the debilitating effects of the 18th-Century Anglo-French wars, and consequent defeat of the French by the English in India contributed to the decline of French fortunes in Indochina.

The decline was abetted by the revival of hostilities between the Vietnamese elements associated with the Trinh and Nguyen families, and more particularly with the rebellion known in Vietnamese history by the area of its origin in central Annam, Tay Son. Three brothers of that village--Nhac, Lu, and Hué--led a successful revolt in the early 1770s against the established Nguyen family, leaders of the Center-South. The latter, dispersed, went further south to the Saigon and Camau Peninsula area. The Tay Son brothers were able to consolidate their power in the vicinity of Ankhe and Quinhon. This afforded the Trinh of the north the opportunity to invade and capture Hué in 1775. For the next dozen years civil war marked the course of Vietnamese history. Gradually, the Tay Son brothers, led by the youngest, Hué--who has been described as a military genius--exploited their advantage against both the Trinh at Hanoi and the remnants of the Nguyen at Saigon, and won. By 1788-1789, they not only defeated these rival claimants to power but also a Chinese (Manchu) army which invaded Vietnam to assist China's tributary princes. Hué married a daughter of the Le dynasty, nominally on the throne, and proclaimed himself emperor of a unified Vietnam. At his death in 1792, his son, Nguyen Quan Toan, succeeded him.

In the meantime, the displaced Nguyen family's cause fell to the leadership of one of its scions, Nguyen Anh, who had retreated before the Tay Son brothers, first to the Camau Peninsula and then to Poulo Condore Island off the coast of Cochinchina. In this process he met and became the lifelong friend of one of the great missionary-political French apostolic vicars to Cochinchina, Monsignor Pigneau de Behaine, Titular Bishop of Adran.

Pigneau was one of the colorful and effective individuals of that troubled time. He had been sent out to Cambodia as a missionary of the Société in 1765. By 1782 he had decided to risk his political future in alliance with Nguyen Anh. For the next five years he endeavored to get the French government, first in Pondicherry (India) and then in Paris, to back this young pretender to the Vietnamese throne and self-styled king of Cochinchina. In late 1787 Pigneau secured a treaty of alliance between Paris and Nguyen Anh by which France was to supply arms and men to help win the throne for its ally. In return France would enjoy certain trading, territorial, and other privileges to the exclusion of other Europeans. Such French aid was to be delivered via the French in Pondicherry. But the latter, either under

instructions from Paris or on their own authority, refused to honor the treaty. The Bishop thereupon proceeded on his own to raise a small military force and fleet and thus came in 1789 to the aid of his friend, who had returned to the mainland. Together they waged war against the Tay Son. Ten years later, in an assault which he led, Pigneau was killed. But Nguyen Anh went on and by 1802 had succeeded in defeating the Tay Son, the remnants of the Trinh, and all other opposition. He became in that year Emperor Gia Long, and Hue, which was his seat, became the capital of Bac, Trung, and Nam, once again a unified state of Vietnam. Founder of the Nguyen dynasty (of which Bao Dai was the last legitimate emperor or head of state), Gia Long was recognized by the Chinese Emperor Tsing and received the seal of office as a tributary prince in 1804. It was he who officially gave the name "Viet Nam" to the country.

Historical interpretation of the Tay Son rebellion and the accession of Gia Long to the throne at Hue in 1802 remains, today, divided. Some regard the Tay Son brothers as bandits who achieved power; others, as forerunners of later peasant rebel leaders who tried to secure some relief from the crushing burdens imposed upon the peasants by the seemingly ceaseless quarrels of the warring nobles and mandarins (the chief civil servants of the realm). For those who hold the first view, Gia Long is a national hero who emerged with legitimacy to reunite the kingdom under a proper royal government. And, whatever the view of the Tay Son brothers, Emperor Gia Long's name is celebrated today in both North and South Vietnam as a national hero. However, there are those Vietnamese who regard the youngest Tay Son brother, Hue, as a true hero and thus look upon Gia Long as one who was not necessarily entitled to the throne, and who in any event committed the fatal mistake of inviting in the French--a mistake of dire consequences as the 19th Century unfolded.

Gia Long reigned from 1802 until his death in 1820. Since the French government had not, as such, honored the treaty of 1787, and since during the Napoleonic era it was neither willing nor able to involve itself in the affairs of Vietnam, Gia Long had little, if any, difficulty in fending off the few official trading ventures proposed in the time of Napoleon and Louis XVIII. It would appear that the Vietnamese emperor wished to avoid getting embroiled in the Anglo-French war; in any event, he turned his considerable energies to the repair and restoration of his wartorn kingdom. Large landholdings of the noble class and villages held as tax-fiefs were abolished. Dykes were built in Tonkin; a long road from Hanoi to Saigon (1,300 miles) was completed; fortifications, in the French manner of outposts, were constructed at strategic centers throughout the land. And, probably to honor

Gia Long's French friend, Catholicism was liberally tolerated. At his death he recommended to his designated heir, Emperor Minh Mang, who was a son of his first concubine, that there be equal protection for the three principal religions of the realm: Confucianism, Buddhism, and Catholicism. But this was not to be.

At the end of Gia Long's reign, as John F. Cady points out:\*

France had very little to show in the way of tangible achievement [in the Far East] after almost two centuries of desultory activity on the part of French missionaries, traders, diplomats, and adventurers. . . . British naval and commercial hegemony . . . based on India, was unchallengeable, so that any move which France might contemplate within the area would have to fall within the bounds of British consent. . . . There were nevertheless two factors on the positive side of the French ledger. One was the vigorous religious revival, centering on France, which swept Catholic Europe following the downfall of Napoleon. The other was the well-nigh desperate concern on the part of the Orleanist and Napoleonic dynasties, which ruled France from 1830 to 1870, to recover at least a measure of the international prestige that had so long been associated with the name of France. These two elements united to revive the imperialist tradition of France in the Orient during the mid-century decades.

The piecemeal conquest of Vietnam, and of the revived kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, were the consequences of this imperialist foray. And French Indochina became their collective name until 1954.

The conquest grew in the first instance out of the anti-missionary, anti-Catholic, and anti-"European barbarians" policies gradually adopted by Vietnamese Emperors Minh Mang (1820-1842), Thieu Tri (1842-1847), and Tu Duc (1847-1883). In 1825 Minh Mang limited the freedom of the missionaries; in 1833 an edict of death was issued against several, and one of them-- Father Francis Isadore Gagelin--lost his life. In 1836 proselytizing was prohibited and all ports save one were closed to Europeans, especially to priests. In 1848 any European priests found were "to be thrown into the sea with rocks tied to their necks," and native Christians were to recant or be banished. Persecution led

---

\*The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia, Cornell University Press, 1954, pp. 16-17.

to martyrdom for European Catholics and others, while martyrdom apparently encouraged new missionaries to enter the country illicitly. The French sent armed vessels to protect the missionaries--in 1843, 1845, 1847, 1852--and did not hesitate to fire upon the shore cities.

Minh Mang viewed his task in a way different from that of his father, Gia Long. He was a traditionalist, a strict Confucian, and a Chinese scholar, and he desired above all to give his country peace and unity. This meant to him a return to the Confucian ethic uniting all customs, beliefs, and institutions; it also meant the eradication of all French influence from his empire.

His dislike of Christianity extended beyond this antiforeign attitude. He knew his position was made insecure by the mandarin's favor for the legitimate heir who had been passed over by Gia Long. Therefore he could not tolerate the propagation of a religion which disrupted Vietnamese-Confucian patterns of thought and behavior as to the Emperor's supreme authority. Not only the Emperor but the entire mandarin system, resting on the authority of a divinely ordained imperial power, was threatened by the attitude of indigenous Christians who would not submit to the absolute authority of the Emperor. To eliminate this kind of thinking, Minh Mang not only had to expel the foreign missionaries, but also had to destroy the Christian enclaves which had escaped local mandarin supervision.

His first moves were of a peaceful nature. He issued an edict in 1825, closing Vietnam to further missionaries, and called those already there to his court as "translators." Three missionaries from Cochinchina were brought to his court in 1827. They were treated graciously, accorded high mandarin rank and official titles as royal interpreters, but their assignments were specious. They were finally released through the intervention of Le Van Duyet, Viceroy of Cochinchina, who had been a companion of the Bishop of Adran. In an impassioned letter, he recalled the aid given to Gia Long.

. . . We still have in our mouth the rice with which we were nourished by the Bishop of Adran when chased, tracked by the Tay Son, we were dying of hunger in the islands of the Gulf of Siam, and we would persecute his co-religionists! No. . . .

Minh Mang continued to refuse politely French attempts to reopen official relations. J.B. Chaigneau, one of the original French companions of Pigneau de Behaine, had visited France in 1819 and

returned to Hué in 1821. He brought presents from Louis XVIII and was accredited as an agent of France, consul for French subjects, and commissar of the King to conclude a treaty of commerce between Vietnam and France. Minh Mang received Chaigneau but refused to read the letter sent him by Louis XVIII. His "Mandarin for Foreigners" wrote a letter to the Minister of the Navy which clearly indicated his unwillingness to agree to any relations between Vietnam and France:

The frontiers of the Kingdom of Annam are situated at the extremities of the South, and those of France at the extremities of the West, the limits of the two States are separated by several seas or by a distance of several thousand leagues. . . . The people of our country are rarely able to come to yours. . . . If the people of your country desire to trade in our kingdom, they will conform to its rules, since that is reasonable.

In 1822 the frigate Cléopâtre docked at Tourane, carrying a letter from the King of France. Minh Mang sent presents and ordered that the frigate's commander be treated with honor, but refused to receive the letter. Another letter from Louis XVIII was refused with the excuse that Minh Mang could find no one to translate it. Finally in 1825, convinced that the change in official attitude rendered their position untenable, the last two surviving French mandarins sailed for France.

When missionaries refused to heed his edict forbidding them to enter Vietnam or returned after having been exiled, Minh Mang turned to violence. Le Van Duyet, the last powerful defender of Christians in Cochinchina, died in 1831. In revenge for his actions halting persecutions of Christians, Minh Mang had the viceroy's tomb desecrated. This caused a strong reaction in Cochinchina where Le Van Duyet's officers raised the standard of revolt, led by Le Van Khoi. They captured Saigon and overran most of Cochinchina.

Despite refusal by French missionaries to come to his aid, Khoi was joined by indigenous Christians eager to battle Minh Mang. Such a situation offered the Emperor a perfect excuse for persecuting Christians. The first victim was François Isidore Gagelin, imprisoned and strangled to death on October 17, 1833. Many missionaries, including Monsignor Taberd, apostolic vicar, fled to Cambodia or Siam.

When Minh Mang, after a bloody two-year war, retook Saigon in September 1835, he found among the rebel leaders a French missionary, Monsignor Marchand, who apparently had resisted Khoi's

requests for official Catholic support of the revolt. The Emperor regarded him as a chief rebel, however, and he was tortured and put to death. The list of martyrs during the seven-year period between 1833 and 1840 includes four apostolic vicars and seven missionaries, as well as an unknown number of Vietnamese Christians. In 1838 a new edict, aimed at returning indigenous Christians to the traditional order by instructing them in Confucian morals, was given out.

Events in China had their repercussions at Hué where Minh Mang heard with horror the results of the Opium War. He began to reconsider his position vis-a-vis the French missionaries and in order to stave off French reprisals decided to send a mission to France. In January 1840, he dispatched three mandarins to Paris authorized to conclude a commercial agreement between France and Annam. Louis Philippe refused to receive them, and his ministers, spurred on by the Church and missionaries, reproached their religious intolerance. The mandarins were surprised by the vehemence of French governmental reaction to events in Vietnam, and especially by ministerial threats of French intervention if persecution continued.

Minh Mang died on January 20, 1841, before the failure of this mission could affect his policies. His death gave some respite to the Church which, while badly shaken, was in some ways stronger than before. The possibility of martyrdom seemed to attract new missionaries. By 1840 there was a total of 3 apostolic vicars (one each for Eastern Tonkin, Western Tonkin, and Cochinchina), 2 coadjutors, 24 missionaries, 144 priests, and 420,000 Catholics in Vietnam.

The new ruler, Thieu Tri (1842-1847), continued the policy of his father but with some modifications. He lacked Minh Mang's vigor and singleness of purpose; while he continued applying the edicts against Christianity, he dared not continue killing foreign missionaries. Instead, he imprisoned them and seemed to welcome opportunities to expel them peaceably. Times had changed in France, also, and while Louis Philippe and his Foreign Minister Guizot did not wish to become embroiled in a Vietnamese war, they could not completely ignore events there, in the face of spreading public sympathy in France for the Christian martyrs.

The first intervention of the French navy in Vietnamese affairs occurred in 1843. The Emperor had condemned five missionaries to death but, loath to kill them and invite French intervention, had allowed them instead to languish in the Hué prison. The French commander Favin-Leveque, with the corvette l'Héroïne, entered the port of Tourane on February 26, 1843. His mission

was ostensibly to renew commercial relations with Annam, but his real purpose also included backing up the threats made to the Vietnamese delegation in France in 1840 by checking on the situation. The commercial parley went badly, but during this time a young priest smuggled a letter to the commander describing the plight of the five imprisoned missionaries. Favin-Leveque demanded their release from the governor of the province, and presented him with a letter addressed to the "first minister" in which he announced:

France has heard their cries and I come, in the name of His Majesty, King of the French, to demand their release, to bring them to their homeland.

The governor received a favorable response from Hué and the missionaries were released in the custody of Favin-Leveque. They wished to remain in Cochinchina but the Commander insisted they leave, as he had promised.

This direct action by the French navy on behalf of the missionaries was the first in a series of incidents which led directly to the decision of the French government to intervene in Vietnam. Having recovered from the effects of the Revolution and the Empire, the navy was eager for additional activity and returned to its role of protector of missionaries.

With the recommencement of the persecutions, another incident ensued when Monsignor Lefebvre, Bishop of Isauroplid and recently made apostolic vicar of Western Cochinchina, was condemned to death. He was arrested in the province of Vinh Long on October 31, 1844, and conducted to Hué for sentencing. By order of Admiral Cécille, commander of the French naval division for the Far East, the corvette l'Alcmène was immediately dispatched to Tourane to demand Monsignor Lefebvre's freedom. This request was granted and the bishop was sent to Singapore. Refusing to accept his exile, he secretly returned to Cochinchina. Arrested again and condemned once more to death, he was sentenced to exile by Thieu Tri and was conducted on one of the Emperor's junks to Singapore. This action indicates that Thieu Tri was intimidated by French intervention and did not wish to provoke further incidents by executing missionaries. The affair also may serve as an index of the aggressive singleness of purpose of the missionaries who openly defied the Emperor's authority to eject them from Vietnam, an attitude which often spurred the Emperor to more violent methods.

After each intervention, Thieu Tri vented his wrath on Vietnamese Christians, who were massacred or exiled to distant areas.



When persecutions recommenced after the departure of l'Alcmène, Commander Lapierre and Captain (later Admiral) Rigault de Genouilly were dispatched with two French naval vessels to Tourane in March 1847. They demanded from Thieu Tri an edict similar to that obtained from China two years previously, granting security for Frenchmen and liberty of religion for Catholics. On April 14, when the Vietnamese reinforced their fleet in the bay of Tourane, Lapierre took the initiative and opened fire on the five Vietnamese corvettes in the harbor, completely destroying them. He failed to gain satisfaction for the Christians; instead he sailed away leaving the missionaries to face the revenge of the Emperor.

Thieu Tri, enraged by the defeat of his fleet, offered a reward for the murder of any European in Vietnam; however, he succumbed to fever and died in November 1847. He had attempted to mitigate the effects of his father's policy toward foreign missionaries to avoid providing an excuse for French intervention. The French government, however, released from the pressing entanglements of the Empire and emboldened by British success in China, was more inclined than before to heed the requests of the missionaries. This, in turn, encouraged the Church in France to press for political solutions for the difficulties which its missionaries encountered in proselytizing in Vietnam. The missionaries themselves, distressed by the results ensuing from the sporadic visits made by French ships, sought a more reliable means of obtaining liberty of religion. To this end, the apostolic vicar of Tonkin wrote to Louis Philippe in October 1848, requesting diplomatic action rather than hasty naval incursions. As for the motive of the letter, the Bishop, fusing the goals of French glory and religious propagation, describes it as ". . . the sole desire to contribute to the good of religion, to the tranquility of our Christians and to the honor of France, in procuring for Your Majesty the occasion for an action as glorious for men as meritorious before God. . . ."

The second son of Thieu Tri, born Hoang Nham, succeeded to the throne under the name of Tu Duc (1847-1883). It was hoped that conditions for missionaries would ameliorate, since the new emperor was said to be of a mild and conciliatory character. For a short time an uneasy calm existed in Annam; then the legitimate heir, Tu Duc's eldest brother, Loang Bao, organized a revolt. Although the apostolic vicar of Cochinchina officially refused to help Loang Bao, there was Christian complicity in the rebellion, and as soon as it was crushed, Tu Duc reopened persecutions with a sweeping and deadly edict (March 21, 1851). This time the missionaries called upon the French government for aid, and the government seemed disposed to act. Internal and external politics prevented an immediate response, but in 1855 a French

mission headed by a M. de Montigny was sent to the Far East. De Montigny went first to Siam, where he successfully concluded a treaty promising freedom of worship for Christians.

The instructions given to him indicate that while the French government was prepared to intervene in Vietnam, its action would take the form of diplomatic parleys and naval menaces rather than direct reprisals. However, as had previously occurred, the local situation outraced instructions from the home government. In conjunction with the mission of M. de Montigny, the French government dispatched two ships to Tourane to await his arrival. The first to dock was the Catinat in September 1856. Its commander carried a letter addressed to the court at Hué which the mandarins refused to accept. In addition, they threatened to open fire on his vessel. Fearing the arrival of Annamite reinforcements at the fortress, the commander took the initiative and captured the fortress of Tourane. This put him in an excellent position vis-a-vis the mandarins, but he was unable to profit since M. de Montigny had not arrived. The commander of another ship, which reached Tourane in October, also found he could do nothing to ameliorate the situation. He had been told of the precarious position of the Christians by Monsignor Pellerin, apostolic vicar of Cochinchina, who risked his life to contact the commander, but the latter, deeming his further stay useless, left Tourane, taking Monsignor Pellerin with him.

M. de Montigny had intended to arrive at the same time as the two vessels and came to Tourane on January 23, 1857, immediately after concluding a treaty with Cambodia. With neither ships nor men to back him up, he failed completely to obtain the treaty of friendship, commerce, navigation, and religion which he proposed. Before he left, he wrote to Tu Duc demanding tolerance for Christians and missionaries. The message dated February 6, 1857, went further than ever before in threatening reprisals:

. . . the undersigned warns the Annamite government that if, from this date on, religious persecutions do not cease, and if there should be new executions for the mere fact of practicing the religion of France [emphasis added]. . . these acts of hostility will naturally place the Government of [His Imperial Majesty] in the obligation of taking more energetic measures.

The Montigny fiasco reduced French prestige to an all-time low and jeopardized the position of local Christians even further. Convinced that missionaries were encouraging foreign infringement of Annam's sovereignty, Tu Duc affirmed that any Vietnamese

aiding them and giving them asylum were rebels and traitors to their country. His retaliation again took the form of redoubled persecutions, especially in Tonkin.

The missionaries were aware that intensified harassment would result from M. de Montigny's threats, which he was impotent to enforce. In a letter to him written the same day as his to Tu Duc, Monsignor Pellerin and Monsignor Miche, apostolic vicar of Cambodia, pointed out their untenable position and concluded that only one path lay open to them:

No resource thus remains for us other than the generous and glorious devotion of H.M. the Emperor and his Government for the Catholic Religion and its missionaries. But if the help which we await comes late, about forty poor missionaries, your compatriots, and nearly six hundred thousand Christians will be exposed to almost certain massacre, due to the failure of the endeavor made today. . . .

These important missionaries thus squarely favored French military intervention to safeguard the Catholic position in Vietnam. The cause was pleaded by Monsignor Pellerin personally in Paris, where he found Napoleon III ready to listen to his proposals. In a letter sent to the Emperor on August 30, 1857, Monsignor Pellerin pointed out the political and economic advantages which would accrue to France by an occupation of several ports in Cochinchina, although he conceded that safeguarding the interests of Catholics in Cochinchina did not necessitate such extensive action.

Napoleon III appointed a special commission to investigate the status of the Franco-Annamite treaty of friendship of 1789 and explore possible courses of action. It found that since the terms of the treaty had not been carried out by either side, the treaty was invalid. The commission further recommended that France occupy the three principal cities of Vietnam: Hué, Hanoi, and Saigon.

Napoleon III, eager to expand French power in the Far East and fearing British predominance in this area, had already joined Britain in the second war against China in 1856. Religion played a part in the Chinese intervention, for the Emperor was ostensibly demonstrating his allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church by avenging the death of a French missionary. Thus, there was precedent for French reprisals in Annam, and Napoleon decided to seize the opportunity. With the protection of Christians abroad as his purpose, he determined to send an expedition to Cochinchina in

conjunction with the Spanish government, which wished to avenge the martyrdom of Monsignor Diaz in July 1857. The war in China ended in June 1858, and the expedition to Cochinchina could then be undertaken.

It is impossible to evaluate the extent to which persecution in Vietnam influenced Napoleon III's decision to attempt the invasion. Certainly it provided an excuse, and was a factor which he, dependent upon Church support in France, could not easily ignore. During the preceding 25 years, 7 bishops and 15 French and Spanish priests had been killed, and the Empress herself took interest in an intervention to punish the Annamese government. The mystique of a religious crusade, then, served as the basis for the expedition to Cochinchina. There had built up in France the feeling that protection of French missionaries concerned the French government, and the continuous persecution of these missionaries intimately touched upon French national honor. Yet, as a noted missionary has pointed out:

Other motives exclusively derived from national honor would have sufficed . . . without the religious question, to decide Napoleon III; the prodigious insults to our nationals, merchants or sailors; the outrages made to our flag; the expulsions of our consuls.

The sanction of a religious issue extended only to the initial French intervention.

Finally, Napoleon III in 1857 informed the world that "the ruthless persecutions of missionaries have brought our warships, on more than one occasion, to the coast of the Annamite kingdom, but their efforts to enter into relations with the government have been futile. The government of the /French/ emperor cannot allow its overtures to be spurned. Therefore, an expedition has been planned."

Spain initially cooperated with France, but essentially it was the latter that from 1858 to 1885 (plus 13 more years for pacification campaigns in Tonkin) established a variety of rule and administration over what became known as French Indochina: Laos, Cambodia, Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina.

French Rule and Vietnamese Struggles for  
Independence, 1885-1925

by

Frank N. Trager

Conquest followed by a series of treaties, the first of which was signed in 1862, permitted the French to establish direct colonial rule over Cochinchina (South Vietnam), and protectorates (treaties of 1884-1885 with China) over Annam (Central Vietnam) and Tonkin (North Vietnam). The name of the country, Vietnam, was officially abolished. In related fashion, though involving conflict with Siam and Manchu China, the French also established protectorates over Cambodia and Laos in 1863 and 1893-1895 respectively. By 1897 the French had complete mastery over these states, but did not yet have peace among their inhabitants. The Vietnamese of the Center, now called the Annamites, began their continued resistance against French rule when the Regents and Mandarins (called "Scholars") supporting Ham Nghi, the 12-year-old Emperor at Huế, attacked the French, were repulsed, and fled to the mountainous area of Ha Tinh province, and for three years successfully eluded capture. (A similar resistance to French power took place in Cambodia in 1885-1886, led by Prince Si Vaththa.) This, the hopeless revolt of the Scholars, was only the first of a series of resistance efforts.

Though it is customary to refer to "direct" and "indirect" colonial rule, these terms when applied to the French in Indochina do not reveal the substance of French administration. Cochinchina, having been the first part of the peninsula to become a French colony, was under military rule until 1879-1880, when a civil governor and a subordinate colonial council were named. The council was represented in the French Chamber of Deputies, but its members were elected primarily by French civil servants and residents in Cochinchina. Tonkin was treated in the same way, while in the protectorates of Annam, Cambodia, and Laos, the semblance of emperor and kingly rule was allowed to exist. Controls and effective power resided in France and in the French appointees.

Before 1893, the Ministry of Marine and the Ministry of Commerce alternatively and competitively were charged with this responsibility. In that year the affairs of Indochina were placed under the authority of the newly created French Ministry of Colonies. (This was reorganized in 1911 as the General Agency of Colonies.) Until World War II the Ministry of Colonies held jurisdiction over the Governor-General for Indochina. In turn the latter governed through a series of Chief Residents who were in charge of local administration in the colony of Cochinchina (which also had a direct governor) and in the protectorates which retained the nominal headship of the emperor or king. All Mandarins (local) were subordinated to the French Residents and French-dominated local councils.<sup>1</sup>

As indicated, resistance to French rule and rebellions against it began almost immediately with the imposition of full French power and administration. Four years after the suppression of the Scholars' revolt, a more serious one was organized by Le De Tham, "The Tiger of Yen The," who presumably capitulated in 1897--but who in fact proved troublesome to the French throughout the first decade of the 20th Century. De Tham, permitted to rule in a section of northern Tonkin, became almost a legendary figure for his ability to hold off the French. Nationalism as we speak of it today certainly had its origins in Vietnam in the waning years of the 19th Century. Movements were organized by the deposed or belittled Vietnamese emperors, by their loyal civil servants, the Mandarins, and by other patriotic Vietnamese who were willing to fight against French colonialism and its denigration or destruction of Vietnamese traditional society. How much popular support these movements acquired is debatable, but that they had or later acquired some popular support is clear, for otherwise they could not have been organized, led, and animated by the elite or educated groups whose initial responsibility they usually were and whose inspiration in most cases called them forth.

The French were willing to use the Mandarins and other Vietnamese as intermediaries between themselves and the general public, but they always used them in positions inferior to those held by the French and always continued to regard them as untrustworthy. In doing this they thought they were introducing French administration, French civilization, French law and custom--all, of course, superior by definition and decree to the indigenous variety. They thus continued to alienate those who might have helped them build a new bridge to a multiracial and more egalitarian society which in high theory the French espoused. And they deepened the antagonism of those others who never would cooperate with that more paternalistic notion of French colonial policy, to wit, that France carried to Indochina its "civilizing mission."

Sixty-five years after the first Scholars' revolt a Vietnamese, Doan Quan Tan, not unfriendly to the French, spoke at the Alliance Française of Indochina (April 16, 1949). Even then he could say:

But here and now the people of our country are jostled and bullied; rights are claimed and satisfaction is given; the French administrator, the French colonial, the French shop-keeper, all have to do with an all-powerful French administration inclined to favour them. "It's only human," say the French, indulgently. "It's inhuman," is the opinion of the Vietnamese, the butt of this unequal treatment, ill-used in their own land, by strangers whom they consider as guests. In short, some speak of rights, but only for themselves, the lot of duty falls on other shoulders. On one side are all the civic and political rights, and the liberties that ensue. On the other side, nothing. Not even the right to justice or to equity. However intelligent, all their lives the Vietnamese have been relegated to inferior posts; they had never the right to administrate a province; except for a few rare exceptions, they could never become the judges of their own countrymen; though fulfilling the same office and doing the same work, they never got but ten seventeenthths of their French colleague's salary. Not a few high-up civil servants of the Viet-Nam earned less than a French gendarme. But why, you will probably ask me, did the Vietnamese never protest instead of waiting, instead of putting up with the injustices, the blunders and humiliations, instead of shutting themselves up in their silence; only to burst out all of a sudden? How could they protest? We hadn't the right to vote, the Cochinchinese deputy was elected by the French and the Hindus, which latter were, as we have explained, French citizens, imported for the purpose of the elections and royally rewarded from funds . . . acquired in Indo-China.

And this is the explanation, in brutal terms, of our present conflict.

As we shall see, Doan Quan Tan was a good analyst of the ailment but not a good historian. For the protests were made repeatedly and repeatedly suppressed.

## FRENCH ADMINISTRATION AND VIETNAMESE PROTESTS

While sporadic armed resistance continued through the end of the 19th Century, the bloody struggle of conquest, which had lasted for almost three decades, was considered ended by 1900, a year which passed unmarred by serious rebel activity. With victory secure, the French in 1897 dispatched Paul Doumer, an administrative and financial expert, to the colony, with the avowed purpose of making it economically self-sufficient. It should be noted that between the "rule of the Admirals" in Cochinchina (1861-1879) and the arrival of Doumer several Governors-General had intervened. Only one of them, Paul Bert, who died early in office, had shown any sympathetic understanding for the plight of the Vietnamese.

Doumer, who later became President of France, was eminently equipped for this job and succeeded in setting an irreversible pattern by which Indochina was to develop not according to its own needs, but in accordance with the 19th-Century colonial concept, in a functional relationship to France. In 1898 he unified the administration of the five states by obtaining a general budget and setting up general services, all directly responsible to the Governor-General. The local state budgets were balanced with direct taxes. The general budget, financed with indirect taxation, was devised to support an ambitious program of many new long-term developmental projects, including mines, roads, bridges, and railroads and harbors, thereby laying the foundation for the infrastructure of the newly organized colony.

In the zeal of his purely organizational approach, Doumer imposed many hardships on the local population which brought them no tangible benefits. His most unpopular measures were government salt and alcohol monopolies which touched the daily lives of the peasants. All the peasants depended on cheap salt in their daily diet, many depended upon its production and marketing for their livelihood, and alcohol was necessary for their traditional rites. During his five-year term he had little, if any, inclination to develop a policy which would involve the Vietnamese. He was indifferent to popular clamor for education, and discontent spread among the educated at his policy of employing French personnel even on the lowest administrative level of government. The keynote of his administration was the 19th-Century French policy of assimilation, which had the long-range goal of turning Vietnamese into Frenchmen. As Virginia Thompson pointed out, "The political and cultural assimilation of a colony was favored by an overwhelming majority in the late 19th Century. This involved the destruction of existing native institutions, and their



replacement by those prevalent in France, with an inevitable substitution of language. It was believed that the mere knowledge of French would bring an insatiable thirst for French ideas and manufactures."<sup>3</sup> By the end of Doumer's term the destructive aspect of the policy had succeeded admirably, but no efforts had been made to create new Vietnamese institutions to fill the void.

It was his successor, Governor-General Paul Beau (1902-1907), who fell heir to the problem of the "moral conquest" of the Vietnamese people. His genuine concern for the indigenes was manifested in some humanitarian medical efforts, abolishment of corporal punishment, and enunciation of a "revolutionary" educational policy, which was revolutionary only in that it was a first step in a field in which no action had been taken by the French so far. Beau appointed a director of public education, created a Franco-Vietnamese curriculum, started sending gifted students to France, and cautiously opened some lower-rank administrative jobs to the Vietnamese. His reforms were too late, too superficial, and too mild. Three years of bad harvests and fundamental discontent with the high taxes, corrupt tax collectors, and monopolies aggravated peasant misery.

In the middle of Beau's term of office occurred the event which was to give nationalist sentiment a new direction and new courage: the Japanese victory over Russia. Up to this point the French had studiously ignored counsel against a policy of repression and exploitation. They had assumed from their military victory a mandate to proceed with colonization without fear of serious opposition. Arms had in fact been the only form of resistance offered by the Indochinese peoples. That opposition derived in part from the Old Scholars, high-ranking members of the mandarin class who had most to lose by French conquest; who sought to preserve the monarchy and their traditional Confucian ideals and systems, fighting in small armed bands, with little organization and little sense of national purpose. At the turn of the century, however, the seepage of western ideas through the French and through Annam's traditional teacher, China, inspired a new form of resistance. The new nationalist leaders, drawn from the educated elite, or lettrés, held out modernization as their unanimous goal, although they held differing political philosophies.

Now with the victory of Japan over a white European power, Vietnamese students turned to Japan's schools and in turn sent letters and pamphlets back home. These in the words of one self-styled "obscure student" were designed to show how Japan had "been able to conquer the impotent Europeans"; to enlist

other Vietnamese students to come to Japan and to join forces with the "six hundred" already there who in turn had as their "only aim" to "prepare the population /In Vietnam/ for the future." One of these "students" was Phan Bội Châu, who had been a supporter of Phan Dinh Phung. The latter had in turn fought for an imperial restoration after the defeat of Emperor Ham Nghi and his Scholars in 1888. Phan Bôi Châu is a major link in this nationalist chain to Japan and back to Vietnam. His first defiant political pamphlet, "Letters Written in Blood," had been published in 1903, in a traditional Chinese literary form with allusions understood only by the educated elite. By 1905 he had decided that Japan, which he had already visited, would lead the colonial Asian nations out of bondage. He returned from Tokyo with the firm belief in a society built on modern, rational, and scientific concepts like Japan, and with reinforced faith in his idea of restoring the monarchy, also based on the Japanese example. He brought home the idea that Japan would aid his cause. Chau attracted a great following among the young. He organized a "secret" revolutionary society known as the Vietnam Modernization League; and he sponsored into exile in Japan one of the great early nationalist figures, Prince Nguyen Cuong De. These rebels did not get what they hoped for from either China or Japan--that is direct aid to oust the French--but their clandestine activity inside Vietnam again erupted in 1908 in Tonkin and Annam.

In that year these returned students plotted unsuccessfully to poison the French garrison at Hué. They then agitated publicly "for the day when France will relinquish Indochina." The activity continued until the French arrested the leaders in 1910. The next year the Chinese Revolution began, instigated by the "Young China" group of Sun Yat-sen and others who had previously found refuge and support in Hanoi. Violence again broke out in Vietnam, while Phan Bôi Châu, from Canton, organized what became the major fountainhead of successive nationalist organizations, the Vietnam Restoration League, and proclaimed a Provisional Government of the Republic of Annam. In 1913-1914 the French military suppressed all dissidence and succeeded in killing De Tham, who had been one of the leaders of armed struggle since 1897.

The factors that gave rise to Vietnamese nationalism and then, later, to communism are easy to see and to diagnose. In the first place, the Vietnamese did not want to be dominated by the French any more than they wanted domination by the Chinese. Nationalism in a "colonial" country begins as a revolt against alien power. Whatever political, racial, cultural, economic, or religious factors go into it, it is always a revolt against alien power.

The pre-European, pre-French economy of Indochina, as in most of mainland Southeast Asia, was based primarily on subsistence production for the indigenous population. Rice and other food products, edible oils from kernels, fruit, fish, woods, weaving, and semiprecious, precious, and other mining constituted the staples of the empire. Rice was seldom if ever exported. But fish, nuts, ebony, ivory, turtle shells, and lacquers were among the products exchanged in the coastal trade of Vietnam's China Sea ports.

The arrival of the French as empire-builders in the 1860s, the opening of the Suez Canal, the use of imported Chinese labor and capital transformed this subsistence economy into an extractive one owned and managed by the French. Rice and rubber became the major items of export for the world market, with raw silk, pepper, tobacco, and other products being imported into France for French domestic consumption. There is no doubt that the French improved the quantity and quality of rice production, contributing thereby to the fact that French Indochina became before World War II the third largest exporter of that item after Burma and Thailand. Also the French developed both the rubber plantations and the extensive coal mines at Hongay and elsewhere in North Vietnam. Tonkin became the so-called "industrial" north while the south became the granary for the whole country. This condition was inherited by the Communist north and the democratic south after 1954.

The French built a variety of roads connecting the two parts of the country and the economy. They, like other imperialist powers in the 19th Century, engaged in public works, public health, and sanitation primarily in the major cities where the colonial administrative and managerial elements were to live. They not only introduced new and better crops, as indicated above, but also improved irrigation, canals, and other elements which helped both production and marketing.

But the changeover from a subsistence economy to a commercial one brought undesirable effects to the countryside. Landlordism gradually got control of the major crop-producing areas --so much so that before the French departed they and the Chinese moneylenders, who constituted less than 3% of the population, owned about 50% of the Mekong Delta rice lands. The peasant farmer who formerly had a use-title to his land became a debt-ridden tenant farmer or farm laborer, or joined the displaced urban "lumpen proletariat." As in Burma, the indigenous 80% rural population --mainstay of the country--became less and less rooted peasants. The benefits of their land and their labor went to the foreigner --French or Chinese.

France had invested heavily in Indochina but the investment primarily benefited the French and France. Only a very thin top layer of Vietnamese acquired French culture, French citizenship, and a share in the new money economy grafted onto the subsistence economy of the rural masses. As Furnivall pointed out in his classic work on Burma, where the same conditions prevailed, the Indochinese rural masses paid taxes, had little if any say in the government, gradually lost their rights to the land, and found their traditional, commune-autonomous village system disrupted by foreign economic, legal, and socio-cultural modes.

There was hardly ever a time during the period of French encroachment and then domination when nationalist-minded or patriotic Vietnamese leaders could not rally to their banner other Vietnamese, including both educated elites and more or less illiterate followers in the countryside. Even the French-educated Vietnamese elites found few opportunities for participating in the French regime in Vietnam except in positions that were inferior in both power and pay. Progressive self-government was not an aim of Paris for the colony. French colonial administration amounted to rule by French officials in Paris, Hanoi, and Saigon. Though some Vietnamese were grudgingly appointed to the so-called consultative bodies, these were limited to a docile minority of French beneficiaries.

In this atmosphere of deprivation Vietnamese nationalism easily flourished. As in other Southeast Asian colonies, existing indigenous patriotism, whether Burmese, Vietnamese, or Indonesian, was fed not only by the Japanese victory over Russia and the Chinese Republican victory of Sun Yat-sen, but also by the Russian Revolution and above all by ideas of democratic and Marxist revolutionary education, derived from the West, in this case from France.

In 1883-1885, as we have seen, a "secret" society--in the Chinese mode--organized around the displaced mandarin, launched an abortive revolt in the name of the Vietnamese emperor. In this, the Scholars' revolt failed. But it took the French some 14 years to bring the countryside of Tonkin and Annam back to "peace."

Such revolts continued in the next decade, always contributing some Vietnamese figure to the roster of anti-French heroes. Phan Boi Chau helped to establish a dual pattern for displaced and escaping nationalist figures. Some went to Southern China, especially to the Canton area, which became a center for Vietnamese nationalism and later communism; others went to Japan, where they received overt and covert assistance and training, especially after 1905. In both places "secret" Vietnamese societies flourished.

And in Vietnam their followers and supporters engaged in anti-French agitation by various means, e.g., the Tonkin Free School movement and the Hair-Cutters movement. These movements were suppressed by the French and their leaders exiled. One such leader, exiled to France, was Phan Chu Trinh, who became the teacher of young Vietnamese brought or sent to France during World War I. One of his pupils was Nguyen Ai Quoc--better known to us as Ho Chi Minh.

The 1910s and the 1920s witness the continuation of these nationalist movements under one or another of various Vietnamese heroes. Agitation, strikes, terror, and insurrection continue to be their instruments--interrupted occasionally by peaceful interludes.

### A MODERATE FRENCH VIEW OF VIETNAMESE

#### PROTEST MOVEMENTS

It may be instructive for us today to see this same story of Vietnamese struggles for freedom from the vantage point of reasonable Frenchmen who advised a policy of enlightened rule and cooperation with patriotic, nationalist Vietnamese elements. One such voice was that of the Comité de L'Asie Française. Founded in 1901 with Eugene Etienne, a Cabinet Minister and Senator, as its first President, it adopted as its purpose the aspiration of constituting "a unifying center of economic, diplomatic, ethnic, social, and religious information which is needed for reasoned action in face of the problems of the Levant and the Far East." It published until 1940 what became a distinguished journal, Asie Française, beginning in April 1901. The journal chronicled the events in Indochina (and the Near and Far East in general), and from time to time published articles dealing with the Vietnamese resistance movement and its aspirations. Its founding statement, written for the first issue by Etienne, enunciated the primary aim of "insuring the economic prosperity of the country and especially the willing cooperation of the natives with their French political teachers." The intent of this policy was in part based on concern for the subject peoples, but prompted also by fear that the ferment in China might endanger French interests in Asia. "The time has come for France to have a definite Asian policy, conscious of herself. The Chinese crisis, just begun, will not fail to change profoundly for better or for worse, the situation of people with interests in Asia." The Comité foresaw the strengthening of China as a threat to French rule in Indochina, and urged consistently that

Indochina be made an "organisme animé d'une vie propre," able to survive by herself without having to drain metropolitan France. The journal would inform public opinion in France about events in Asia, in order to give it a sense of the future and provide a factual basis for the foundation of a cohesive, long-range colonial policy. It recognized the dangerous tendency in a democracy to destroy continuity in policy, and hoped to counteract this feature of a system of government where power rests on the changing will of its people.

It should be useful here to recount the activities of the early Vietnamese nationalists, as they were presented to the readers of Asie Française (hereafter, AF), in the years 1900-1925, i.e., those covered in this section.

The first such series of social and political articles, usually unsigned and headed "Lettres de l'Indochine," appeared in May 1906, when the effect of the Japanese victory was starting to be felt. The initial letter simply noted the development of some political consciousness among the peasants of Tonkin. AF also noted the loss of prestige suffered by the King of Annam among Tonkinese peasants, in comparison with the glorified public image of Governor-General Beau, who made a greater impression on them with his new educational policy. While AF points out that the mass of the people were still far from thoughts of deposing the monarchy, murmurs were heard among the peasantry favoring more direct rule as exercised in Cochinchina. The feeling existed, it is asserted, that the indigenous rulers were in any case mere French puppets and an unnecessary expense. At the time of the Emperor's visit to the seat of his ancestors near Hanoi, many peasants were heard expressing the superstitious fear that his presence there might cause bad harvests.

In noting this reaction, AF suggested that an important effect of French domination, under the pressure of modern ideas, was to bring about a transformation among the whole of Annamite society. Where it was possible, the French had tried during the early stages of the conquest to preserve and work through some of the local institutions and mandarinates. But the Confucian tradition rested on an ethic of immutability, which alone had permitted it to last until the French conquest. The mandarinates were corrupt and self-seeking; faced with foreign domination, some mandarins turned to armed resistance, but more abandoned their moral and educative role in the society, and either fled or collaborated with the French, discrediting themselves in the eyes of the people. The monarchy had not escaped degradation either, for by one method or another, the French always assured themselves of a cooperative "sovereign." With all the traditional

sources of authority in their society discredited, the Vietnamese (called Annamites) were thus susceptible to new ideas and institutions. In June 1908 AF was at pains to point out that the Vietnamese had not found this "good mother" in the French administration. In another letter much discontent among the peasantry was described. The great economic changes in the country had not affected the masses; railroads were being built, but hunger was rife; the cost of living had skyrocketed due to inflation; and the major objects of bitterness were the alcohol and salt monopolies, and unequal taxes which hit the peasants hardest. A Tonkinese was quoted as observing that the peasant was not thinking of revolt, since he was used to domination. Hence, this same spokesman added, the peasant would as willingly accept Japanese domination as French, and France should not count on the Annamites to prevent Japan from taking over their country if such an attempt were made.

This prophetic note was picked up the following month in an article headed "L'Evolution de l'esprit annamite." The author described an important body of local opinion which deserved notice--that of the lettered Tonkinese. Two types were defined: classic Chinese scholars, and more significant, those who were Western oriented. He pointed out that the French were creating a dangerous class of uprooted intellectuals who had high aspirations and had overcome strong family and social opposition to obtain Western education. Their achievement had not been recognized by the colonials, and Vietnamese society still gave classic scholars more respect. In 1904 some administrative positions had been opened to them, but these jobs offered no responsibilities and were usually only for translators. Furthermore, the youths whom the French had permitted to be educated in France were exposed there to a democratic society and treated well. Upon their return to Vietnam they were held in contempt by French colonials and treated as "boys."

AF attributed the growing popularity of Western education primarily to the example of Japan, which had achieved so much success in applying the techniques learned from the West against it. Additional spurs were the introduction of quoc-ngu (romanized Vietnamese) and the example of the Chinese empress who had just embarked on a program of reforms. Public desire to learn was intense. In 1904 Chinese newspapers had been banned in Tonkin, which had the effect of increasing their popularity. Other widespread literature, in Chinese translations, included the works of Rousseau, Voltaire, and histories of Europe and Japan. The influence of Phan Boi Chau in particular was cited, in regard to the importance attached to Western education. His pamphlet exhorting Vietnamese youth to study is reprinted, along with an

anonymous pamphlet circulating in Tonkin, and a popular song, which were causing a stir among the youth.

Chau's "Advice to the Young to Study Abroad," which was "written in tears," derides his countrymen for their ignorance. We are human beings like the Japanese, writes Chau, exhorting Vietnamese to organize aid societies to send their youth abroad to Japan to study. The anonymous pamphlet, written probably by one of Chau's followers, calls the Vietnamese fools, who deserve the treatment they are getting at the hands of the French. It urges the youth to study and learn the talents the Japanese have acquired, and thus prepare to reconquer Annam.

The "chanson populaire" has a more bitter and political tone. It extols the Japanese emperor as a glorious wise prince who has reformed his nation and inspired the sentiment of national solidarity. The Annamite king is by contrast called a "wooden statue." It accuses the French of keeping Annamites in darkness and decries the foreign character of all impetus for modernization in Vietnam. In true French romantic literary style the author cries "Awake, Annam. Call forth a new education and national solidarity."

On the question of Vietnamese education, AF spotlighted the issue which according to Virginia Thompson<sup>4</sup> provided the first forum for nationalist agitation in the 20th Century. "Learning, not revolution was the byword of the great majority before 1914." In mentioning for the first time the name Phan Boi Chau, it named the individual who personified at least for the first two decades of the 20th Century the political character of the Vietnamese resistance. AF was unaware that the author of the "Advice to Study" had been organizing loyalist bands against the French since 1900.

In September 1906, AF examined "L'Etat des esprits en Cochinchine" and found the new educated class there also chafing under French subordination and turning for inspiration to Japan. A Cochinchinese expressed to the reporter their pleasure in the proof offered by the Japanese that "there was some value in yellow skin." This spokesman showed a growing pride of race when he spoke bitterly about the pressured resignation of a "native" who had been accidentally elected to the Vice Presidency of the Cochinchinese Colonial Council. (AF had earlier reported and deplored the incident.)

The author criticized French policy, stating: "We try to put ourselves on a pedestal, but our acts lower us to the level of the crowd." The Cochinchinese did not respect their representatives in elected councils, he said, viewing them rather as French puppets. He asserted that the French were creating still another



class of malcontents: the unrecognized children of French men and local women. They were also overburdening the peasants with the salt and alcohol monopolies, feeding their desire to revolt, and filling the ranks of the secret societies. The constitution of one of the numerous secret societies fell into the hands of AF and is reprinted. These are seen as especially dangerous because of their ties with the Chinese societies. The most invidious feature is their brutality, exemplified by the best known, the "Société du Ciel et de la Terre" in Saigon. The author calls attention to the frequent murder of Vietnamese who refuse to join and cites the brutal punishment meted out to those who refuse to abide by the decisions of the society, and to those who betray it. If AF misjudged the extent of Chinese influence in the secret societies, it was correct in underlining the growing importance of the societies themselves, which multiplied rapidly and provided a haven for nationalist agitators.

AF continued in October 1906 to attempt to get at the root of Vietnamese feelings revealed since the Japanese victory. It was found a difficult task because the local councilors were "useless" as true representatives. Either they were too fearful to express themselves, or had no knowledge of the French language, in which discussions were conducted. The lack of and great need for an effective channel for indigenous opinion was emphasized, and the author called again for reform of taxes and their fraudulent collection. These taxes went mostly for the public works, which were for the benefit of France, not the "natives," he pointed out. He also called attention to the people's tremendous desire for education, and urged that they be trained for full cooperation in government. The desire was already there, he said. Japan and Rousseau's ideas had already showed them the road.

The author saw it as dangerous not to encourage a complete policy of association. This was the name given to the increasingly popular theory that there was some value in Annamite culture, at least for the Annamites, and that the French should try to adapt it to modern times, and work with it and the people, rather than continue to follow their destructive policy of assimilation. By 1905 in France, there was a formidable amount of criticism of assimilation, which had succeeded in destroying much of the foundation of Vietnamese society and culture, but had replaced it with nothing. Governor-General Beau's educational efforts were seen a step in the associationist direction. The French colonials in Indochina were violently opposed to any policy of cooperation that might raise the level of the Vietnamese to challenge their supremacy. They advanced a series of arguments against it, which the writer in AF systematically refutes.

"Nothing in the organization of this people is opposed to level by level rapprochement with us." He discounts the influence of conservative Chinese thought in Annam, noting that since the Chinese reforms, and since the Japanese victory, the Annamites see these two Asian powers as on the same path as the West. Religion is not necessarily divisive, he says. The Chinese family-based ethic is not properly a religion or a culture that would defy modern society. The author adds that politically, before the French came, the Vietnamese never constituted a solid group from Tonkin to Cochinchina. Annam and Tonkin were rivals. Under the French, Cochinchina grew away from the Hué emperor. Tonkin is also growing away, but not toward alliance with Cochinchina. "If a union of Annamite spirits occurs, it will be under our eyes, and if it is against us, it will be our fault."

AF gives a voice to some Vietnamese exponents of the policy of cooperation. In "Cahiers annamites," "a group of Annamites" state: "For fifty years we have suffered under a policy of domination, which has created a gulf between masters and subjects which grows bigger every day, inciting hatred and leading to bloodshed." They add that France understands this and beg her to work for our "physical and moral uplifting, like the Americans in the Philippines. . . . We do not intend to be slaves forever. We want to be treated like men." This letter, written in excellent French, ends on a sarcastic note, with a plea for the reader to excuse their French, since they were only permitted a primary education.

An extract from another local letter is also offered, decrying unjust accusations of disloyalty against the Vietnamese. The writer advises that if the French treated them well and showed respect for their educated compatriots, they would remain loyal.

The most effective spokesman and leader of the educated Vietnamese who hoped to achieve modernization and eventual independence through collaboration with the French was another lettré, Phan Chau Trinh. He, like Phan Boi Chau, had been travelling up and down his country, calling for the awakening of national energies and deriding the corrupt mandarins. In August 1906 he had addressed an open letter to Governor-General Beau which, while decrying the obvious evils of French administration, was of enormous importance in that it was, according to Le Than Khoi,<sup>5</sup> the first local expression of rejection of the antique monarchical system. Trinh signalled the birth of the "reformist" movement by setting up a republican ideal and calling for participation of the masses and a modern economy; he offered to collaborate with the French in working toward these goals. This letter somehow escaped the attention of AF, but it remarked Trinh's influence

in a brief, intense period of educational activity in 1907 and 1908. In June 1907 AF applauded the founding of several education societies and schools, under the leadership of the Free School of Tonkin. This school, inspired by Phan Chau Trinh's principles, rapidly attracted over 1,000 students. It offered a free education in three languages, and in French, Chinese, and Vietnamese national culture, the exact sciences, and political economy. Another "Society of Encouragement for Secondary, Superior, and Professional Education" was founded, which AF found worthy of French support. The French, however, suppressed this society because its purpose was to send students abroad. They ignored the intent of this group to send its youth to France and assumed it was Japanese oriented, like the illegal activities of Phan Boi Chau.

The Free School of Tonkin originally had the support of the French; but it possessed its own printing press and was emboldened by its success to print nationalist propaganda. The French closed its doors after eight months, imprisoning its leaders at Poulo Condore, an island the French transformed into a prison camp for political offenders.

In May 1908, AF signalled some "Troubles indigenes" in its monthly news summary. It said the local press had been talking for several weeks of an unusual movement in the four central Annamite provinces. The nature of this peasant movement was difficult to determine. It had been issuing a peaceful call for moral reform while apparently engaged in stealing from rich Annamites. The peasants sported short hair, i.e., were modernizing by cutting off their traditional queues, which AF noted seemed to be the principal sign of reform in the Far East. AF attributed the movement to discontent with taxes and the inflammatory effect of students in and returning from Japan. Generally, the peasants seemed to direct their ire against the mandarins, without challenging French authority. This strange manifestation was quickly repressed by government troops, and Phan Chau Trinh was arrested as its leader and condemned to die (he was later exiled instead to France). AF points out that if he was behind the demonstration, his past indicated that he was really against the mandarins and not the French. The author refers to a curious pamphlet by Trinh published in the June 1907 issue of Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise de l'Extrême Orient, in which he blamed the mandarins for the misery and stupidity of the Vietnamese people. He ascribed their misery to three causes: too much authority remaining in the hands of the mandarins; French contempt for all Vietnamese; and misunderstandings between the French and the "natives," perpetuated by the mandarins for their own interest.

The following month AF again discussed the peasant demonstration in its monthly review. It noted that measures taken for order ("repression is too severe a term") had avoided violence. The movement was serious enough, however, to seek the motive. Phan Chau Trinh, who was seen behind it, announced that he was not hostile to a France which modernized Annam. If this is so, how can we modernize, asked the author? Should we dispose of the mandarinat, or align with the mandarin minority who want to enthrone a constitutional emperor at Hué? Without going further into this question, the author urged that the most needed reforms be effected: that the method of tax collection be reformed, the salt monopoly be abolished, and the French functionaries in the colony be required to learn the Vietnamese language.

In August 1908 AF chronicled the continuance of local manifestations in the form of a poison plot at the Hanoi garrison. In contrast to the colonials' hysteria, AF played down the plot and called it just a warning. The author found that the colonials had grossly exaggerated its character. The guilty ones were sentenced to death, and that should be the end of it. It was not until the following March that AF treated the matter more fully, at which time the trial of one of the plotters revealed the hitherto unsuspected links among all the Vietnamese manifestations of the last few years.

In March 1909, in an article on Le De Tham, AF announced that the old rebel chief had finally been crushed, although he personally was not yet captured. The author attributes the government's final and successful routing of his band to the hysteria caused by the Hanoi poison plot. The French were worried by the dangerous legends growing up around him. He controlled a virtually independent principality in the brush, in the province of Yen-the, whose geography favored his movements. He had become a sort of national hero favored by the lettrés, especially the Japan-centered group, that is by Phan Boi Chau and Prince Cuong De, now recognized as a king by the other two.

Thus, AF reveals, the De Tham question was joined to the question of native agitation. As for the Hanoi poison plot, this was also the joint work of Chau and De Tham. Some lettrés attracted the "native" soldiers in the Hanoi garrison to a pseudo-education society. They were enrolled in legitimist troops De Tham pretended to form. De Tham spoke to them as the general of the exiled king preparing for war. He led the soldiers to believe that Chau and Cuong De had written that the war should take place that year. Elaborate rites and rituals were set up for the would-be army, especially at the garrison. The author points out that despite the ridiculous supposition that the Hanoi troops alone could

overthrow the French, the plotters were able to play on the superstition of the people and support them. The idea was often "revealed" that the Japanese would come to aid their cause.

When the story "broke," on June 27, 1908, the conspiracy was at least ten months old. The poison plot turned out a tragedy-comedy. While it did little real harm (it was discovered before the poison caused any injury), it raised the cry for heads among the French. AF placed this plot in the "pure tradition of Annamite revolutions." Few Vietnamese soldiers were actually involved, and it never constituted any real threat. But it could have snowballed if not for the quick trials and the end of De Tham's power.

The French hysteria had resulted in the closing of the newly opened University of Hanoi and many other local educational institutions. AF continued in its analysis by criticizing this reaction. It asserted that all the lettrés involved in the plots had been from the old school: "Phobias dominate our colonial policy." Revolutionary ideas could enter the country in a thousand other ways besides French language schools, the article continued. Closing schools which offered modern education would not prevent the growth of anti-French feeling. "We must be reconciled to the fact that native intellectuals will never be very favorable to us." The author also added that the Japanese government had no hand in the native movements. Japan had been extremely suspect after her victory, but in 1907 had signed a treaty with France which guaranteed the security of the latter's Asian interests. "We must stop seeing an evil Japanese fairy behind Indochinese agitation."

The years between 1908 and 1913 were not marked by serious manifestations of nationalist resistance. Phan Boi Chau and Prince Cuong De remained in Japan until they were expelled in 1910, and thereafter in China and Siam; Phan Chau Trinh, whose death sentence was commuted in 1908, was permitted to live in Paris.

In March 1910, AF published "une opinion annamite sur la domination française" by Hoang Cao Khai, a member of the Conseil Supérieur de l'Indochine and the Légion of Honor, who was in favor of collaboration and believed that the French domination could be turned into a benefit for Indochina. His major thesis was that Annam should turn to France for guidance. No good purpose could be served by turning to Japan, he felt, pointing to the misery of Korea under Japanese rule. He advised his countrymen to stay with France, because independence would come. He argued

pragmatically that the average Frenchman, with his comparatively high standard of living, would not want to colonize the area and that the French were bound now to foster a more liberal policy because they wanted Indochina to remain loyal and be able to defend itself against Asian aggressors. He looked forward to the day in 50 to 100 years, when modern education should have enlightened all his compatriots, and France would have granted them internal autonomy. AF did not comment on the views expressed here. It would appear that this spokesman was either an example of thorough assimilation, or sincerely taken in by French oratory.

August 1912 was marked by the assassinations of two Frenchmen, both isolated incidents. The following month AF quoted Lieutenant Governor M. Destenay as denouncing the Siamese and Chinese he said coming into Annam and Tonkin, and stirring up nationalist emotions in favor of the Annamite reformists. M. Destenay noted, however, that one root of nationalist discontent was continued failure to recognize the achievements of educated "natives." He advised sardonically that it would be better to close the schools than to keep up this disastrous policy.

Later in the year (December), AF chronicled and applauded an order issued to the chiefs of the general services to stop the practice of "tutoyer" of natives. Low-grade French civil servants had been addressing Vietnamese who worked in their offices, many of whom had advanced degrees earned in France, with the language forms suitable for children and servants.

If the relative quiet on the surface of these years led to complacency, the events of 1913 were to prove that Vietnamese resistance was not dead. AF first signalled this with a brief mention that on April 26 a bomb had been thrown in Hanoi, and that the act had been done by the followers of Cuong De, like the 1908 plot. "Unfortunately," it continued, "such acts can find an echo in a population which cannot be happy with our native policy, as recently proved by the decision of the Governor-General in the alcohol affair [i.e., restoration of a government monopoly]." In the same issue AF reported and deplored the raiding of the tomb of the Emperor Tu Duc, apparently by some French colonials in search of the treasure hidden there. AF condemns the Resident Supérieur of Annam, who permitted this to happen, revealing "his complete ignorance of the native soul."

The next month AF presented a long feature on "La Bombe de Hanoi," written by Charles Fournier-Vally. He also attributed the bomb to the revolutionaries grouped around Chau and Cuong De and presented two schools of thought on the way to solve the problem of local discontent and agitation. He first gave the account

of a meeting held by the French of Cochinchina urging the government to re-establish severe local justice (comparable to that which had been imposed in 1908) to avoid further incidents. These colonials attributed the native troubles to the misguided humanitarianism and liberalism of Governor-General Sarraut, much as they had blamed the 1908 disturbances on the "pro-native" policies of Paul Beau, who was recalled just a few weeks before those demonstrations occurred.

The opposing point of view on how to handle the situation was presented in the same issue by excerpts from a letter from Phan Chau Trinh, published originally in a Paris newspaper. Trinh proclaimed that he had foreseen this tragedy. He said he had made his views known to Messimy, the Minister of Colonies, and to Governor-General Sarraut.

I told them that if they did not give the people of Annam the reforms they promised, there would be much to fear. That was twenty months ago. Since, they have done some small things for the Annamites, but their efforts were like giving candy to a baby to erase the sting of blows he had received; the alcohol monopoly was renewed, although they promised it would not be; the patriots imprisoned in Poulo Condore perished while they were promised grace; the education we call for is always refused; the contempt in which we are held is ever increased, and now they add new faults to these old ones: they violate the sacred tomb of Tu Duc for money! The people of Annam want to learn, to be respected . . . they want little by little to emancipate themselves. On this point, do you not think it is to France's interest to come to an understanding with the Annamites? The day when the people of Annam, instructed by France, will obtain from her, normally, their autonomy, France, who will have prepared us for liberty, who will have given it to us, will conserve with us all her interests and we will love her as friends and allies.

The author finds Trinh's views extreme and claims that he cannot represent the whole of "native opinion." He attacks his points one by one in a much more hard-headed fashion than AF had previously used in regard to nationalist sentiment. Fournier-Vailly fears that Trinh and other French-educated Vietnamese do not believe sincerely in the good intentions of France relative to self-government. He cites an inflammatory pamphlet written in 1907 against certain Annamite notables who had founded a scholarship program for study in France. The crux of its message was:

Twenty years ago our compatriots lived in a profound sleep. They were awakened suddenly by the Russo-Japanese War, and many Annamites went to Japan to work for the independence of Annam. The French could not stop this exodus. They tried to use the mandarins, and even effected some educational reforms. But even the educated were kept enslaved. You are taking your enemies as school masters. The French are keeping us ignorant of science. The French will never instruct Annamites and lead them to progress. You are wasting your time and money.

The author assured himself that Annamite opinion had changed a little since then, in response to some real gains achieved by the French, particularly in medicine. As for education, he advocated professional education, but sputtered that "some of them have the presumption to demand the baccalaureate," and see themselves called to high destinies. He added that the French in Indochina were defeating the good intentions of the French in France. The colonials distrust educated Vietnamese. He concluded by justifying French experience in Indochina and asserted that not only would the French lose all if the "natives ruled," but that they would relapse to their ancient Chinese ways; French institutions could not have penetrated so fast.

A follow-up chronicle in September 1913 on the sanctions imposed for the bomb plot asserted that 85 had been condemned; if sanctions against the plotters had not been taken immediately, this would have been the biggest conspiracy in Tonkin. It was well organized and aimed to chase the French out of the country. The plotters intended to have a series of blows killing all the great local civil and military leaders loyal to France, then to pass into Tonkin with an army of Annamite revolutionaries. The inquiry of the revived Criminal Commission showed that the source of the conspiracy was in the traditional lettrés; but the author adds that we must not conclude that the new-style students are necessarily loyal subjects. He pointed out that Phan Chau Trinh, operating in Paris, was having an effect on Annamite students in France.

Late in December 1913 one Lieutenant J. Coulon discussed the effects of the Chinese Revolution in Cochinchina. Some malcontents followed the events with passion, he said, but the young Cochinchinese who think are not Sinophiles. They intend to drive the Chinese out of their position of economic dominance. In the same issue the editors noted that the Lieutenant Governor had taken measures to stop a curious movement of revolutionary propaganda, the distribution of clandestine money. This revolutionary



money was marked good after "the event" which was to occur in about two years. It was to be suppressed, with severe punishment for its distributors.

Charles Fournier-Vailly again discussed Annamite loyalty in January 1914. He confirmed Sarraut's opinion that most of the population was not responsible for the Hanoi crime and praised the Governor's intent to continue with a liberal policy. He states that events proved that Sarraut was right in this policy, as evidenced by the internal quiet in Annam since the bombing, and by statements of loyalty from the Notables and the Consultative Chamber of Tonkin. But, he asks, how must we interpret this loyalty? Are there different degrees? The Annamite "ne demande qu'a rester fidele et soumis à un protecteur qui le traitera humainement et cherchera à améliorer sa situation matérielle et morale." This, he advanced, was necessary and sufficient. He advised conserving the village organization as the basis of society, but curbing the power of the Notables; he advocated using the lettrés in the administration. "Until this class subordinates itself to the general interest and realizes that economic and social evolution must precede complete liberation of the individual vis-à-vis the community, our measures will seem tyrannical, even if they have the approval of the reformists." These latter are seen as not truly representative of the people.

He also recommends not giving too much credence to those less well advised who keep their aspirations on a political level only. We must nevertheless, he says, keep aware of what they think. Let time do its work. "La France est assez solidement établie en Indochine; elle peut dire en toute sécurité comme en toute douceur: J'y suis, j'y reste."

The smug tone of this commentator should not mask the fact that he made some very astute observations about the character of the nationalist leaders. Their failure to understand the importance of social and economic changes not only increased their hatred of the French, but weakened their own strictly politically oriented movement. They were never able to appeal to the masses with their program, which aimed primarily at education and political reforms, so in fact they represented the educated and new bourgeois elements of the society, rather than the nation as a whole. They never sensed to the end the necessity of turning to the peasantry for support in their national cause.

The war years were characterized by testimonials to the loyalty of the Annamites. In January-April 1915, however, AF called attention to German inroads in the nationalist movement. A correspondent from Hong Kong advised the editors that the material situation of Indochina seemed from reports to be brilliant;

if any trouble were to occur, it would be on the part of the revolutionaries. He reported that they had been much influenced by the tactics of the Kuomintang and had been aided by the Chinese until Yuan Shi-kai came to power. Chau's group then found a new banker in the Germans. From 1912 on, certain suspect Annamites could be found in German schools in Canton, and in 1914 Cuong De had made a trip to Berlin to seek funds. The author estimated that the Germans had given over 500,000 francs to the revolutionaries. However, he opined that they had not succeeded in making any important progress in sabotaging France's war effort.

It was a full year later, January-March 1916, that the next reference to the Indochinese occurred. It was noted that the Japanese entry into the war and the victory at Tsingtao negated German efforts to get the revolutionaries to organize local revolts against the French. Sporadic incidents did occur, but they were not based on, nor did they arouse, any mass sympathy. Vietnamese revolutionaries, numbering barely several hundreds, existed on foreign handouts, and seemed powerless to interest even their own class, much less the peasants, in their program of revolt and destruction. Some joined pirate bands, but most exiled themselves in Siam while waiting for a favorable moment for their plans.

In June 1916 AF chronicled that news had been rare from Indochina since the outbreak of the war, but that this largely reflected a tranquil internal situation. Some outbreaks had occurred, which AF attributed to German influence. In May however, Duy Tan, the youthful Annamite king, was involved in an abortive semicomical plot, resulting in his being deposed and exiled. His unsuccessful cohorts were some of the old monarchists. AF did not take the episode very seriously and revealed injured pride at having been deceived by the young man, rather than anything else.

The next mention of the internal situation of the colony was in 1920. From this year until 1925 occasional news items in the monthly review highlighted the growth of nationalist ideals in all the states. Only two incidents involving violence are reported: a plot in Tonkin in late 1920, similar to the bomb plot of 1913, and an assassination attempt against the reactionary Governor-General Merlin when he was visiting Canton. AF also noted in January 1922 the growth of national sentiment when it reported that the Tonkinese Consultative Chamber had received a request to create several new national holidays, celebrating the birthdays of Gia Long, the great emperor, and other national heroes. The writer found this very important in that it reflected the beginning of patriotic sentiment which transcended village affairs.

This five-year period was most marked, however, by the increase of Bolshevik or Communist propaganda and influence. As early as September 1921, AF attributed anticapitalist tendencies in a native newspaper to Bolshevik influence. The author added that at this point Bolshevism had not made much progress in Indochina. He discounted the influence of the malcontents who propagandized only in writings and disdained the indigent masses, calling them dangerous only in their own milieu. He believed the French could mitigate their effect by granting reforms. By 1924, however, the frequency of reports of Communist activities indicated a new character for the nationalist resistance movement. The name of Phan Boi Chau was heard only once more, in April 1926, when it was reported that after a series of student demonstrations and a violent press campaign, his new death sentence was commuted to lifelong house arrest. The death of Phan Chau Trinh the following year effectively removed the second of the old nationalist leaders, and closed the first chapter of Vietnamese resistance, clearing the way for the second generation.

The ultimate contribution of AF to an understanding of the nationalist movement should not be evaluated in terms of the extent to which it turned up all the facts modern historical study has revealed. Vietnam had the most primitive communications facilities at the beginning of the century, which made reporting difficult. More importantly, it is obvious that a contemporary reporter in an alien culture cannot possibly uncover all the facts about an illegal underground movement.

French censorship prevented the appearance of a free, local newspaper which could adequately express indigenous opinion. The Indochinese press, run by French colonials, was ultra-conservative and uniformly denounced anything that smacked of local self-improvement or independent activity. In view of the paucity of articulate Vietnamese writings for the period or relatively unbiased news accounts, AF appears a useful original source of moderate French outlook.

Many of its accounts have not turned up in any other literature and add a sense of color which makes the period much more alive than the few pages devoted to it in most histories would indicate. Its analysis of the shortcomings of the early nationalist leadership, and its contemporary ability to place their movement in the historical perspective of European-Asian tensions have been borne out by the work of subsequent students.

AF was ordinarily just in its criticism of the French administration and fairly perspicacious in pointing out danger signals.

In relation to the security of the colony, the journal in retrospect seemed to have an exaggerated fear of Chinese potential, as shown by the preponderance of articles on developments in that country. This is understandable in light of the fact that the French held Indochina for many years before they ceased thinking of their colony primarily in terms of an entry into the south of China. But this was a preoccupation which they shared with their 19th-Century rival, England, for control of the whole peninsula. Only later did they begin to plan for Indochina's own development.

The picture which emerges from AF of the early nationalist movement is relatively complete in that it transmits the currents of ideas, the basic personalities, and significance of the movement. If French policy-makers had conscientiously read it, and followed its suggestions, the political and social history of Vietnam might have been considerably different.

### Footnotes

1. See T.E. Ennis, French Policy and Developments in Indochina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), pp. 72-77, for an outline of this complicated system.

2. Reprinted in Asia, Vol. I, No. 1, Saigon, March 1951.

3. French Indochina (New York, 1937), p. 399.

4. French Indochina, p. 479.

5. Le Viet-Nam (Paris: Les Editions de Minuet, 1955), p. 390.

French Rule and Vietnamese Struggles From  
the Mid-1920s through World War II

by

Frank N. Trager

The preceding section closes with the end of a first generation of nationalists. Phan Chau Trinh, who placed such great emphasis on education, returned to Vietnam in June 1925 and died the following March. Phan Boi Chau, who supported a revised and reformed monarchy represented in the person of Prince Cuong De, was arrested in June 1925 by the French police in the French concession at Shanghai and imprisoned for life in Hué. Their efforts were in the main devoted to the restoration of a modernized and independent monarchy or to reforms within the French regime. Moderate elements, influenced in part by the kind of thinking expressed in Asie Française and illustrated perhaps by Phan Chau Trinh, did in fact form a Constitutionalist Party in 1923 to work toward transforming the colonial councils into legislative bodies. These elements, particularly in Cochinchina, led by Bui Quang Chieu, a professor, and Nguyen Phan Long, a lawyer and former civil servant, achieved a measure of success. They had become members of a prosperous middle and professional class through cooperation with the French and had elected a bloc of candidates to the Saigon Council in 1925 but failed to achieve any lasting reforms. Later in the 1930s there seemed to be some promise in again pushing constitutional reforms, but again they were disappointed. Their party dissolved before World War II, some of its members joining the Cao Dai Sect, others the various revolutionary movements for independence.

It is not without interest that Bao Dai succeeded to his father's throne at Hué in 1925 but continued his education in France, fulfilling a request of his father, until he returned to Annam in 1932. He then pursued a reform policy, appointing Ngo Dinh Diem as Minister of the Interior and head of a commission to reorganize the government on a more democratic basis. The French and the conservative mandarinat at Hué thwarted his

policies. Diem resigned in protest, but Bao Dai went on to his eventual humiliation.

The disciples of Phan Boi Chau moved in another direction. They in 1925 reorganized to seek independence for Vietnam without the monarchy or the mandarin state. "Republican principles" and Marxist groups now appeared on the scene. For in the period after World War I and the Russian Revolution, Vietnamese youth were exposed to the winds of doctrine which flowed both from the Chinese Republic and from Moscow.

From this time forward--the mid-1920s--there evolved in Vietnam two fundamental, partly underground, revolutionary tendencies which under one name or another occasionally unite, but more often contest for leadership against the French. These two tendencies are today embodied in the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) and the nationalist anti-Communist Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

In 1927 the nationalists were organized under the name of Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD), the Vietnam National (or Nationalist) Party. It has been well called the most significant non-Communist revolutionary nationalist organization. It was modeled on the Kuomintang and frequently supported by it. The Communists, under one name or another, such as the Vietnam Revolutionary League or Party or Youth League (Viet Nam Cach Merh Dong Chi Hoi) or the Indochinese Communist Party (1929) were led almost from the beginning by Ho Chi Minh and were recognized as a proper section of the Comintern in 1930.

These two forces, the nationalists (various groups) and the Communists (orthodox and Trotskyist groups) occasionally cooperated in uneasy united fronts, depending upon the current shifts of Kuomintang and Comintern policies. What I have elsewhere called the nationalist-Marxist amalgam runs through the Vietnamese anti-French struggle from the mid-1920s to the beginnings of the Franco-Vietnamese war of 1946-1954. To disentangle the extremely fissiparous groups and their leaders is a first requirement for an understanding of the period, but a requirement extremely difficult to fulfill. No anticolonial struggle in Southeast Asia is as disorganized as that of Vietnam. This disentanglement has already been done by competent authorities, however, and need not be repeated here.\*

---

\*The interested reader may if he wishes follow their disputes and their migrations in I. Milton Sacks, "Marxism in Viet Nam" in Marxism in Southeast Asia, edited and co-authored by Frank N. Trager, Stanford University Press, 1959.

The VNQDD publicly based their operations on a publishing business in Hanoi and clandestinely enrolled and trained their members for revolutionary action against the French authorities. The French Security police--a most efficient organization between the wars--discovered and arrested some of the members in 1929 following an assassination of a French labor-recruiter. This in turn led to plans for an uprising which was to join with nationalist-oriented Vietnamese troops in the French army stationed at Lac Kay. A date was set for the insurrection, probably by its young student-leader, Nguyen Thai Hoc. Agreement on the timing of the event, scheduled for February 10, 1930, caused confusion in the execution of the plans. A mutiny of Vietnamese soldiers against their French officers took place on that night at Yen Bay. Other attacks followed in Phu Tho and Hai Duong provinces; bombing occurred in Hanoi. The French police and armed forces quickly suppressed the mutineers and arrested and executed Hoc and others charged with complicity in the insurrection. The remnants of the VNQDD fled to Canton and Yunnan. Activity of the party within Indochina seems to have been completely halted by 1932. However, the émigrés to China formed sections of the Vietnam Nationalist Party both at Canton and Yunnan. Out of these and related efforts came the wartime and postwar VNQDD and Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang, the Great Vietnam Nationalist Party. The VNQDD and the Dai Viet, together with the Vietnam Restoration League (Viet Nam Phuc Dong Minh Hoi), a group that still supported the monarchical pretender resident in Japan, Prince Cuong De, made up a nationalist anti-Communist coalition--the Vietnam Revolutionary League or the League of Vietnamese Revolutionary Parties (Viet Nam Cach Menh Dong Minh Hoi). Ho Chi Minh came to terms with them for seats in the December 1945-January 1946 "elections" and meeting of the postwar National Assembly of the DRVN.

The Yen Bay nationalist uprising in early 1930 was followed by a Communist effort in September. The Vietnam Communist Party, with headquarters at Haiphong, organized a series of demonstrations and strikes, sacked public buildings, and with some 6,000 peasants marched on Vinh. Two "Soviets" were set up in nearby areas. Landlords were killed and their estates in Ha Tinh and Nghe An provinces divided. The Communists were then operating under the "hard line" revolutionary policy enunciated by the Sixth Comintern Congress of 1928.

The French responded vigorously. Fully armed French troops, planes, and first-class military material were used to quell the uprising. Civilian casualties numbering 10,000 have been reported and another 10,000 were arrested and confined to penal islands and other prisons. French security police penetrated the Communist cadres and wrecked their organization. Ho Chi Minh was



arrested with the aid of the British police and tried in Hong Kong. He was subsequently allowed to leave the colony and for a time disappeared.

The next few years were relatively quiet. Nationalist and Communist activity shifted from Tonkin (Hanoi) to Cochinchina (Saigon). The Indochinese Communist Party, operating underground, was in 1933 part of a united front with the Trotskyists in the municipal elections of Saigon, where they succeeded in electing two members of their Struggle group (La Lutte--both a publication in French and an organization). This group also formed above-ground rural societies and an Indochinese Democratic Front. In the Saigon Council elections of 1937 La Lutte group elected Tran Van Giau and one other Stalinist, and Ta Thu Thau, the Cochinese leader of the Fourth International. Once again, just after the war had started, Tran Van Giau organized a rising in the delta, on November 22, 1940. And once again French fully armed troops and aircraft crushed the Communists in a two-week action. Earlier, in September 1939, the French successfully squelched the Trotskyist faction by a series of raids and mass arrests.

Then came the period of the war. The French Communist Party in 1939 followed the Nazi-Soviet Pact policy and refused to support the war effort. Communists in Indochina were jailed wherever possible. The French in the colony, some 40,000, were unwilling to make any concessions to bona fide Vietnamese nationalists even in the face of Japanese armed forces poised in China and known to have designs on Indochina. By agreement with the French, Japanese troops moved into Indochina in September 1940.

Vichy France in 1940, through Petain and Admiral Decoux in Vietnam, made its peace with Japan. In return for Japanese recognition of French sovereignty over Indochina, the Japanese were given air bases in Tonkin, the right to garrison there with troops and other troop transit rights. Vietnam's ports on the China Sea were to prove of immense strategic advantage for the Japanese attack on British and Allied shipping. From bases in Vietnam the Japanese bombed and sank the Repulse and Prince of Wales and initiated their invasion of Thailand, Burma, and Malaya. All Vietnamese nationalists and Communists (after 1941) were suppressed or imprisoned or otherwise subject to punishment if found. Only in China did they find refuge.

Vichy France and Decoux lasted from September 1940 to March 1945--a nasty, cowardly episode. In 1945 the Japanese decided to rid themselves of their French puppets and, choosing between Prince Cuong De, the royal exile in Japan, and Bao Dai, emperor of Annam at Hue, selected the latter. Bao Dai was emperor of

Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina from March 1945 until his abdication in August following the surrender of the Japanese and the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh. Bao Dai promised to serve the DRVN, considering it a nationalist Vietnamese government! Bao Dai as a Japanese puppet could do nothing, though he tried to enlist various nationalists, among them Ngo Dinh Diem, who was still in retirement. Diem refused. In the meantime the Viet Nam Doc Lap Don Minh Hoi, the Vietnam Independence League, which came to be known as the Viet Minh, had been organized as a Communist-dominated front in China as far back as 1941. Under the leadership of the revolutionary who had by then adopted the alias Ho Chi Minh (he who enlightens) and had been freed in 1942 from a Chinese prison, this group operated from China. They offered to supply intelligence and to fight against Vichy and the Japanese, and received support from the United States and its allies. The Chinese Kuomintang was not unwilling to accept their aid because of old grievances against France and, of course, against Japan. But the Kuomintang, probably also distrustful of Ho, helped to organize a second group of Vietnamese as the Vietnamese Revolutionary League. The Viet Minh thereupon joined the Vietnamese Revolutionary League in a broad coalition front against Vichy and Japan. Ho and Vo Nguyen Giap, who learned his guerrilla ways in Yenan, became its political and military leaders when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed in August 1945.

The Chinese under Chiang had helped to sponsor the Viet Minh and in part controlled the country down to the 16th parallel. The British, as part of the Potsdam Conference agreement, were to assist the French below this demarcation point. The Chinese and the Anglo-French forces were to disarm the Japanese and restore law and order. This military assignment was converted into a political one.

The Viet Minh had established a kind of regime in Hanoi. They, and to a lesser extent the Chinese, did not want the French back. France, of course, had other ideas. Vietnamese nationalists in the north and in the south were decidedly against the French. They had scorned French Radio Saigon wartime propaganda --all Vichyite. They had been beaten, suppressed, and imprisoned by Vichy troops during the war when they sought to form any kind of resistance movement against the Japanese and the Vichyites, so, when the Japanese collapse came in August 1945 they aspired to genuine national freedom.

This was denied them. Fresh French troops supported by the British began to arrive in September. Saigon was retaken. In the north, however, the Chinese refused to admit the French until

the end of February 1946, by which time they had wrung concessions from them but had also enabled the Viet Minh to further entrench itself as the government of Vietnam in Hanoi.

In March 1946 the French agreed to recognize the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the north) as a free state within the Indochinese Federation and the newly formed French Union. A referendum was to decide whether the south (Annam and Cochinchina) were to join this Vietnamese free state.

Several conferences between the Viet Minh and the French were then held, presumably to carry out the March 6, 1946, agreement: one at Dalat in April, another at Fontainebleau in July, another at Dalat which included representatives of Laos, Cambodia, and southern Vietnam but not the north, and so forth. It soon appeared that the French had no real intention of carrying out the referendum agreed upon in March, which undoubtedly at that time would have joined the two parts of Vietnam. In the meantime hostilities continued. These led to a new cease-fire, the modus vivendi of September 1946.

As it turned out, the latter was not worth the paper on which it was written. Clashes continued. On November 23 the French bombed Haiphong, and on December 19 the Vietnamese of the north responded with attacks on French forts in Tonkin and Annam. The war began which was to end--for a time--with the partition at the 17th parallel in 1954.

General Observations on French Counterinsurgency  
Experience and Practice Prior to World War II

by

Frank N. Trager

On the whole, it may be said that the native problem in Indo-China is not really serious. There is little of the open secession that is so obvious in Asia or of the passive hate that characterizes Algeria. In Indo-China the general reveil movement of Asiatic Powers naturally finds an echo, but it is difficult to make rebels of a prosperous peasantry.\*

One year after Roberts made his bold prediction four companies of Vietnamese troops mutinied at Yen Bay. The soldiers killed their French officers and vainly attempted to free Vietnam from foreign control. The Yen Bay uprising was only a minor mutiny--one of the many indicated in the preceding pages; but it was also a small outward sign of the general discontent with French rule. The prosperity that Roberts mentioned was not enough to lull the proud remnants of a 1,000-year-old civilization into passive submission. Nor did that prosperity reach the masses of the rural inhabitants or urban workers.

Economic motivation played a part, but not the largest part in fomenting discontent and developing it into conflict. The Communists, eventually successful in North Vietnam, had in addition to purely local Vietnamese grievances--on which of course they could build--a theory and practice of warfare. In this instance, the French regime fulfilled the theory and became the target for the practice.

---

\*Stephen H. Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy (1870-1925) (London: King and Son, 1929), p. 478.

There is no reason, however, here in the time-frame before World War II to consider Communist theory and practice of warfare. For what was then at stake essentially in Vietnam was a patriotic anticolonial struggle which could and did enlist bona fide nationalists as patriots of Vietnam. The Communists added a dimension to this struggle which in post-World War II days aroused misguided sympathy for the reimposition of French colonial rule.

The major fact to emerge from these pages is that Vietnamese, monarchical, mandarin, authoritarian, reformist, republican, constitutionalist, or revolutionist wanted to be rid of an alien master who happened to be French between the 1850s and the 1950s. The idea of a national Viet State, spreading down the reaches of the peninsula, emerged slowly and episodically. At various times in history the whole of Vietnam had been united as one unit under a dynastic empire, but, at many other times, this empire had been fragmented by revolts in different provinces. The ties holding Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina together were frequently tenuous, and they did not provide a strong historical base for a united nationalistic movement until the cement of protest brought them together.

The French were aware of the dissonances among the sections of Vietnam, and during the early years of their rule they believed they were completely safe from a general uprising. "There is nothing in common between the various peoples, or their ideas or methods. There is no native public opinion, there probably never will be one. Thus a general rising is not possible," said Roberts,\* and the French believed this. The French overlooked the ties that did bind the Vietnamese peoples together; they could never quite understand the community of grievances common to the Indochinese states and peoples. They also could never really act out their roles as exponents and practitioners of libertarian, revolutionary ideas which presumably were embraced in their "mission."

The Vietnamese, for their part, essayed what may be called romantic rebellion--a looking backward to a past which they attempted to restore--and in the 1920s tried to reform the French-dominated, French-controlled governments of the Indochinese protectorates. The more far-sighted members of the educated or middle class recognized that the progress of their people was shackled by the archaic system of government that the French

---

\*In the work mentioned above, p. 429.

were committed to perpetuate. These middle-class leaders saw the lack of scientific and technical knowledge among their people as the other major block to independence. Their requests were for the most part modest, and they carried out their activities in the open.

However, as Donald Lancaster and others have pointed out, the French were not prepared to loosen, in any significant manner, their hold on their colony. All Vietnamese attempts at reform were met by the activities of the French Security Service. This force was supported in its activities by the reactionary French community in the colony. The Security Service was responsible for the protection of all French interests in the colony. To fulfill this function they restricted travel by the indigenes within the colony and abroad. They made searches without warrants, and they could detain a local person for up to ten years without a trial. To battle the nationalist movement the force adopted additional tactics. The Security Service fomented regional and personal rivalries to break the unity of the nationalist front, and often applied pressure and threats in the cases of individuals who were isolated by the travel restrictions and therefore unable effectively to resist.

The frustrations caused by police harassment of overt attempts to reform the system of government eventually forced the nationalists to go underground and engage in conspiratorial agitation, which of course were suppressed when discovered.

But such an account--that is, of the role of the Security Police in effective suppression of dissent, dissidence, and conspiracy--is a partial account. French policy early and late envisioned these territories as provinces to be ruled and controlled by the French. The Security Police was an instrument always backed by military power which the Vietnamese in the pre-World War II period did not and could not equal. As far back as 1891 Governor-General de Lanessan arranged for the military policing of the Tonkin-Chinese frontier region. Each region was under the command of a colonel with both civil and military powers. Eventually Tonkin as a whole was composed of Five Military Territories and two Frontier Regions. Annam and the delta area were similarly plotted. Village police with regularized arms, pay, and uniforms were organized. Militia, a higher grade of service under French officers and NCOs, were assigned to fixed posts. Regular troops and the French Foreign Legion were used initially to guard the frontiers between the several states and between French Indochina and China. The "regulars" and the Legion were used as a reserve force.

By 1931 these three types of forces were supplemented by a Garde indigène operating in the protected states; a Garde civile in Cochinchina only; and by "partisans" in the north Tonkin areas. The Garde indigène was organized by brigades of average size, 150 men, with each brigade assigned to a province. The French provided their own hierarchy of ranks to the brigades. The Garde civile of Cochinchina replaced the former militia and was subordinated to the French cadre of the gendarmerie. The partisans of Tonkin were indigenous mobile and sedentary units serving as "trip-wire" border defense units. In various forms and under various names, these organizations have been largely retained up to the present.

The military command--usually under the command of a lieutenant general--had the following in 1931: 11 European infantry battalions, four of which were Foreign Legion; 18 battalions of indigenous riflemen (tirailleurs); 1 mixed battalion of riflemen and colonials; infantry (European); 7 artillery groups; various air formations; and service troops. These units were divided into two divisions and one independent brigade. The indigenes were confined to tirailleur units, mixed units, and service troops; they had barely begun to be promoted to NCO ranks. Total military strength in 1931 was one-third French and two-thirds local and was estimated at 800 officers, 9,000 NCOs and European troops, 18,000 other.

With nationalist political agitation carefully guarded or suppressed, nationalist military operations were easily liquidated by these French forces because nationalist--and Communist--military operations in the pre-World War II days were largely nonexistent or, if tried, poorly planned and executed on a highly episodic schedule. There was then no concerted theory and practice. The models for insurrection were 19th-Century ones of terror, assassination, individual acts of bomb-throwing and other forms of unsustained, uncoordinated violence and withdrawal, if one was to survive, to remote or foreign climes. Sympathetic though the Kuomintang was, provocative though the Japanese wanted to be, neither the Chinese nor the Japanese invested or seemingly thought to invest in training and providing for a Vietnamese guerrilla force.

All that remained, therefore, prior to World War II in Vietnam was what has been presented in these pages. The only lesson to be drawn is that of the vitality of something called nationalism, at least to the extent of opposing alien-imposed power. This is what the Vietnamese did during the French century in Vietnam. And this same force is what has apparently sustained the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in its struggle against other

Vietnamese who wish to impose an alien-oriented dictatorship over Vietnam. The key phrase in this sequence is the struggle against alien power, no matter what its source.



## Bibliography

Ahn Van and Jacquelin Roussel. Mouvements Nationaux et Lutte de Classes au Vietnam. Paris: Publication de la IVme Internationale, 1947.

This is a Trotskyite analysis of the national movement, sometimes inaccurate in its facts, but useful for the amount of information it brings together about the leaders.

Asie Française. Bulletin de la Comité de. Paris, 1901-1925.

A useful journal which presented articles over the years dealing with developments in the Far East, with especially heavy concentration on political developments in China and Japan. Each month it reviewed the news of the Near and Far East that pertained to French interests. It is unindexed except for the period 1911-1918. The index for those years is useless.

Aubert, G. (trans.) Histoire et Description de la Basse Cochinchine. Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1863.

Bénard, Charles. Au Service de l'Indochine L'ouvre de Maurice Long, 1919-1923. Paris: Larose, 1931.

Bourgeois, Remi. Le Tonkin en 1857. Hanoi: G. Taupin, 1943.

Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958.

Cady, John F. The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1954.

\_\_\_\_\_. Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954.

Chaigneau, Michel Du'c. Souvenir de Hué. Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1867.

Chappoulie, Henri. Aux Origines d'une Eglise. 2 vols. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1943.

Chastel, Guy. Un Siecle d'Épopée Française en Indochine (1774-1874). Paris: Les Editions de l'Ecole, 1947.

- Collins, Ross William. Catholicism and the Second French Empire. New York: 1923.
- Cordier, Henri. A Narrative of Recent Events in Tong-King. Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1875.
- \_\_\_\_\_. La France et l'Angleterre en Indochine et Chine sous le Premier Empire. Leide: E.J. Brill, 1903.
- \_\_\_\_\_. La Politique Coloniale de la France au Debut du Second Empire. Leide: E.J. Brill, 1911.
- Doumer, M. Paul. Situation de l'Indo-chine (1897-1902). Hanoi: F.H. Schneider, 1902.
- Dutreb, M. L'Amiral Dupré et la Conquête du Tonkin. Paris: Editions Larose, 1924.
- Ennis, Thomas E. French Policy and Developments in Indochina. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936.
- Faure, Alexis. Mgr. Pigneau de Behaine, Eveque d'Adran. Paris: Chailamel, 1891.
- Fisher, C.R. South East Asia, A Social, Economic and Regional Geography. London: Methuen and Company, 1964.
- Gaultier, Marcel. Minh-Mang. Paris: Larose Editeur, 1935.
- Grousset, René. Historie de l'Extrême Orient. Vol. II. Paris: P. Geuthner, 1929.
- Hall, D.G.E. A History of South-East Asia. London: Macmillan, 1960.
- Joinville, Pierre de. La Mission de la Cybèle en Extrême-Orient (1817-1818). Paris: Larose, 1914.
- Lancaster, Donald. The Emancipation of French Indo-China. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Lanessan, J.L. de. La Colonisation Française en Indo-Chine. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1895.
- Latourette, Kenneth. A History of Christian Missions in China. New York: Macmillan Company, 1929.

Launay, Abbe Adrien. Historie de l'Annam. Paris: Challamel Aine, 1884.

\_\_\_\_\_. Historie Générale de la Société des Missions Etrangères. 3 Vols. Paris: Tequi, 1894.

Le Thanh Khoi. Le Viet-Nam. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1955.

Louvet, L.E. Les Missions Catholiques aux XIX Siecle. Lille: de Brouwer et Cie., 1894.

Maspero, Georges. L'Indochine. Vol. I. Bruxelles: Les Editions G. Van Oest, 1929.

Matgioi (Albert de Fouvourville). Etudo Coloniales. Vol. III: La Politique Indo-Chinoise (1892-1893). Paris: Albert Savine, 1894.

Maybon, Charles B. (ed.) La Relation sur le Tonkin et la Cochinchine de M. de la Bissachere, Missionnaire Francais (1807). Paris: Champion, 1920.

Murphy, Agnes. The Ideology of French Imperialism (1871-1880). Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1948.

Naval Intelligence Division (United Kingdom). Indo-China. Geographical Handbook Series. December, 1943.

This is an interesting book because, among other things, it depends almost exclusively on French sources.

Nguyen Van Thai and Nguyen Van Mung. A Short History of Vietnam. Saigon: The Times Publishing Company, 1958.

Norman, C.B. Tonkin or France in the Far East. London: Chapman Hall Ltd., 1884.

Roberts, Stephen. A History of French Colonial Policy. 2 vols. London: P.S. King & Son Ltd., 1929.

Sénèque, Capitaine de l'Infanterie Colonial. Luttes et Combats sur la Frontière de Chine Cercle de Moncay (1893-1895). Paris: Henri Charles-Lavaurelle, 1906.

Septans, Albert. Les Commencements de l'Indo-Chine Francaise. Paris: Challamel Aine, 1887.

Taboulet, Georges (ed.) La Geste Française en Indochine. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1955.

A fine two-volume collection of original documents by contemporaries.

Thomazi, Auguste A. La Conquête de l'Indochine. Paris: Payot, 1934.

Thompson, Virginia. French Indo-China. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937.

#### Articles and Periodicals

Hanotaux, Gabriel. "La Fondation définitive de l'Indochine française (20 Juin 1895)." La Revue de Paris, XXXVI, No. 11 (1 January 1929), pp. 5-17.

Ibos, Pierre. "Un Gouverneur général de l'Indo-Chine; Paul Doumer." Le Correspondent, Année 103 (25 December 1931) pp. 818-845.

Madrolles, Claude. "Annam and Vietnam." Asia, I, No. 1 (Saigon, March 1951), pp. 43-46.

Sarraud, Albert. "L'Indochine et Paul Doumer." La Grande Revue, Année 35, No. 7 (July 1931), pp. 3-15.

#### Reports

Exposition coloniale internationale, Paris, 1931. Les services militaires en Indo Chine. Hanoi: Imprimerie d'extrême-orient, 1931.

Nguyen Phuong. "Chinese Origin of the Vietnamese People." (International Conference on Asian History, University of Hong Kong, August 30-September 5, 1964, Paper No. 58.)

\* \* \*

The French sources are, as to be expected, extraordinarily rich. The ten pages of small-type entries listed in the bibliography of Virginia Thompson, French Indo-China (New York: Macmillan, 1937), will provide the reader with a formidable listing.

AD816038

H

E

R

O

## SUPPORTING CASE STUDIES


### VOLUME III

Each transmittal of this document outside the agencies of the U.S. Government must have prior approval of the Office, Chief of Research and Development, DA, ATTN: CRDBES, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Destroy this report when no longer needed.  
Do not return it to the originator.

## ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA

1 February 1966



HISTORICAL EVALUATION AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

2233 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20007

## ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA

### Supporting Case Studies (Volume III)

A Report prepared for the Army Research Office  
under Contract No. DA-49-092-ARO-1.02,  
dated 6 May 1965

No statements or opinions expressed in this  
report or its annexes are to be interpreted  
as reflecting official views of the Army  
Research Office or of any official of the  
United States Government

Not to be quoted at length, ab-  
stracted, or reproduced without  
the specific permission of the  
Historical Evaluation and Re-  
search Organization, except in  
official publications of the  
Department of Defense

<

Historical Evaluation and Research Organization  
2233 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C., 20007

1 February 1966

SUPPORTING CASE STUDIES  
(Volume III)

North America: The Revolutionary Period, by John Shy . . . . .	1
The American Civil War, by Marshall Andrews . . . . .	21
North America: The Indian Wars, by R. Ernest Dupuy . . . .	55
The Philippine Insurrection, November 1899-July 1902, by Linnea P. Raine . . . . .	77
The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: The Hukbalahap, 1942-1955, by Charles T.R. Bohannon . . .	117
The Irish Troubles, 1916-1921, by Gunther E. Rothenberg . . . . .	145
The German Experience in World War II, by Gunther E. Rothenberg . . . . .	163
Israel, by Gunther E. Rothenberg . . . . .	181
The Hungarian Uprising, October 23-December 15, 1956, by Andrew C. Janos . . . . .	207
A Summary of French Efforts at Isolating the Guerrilla During the Algerian Conflict, 1956-1962, by Peter Paret . . . . .	229

## North America: The Revolutionary Period

by

John Shy

### BACKGROUND

The American Revolution was the first successful colonial revolution in modern history before the 20th Century. There are of course certain differences between the American Revolutionary War and 20th-Century insurrectionary wars in the developing areas: (1) the great technological developments of the last century, particularly in weapons and communications; (2) the lack of any serious ethnic or racial division between American insurgents and the British army and government; and (3) the relative absence of American reliance on the kind of guerrilla doctrine and tactics which have been so visible in the more recent past. But at a deeper level of analysis, the differences recede and comparison becomes more promising. To reach this level, it is necessary to focus on the main actors in the American Revolution; that is, to distinguish between active insurgents, passive supporters, neutrals, loyalists, British military leaders, British political leaders, and the effective British public; and to analyze their perceptions, attitudes, behavior, and interactions with one another. At this level it becomes clearer that, while most of the American Revolution does not strictly qualify in terms of weapons and tactics as guerrilla warfare, the Revolution regarded structurally and behaviorally is comparable to contemporary problems of insurgency.

The British Empire of the 18th Century was comparatively decentralized in operation, though its structure was clearly hierarchical and potentially authoritarian. Its nexus was not primarily political, however, but cultural and commercial. Despite a number of points of chronic friction, its internal working had reached a delicate modus vivendi which was the basic reason for its political and economic success.



The Seven Years' War (1755-1763) brought the Empire to its apogee of power and prestige. Britain and her colonies had decisively won a war in an age when wars were severely limited. British control of the mainland was greatly expanded to include everything east of the Mississippi. War and territorial expansion also brought heavy public indebtedness in Britain and a need for new governmental arrangements and defense policies in the colonies. On both sides of the Atlantic, postwar readjustment triggered a sharp economic recession which made these problems more difficult and their solutions more urgent.

A series of crises, finally leading to open rebellion, developed from this postwar situation. Successive British governments approached these constitutional, military, and fiscal problems through greater centralization, emphasis on rationality and efficiency, and shifting some of the burden of taxation to the colonies themselves. Almost all colonial leaders regarded these measures as an immediate threat to the large degree of autonomy which the colonies had previously enjoyed, and an ultimate threat to the equal status within the Empire of individual colonists themselves. Resistance gained strength from the economic recession, which seemed somehow linked to the new British policies. By 1774, both the British government and most colonial leaders had reached the point where each believed that the objectives of the other were unlimited (i.e., complete subjection and virtual independence, respectively), and that the other had acted in bad faith during previous crises; each was also convinced that the other could not win a military struggle.

When war began (April 1775), Britain could draw on a population of about 7,000,000, while the insurgent colonies contained about 2,500,000, of whom about 500,000 were Negro slaves living south of Pennsylvania. The British economy was generally regarded as the soundest in the world; it depended primarily on overseas commerce, secondarily on agriculture and manufacturing. Its greatest strength was financial; the availability of great liquid wealth, and the confidence of investors in the government, made it possible to mobilize much of the potential strength of the country in cases of emergency. The economy of the rebellious colonies was basically subsistence agriculture conducted on an unlimited supply of land, but with the social elite of the colonies largely dependent for their wealth on overseas commerce--staple export in the South, commerce and shipping in the North.

Strategic geography had an important effect on the rebellion. Communications with the insurgent area from London were slow (1-3 months), but the urban centers of insurgency were especially vulnerable to British seapower. The area to be pacified was enormous

(about 250,000 square miles), but execrable overland communications increased the value of the strategic mobility which sea-power provided. Moreover, the Hudson-Champlain corridor presented a strategic opportunity to divide the New England stronghold of insurgency from the rest of the colonies. Most of the other river systems acted as obstacles to overland movement by either side.

### NATURE OF THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT

A tradition of comparatively broad participation in politics under the control of the social elite provided the insurrection with great popular strength, inasmuch as rebel leadership was almost completely of elite origins. A tradition of colonial particularism, however, made it difficult ever to mobilize and direct more than a fraction of this strength. The central organization of the rebellion was loosely unified on a representative basis, with a degree of control and discipline that ranged from fair to poor. Organization at the colony or state level tended to be highly centralized but no more than fairly efficient. Organization at the local level was representative in structure and spirit, and highly effective in operation. Military organization was tripartite: universally obligated militia served as local defense and police; volunteer or conscripted state forces participated as they were needed in mobile operations; and volunteer "regulars" served in two or three main armies.

Political doctrine drew almost exclusively on broad, rather than provincial, appeals: on the idea of equality (both for citizens within society and for governments within the Empire) as a "natural" right; on the concept of the "people" as the only legitimate source of political authority; and on the emphasis in British political theory since the 17th Century on the problem of tyranny and the right of resistance to it. Likewise, military organization and doctrine drew heavily on European models, though these were often--if reluctantly--adapted to both the strategic and the social circumstances of America.

Clothing, recruits, food, cash, cavalry, artillery, cadre, and other munitions were the critical items for the rebellion, in roughly that order of importance. Several logistical systems were tried, but all were considered more or less unsatisfactory, though obviously none was a complete failure. Essentially rebel logistics depended on voluntary local support; both coercion and profit were used, but neither was the primary means of procurement.

The major logistical difficulties were: inexperience, the comparatively low density of population, the lack of food and manpower surpluses in most areas of a subsistence economy, a chaotic currency system and shortage of foreign exchange, poor overland communication and a vast theater of operations, and the desire of rebel leaders to maintain large European-style armies constantly in the field.

The political objectives of the rebellion progressed quickly under pressure of war from considerable autonomy for colonial governments with the Empire to complete political independence. The military objectives were less clear; they oscillated between conventional strategic decision through tactical success on the one hand, and political decision through attrition, exhaustion, and demoralization on the other. In geographic terms, rebel objectives came to be resistance whenever possible to any movement of British troops, expulsion of government forces from any area not occupied in great strength, the positional defense of major port cities, and all-out defense of the Hudson Highlands.

The techniques and tactics of the rebellion involved using its considerable capability for irregular warfare, acquired through long experience of Indian and bush fighting, only as a last resort; yet it was used when necessary to great effect, especially at the beginning and the end of the war. Conventional operations were generally preferred because they were better adapted to area defense, had a markedly better psychological impact on the rebel army itself, were more prestigious in civilian and international eyes, were more in harmony with the socially conservative objectives of the rebellion, and seemed to promise political decision through military encounters in a way that irregular operations did not.

Rebel political warfare was extremely effective for a number of reasons: a comparatively well-developed newspaper press, most of which fell under rebel control; the comparatively high level of literacy and political awareness, especially in seaboard areas; the prolonged prewar controversy, which had served to politicize the mass of the population, to develop extralegal organizations performing quasi-governmental functions, and to create a web of contacts among these organizations; the high incidence within the rebel leadership of lawyers, who worked skillfully and incessantly to make the rebel case in the courts of colonial, British, and world opinion; the use of some of the ablest rebel leaders as diplomatic agents serving abroad; the use of arguments which were generally respected at the time throughout the Atlantic world; and the emphasis on the "corrupt" character of the

British government, an argument which was reinforced by a similar attack from the small but articulate opposition in Britain itself.

Terror, for the most part, was used selectively and on a limited scale. Extralegal "mob" coercion was aimed at loyal leaders; it generally stopped short of extreme violence only because threats, ridicule, and expulsion proved effective. In areas under rebel control, local committees conducted summary proceedings against "disloyal" persons, especially those who had furnished supplies or information to the government, employing a system of oaths, surveillance, expulsion, confiscation of property, and, when necessary, execution. During the last phase of the war, when the government attempted to establish control of large areas, previous restraints on terror broke down: all "disloyal" persons became targets for summary execution, and more than one government paramilitary formation was massacred. But more frequent throughout the war was a well-publicized restraint, even when reprisals against government might have been justified, in order to sharpen the contrasting images of British and rebel conduct. Both sides found their mutual interest in keeping terror aimed at regular military personnel to a minimum.

#### SUPPORT

Despite a great deal of research, it has proved exceedingly difficult to draw a trustworthy profile of those Americans who supported the rebellion. Any simple explanation in terms of social class or geographical location is clearly wrong. It was hardly an insurrection against the colonial elite, because a large segment of that elite led the rebellion throughout. Nor did the supposedly more radical and rebellious West lead or support the rebellion as much as did the seaboard, where the few port cities--Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston--had been the centers of agitation before 1775.

A few general statements can safely be made, however. Rebel support was strongest in the oldest and socially most homogeneous colonies--Massachusetts and Virginia. Beyond that, it is easier to say who did not support the rebellion. Very few people connected with royal government--appointive office holders, contractors, close relatives--were rebels. Remote and newly settled areas tended to be at least passively loyal. Unassimilated minority groups everywhere tended to be loyal or at least apathetic:

1. Anglicans and Baptists in New England, who disliked the established Congregational Church;

2. Those Dutch and Germans who retained their linguistic identity in New York and New Jersey;

3. Quakers;

4. Germans and Scots-Irish in the Carolinas, who disliked the seaboard rebel leaders, although this situation was very complex and is open to major qualifications;

5. Highland Scots, recently settled, who were actively loyal;\*

6. Negro slaves, who responded to appeals offering them their freedom;

7. Indians, who identified American frontiersmen as their major enemy.

A reasonable estimate is that 20%-25% of the population would have been ready, under appropriate circumstances, actively to support the government. In summary, rebel support tended to come from the most English, least threatened, or oppressed parts of colonial society. One exception is the official class, which was uniformly loyal; another may be Jews and Catholics, who seem to have been as rebellious as anyone else.

Local support for the rebels was most clearly affected by events in two major ways. One was the conversion to active rebellion of the victims of harsh government actions; these were men who usually had previously been neutral or even passively loyal. In almost every case, such harsh action was not dictated by policy, but rather was uncontrolled behavior by government auxiliaries--Hessians (New Jersey 1776), Indians (upstate New York 1777), and especially "Loyalist" provincial troops. The other was the conversion of loyal elements into passive supporters of rebellion as a result of local rebel military success. Often this conversion was directly related to the withdrawal of protection by government forces and to a desire to save life and property. Finally, there is a modest possibility that prerevolutionary economic dislocations helped produce support for rebellion in those areas already economically declining with respect to other areas; Massachusetts and Virginia are the cases in point.

---

\*Somewhat surprisingly since most of them had emigrated because of their Jacobite leanings.

Outside support for the rebellion came principally from France, the leading international rival of Britain, though it did not come from French Canada, where everyone expected some sort of counterpart insurrection. Recent British reforms had mollified the 100,000 French Catholics of Canada. These same reforms, however, had inflamed the anti-Catholic prejudices of the rebellious colonies. But neither American anti-Catholicism nor even a long history of regarding France as the enemy seriously inhibited the acceptance of French support when it came.

French support was covert until 1778 (after the first major American victory), and consisted of substantial sums of cash, munitions, volunteer officers, and to some extent the use of French ports. Munitions were the critical item, though the "powder crisis" was overcome before the arrival of French aid by trading through neutral West Indian ports. From 1778, French assistance was overt, adding a small army and all her naval power to the war. In 1779, Spain joined France, and by 1780 a general European "armed neutrality" had for Britain reduced the war in America to merely one theater of a global struggle.

The importance of French aid is still disputed. Of course French military and naval forces speeded victory, but increasingly historians of all viewpoints judge French aid as something less than critical to the continuation of rebellion. Only France allied itself directly with the American rebels, though Dutch financial support may have been as valuable as French military aid.

It should be noted that outside support was clearly motivated by anti-British, not by pro-American, considerations; balance-of-power, rather than ideological, arguments were employed, and even so the policy of support of rebellion was controversial within both the French and Spanish royalist governments. Only some of the foreign volunteer officers were ideologically motivated.

#### COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

Three phases in the British effort to cut local support for rebellion may be distinguished and briefly described.

### Phase I (mid-1774 to late 1775)

For almost a decade of agitation, successive British governments had defined the problem in America as one of law enforcement and the maintenance of order, with legal measures aimed at recalcitrant individuals. The immediate explanation for the failure of this policy was widespread local sympathy for these individuals, an attitude which paralyzed even the local judiciary. In early 1774, after the destruction of tea shipments in Boston harbor, the British government adopted a new policy: punishment and isolation of the center of insurgency--Boston. The policy assumed that the other colonies, and even rural Massachusetts, were disturbed by the extremity of the latest actions of Boston insurgents and would be intimidated by the example made of the Boston community. The policy was considered to depend upon the application of overwhelming force and the achievement of clear-cut success at a single point.

The policy assumption proved completely wrong. Coercive laws and the manifest intention to enforce them with troops gave insurgent leaders greater leverage than ever before outside Boston. Despite many misgivings, the Massachusetts countryside and other colonies concluded that they had no choice but to support Boston, since the new policy of community punishment and isolation seemed to threaten the political and legal integrity of every colony.

From this support, Boston acquired military force sufficient to make the first military encounters inconclusive (Lexington, Concord, Bunker Hill, and the siege of Boston), and susceptible to description as moral victories for the insurgents. Nothing did more to expand and consolidate rebel support throughout America.

Some aspects of the British performance may be noted. The outbreak of open fighting came in an attempt to break up an insurgent base area. British intelligence of the target was good, but it failed in two other critical respects. It could not prevent the transmission of every British order and movement throughout the civilian population, and it grossly underestimated the rebel will and capability for large-scale combat: "These people show a spirit and conduct against us that they never showed against the French, and everybody has judged them from their former appearance and behavior, which has led many into great mistakes," reported the British CinC for America after Lexington and Concord (April 19, 1775). Related to this failure was the psychology of the British command. The long period of relative inaction before the outbreak and the CinC's increasingly pessimistic estimates of



the situation during that period finally put him in the position of having to take some action in order to redeem himself in the eyes of his own government. The first setback between Concord and Boston prepared the way for the second at Bunker Hill (June 25, 1775), since an even more sensational battlefield success was required for redemption. A British general officer described why a tactically reckless assault was made at the latter:

The respect and control and subordination of government depends in a great measure upon the idea that trained troops are invincible against any numbers or any position of untrained rabble; and this idea was a little in suspense since the 19th of April.

#### Phase II (early 1776-early 1778)

When the attempt to isolate Boston from support elsewhere in the colonies failed, the British government found itself faced with what looked to be a fairly conventional war. The American rebels were organizing an army on European lines, and the game now seemed to be one of prolonged maneuvering in order to bring that army to a decisive battle. The principal base of British operations was shifted from Boston (a dead-end in terms of strategic geography) to New York, which was a superior port with access to the best lines of communication into the American interior. An incidental consideration, but no more than that, was the greater friendliness of the civilian population in the Middle Atlantic theater of operations as compared with New England.

The underlying policy assumption, which was not very closely examined at the time, was that success in conventional operations against the main rebel army would more or less automatically bring a restoration of political control in the wake of military victory.

The assumption proved to be not wholly wrong. A series of tactical successes through the summer and fall of 1776 not only secured the New York port area, but produced a striking collapse of resistance in New Jersey as well. Without any special effort by the British command, local rebel leaders fled or went into hiding as the main rebel army withdrew. The local rebel militia, which had firmly controlled the communities of New Jersey, tended to disintegrate and to be replaced by an improvised loyal militia. It is clear that almost every civilian in New Jersey believed that the rebellion would collapse completely and that it was not too soon to reach an accommodation with the royal authorities.



The government granted free pardon to all civilians who would take an oath of allegiance, and almost 5,000 Americans accepted the offer in a few weeks, including one signer of the Declaration of Independence.

The failure of the pacification campaign in New Jersey, after such a promising start, had two major causes, one external, the other internal.

The internal cause is neatly summarized in a pair of quotations from two British observers: one noted that the lenient policy toward the civilian population "violently offends all those who have suffered for their attachment to government"; the other noted "the licentiousness of the troops, who committed every species of rapine and plunder." British regulars and especially their non-English speaking German auxiliaries--products of the hard school of European warfare--tended to regard all civilians as possible rebels and hence fair game. Even if civilians avoided the regular foragers, they were not permitted to relapse into passive loyalty if they had ever shown the slightest sympathy for the rebel cause. Loyal bands of militia regarded retribution as their principal function and were determined that no rebel should escape, pardon or no pardon. In many cases, former neutrals or lukewarm rebels found no advantage in submission to government and came to see flight, destruction, or resistance as the only available alternatives.

The other, external cause of failure stemmed from the British attempt to control and live off the central part of New Jersey: brigade garrisons were deployed among towns, mainly for administrative convenience. Not surprisingly, the rebel main army, weak as it was, was able to achieve local superiority and exploit its excellent tactical intelligence to pick off two of these garrisons (Trenton December 26, 1776; Princeton January 3, 1777). The tactical effects were modest, but the strategic and psychological effects were enormous. British forces were withdrawn from all exposed locations and henceforth kept concentrated. The morale of rebels, already sensitized by harsh treatment, soared, while the morale of loyal civilians, now out of range of British regular support, dropped sharply. Almost all New Jersey quickly came under insurgent control. The international repercussions of Trenton and Princeton were likewise serious.

One noteworthy point: in the only intensive study made of a single community during this period (Bergen County), it is apparent that the local and bloody battles between rebel and loyal militia were related to prewar animosities between ethnic groups, political rivals, churches, and even neighbors.

The campaign of 1777 was essentially a continuation of the strategy of 1776: to bring the rebel main army to decisive battle and to quarantine New England insurgency by gaining control of the Hudson Valley. Civilian attitudes affected planning in two ways. Because the unexpected continuation of the war for another year strained British military manpower, one British force would move to Philadelphia, not only luring the main rebel army to defend its capital, but also permitting the recruitment of badly needed provincial troops from the supposedly friendly population. Another British force would move down the Champlain-Mohawk-Hudson corridor on the assumption that government supporters were numerous in that area, and Indian auxiliaries could terrorize those who were not. The campaign was a disaster, in large part because the intelligence estimates (gleaned mainly from exile sources) were grossly in error. The Canadian force simply drowned in a hostile sea (Saratoga October 17, 1777), which its Indian allies had done much to roil and its commander little to calm. The Philadelphia force could not assist it when unexpected local resistance in Pennsylvania slowed every movement. Other factors contributed to the disaster, especially a three-way failure to agree on the basic concept of the whole operation, which was attributable only in part to the slowness of transatlantic communications. But a primary cause was the miscalculation of time-space factors, to which an erroneous conception of the civilian environment within which military operations were to be conducted contributed materially.

Throughout this second phase of the war, the British military and naval CinCs were empowered to negotiate with rebel political and military leaders. These negotiations came to nothing, because the rebel military situation was never truly desperate except briefly at the end of 1776, and because rebel unity depended on adherence to political demands which the British government was not yet willing to concede. It has been argued that this diplomatic effort inhibited British military operations, but there is no direct evidence to support the contention. Equally plausible is the view that cautious British operations were a result of tactical lessons learned in America during the Seven Years' War and the opening battles of the Revolution.

### Phase III (early 1778-late 1781)

The third and last phase of the war is most interesting from the viewpoint of isolating insurgents from civilian support. Escalation of the war, when Britain attacked France after the latter allied itself with the rebels following Saratoga, shifted the

focus of conflict to the West Indies, which were of great economic and strategic value to both powers. For more than a year, strategy on the mainland was defensive: occupation of New York and Newport plus naval blockade and coastal raids. During this pause, a general reevaluation of British strategy took place. For the first time, the civilian population came to be the major factor in planning. As never before, it was seen that loyal and neutral civilians had to be organized and protected before pacification could be achieved, and that the great pool of civilian manpower largely accounted for the surprising resilience of the rebel main armies. Because civilian response had so far been disappointing in New England and the Middle Atlantic states, because West Indian and mainland operations now had to be coordinated, and because earlier small-scale operations had produced a surprisingly favorable response from civilians in the southern colonies, it was decided to begin the new campaign of pacification in the South. By some British officials the South had always been seen as the soft underbelly of the rebellion, with its scattered population, its fear of slave uprisings, strong Indian tribes at its back, and a split between tidewater and upcountry societies in the Carolinas which approached a state of civil war. At last it was understood that the recruitment of loyal provincial troops merely for use in conventional operations often had deprived an area of the very people who might control it; high priority would now be given to the formation of local self-defense forces. The basic concept was to regain complete military control of some one major colony, restore full civil government, and then expand both control and government in a step-by-step operation. A heavy stream of advice from loyal American exiles supported the plan.

The new strategy was linked to the political situation in Britain itself. Increasingly, the government had justified a costly and controversial war to members of the House of Commons on the ground that Britain had an unbreakable commitment to defend loyal Americans against rebel vengeance. The government thus staked its political life on the success of pacification in the South. The decision, however, was not seen as a gamble so much as the pursuit of a logical course, because the government, especially the king and his principal war leader (Germain), had always believed that most Americans, given a chance to choose freely, would support the Crown. When Lord North, nominally prime minister, but in a weak position within his own government, expressed an opinion that the war was no longer worth its cost, the king rebuked him by saying that "this is only weighing such events in the scale of a tradesman behind his counter," and that American independence would surely lead to the loss, one after another, of the other British colonies.

The campaign began well. Amphibious attack captured Savannah (December 29, 1778) and led to a collapse of rebel resistance in the more densely populated part of Georgia. Twenty loyal militia companies were organized and 1,400 Georgians swore allegiance to the king. Yet certain problems appeared which would recur throughout the Southern campaign and which would never be solved. In attempting to clear rebel remnants away from pacified areas, British regulars pushed detachments to Augusta and toward Charleston, beyond the limit where they could be permanently maintained at that time. Subsequent withdrawal of these detachments led to the deterioration of loyal militia units left in these outlying areas and to an adverse effect on the future behavior of their loyal and neutral residents. Furthermore, regular commanders revealed themselves as unduly optimistic in deciding that any particular area had been pacified and could safely be left to defend itself. Finally, troops and even some commanders could not be made to treat civilians (except those actually in arms for the Crown) as anything but suspected rebels, despite explicit directives from London and headquarters to the contrary.

Large reinforcements in 1780 brought about the capture of Charleston (May 12) and its large rebel garrison; the other large rebel army in the Carolinas was destroyed at Camden (August 16). Now mounted forces successfully employed irregular tactics and achieved tactical mobility equal or superior to that of the rebels. Upcountry, loyal militia was organized district by district: men over 40 were assigned to local defense while those younger served as territorial auxiliaries. Every effort was made to meet the rebel threat by effective countermeasures at the local level. Moreover, the orders of the CinC to the Inspector of Militia show the spirit in which these measures were undertaken:

You will pay particular attention to restrain the militia from offering violence to innocent and inoffensive people, and by all means in your power protect the aged, the infirm, the women and children from insult and outrage.

In the end, the policy failed; the question is, why? Small groups of rebel irregulars could not be eliminated altogether. They hid in some of the least accessible swamps and mountains, or operated from unpacified prorebel locations on the periphery--in upper Georgia or southern North Carolina. These irregulars made complete physical security unattainable for many pacified areas. Rebel bands usually could achieve local superiority against any particular body of self-defense militia, and sometimes even against mobile detachments. In an action reminiscent of both

Trenton and Saratoga, a group of rebels quickly built up strength to wipe out an unsupported loyal force of 1,000 men at King's Mountain (October 7, 1780). Thus, neither side had the capability of fully protecting its supporters among the civilian population, and a ferocious guerrilla war spread throughout South Carolina and into Georgia and North Carolina. Areas thought to have been pacified quickly slipped out of control, sometimes because terrorized or overrun by rebel guerrillas, more often because loyal forces fought their own little wars of counterterror against rebels, rebel sympathizers, suspects, and anyone else they disliked.

Almost every British action appears to have exacerbated this situation. The chronic rough treatment of civilians by regulars simply could not be curbed to any significant extent. Moreover, the British force that had successfully employed irregular tactics (Tarleton) quickly acquired in the course of its operations a reputation for inhumanity which drove apathetic civilians toward the rebels for protection. A proclamation offering full rights of citizenship and pardon to all who would take the oath of allegiance, but declaring all others rebels, drove many paroled rebel prisoners out of the neutral position which they had assumed and back into active rebellion. At the same time, the conciliatory aspect of this policy infuriated loyal auxiliaries, militia, and irregulars, who increasingly ignored official policy and orders, and took matters into their own hands. A loyalist observer (who had defected some time before from the rebel side) described South Carolina as "a piece of patch work, the inhabitants of every settlement, when united in sentiment, being in arms for the side they liked best, and making continual inroads into one another's settlements." During this civil war, there was little difference between loyalists and rebels in terms of organization, tactics, or the use of terror. Pacification had failed well before a new rebel army was organized in central North Carolina.

The failure of pacification, and the reappearance of this large rebel force to the northward (Greene), led the British commander to return, almost with a sigh of relief, to more conventional operations. Priorities were shifted, mobile forces were concentrated, and the principal objective became the destruction of the rebel army through maneuver, battle, and pursuit. This new approach ended in disaster (Yorktown October 19, 1781) when the British temporarily lost command of sea lines of communication with the southern army. From that time on, all serious attempts to pacify the interior were given up, and only New York and Charleston were maintained as impregnable base areas until the end of the war (April 1783).

Certain aspects of the failure of pacification require emphasis. One is that neither British nor rebel leaders regarded the bloody civil war in the Carolinas as "favorable" to their side; both tried to curb it in order to gain political control and to prevent large-scale alienation of potentially friendly civilians. But it was beneficial to the rebels inasmuch as they could choose to operate in prorebel areas while the British were constrained to operate everywhere. Furthermore, the relative proximity of a large British regular army had a surprisingly unfavorable effect on civilian attitudes. One might say that civilians tended to overreact to the army. Depending on the particular circumstances, civilians were intimidated by it and so behaved "loyally," for which they later suffered; or they were disillusioned by its predatory conduct and lack of sympathy for the precarious position of the civilian; or they felt secure in its presence, and committed violent acts under its aegis which ultimately created prorebel sympathy; or they saw it as an alternative, a place of flight and refuge; or they were demoralized when it moved away and refused to protect them, their homes and families.

This last point may be the most important: every major British troop movement in the American Revolution created shock waves of civilian behavior in the surrounding area. Repeatedly loyal and neutral civilians responded excessively, prematurely, and unwisely (in terms of their own personal security) to the appearance of British troops, only to see those troops withdraw or move elsewhere. British leaders throughout the war assumed that civilian attitudes and behavior were more or less constants which could be measured by civilian actions on any specific occasion when they became visible. In fact, each of these occasions brought about a permanent change in the attitude and behavior of those civilians who were involved in, or even aware of, what happened; over time, these occasions had a major, cumulative effect. By 1780-1781, perhaps earlier in some places, most civilians, however weary, unhappy, or apathetic toward the rebellion they might be, were fairly sure of one thing: the British government no longer could or would protect them, and sooner or later the rebels would return. Under these circumstances, civilian attitudes could no longer be changed by British policies or actions.

The problem posed by outside support and the attempts made to block it can be described much more briefly.

Phase A (1774-1777) was characterized by covert outside support. The blockade of colonial ports was partially effective

but could not prevent the infiltration of low-bulk critical items (money, munitions, and cadre). It may be that the naval CinC was too lenient in unofficially permitting some noncontraband trade in the Carolinas and Chesapeake Bay area, but he believed that close blockade would alienate a potentially loyal region. There is no evidence, however, to indicate that this leak was crucial to the war in any way.

Phase B (1778-1783) was a period of global war for Britain, in which support for American rebels was overt and included 8,000-9,000 regular troops and seapower as great as Britain's own. Because Britain had retained no Continental allies after the Seven Years' War, it found itself unable to attack or divert outside support at the source (on the European Continent), and instead had to disperse most of its energy on the strategic defensive, fending off threats to India, Gibraltar, Minorca, the West Indies, and the home islands. Perhaps Britain could not have avoided going to war with France (1778), Spain (1779), and Holland (1780), but escalation in each case probably made a bad situation worse, and the evidence indicates that little serious thought or effort was given to the limitation of conflict. Escalation actually served to loosen the blockade of America and led to the final disaster at Yorktown, which ended the attempt to suppress rebellion, ultimately brought down the government, and weakened the monarchy itself.

Administrative machinery was clearly inadequate to cope with rebellion. Local officials were comparatively few: elective officials were often rebel leaders or sympathizers, while appointive officials were displaced by extralegal organizations which paralleled royal government. Militia was the only police force within an armed population, and the rebels quickly purged it and made it an effective instrument of insurgent local control. Those loyal civilians who might have been organized to perform police functions were ignored in 1775, recruited for conventional military service in 1776-1777, and, when finally employed as police in 1778-1781, behaved badly toward civilians and resisted playing their low-prestige role. Consequently government control was limited, except in New Jersey in 1776 and Georgia and South Carolina in 1779-1780, to the ground physically occupied by the regular army. And in those areas, even when long occupied, it proved impossible to return power to civil authorities.

Government attempts to deal with public opinion in the insurgent areas were largely ineffectual, despite the common cultural background of the government and the rebels. Local appeals were



often vitiated by troop misconduct, poor intelligence, and inapplicable assumptions about rebel psychology and colonial social structure. Use of foreign mercenaries and Indians probably did more to alienate civilians than to terrify them or assist military operations. Conciliatory appeals were invariably one or two steps behind the development of insurgent objectives. Finally, the government simply could not resolve the dilemma that harsh measures tended to alienate neutrals and rebel supporters, while conciliatory measures alienated actively loyal elements.

At home, the government was able to maintain strong public support despite its lack of military success against the rebellion. In particular, the outbreak of war muted some of the fairly vigorous criticism of government policy which was uttered before 1774, and the expansion of the war to include France further reduced criticism. But in its efforts to maintain public support for the war, the government had to promise more than it could produce and became increasingly committed to defense of loyal Americans as the justification for its strategic decisions. Consequently, public support was strong but brittle; it crumbled after the Yorktown disaster, when all hopes based on the alleged loyalty of most Americans suddenly evaporated.

British determination to prosecute the war was greatly strengthened by a sincere belief that loss of America would start an inevitable decay of the British international position and by mercantilist economic doctrine, which argued that British wealth and power depended on naval supremacy which in turn depended on control of the colonies and the exclusion of other European powers from access to them. Aristocratic concepts of administrative and political behavior may have weakened the government somewhat in its fight against the rebellion, but historians have too often exaggerated this facet of the war; British leaders were neither dolts nor dilettantes. It is barely possible that a sense of fighting fellow Englishmen may have inhibited military commanders in exploiting tactical success, but the contemporary code of war on balance aided the government, because it induced the rebels to fight in a more conventional way.

#### OUTCOME

In the end, the rebels achieved all their objectives. Yet, considering the disadvantageous strategic situation of 1781-1782, the government was able to conclude a surprisingly favorable peace, and Britain quickly regained its leading international



position.\* Fears for British power were as misplaced as had been the hopes for loyal American support.

No simple lessons for the 20th Century emerge from the American Revolutionary War. Yet some general observations are warranted. Once the war had passed a certain point--a point that varied with the locality, but might roughly be placed in early 1777--it became extremely difficult to alter the behavior of the civilian population substantially, either by force or by persuasion. Though the British lacked the modern techniques of air power and social science, they had comparatively great military strength and their understanding of the political dimension of the conflict was more sophisticated than is usually recognized. They came to see the importance of pacifying the civilian population, but they could never resolve the dilemmas which actually doing it presented to them. In this connection, it should be noted that a common race and language did little either to diminish the alienation of the insurgents, or to prevent British miscalculation of the American response to shifts of policy and strategy. In other words, conflict itself seems to have nourished the kind of illusions and delusions that in the 20th Century are sometimes charged to a cultural or racial gap between insurgents and counterinsurgents.

British defeat has been explained in various ways: by poor leadership, by momentary French naval superiority, and by British psychological exhaustion. All such explanations suggest that, with more military power, more efficiently and more resolutely applied, a British victory would have been possible, even probable. The actual events of seven years, however, offer little support for this view. Though the insurgent effort fell far short of the ideal standards set for it at the time by American leaders (and later by American historians), its extraordinary endurance and resilience need to be recognized by anyone who would grasp what really happened.\* Certainly the war could have been prolonged, perhaps indefinitely, especially with better luck against the French at sea. But when one focuses on the actors themselves, it becomes more apparent that the very continuation of warfare provided motivational fuel for insurgency, and that a true British victory was not likely short of physically destroying a great number of both the insurgents and their civilian supporters.

---

\*This, of course, was primarily due to a series of British naval victories in the global war against France, Spain, and Holland, after the Revolution itself had been virtually decided at Yorktown.

\*\*The important element of superb leadership, military and political, among the rebels contributed significantly.

## Bibliography

- Bass, Robert D. The Green Dragoon. New York, 1957.
- Brown, Richard M. The South Carolina Regulators. Cambridge, Mass., 1963.
- Chalmers, John. Letter, August 20, 1780, Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 6th series, Vol. X (1872), pp. 794-811.
- Clinton, Sir Henry. The American Rebellion, ed. William B. Willcox. New Haven, 1954.
- Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. The Compact History of the Revolutionary War. New York, 1963.
- Freeman, Douglas S. George Washington, 7 vols. New York, 1951.
- Gray, Robert. "Colonel Robert Gray's Observations on the War in Carolina," South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine, Vol. XI, No. 3 (July, 1910), pp. 141-159.
- Lee, Henry. Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department. Washington, 1827.
- Leiby, Adrian C. The Revolutionary War in the Hackensack Valley. New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1962.
- Mackesy, Piers. The War for America, 1775-1783. London, 1964.
- Nelson, William H. The American Tory. New York, 1961.
- Pugh, Robert C. "The Revolutionary Militia in the Southern Campaign," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (April, 1957).
- Robson, Eric. The American Revolution. London, 1955.
- Seymour, William. "A Journal of the Southern Expedition, 1780-1783," Papers of the Delaware Historical Society, Vol. XV (1996).

Shy, John. Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution. Princeton, 1965.

Smith, Paul H. Loyalists and Redcoats. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1964.

Thayer, Theodore. Nathanael Greene. New York, 1960.

Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution, ed. John R. Alden, 2 vols. New York, 1952.

Willcox, William B. Portrait of a General. New York, 1964.

[NOTE: Quotations in the text have in some cases been modernized in minor respects.]

# The American Civil War

by

Marshall Andrews

## GENERAL

By its very nature the Civil War which embroiled the United States with the Southern Confederacy (1861-1865) produced guerrilla warfare of a most marked, brutal, and vicious kind. Not only were parts of the Confederacy occupied almost from the beginning by Union forces, against which sometimes desultory and sometimes violent guerrilla activities were invoked, but long-standing vendettas in some border states were simply continued under the aegis of war.

Furthermore, guerrilla tactics were employed by both sides, though more particularly by the Confederacy, against the communications of the other, using formally organized and recognized troop components. These operations were generally of two sorts: those of "partisan" commands regularly enlisted and under officers holding formal commissions, which disbanded between forays; and raids of cavalry units bent on crippling destruction, liberation of prisoners, or some other such objective. The former method was pursued generally by the Confederacy in Union-occupied territory, the latter generally by the Union in Confederate territory not yet occupied but accessible. Nevertheless, both methods were used at times by both belligerents.

Neither army ever succeeded, except in a very few minor and inconsequential cases, in isolating guerrillas or partisans from their bases of support, even though special Union counter guerrilla bands were organized, some operating in Confederate uniform.

## CONDITIONS AFFECTING GUERRILLA WARFARE

Since the fundamental basis of the Civil War was an irreconcilable political incompatibility, it was only to be expected that men of Union sympathies, many of them slaveholders, were caught in the secession of the 11 southern states forming the Confederacy. In like manner, not a few advocates of secession remained in the north, where their opposition to the Federal Government and its acts at times proved troublesome, not only in the border states but in the Midwest, New York, and New England.

With a few exceptions, Union men in the south were inhibited by the bellicose partisanship surrounding them from any overt acts in behalf of their convictions. The major exception was the separation from Virginia of its 40 western counties in 1861 and their admission as the 35th state of the Union in 1863.

In the other border states there was much unrest and some defiance of Federal authority; the governors of Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee, Maryland, and Virginia refused to furnish troops to "coerce" their sister states. Subsequently Arkansas, Tennessee, and Virginia joined the Confederacy, while the other three states, though remaining in the Union, supplied military units to both sides.

East Tennessee, northern Alabama, and northern Georgia contained strong pro-Union factions. In Alabama and Georgia these factions were generally powerless until late in the war when Union troops reached them; in east Tennessee a situation existed almost comparable to that in West Virginia.

In the north, opposition to "coercion" of states, the war itself, and, in particular, Republican politics, resulted in much ill-feeling and no little disorder. Democratic and pro-southern secret societies, with a weird catalog of oaths, handshakes, and ritualistic mummary, rose up, especially in Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. These were matched by Union societies with equally fantastic rituals but with the power of the Federal Government and the Union army behind them.

Thus the Knights of the Golden Circle, Sons of Liberty, Circle of Hosts, Union Relief Society, and the Order of American Knights annoyed, horsewhipped, and sometimes murdered Union men in the north. Collaterally, the Union League and the Order of the Stars and Stripes, among others, were retaliating with, or

initiating, similar outrages against southern sympathizers. In general none of these disorders got beyond the control of local authorities.

But with adoption of conscription for the Union army in 1863 anti-Union activity assumed a character considerably more threatening to the central government. In Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, pro-southern organizations assisted several thousands of conscripted men to desert and occasionally armed them to resist recapture. Wholesale resistance to the draft, sometimes with Democratic and other pro-southern support, took place in New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, and even in New Hampshire, Vermont, and Connecticut. The Illinois legislature, about to enact bills restoring the writ of habeas corpus and barring Negroes from the state, was prorogued by the Republican governor before the bills could be passed. The Indiana legislature attempted to recognize the Confederacy and cut all ties with New England, but was thwarted by the calculated absence of sufficient Republican members to prevent a quorum.

In the Confederacy, the States' Rights doctrine on which it was founded soon came into conflict with the rigid central control necessary in the prosecution of a war. Georgia's Governor Joseph E. Brown refused to permit Georgians to be drafted for military service outside of his state. In North Carolina Governor Zebulon B. Vance not only opposed conscription, but declined to permit foodstuffs to be exported for use of the Confederate army and, near the end of the war, made gestures toward a separate peace with the Union.

In addition to these generally political acts of nonconformity or resistance, guerrilla warfare of terrible ferocity, provoking acts of retaliation no more gentle, was tormenting the states of Missouri, Kansas, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Texas. In Virginia and West Virginia insurgency of another sort was under way: partly true guerrilla warfare in West Virginia and, in Virginia, the application of guerrilla tactics by organized military units, both Union and Confederate.

In some parts of the border country, especially the heavily forested mountains of eastern Kentucky and western West Virginia, relentless guerrilla fighting persisted long after the war. As late as the 1880s one of these border feuds almost brought Kentucky and West Virginia into armed conflict.<sup>1</sup>

## PREPARATION FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE

Although guerrilla warfare had been practiced with considerable effect by Patriots and Tories alike during the Revolution, its future possibility and the means of conducting or countering it apparently did not occur to the leaders of the young Republic.

Nowhere in the Acts of Congress or in Army Regulations is there specific recognition of guerrilla or partisan service until the Regulations of 1857, those in force, with amendments, during the Civil War. In the Regulations of that year appeared a brief section on "Partisans and Flankers," under Instructions for Cavalry. The duties of these forces, detached from the main column, were "to reconnoitre at a distance on the flanks of the army, to protect its operations, to deceive the enemy, to interrupt his communications, to intercept his couriers and his correspondence, to threaten or destroy his magazines, to carry off his posts and his convoys or, at all events, to retard his march by making him detach largely for their protection."

It was noted that "while these partisan corps fatigue the enemy and embarrass his operations, they endeavor to inspire confidence and secure the good will of the inhabitants in a friendly country and hold them in check in an enemy's country. . . . The partisan commander must frequently supply by strategem and audacity what he wants in numbers."

These instructions and admonitions were copied into the Confederate army regulations. But the small attention generally accorded guerrilla and partisan warfare in the military thinking of this country prior to the Civil War is well indicated by its treatment in a Military Dictionary published in 1861.

Under Guerilla (sic), one finds "See Partisan." At that heading no distinction between guerrilla and partisan is made; indeed, although the partisan is described as a detached soldier, he is defined as a guerrilla.

In its definition of "War" the same dictionary, after examining the dictates of international law and the common usages of war, declares that "the whole international code is founded on reciprocity" (emphasis in original). Therefore, it concludes, retaliation is both allowable and customary to restrain an enemy from excesses and violations of the laws of war. But, since the existence of war tends to place all the subjects of each belligerent power in a state of mutual hostility, the laws of nations had

sought to ameliorate the natural consequences of such a condition by legalizing the warlike acts only of those formally designated as military personnel by the state.

"Hence," this examination concludes, "it is that in land wars, irregular bands of marauders are liable to be treated as lawless banditti, not entitled to the protection of the mitigated uses of war as practiced by civilized nations."

With these inadequate, confused, and sometimes contradictory ideas of guerrilla warfare, the United States and the Confederacy entered upon a conflict that included guerrilla action from its first day. At the outset, especially in the border states and in quickly occupied areas of the south, guerrillas and suspected guerrillas captured by Union forces were summarily tried by court-martial and sentenced as criminals or, in some cases, executed. Unfortunately for this practice, the principle of retaliation also existed and Confederate threats to retaliate on Union prisoners generally put a stop to it except in those areas where sectional bitterness bred bloody excesses on both sides.

After Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck had been called to overall army command at Washington he sought the help, on August 6, 1862, of Dr. Francis Lieber, an international lawyer of high repute. Halleck wrote:

The rebel authorities claim the right to send men, in the garb of peaceful citizens, to waylay and attack our troops, to burn bridges and houses, and to destroy property and persons within our lines. They demand that such persons be treated as ordinary belligerents, and that when captured they have extended to them the same rights as other prisoners of war; they also threaten that if such persons be punished as marauders and spies they will retaliate by executing our prisoners of war in their possession. I particularly request your views on these questions.

Lieber promptly replied with a long brief in which he recognized the question as "substantially a new topic in the law of war" (emphasis supplied). After defining the term "guerrilla" and pointing out that it had been variously construed, and that activities of guerrillas were at the time disturbing the governments of both belligerents, he made these points:

1. As currently understood in the United States a guerrilla party was "an irregular band of armed men, carrying on an irregular



war. . . . The irregularity of the guerrilla party consists in its origin, for it is either self-constituted or constituted by the call of a single individual, not according to the general law of levy, conscription or volunteering," as well as in its disconnection from the army and its impermanency as an organization.

2. Guerrillas normally pillage from friend as well as from foe since, not being connected with the army, they can subsist in no other way.

3. Guerrillas destroy for the mere sake of destruction, since their operations can be directed at no overall strategic goal.

4. Associated with guerrillas is the idea of "necessitated murder," since the guerrilla cannot encumber himself with prisoners of war and expects to be killed in turn if captured, "thus introducing a system of barbarity which becomes intenser in its demoralization as it spreads and is prolonged."

5. Lax organization and dependence of the leader on the band leads to poor discipline and consequent lack of control over the band's actions.

6. The rising of a citizenry, whether or not uniformed and organized, to repel invasion is justifiable, but he who renews war within an occupied territory "has been universally treated with the utmost rigor of the military law" because he "exposes the occupying army to the greatest danger, and essentially interferes with the mitigation of the severity of war."

Lieber made the first clear distinction between guerrillas and partisans (pointing out that Halleck had failed to do so in his own work on international law published in 1861). The partisan, according to Lieber, was a regularly constituted soldier, detached from the main body, acting under legitimate orders, and entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war provided he had violated no recognized rules or usages of war in his partisan activities. Then he reached these conclusions:

The law of war, however, would not extend a similar favor to small bodies of armed country people, near the lines, whose very smallness shows that they must resort to occasional fighting and to occasional assuming of peaceful habits, and of brigandage. The law of war would still less favor them when they trespass within the hostile lines to commit devastation,

rapine, or destruction. . . . So much is certain, that no army, no society engaged in war, any more than a society at peace, can allow unpunished assassination, robbery, and devastation without the deepest injury to itself and disastrous consequences which might change the very issue of the war.<sup>2</sup>

Halleck, while commanding the Union Department of the Mississippi, with headquarters at St. Louis, Missouri, had already issued, on March 3, 1862, General Orders No. 2,<sup>3</sup> warning "all persons" that "if they join any guerrilla band, they will not, if captured, be treated as prisoners of war, but will be hung as robbers and murderers." Anyone joining such an organization, the order declared, "forfeits his life and becomes an outlaw."

Copies of Dr. Lieber's opinion were distributed and, in some cases, incorporated in General Orders of Department commanders. This opinion, or its publication, in no way altered the attitudes of commanders toward guerrillas or their treatment, except by affording them support for stringent measures.

Most certainly it did not affect the conduct of the guerrillas themselves, whether their declared allegiance was to the Union or the Confederacy.

#### GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

It would be a sheer impossibility to describe, or attempt to discuss in detail, all of the guerrilla and partisan activities that took place, actually or by repute, during the Civil War. Such activities were reported constantly by commanders in the field, wherever the armies operated. Many of these activities were genuine guerrilla or partisan attacks; of some, rather complete records have survived. Yet a great many of those reported must have been purely alarmist, or devised by commanders to account for delays, losses, or failures.

On the basis of the written record, guerrillas were everywhere all the time, and fights with them consumed more time and powder than did the great pitched battles between armies. Research in this field leads to the suspicion that if all the guerrillas reported by Union officers to have been killed, wounded, and captured were added up the sum would more than equal all the guerrillas who ever fired a shot on both sides. The same suspicion with respect to Confederate reports must be withheld only because those reports are fragmentary and incomplete.

This is not to deny or to discount the fact that troops operating in the enemy's country were subject to constant and sometimes costly harassment. In every occupied area of the south, even in those of predominant Union sentiment, there were bands of guerrillas, perhaps only three or four men bent principally on pillage, which struck when and where they could and disappeared after each attack. Often these small bands were never officially identified, in which case their depredations would be attributed to known guerrillas. Sometimes they undertook more than they could handle and were wiped out in battle or captured and summarily executed; many of them ultimately joined and lost their identities in larger bands, accepting the new leadership and discipline to whatever extent they chose.

In any event, the results of guerrilla warfare and of partisan attacks employing guerrilla tactics were serious enough in themselves to need no embroidery. One historian of Civil War guerrilla activities, Virgil Carrington Jones, has estimated that Confederate guerrillas held back as many as 200,000 Union troops from the active armies. Col. John Singleton Mosby, himself a most active and successful Confederate partisan leader, wrote after the war that, with no more than 200 men, he was able at one time to force detachment of 30,000 troops from the Union Army of the Potomac.

In some of the border states whole counties were ravaged and depopulated by or in consequence of guerrilla warfare. Civil wars within the Civil War were fought, and commanders in both armies now and then turned against their own guerrilla bands with threats or direct action. This type of warfare will be examined first in order.

### Guerrilla Warfare

When the US Congress in 1854 upset the 34-year-old Missouri Compromise by passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, it laid the foundation for perhaps the bloodiest and most disreputable episode in American history. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 had banned slavery north of latitude 36° 30'; the Kansas-Nebraska Act permitted admission of Kansas and Nebraska territories, both north of that line, as free states or slave, depending on the vote of their residents when sufficient population had been attained to warrant statehood.

Kansas, clearly able first to meet the population requirement, became a battleground for domination by both interests. Altruism, idealism, compassion, intolerance, vengeance, thievery, murder, duplicity, greed, all had their parts and all became inextricably mixed in the contest for Kansas. Slaveholders already there, reinforced by Missourians and adventurers from other parts of the south, collided not only with free-state Kansans but with numerous outsiders, some dedicated abolitionists, some fishing in troubled waters, and some imported and armed by the Emigrant Aid Society of New England.

This local war was at full heat when the greater war supervened. The local war was one of sudden forays in the night by forces of one complexion against the farms and homes of the other. Men were shot down before their families, their homesteads burned, their slaves seized, and their crops destroyed. John Brown, destined to achieve limited apotheosis at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, won hosannas in the north and execration in the south when he and his sons called out five proslavery men in the night at Pottawatomie, Kansas, and cut them down while their womenfolk were forced to look on.

It was war of guerrilla against guerrilla from which certain identifiable bands and leaders emerged. On the antislavery side were "Regulators," "Jayhawkers," and "Redlegs," led by such men as James H. Lane of Lawrence, Kansas, and Charles R. Jennison, a bloodthirsty expatriate New Yorker. Jim Lane was to become a Union brigadier general and Senator from Kansas when it was admitted as a state in 1861. Jennison got a colonel's commission in the Union army which lent a veneer of respectability to his stepped-up forays into western Missouri.

Proslavery forces were "Bushwhackers" and "Border Ruffians," whose leadership prior to the war is vague, but whose deeds were as atrocious as any committed in the name of abolition.

Among the Jayhawkers, perhaps in 1859 and certainly in 1860, was one William Clarke Quantrill,<sup>4</sup> a young man from Ohio who had worked as schoolteacher, prospector, farmer, and, reputedly, under the alias Charlie Hart, as a professional gambler. At none of these various endeavors did he achieve the financial success he sought. Then his membership in the Kansas Jayhawkers threw rich opportunity his way.

Quantrill learned the lucrative trade, common enough in the border wars, of enticing slaves from their masters with promises of freedom, then returning them for the usual reward. The future

guerrilla leader, with a gang of associates in both Kansas and Missouri, was engaged in this remunerative enterprise when President Lincoln called for state troops to uphold the Union in April 1861.

While there were extreme elements in Missouri, especially along the Kansas border, the majority of its people were "conditional Unionists." This less than precise description meant that they were proslavery but had no wish to see the Union dissolved; if they could have had their way, Missouri would have remained neutral throughout the war. That, of course, was impossible, not only on its face, but because an undeclared state of war already existed between Missouri and Kansas, and active warfare had been going on in its western counties for five years.

President Lincoln, deploring this war within a war, nevertheless was forced to take sides in what he called "a pestilential factional quarrel." Jim Lane was a powerful Republican leader in Kansas, and slaveholding and secession were almost, if not quite, synonymous in the political semantics of the time. Abolitionists in Missouri and Kansas, the President said, were "utterly lawless . . . but, after all, their faces are set Zionward."

Missouri was quickly occupied by Union troops, with headquarters at St. Louis, and Missouri and Kansas militia were armed, uniformed, and mustered into Federal service. Union military strength in the Department of the Missouri averaged 50,000 throughout the war, fighting few major battles and dedicated almost exclusively to maintaining the authority of the central government.

The Jayhawkers and Redlegs under Lane and Jennison waited for no orders from Washington or St. Louis or anywhere else. Immediately on the outbreak of hostilities they began raiding in the guise of Union troops into western Missouri, burning towns and farmsteads, slaughtering civilians, and returning to Kansas with slaves and whatever other plunder they could cart away. General Halleck, soon after taking command at St. Louis in 1861, replaced many of their commanders, with the observation that "a few more such raids will make Missouri as Confederate as Eastern Virginia." Because of their political strength, Halleck could do nothing about Lane and Jennison, both of whom continued raiding into Missouri at will.

Among the numerous guerrilla bands operating in western Missouri ostensibly in support of the Confederate cause was one headed by Quantrill, the erstwhile Jayhawker. It included, then or later, some of the most unsavory characters spawned in the

general lawlessness of the border country. Among these were the Younger brothers and the James brothers, all destined for post-war notoriety as thieves and wanton murderers. Also among Quantrill's recruits were W.T. Anderson, George W. Todd, and David Pool, alike in their carelessness of human life, who were to become guerrilla leaders themselves and, under the license and provocations of guerrilla warfare, true homicidal psychotics.

In its early operations among the hills and dense woods and underbrush of western Missouri, Quantrill's gang had no vestige of official sanction. They were mostly young men (including one Negro who was extremely useful as a scout) who sought revenge for homes destroyed and kin slaughtered, or who joined Quantrill for adventure and plunder. It was not until August 15, 1862, that the gang was enlisted in the Confederate service by Colonel Gideon W. Thompson, one of several officers sent into the border states to stir up insurrection and enroll recruits. Quantrill was commissioned a Confederate captain and Anderson and Todd were elected lieutenants.

By the summer of 1862 the activities of Quantrill and other Confederate guerrillas in Missouri had become so troublesome that Brigadier General John M. Schofield, then in command at St. Louis, on July 22 issued General Orders No. 19, requiring all able-bodied men in Missouri to enlist in the (Union) State Militia, "for the purpose of exterminating the guerrillas that infest our state." Schofield also renewed Halleck's previous order that captured partisans were to be "shot down on the spot." This order, rather than mitigating the disorderly conditions in the state, no doubt increased them. Many men, sympathetic to the south but reluctant to take arms against the Union, were driven into hiding or into the ranks of one of the guerrilla bands. It most certainly had no effect in curbing the guerrillas.

Many organized military expeditions were sent into the border counties in an effort to stamp out the numerous guerrillas, as contrasted to the Jayhawker and Redleg raids solely for plunder and vengeance. None of these expeditions accomplished more than the destruction of a few more homesteads, the capture of a few questionable prisoners, and the shooting of citizens who may or may not have been guerrillas. The commander of one of these expeditions, Captain D.H. David of the Fifth Missouri Cavalry, let himself be ambushed by Quantrill. Returning to base, he declared: "We do not believe that guerrillas can ever be taken by pursuit, we must take them by strategy."<sup>5</sup>

With the advent of cold weather, with its rains and snows and defoliation of the guerrillas' natural cover, Quantrill led his band south into Arkansas.

His success during the first year of his operations may be attributed to several factors:

1. The difficult terrain from which he operated, in which concealment was easy, pursuit onerous, and ambushes of pursuing forces readily contrived.
2. The friendly attitude of much of the civilian population which had suffered greatly from Jayhawker and Redleg raids. Union sympathizers not subject to the same sense of outrage were terrorized by the guerrillas into cooperation with them and restraint toward their enemies.

A great many measures were placed in effect by the Union authorities to repress the guerrillas, and all of them failed. These measures included fines and imprisonment of actual or suspected guerrilla supporters, placing others under bond, burning the homes of guerrillas and their supporters, and summary execution of men found with arms who could not prove their loyalty. In many cases oaths of allegiance to the United States were required, which were cheerfully taken and as cheerfully disregarded, since those who took them considered them not binding, having been extracted under duress. None of these measures overcame the natural sympathy of those favoring the guerrillas or the fear of guerrilla revenge on the part of the loyal or neutral population.

Even with Quantrill gone south, guerrilla activities throughout Missouri continued during the winter. While none of these was as spectacular as his, or to any degree decisive, each of them was a harassment and a threat that had to be dealt with. As a result, Union detachments were out in all sorts of weather, mounts were worn out, men were dispirited, and more homes were burned, farms devastated, and citizens killed.

With the coming of spring in 1863, Quantrill returned from Arkansas and Indian Territory (now Oklahoma). For the first time he and his men began the practice of wearing Union cavalry uniforms, Quantrill identifying himself as "Captain Clarke" of the nonexistent Fourth Missouri Cavalry. This practice greatly assisted in surprising and ambushing Union troops and trains and led to confusion and suspicion among Union forces in the field. His successes and the glamor surrounding him and his band, added to the results of Union army, Jayhawker, and Redleg activities in the area, brought to him recruits in increasing numbers.



On June 16, 1863, Quantrill's men attacked and routed a detachment of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry near Westport, Missouri (the river landing at Kansas City), killing about 20 enemy troopers with no loss to themselves. The same day Brigadier General Thomas Ewing, Jr., assumed command of the new District of the Border, with headquarters at Kansas City, embracing all of Kansas north of the 38th parallel and the Missouri counties of Jackson, Bates, and Cass, between that parallel and the Missouri River.

The new District commander took prompt and drastic action. First he denounced the guerrilla bands of both sides, saying of the Jayhawkers and Redlegs that they were "stealing themselves rich in the name of liberty." All Kansas guerrillas were ordered arrested wherever found.

Against the Confederate guerrillas Ewing adopted in Missouri a two-pronged effort: (1) keeping them out of Kansas and (2) hunting them down and making their existence precarious in Missouri. The defenses in Kansas were strengthened and garrisons were placed at key towns to maintain constant counterguerrilla patrols. These methods proved no more successful in putting down the guerrillas than had those of his predecessors, and Ewing adopted the more fundamental tactic of striking at their bases.

On August 14, 1863, Ewing issued his General Order No. 10, ordering the arrest of all men and women "not heads of families" who were assisting the guerrillas in the three Missouri border counties. When arrested these people were to be taken to Kansas City for confinement, although the order did not specify how detachment commanders were to distinguish between those who had aided the guerrillas through sympathy and those forced to do so through fear. Wives and children of known guerrillas were to be deported from Missouri immediately, including women who were "heads of families." Guerrillas who voluntarily gave themselves up would be allowed to accompany their wives out of the state.

The deportation of women kin of known guerrillas already had been going on under a previous order of Schofield's and a number of these were confined in an ancient three-story brick building in Kansas City. This building collapsed August 13, killing five women and crippling one for life. Ewing had been warned that the building was unsafe, and the belief spread, not only among the Missouri guerrillas, but generally, that Union troops had deliberately undermined its walls.



At daylight August 21, 1863, Quantrill, with 300 to 400 guerrillas made up of his own gang reinforced by others, raided the town of Lawrence, Kansas, 35 miles southwest of Kansas City, perpetrating one of the bloodiest and most notorious atrocities of the border warfare. Lawrence, named after a Boston abolitionist, was established in 1854 by the Emigrant Aid Society of New England. Jim Lane's home was there, and the town had been the center of intense Free State activity in the prewar years.

Quantrill's raiders, although they had to march more than 40 miles through country patrolled by Union troops, achieved complete surprise. For three terrible hours the guerrillas held the town captive, looted all of its banks and most of its stores, murdered nearly 200 persons, most of them unarmed, and burned the business district and many residences, in all about 185 buildings.<sup>6</sup> Among the residences burned was that of Jim Lane, in which the guerrillas claimed to have counted five pianos stolen from Missourians, a claim unsupported by any objective evidence but indicative of the prevailing state of feeling.

Quantrill led his guerrillas, with their loot and fresh horses taken in Kansas, in a masterly retreat back into Missouri. Not only were all Union troops within marching distance alerted and sent to intercept him, but many armed citizens joined in the chase. Covering his withdrawal with a rearguard of his best-mounted men, he lost only a few followers whose mounts gave out and left them afoot (Union claims ranging from 20 to more than 200 guerrillas killed on the retreat are discounted by their own inconsistencies). One thing is certain: those captured were promptly hanged by pursuing Jayhawkers and Redlegs. A subsequent report that one guerrilla was scalped by an Indian among the pursuers led to dreadful retaliation later.

Quantrill's apologists have maintained that the raid was in revenge for the collapse of the prison housing the guerrillas' womenfolk. General Schofield felt that it was in retribution for Ewing's General Order No. 10. Neither of these explanations takes into account the brief time that elapsed between either event and the raid itself. Planning and organization considered, it seems clear that Quantrill had prepared the raid well before either of those alleged provocations came into being. It was a deliberate, calculated act of warfare, with pillage and murder its principal objectives.

The consequences of the Lawrence raid were immediate and violent. Union cavalry commands pursued the guerrillas deep into their hiding places in western Missouri, but with small success.

Several "enemy" were reported killed in numerous skirmishes and attacks on farmsteads, but how many of these were guerrillas and how many innocent citizens cannot now be determined.

Of greater consequence were actions taken by Lane and Ewing. Having lost his home and barely escaping with his life, and being little short of a guerrilla himself, Lane called for an expedition by Kansas militia and citizens into Missouri to exact vengeance. The governor of Kansas appealed directly to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton for 1,000 stand of arms from the arsenal at Ft. Leavenworth, a request Stanton granted without consulting General Schofield. Lane's expedition was organized at a meeting at Leavenworth August 26 and the invasion of Missouri set for September 9.

Schofield at once directed Ewing: "Do not permit irresponsible parties to enter Missouri for retaliation." Ewing assured Schofield that he would oppose with dependable troops any invasion from Kansas. Meanwhile, Lane held another meeting at Leavenworth, at which it was agreed that armed parties should meet September 8 at Paola, Kansas, ready "to search for their stolen property in Missouri." Brigadier General Egbert R. Brown, commanding the District of Central Missouri, with headquarters at Jefferson City, forthrightly met this threat of lawless and bloody revenge. He issued Circular No. 6, dated September 3, declaring that armed bands of irresponsible Kansans entering Missouri would "be treated in the same manner as . . . other robbers, murderers, and marauders." If they refused to leave the district they were to be considered "open enemies warring against the Government."

Then General Brown disclosed his own intention to proceed with dispatch against Quantrill and called on citizens to arm themselves to protect their homes. He ended his circular with the resounding invocation: "Soldiers, remember Lawrence! . . . Guerrillas are outlaws and are to receive no quarters."

The final outcome of Lane's call for vengeance by direct and independent action was, in the face of this determined military opposition, perhaps a little anticlimactic. Schofield, aware that "so absurd a proposition as that of Mr. Lane could not have been made in good faith," told the Senator-General that he and his "lawless rabble" would be met by force if they attempted any invasion of Missouri. Several hundred people met at Paola as scheduled, listened to an impassioned speech by Lane, and then dispersed. General Schofield, whose "imbecility and incapacity," Lane had informed President Lincoln, were "most deplorable," had won hands down.

Quantrill and his gang remained safely hidden in the hills and tangled forests of western Missouri, and against them General Ewing directed General Order No. 11, dated August 25, 1863. Under this order, the northern part of Vernon County, Missouri, was added to the three counties depopulated under General Order No. 10. All hay and grain in the fields or under shelter was to be seized for the Government and moved out of the county. Finally, paragraph 3 of General Order No. 10, permitting guerrillas to surrender subject to banishment with their families, was rescinded.

The effect of these orders and activities on Quantrill and his adherents was exactly nothing. He continued sporadic raids in Missouri, ambushed a few of the many Union detachments sent to hunt him down, and lived well enough on the abandoned smokehouses, barns, and loose livestock of the dispossessed farmers.

In October, when his cover began thinning out, he moved south again, this time into the north Texas district of Brigadier General Henry McCullough, CSA, with headquarters at Bonham. McCullough accepted the guerrillas with some reserve. To General E. Kirby Smith, commanding the Confederate trans-Mississippi Department, he described their mode of warfare as "but little, if at all, removed from that of the wildest savage."

Kirby Smith suggested that McCullough use the guerrillas to round up deserters, who were numerous and had themselves collected into guerrilla bands preying on their own people. At this task Quantrill proved fairly successful, infiltrating the deserters, gaining their confidence, and bringing in several hundred of them.

Against guerrilla fighters of another sort, Quantrill's people were less successful. Sent out by McCullough to round up a band of marauding Comanche Indians, Quantrill was completely outguerrillaed and soundly beaten, with higher losses than he had suffered in any encounter with Union troops.

Ever since the Lawrence raid, tensions had been building up within Quantrill's rather loosely organized command. In addition to necessarily lax discipline, these apparently came from several causes, among them a natural gravitation of the men toward favored or admired lieutenants, and the general depression of morale following the Confederate defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg. While they were in Texas, several bloody internal fights had occurred, and at one time, when McCullough had placed Quantrill under arrest

and the guerrilla escaped, Bill Anderson, one of his most homicidal lieutenants, joined the troops sent out in a vain effort to recapture him.

The gang left Texas April 10, 1864, and soon after returning to Missouri, Quantrill quarrelled with another of his lieutenants, George Todd, and retired, leaving Todd in command. A few men went along with Quantrill, but the broken gang, now under Todd, Anderson, and a few other favored leaders, pillaged and ravaged with less system and greater maliciousness than before. The Kansas City Journal said of the fragmented gang's activities:

No loyal man can till a farm or raise a crop . . . or safely travel the highways. Should he venture to run the gauntlet from one military post to the next he does so at the risk of . . . assassination. In a word, the rebels hold the country, while the loyal people are besieged in the towns."

With one exception, the Missouri guerrillas after Quantrill's departure performed no military service. That exception was in support of the campaign of Confederate General Sterling Price to recapture the state in September 1864. Even in that endeavor their activities produced so little of military value and resulted in so much murder, pillage, and outright savagery that Price finally ordered them to leave his army.

In addition to the breakdown within the guerrillas' principal gang, other events had transpired which were to alter radically their mode and place of operations. While they were in Texas the 2nd Colorado Cavalry, a regiment of some 1,200 mountain men as hard and wily as the guerrillas themselves had been moved into western Missouri for the express purpose of hunting them down.

This command presented the guerrilla bands with something new: troops who not only would stand up and fight them, but who pursued them relentlessly into their fastnesses, putting pressure on them which never relaxed. Also operating against the guerrillas was the fact that, with Quantrill's departure they had broken up into smaller bands, the two principal ones commanded by Anderson and Todd, but many others of less than a half-dozen men each. None of these could bring to bear sufficient force or ingenuity to meet aggressive and determined pressure from seasoned, disciplined, and well-led troops unimpressed by the guerrillas' reputations.

The pressure of the 2nd Colorado, plus action of General Brown, now commanding the new District of Central Missouri, in relaxing Ewing's General Order No. 11, permitted many refugees to return to western Missouri, driving the guerrillas out of their old theater of operations. First they moved eastward, then north across the Missouri River. Anderson's men ambushed a 13-man Union patrol near Warrensburg in Johnson county and killed 12, leaving their bodies scalped and horribly mutilated. Other successes of the gangs were limited to stage robberies, attacks on single farmhouses, and murders of individual citizens, always pursued, further fragmented, and often thoroughly shot up. The return of refugees under Brown's relaxation of General Order No. 11 hindered them also, since most of these people were Unionists who refused to panic, now that they were backed by present and effective military force.

The appearance of the guerrillas north of the Missouri River coincided with the fiercely partisan presidential campaign of 1864. Thus the guerrillas were supported by secessionists who had been driven out of western Missouri by the Union depopulation orders and by such Copperhead organizations as the Order of American Knights. From another standpoint, they were provided with targets for their savagery not only by the inadequate and politically divided militia defending the area but by ardent Unionists who made themselves conspicuous by their activities, both verbal and physical, against their political opponents.

Here occurred the only effort known to have been made by Federal authorities to pit Union guerrillas against Confederate guerrillas in Missouri. It was an abject and most costly failure.

Major General William S. Rosecrans, now commanding in Missouri, commissioned as a Union captain a Missourian variously described as a "scout" and "detective," one Harry Truman,<sup>8</sup> to apply guerrilla methods against the Confederates who had crossed the river. Truman organized a band of some 20 ruffians whom he commanded from a buggy reputed to have contained, besides himself, a jug of whisky and two prostitutes. Thus accoutered he swept through northwest Missouri, murdering and plundering Confederates and Unionists, Republicans and Democrats, alike. For a time his enthusiastic reports of resounding "victories" over enemy guerrillas kept his employers happy. But before long, Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk, commanding the District of Northern Missouri, was flooded with cries of invective and alarm and petitions for relief from Truman's area of operations.

Fisk finally managed to put Truman and some of his followers under arrest. The erstwhile guerrilla, who had proved as dissolute as he was murderous, was convicted by a military commission in November 1864 of murder, arson, and larceny and sentenced to be hanged. His sentence was commuted to imprisonment by Rosecrans, and in March 1865 he was released by order of the Secretary of War, apparently as the result of pressure by the Union Leagues of northern and central Missouri. In May 1865 Truman was employed again, over Fisk's protests, by Major General G.M. Dodge, the latest commander in Missouri, and once more turned bandit. Dodge ordered him arrested on June 4, 1865, but from then on the record is silent.

By mid-July 1864, both Todd and Anderson, with perhaps 100 men altogether, were north of the Missouri, inflicting on the north central part of the state the most barbarous atrocities in the somber record of border guerrilla warfare. At one point they sought the aid of Quantrill, to whom they proposed capture and devastation of the fortified town of Fayette, north of the river in Howard county. When Quantrill rejected the venture as too hazardous, he once more departed after "an animated and heated argument."

Anderson and Todd undertook to attack Fayette on their own, with Anderson leading. Only 30 Union militia guarded the place from a blockhouse and Anderson roused no suspicion when his band rode in at 10:30 A.M., all in Federal uniforms. This advantage was stupidly squandered when one guerrilla could not resist banging away at a Negro soldier on a sidewalk, and the militia readied itself in its wooden fort. After a series of reckless mounted charges against this resolutely defended place, the guerrillas were beaten off with a loss of 13 killed and 30 wounded. This was a high toll of casualties relative to previous fights, but impossible to calculate relative to guerrilla strength present, since that is not surely known.

This humiliating defeat was avenged by an act of wanton cruelty three days later at Centralia, Missouri. Riding into the town early on the morning of September 27, 1864, Anderson's men had time to get themselves well saturated with whiskey before the westbound train from St. Louis rolled in at noon. Anderson and his men rushed into the train and drove the passengers, including 25 furloughed, sick, and wounded soldiers from Sherman's army, all unarmed, onto the platform. The soldiers were ordered to undress and then all were shot, those not succumbing immediately being clubbed to death. Some were scalped. Then the passengers were robbed, two who attempted to hide valuables being killed,

and the train was set on fire and started at full speed down the track. A freight train arriving not long afterward was stopped and its crew murdered.

Thirty minutes after Anderson left Centralia, Major A.V.E. Johnston rode in with 147 men of the 39th Missouri Mounted Infantry, a militia regiment. Appalled at what he saw and heard, Johnston left 36 men to guard Centralia and galloped off after the guerrillas. He found them without difficulty, since Anderson and Todd, who had rejoined, had laid an ambush and were waiting.

Johnston rode straight into the ambush and, when he discovered the guerrillas' presence, ill-advisedly dismounted his troops. The guerrillas, amazed and delighted, rode them down. After one volley, they turned and fled toward Centralia where the garrison joined their rout. Anderson and Todd pursued them until confronted by a Union blockhouse at Sturgeon, Missouri, where they abandoned the chase.

At a cost of three guerrillas killed and ten wounded by the single Union volley at the ambush, the guerrillas killed 124 of the Union militia, including Major Johnston. Him and some others they decapitated, many were indescribably mutilated, a large number were scalped. That night the guerrillas began retreating westward toward Howard county to escape the expected reaction which, in fact, promptly came. On the morning of September 28 they were overtaken by a large Union force with two pieces of artillery, which pressed them all day but broke off pursuit that night.

The guerrillas, now under tremendous pressure from all Union forces in northwestern Missouri, succeeded in recrossing the river when Price's advance toward Jefferson City forced a temporary Union concentration in that direction. Todd, scouting for Price near Independence, Missouri, was killed on October 21, 1864. Five days later Anderson, who had again recrossed the river on a career of brigandage independent of Price's campaign, was shot to death in a pitched battle with 150 militia near Albany in Ray county. Most notable among his effects was a fringe of human scalps on each bridle rein.

With Todd and Anderson gone and their bands split and leaderless, Quantrill emerged from his enforced retirement. But, since Price had been finally defeated and his broken army pursued into Texas, guerrilla warfare as a profitable profession in Missouri appeared finished. Quantrill, therefore, gathered together about

30 men of the old bands and moved into Kentucky, where political dissension and a long-standing state of guerrilla warfare promised a satisfactory harvest.

Early in December Quantrill and his 30 men began moving east and south, crossing the Mississippi into Tennessee the night of January 1, 1865. All the guerrillas were in US uniforms, and Quantrill, passing himself as Captain Clarke of the Fourth Missouri Cavalry, easily obtained food, forage, and shelter at Union garrisons along the way into Kentucky.

The Kentucky venture was ill-starred from the outset. Near Harrodsburg 11 guerrillas were killed or captured. From Harrodsburg, Quantrill moved into Nelson county, where he joined forces with the Kentucky guerrilla, Sue Mundy. Still pursued relentlessly by Union troops, they were overtaken again at Houstonville by Union troops; four guerrillas were killed, four captured, and the rest dispersed.

Finally making their way, assisted by southern sympathizers, into Spencer county south of Louisville, they spent February and March in petty raids of no military consequence and of little profit to themselves. Nevertheless, Quantrill's presence in the state stimulated extraordinary efforts on the part of Federal military authorities, especially since all guerrilla attacks, of whatever magnitude and wherever directed, were automatically credited to the terrible Missourian.

Major General John M. Palmer, Union commander in Kentucky, baffled by the activities of Confederate sympathizers in keeping the guerrillas informed of his troop movements, organized a guerrilla command of his own. He commissioned one Edwin Terrill, leader of a small Union guerrilla band in Spencer county, to undertake the pursuit and capture or destruction of Quantrill. Terrill, a deserter from the Confederate army, acted promptly and made contact with Quantrill on April 13, 1865. He never lost contact, pursuing and harassing the Missouri gang without cessation.

Finally, on the morning of May 10, Terrill caught up with Quantrill resting on a Spencer county farm. The usually wary Missourians were taken completely by surprise and several were killed, while Quantrill was shot in the spine and partially paralyzed. He died in a military prison at Louisville on June 6. Ironically enough, Terrill was killed before Quantrill's death, while raiding near Shelbyville, Kentucky.



Before Quantrill's career was ended all the Confederate armies east of the Mississippi had surrendered, and before his death all land action had ceased and there was no more Confederacy. With all his daring, enterprise, and ruthlessness, and that of those who followed or imitated him, very little of direct military value was achieved by the Confederate guerrillas during the war. It is true that they did divert numbers of Union troops in pursuit of them, but these were principally local militia who probably would not have been called out of their states in any event. Union guerrilla bands in like manner achieved nothing decisive except the capture of Quantrill himself long after he had degenerated from a quasi-military factor to a mere bandit, and long after his services, however directed, could have produced anything of military value to the Confederacy.

### Partisan Warfare

Unlike guerrilla warfare, which flared up immediately wherever troops entered hostile country, partisan warfare using guerrilla tactics began slowly and proceeded along more conventional lines. Prewar American military thought, as has been noted, made no distinction between the two, and adjustment to the distinction came slowly or, occasionally, not at all.

Partisan commands in both armies tended to be regarded by the other as guerrillas, and only the threat of retaliation induced caution in subjecting those captured to summary execution. Publication of Dr. Lieber's brief in 1862 had cleared the atmosphere, but not entirely. Individual commanders interpreted the distinction according to their own temperaments and the pressures upon them. As late as September 1864, six members of Lieutenant Colonel John S. Mosby's 43rd Battalion of Partisan Rangers were executed as "guerrillas" by Major General George A. Custer. Mosby waited until he had as many of Custer's men captive and executed them in retaliation.

Partisan operations were confined principally to Virginia and West Virginia, where Confederate partisans became exceedingly active as the war advanced, seriously interfering at times with Union lines of communication. With considerably less success a few Union partisan commands were organized, and occasional raids were made by formal Union cavalry commands against the Confederate rear.

Soon after hostilities commenced in 1861, secessionist residents of western Virginia, distressed by the pro-Union sympathies of their neighbors and menaced by approaching Union forces, petitioned the government at Richmond for authority to constitute guerrilla bands. Both the term and the methods of guerrilla warfare were repugnant to Confederate officialdom and all these requests were turned down. As acting Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin explained late in 1861: "Guerrilla companies are not recognized as part of the military organization of the Confederate States, and cannot be authorized by this department."

Nevertheless, the way had been opened by the Virginia legislature which, in 1861, authorized formation of ten Partisan Ranger companies in the state forces. Under this Act the first partisan organizations in the state and in West Virginia were assembled. Then, in the spring of 1862, the Confederate Congress authorized partisan units, and the way was opened for numerous organizations whose services were at times highly useful but which brought with them side effects which, in most cases, limited or cancelled out their military value.

There were, of course, in both Virginia and West Virginia, small guerrilla bands which with no shadow of legal sanction pursued a course of independent thievery and murder similar to that current along the western border. But at no time were the acts of these bands militarily important, or of consequence to anyone but their victims, except on occasions when their depredations were attributed to the organized partisans.

These latter grew in part from emulation of the tactics introduced by the Confederate leader of light cavalry, Colonel Turner Ashby, in 1861, in the Shenandoah Valley. After Ashby's death in battle, some of those who had served with him organized units of their own under the Partisan Ranger Acts. Independently of these, a few partisan units emerged naturally from the situation obtaining in a region divided against itself and, early in the war, largely occupied by enemy forces. Apparently the first of these appeared in Loudoun county, Virginia, an area of diverse background and conflicting sentiment.

The northern part of Loudoun county, under the shadow of the Catoclin mountain range, had been settled largely by Germans and Quakers from Pennsylvania. These people were industrious small farmers and ardently loyal to the Union. The fact that very few of them were slaveholders was beside the point; slavery was not an issue in the county, only some 5,000 slaves being held there at the onset of the war. The issue was unionism vs. secession, and that alone.

This division accounts, at least in part, for the fact that the first partisan units in the Eastern theater, both Union and Confederate, were raised in Loudoun county. The first of these was the 35th Battalion of Virginia Partisan Rangers, commanded by Elijah V. (Lije) White of Leesburg, organized in the fall of 1861 under the Virginia Partisan Ranger Act. It was countered in June of 1862 by formation in the upper section of the county of the Independent Loudoun Rangers, authorized specifically by Secretary Stanton under command of Samuel C. Means of Waterford.

Despite the loyalty of the section where Means's rangers were raised, their total enrollment throughout the war was only 120. This was due first to their having mounted themselves, at Stanton's order, on horses taken from secessionist Virginians, which made them highly unpopular among their neighbors. Second, they were repeatedly defeated by White's "Comanches," as they preferred to call themselves, and later by Mosby's command. Still, in conjunction with Major H.A. Cole's Maryland Cavalry Battalion, Means's rangers patrolled the Potomac and endeavored to cover the vital and sensitive Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. In a principal enterprise enjoined upon them by Stanton, that of ridding the county of "guerrillas," they were markedly unsuccessful. Means finally resigned his commission in April 1864, when the depredations of his command led to a sensible increase of anti-Union feeling in the county, and his unit was absorbed into the Union cavalry.

Other Confederate partisan units were organized in Virginia by Harry Gilmor of Baltimore who, like White, had served with Ashby, and, up in the northeastern corner of the new state of West Virginia, by John Hanson McNeill. This extremely diligent and effective partisan leader was born in Hardy County, Virginia, nearly 50 years before, and had migrated to Missouri, where he commanded a company of militia in Price's army early in the war. Although opposed to secession he, like so many of his kind, went along with his native state and took his three sons with him. After being wounded and captured, he escaped from a Union prison at St. Louis and returned to Hardy county.

Unlike White's Comanches, who attended first to affairs in Loudoun county and then served almost continuously with the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, Gilmor and McNeill directed their efforts primarily at Union army communications. McNeill succeeded in wrecking the rail line from Harpers Ferry to Winchester and, like Gilmor, nibbled unceasingly at the B & O, the Union's main east-west rail artery. Although their damage to the line was never permanent, they made travel on it precarious and, by

constantly damaging its right-of-way, made it impossible for the B & O to double-track its Baltimore-Washington branch, the Capital's only direct rail link with the north, until 1864.

McNeill was killed in October 1864, apparently accidentally by one of his own men, and his 23-year-old son Jesse took command. Meanwhile, Major General Philip H. Sheridan had begun his devastation of the Shenandoah Valley under orders of Lieutenant General U.S. Grant. Sheridan, in common with some other Union commanders, never regarded Confederate partisan commands as anything but guerrillas and bushwhackers. Not only was his execution of Grant's order thorough and meticulous, but he tended toward summary execution of partisans who fell into his hands; of McNeill's death he said: "This was fortunate, as he was one of the most daring and dangerous of all the bushwhackers in this section of the country."

Neither McNeill's death, Sheridan's devastations, nor his ruthlessness toward captured partisans relieved the pressure on his lines of communication. Couriers continued to be captured, railroad trains wrecked, track torn up, wagon trains looted and burned, bridges in his rear destroyed, and isolated detachments of his troops ambushed. This went on until Sheridan left the Valley and joined Grant on the James River.

Harry Gilmor was twice captured, the second time near the end of the war, but with his independent cavalry force he managed to make things miserable for travellers on the B & O and for Union commanders using northern Virginia wagon roads. Between them, Gilmor and McNeill captured three Union general officers whose value as media of prisoner exchange was high. White and Gilmor also scouted for the Army of Northern Virginia in its Second Manassas, Maryland, and Gettysburg campaigns. In the last, White served as part of the rearguard which held off Union attacks while the defeated army struggled to recross the flooded Potomac.

The best known and generally most successful Confederate partisan leader in Virginia was John Singleton Mosby, a Virginian who served for two years as a scout for Major General J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry command and has been credited with suggesting Stuart's ride around the Union army in June 1862. Almost from the beginning of his service, as a private, Mosby had considered the probable effectiveness of a partisan command free to operate on the Union lines of communication near Washington. After the Fredericksburg battle, Mosby suggested this possibility to Stuart during a cavalry incursion into Fairfax county, Virginia, in January 1863. The future partisan leader was permitted to remain behind with nine men.

From this small beginning Mosby built up a disciplined, efficient, and effective force which, until the end of the war, was a source of serious and constant harassment to Union forces in its vicinity. After the war General Grant was to write: "There were probably but few men in the South who could have commanded successfully a separate detachment, in the rear of an opposing army and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command." This Mosby did, increasing his nine-man detachment to a full battalion, eventually with its own artillery, captured, of course, from the richly supplied enemy.

Mosby first called attention to his new command the night of March 8, 1863, when he rode with 29 men into the midst of Union forces covering Fairfax Courthouse and snatched their commanding general from his bed. This dramatic exploit was followed by a series of lightning raids at Union outposts. Parties sent to capture this new menace were successfully eluded or met head on and defeated.

One effect of the Fairfax capture was to alarm President Lincoln himself, who reasoned that if the lines about Washington were so fragile that they could be penetrated to a general's headquarters, the city itself could not be safe from raiders. The President personally ordered extraordinary efforts to take or kill Mosby, efforts which were to consume increasing numbers of troops as time went on.

Aside from his attacks on enemy outposts and frequent fights with pursuing cavalry, Mosby's principal concern from the outset of his partisan career was the Manassas Gap Railroad, the principal artery of supply for Union forces in the Valley. He began his attacks on this line in the spring of 1863 and kept them up until the Valley no longer was capable of supporting an army, Union or Confederate. At one time his attacks were so successful that the railroad was put out of operation entirely and Union forces in the Valley compelled to rely on long wagon trains, upon which Mosby pounced as eagerly as on the railroad. Finally, after the device of forcing prominent Confederate civilians to ride on every train had failed to stop Mosby, Grant ordered all buildings burned and all trees cut down along a strip of five miles on each side of the line.

In a last desperate effort to put an end to Mosby's forays, Grant instructed Sheridan in August 1864: "If you can possibly spare a division of cavalry, send them into Loudoun County to destroy and carry off all the crops, animals, negroes, and all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms." It was

November before Sheridan got around to this chore, but then he sent the cavalry division of Major General Wesley Merritt into the area in Loudoun and Fauquier counties between the Bull Run mountains and the Blue Ridge to carry out Grant's order.

The devastation that followed was complete, although no reliable statistics have survived. The rich "Loudoun Valley" was left desolate, not a mill or a barn standing, crops and livestock carried off or destroyed, and many homes burned. This rather increased local public support of Mosby than otherwise and his activities continued unabated until General R.E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox April 9, 1865. Mosby then entered into prolonged negotiations for surrender to the Federal authorities and finally gave up in disgust. Almost two weeks after Appomattox Mosby called his men together at Salem (now Marshall) and disbanded them. He never did surrender and was never called to account for his partisan activities.

Whatever advantages may have been achieved by the activities of organized independent partisan commands, and these were many, they were more than counterbalanced by numerous disadvantages. If all such commands had been conducted as were those of Mosby and McNeill, some of the disadvantages might not have arisen. But few of them were so conducted, and their reputations were engulfed in the tide of recrimination which flowed from the fierce and mutual violence inspired by the irresponsible acts of guerrillas and bushwhackers. Even so, the operations of the best of these commands, as well as those of the worst, inevitably led to devastation of sometimes large and important areas of land and the death or deprivation of their inhabitants of whatever political complexion.

From time to time throughout the war elements of army units already in the field were designated specifically to hunt down partisan bands, but rarely with much success.

In April 1862 25 former Jayhawkers, headed by Captain J. Carpenter of the 2nd Arkansas Cavalry, appeared in West Virginia. Calling themselves "Jessie Scouts," after the wife of Major General J.C. Frémont, they dressed in captured Confederate uniforms and announced their intention of ridding the state of partisans and guerrillas. In short order they degenerated into undisguised freebooters, preying on the population at a cost greater than that levied by all the Confederate partisan units put together. By July the Jessie Scouts had disintegrated, their leader shot

by a woman he was squiring, and their sponsor, Frémont, resigned from the army.\*

Of vastly different metal were Sheridan's Scouts, daredevil Union soldiers who roamed the Shenandoah Valley in Confederate uniform during the campaign of 1864-1865, to gather information and to combat Confederate guerrillas. They took double risks, of course, for some were shot in error by Union troops, and others were executed by Confederate leaders whose commands they had penetrated. But Sheridan was able to reward them well out of Secret Service funds, and they were quite efficient, up to the end of Appomattox. The scouts were commanded by one of Sheridan's staff officers, Major Henry H. Young, 2nd Rhode Island Infantry, and were recruited in the main from the 17th Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry. It was Young and a detachment of his men who captured Confederate leader Harry W. Gilmer (mentioned supra) in 1865.<sup>9</sup>

To the outnumbered southern armies the principal disadvantage accruing from the activities of partisan bands was their drain on already inadequate human resources. As the attrition of battle cut more deeply into southern military manpower, increasing numbers of men, not only deserters but those with influence or not yet drafted, were drawn from the ranks. The adventurous life of the partisan, his share of the spoils of captured rail and wagon trains, his independence of strict discipline, appealed to entirely too many eligible soldiers. As a result, the Confederate Congress, at the request of Secretary Seddon, repealed the Partisan Ranger Act in February 1864. Lee promptly ordered that all partisan commands under his jurisdiction be disbanded, with one exception.

"I am making an effort," he notified Seddon, "to have . . . Mosby's battalion mustered into the regular service. If this cannot be done, I recommend that this battalion be retained as Partisans for the present. . . . Mosby has done excellent service, and from the reports of citizens and others I am inclined to believe that he is strict in discipline and a protection to the country in which he operates." Seddon agreed to this, and also retained young Jesse McNeill's company in partisan service in West Virginia.

---

\*There were, however, many other more significant reasons for Frémont's resignation. This was at most a minor contribution.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. The failure of US military authorities to recognize, define, distinguish between, and provide for partisan and guerrilla services, and for counters to them, permitted a situation to develop which was costly and discreditable to both sides in the American Civil War.

2. In all theaters, attempts to counteract partisan or guerrilla activities by attacks on or drastic dislocation of the civilian population failed of their purpose. Civilians sympathetic to the independent forces, or essentially neutral, were impelled by their own resentment of attacks on themselves to aid further the forces they considered friendly or not actively hostile. Civilians inimical to the independent forces were terrorized into aiding them and then were forced to suffer equally with their neighbors whatever general devastation was inflicted on civilian populations.

3. The tendency of independent commands to revert, either directly through their leaders or in spite of them, to unbridled thievery and murder was marked and mutually costly. In very few such commands, Union or Confederate, was discipline or control by higher authority ever successfully maintained.

4. Of all the counter guerrilla devices attempted during the war, only those proved effective which met the guerrilla bands with well-trained, disciplined, and hardy troops. These succeeded only when they maintained unrelenting pressure on the guerrillas and remained in possession of recovered land areas, so that friendly and neutral civilians were reassured and no longer subject to terrorization, and hostile civilians were unable to aid the guerrillas without detection.

5. Use of local militia units in counter guerrilla operations very rarely produced acceptable results. These units almost invariably were (1) untrained and ill-disciplined and unable to face a spirited attack; (2) their officers were unskilled and easily surprised and ambushed; (3) the loyalty of many was divided and the units therefore unreliable; and (4) local militia units of strong political sympathies often became little more than guerrilla bands themselves.

6. Guerrilla activity was confined almost exclusively to areas divided in political sentiment, where this activity itself was an expression of violent political differences.



7. Both belligerents found organized partisan warfare generally so unproductive of concrete military results that both largely abandoned it as an instrument of policy before the war ended.

## Footnotes

1. One of the many presumed causes of the notorious Hatfield-McCoy feud was continuation of Civil War guerrilla warfare in which the West Virginia Hatfields were Confederates and the Kentucky McCoys sided with the Union. Cf. Virgil Carrington Jones, The Hatfields and the McCoys (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948), pp. 13-16.
2. The full text of General Halleck's request and Dr. Lieber's reply will be found in Official Records (see Bibliography), Series III, vol. II, pp. 301-309. Dr. Lieber later compiled for the War Department a detailed brief on international "laws" of war, which was issued in 1863 as General Orders No. 100 and, until after World War I, was copied into US Army Field Service Regulations as the Rules of Land Warfare.
3. Literally scores of counterguerrilla General and Special Orders, circulars, and instructions were issued by Union commanders throughout the war. To cite all of them would place an unsupportable burden on available space, to say nothing of their redundancy. Those cited are indicative of the general tenor of all such documents, with the observation that those which bore most harshly on civilian populations seem to have been less effective in curbing guerrilla activities and most effective in arousing pro-guerrilla sentiment in the areas affected.
4. Often spelled Quantrell; the overwhelming bulk of evidence supports the spelling employed here.
5. Captain David's complaint had a long and sound basis in history. For instance, in 1250, Henry III of England sent the great soldier Simon de Montfort to put down an insurrection in Gascony and after a time received an account of his activities in which this appears: ". . . . Nor can they be checked by an army as in a regular war, for they only rob and burn, and take prisoners and ransom them, and ride about at night like thieves in companies." Quoted in Thomas B. Costain, The Magnificent Century (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), p. 172.
6. Discrepancies among sources prohibit precise enumeration of the damage done at Lawrence. The mayor on the day of the raid claimed 60 killed. General Ewing's official report, dated August 31,

detailed 185 buildings burned and 140 unarmed persons killed, including 106 civilians, 14 recruits of the 14th Regiment, and 20 recruits of the 2nd Kansas Colored Volunteers, and 24 persons wounded. The provost marshal at Leavenworth reported to the Provost Marshal General August 25 that \$100,000 cash had been taken, \$2 million in property destroyed, and "up to the present time 150 dead bodies have been found and many more will doubtless be found in the ruins." A later newspaper account placed the killed at 183, and subsequent authorities, including the Encyclopaedia Britannica, seem to have settled on 150 deaths.

7. It is perhaps redundant to call attention to the parallel between this last observation and the conditions encountered in many insurgent-plagued areas today.

8. For the reassurance of possible skeptics, it should be noted that Captain Harry Truman's escapades are recorded in considerable, though inadequate, detail in Official Records (see Bibliography), Series I, Vols. 34, 41, and 48, passim.

9. Dupuy, R. Ernest and Dupuy, Trevor N., Compact History of the Civil War (Hawthorn, New York, 1960), 348 ff.

Henry P. Moyer, History of the 17th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry (Lebanon, Sowers Printing Co., 1911), passim.

## Bibliography

- Callan, John F. The Military Laws of the United States, 1776-1863. Philadelphia: Childs, 1863.
- Castel, Albert. William Clarke Quantrill: His Life and Times. New York: Fell, 1962. This recent account of Quantrill's career, alone among those consulted, attempts and attains objectivity.
- Connelly, William Elsey. Quantrill and the Border Wars. Cedar Rapids: Torch Press, 1910. Violently anti-Quantrill, although indispensable for its thorough underlying research.
- DeLeon, T. C. Four Years in Rebel Capitals. Mobile, Alabama: Gossip Printing Company, 1890.
- Gilmor, Harry. Four Years in the Saddle. New York: Harper, 1866. An enthusiastic extrovert, Gilmor's autobiographical account of his partisan career should be used with caution.
- Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. New York: Webster, 1886. 2 vols.
- Johnson, Robert Underwood, and Clarence Clough Buel, eds. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. New York: Century Company, 1884-1888. 4 vols.
- Jones, John B. [Earl Schenck Miers, ed.]. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary. New York: Sagamore Press, 1950.
- Jones, Virgil Carrington. Ranger Mosby. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Hatfields and the McCoys. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Gray Ghosts and Rebel Raiders. New York: Holt, 1956.
- Klement, F. L. The Copperheads in the Middle West. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.

McCorkle, John [O. S. Burton, Comp.]. Three Years with Quantrell.  
Armstrong, Missouri: Acme & Herald Print, n.d. (c. 1914).  
An account, related in his old age, by one of Quantrill's  
followers which contains much circumstantial and episodic  
detail. It is, of course, ardently pro-Quantrill.

Mosby, John S. Mosby's War Reminiscences. New York: Dodd, Mead,  
1898.

Official Records. See U.S. War Department.

Sandburg, Carl. Abraham Lincoln: The War Years. New York:  
Harcourt, Brace, 1939. 4 vols.

Scott, H.L. Military Dictionary. New York: Van Nostrand, 1861.

Sheridan, Philip H. Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan. New York:  
Webster, 1888. 2 vols.

Turner, Fitzhugh, ed. Loudoun County and the Civil War. Lees-  
burg, Virginia: Loudoun County Civil War Centennial Commission,  
1961.

U.S. War Department. Revised United States Army Regulations.  
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1863.

\_\_\_\_\_. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Offi-  
cial Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington:  
Government Printing Office, 1881-1901. 130 vols. Habitually  
cited as Official Records or OR.

Younger, Edward, ed. Inside the Confederate Government: The  
Diary of Garlick Hill Kean. New York: Oxford, 1957.

## North America; the Indian Wars

by

R. Ernest Dupuy

### BACKGROUND

Guerrilla warfare between whites and Indians began with the first colonial settlements in North America. It ended only in 1892. Manifestly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss and analyze in detail nearly 300 years of Indian fighting. However, certain generalities are in order, particularly since this guerrilla warfare had some very distinct and individualistic peculiarities.

The pattern was that of the eviction of a primitive culture by one more sophisticated. The Indian possessed the land. The white man craved the land and threw the Indian out. The conflict raged along the western progression of the frontier of an expanding nation, gradually developing into the establishment of a coron sanitaire--a tenuous and thinly held series of frontier posts garrisoned by the US Army--across whose ill-defined border, from Canada to Mexico, forays by both sides stabbed from time to time.

On the Indian side, reactions to the white man's encroachments were tribal and piecemeal. With the exceptions of the confederations of Pontiac and Tecumseh, major concentrations of Indian forces toward a common goal did not exist. On the contrary, time and again through the long struggle various tribes--inspired by long-established animosities--acted as active allies of the white man against their red brethren.

To the Indian, conflict was second nature, war a game; raids of one tribe on another were common affairs, and treachery, murder, and torture normal concomitants of life. In fact, torture was to be considered an honor to the victim; the greater the warrior, the more atrocious his torture if captured.<sup>1</sup>

The white man, subjected to Indian excesses, reacted violently and in kind. Almost from the beginning, frontiersman and Indian alike "counted coup" by scalping fallen adversaries. Without too much digression into the complicated and very ugly story of US-Indian relationships, it can be put bluntly that the white settler proved himself in numerous instances to be as bloodthirsty and as treacherous as his opponent.<sup>2</sup>

The white man early found that the Indian, brought up from infancy as a warrior, hunter, and tracker, roving far and fast, could not be overcome by the ponderous classical tactics and strategy of European warfare. The British Army in 1755, following Braddock's defeat, evolved rudimentary counterinsurgency tactics during the French and Indian War, borrowing from the Indian's book. Light infantry (notably the 80th "Light-armed" Foot and the 60th Foot--Royal American Regiment, now the King's Royal Rifles) as well as Rogers' Rangers, were the prototypes. This disciplined brush-warfare brought success at Bushy Run (1763) and crushed Pontiac's Rebellion.

However, the lesson was forgotten when the US Army first came into existence, as evidenced by the defeats of Harmar (July 15, 1790) and of St. Clair (November 3, 1791) by the Miami Indians in the Ohio Valley. Emboldened by their successes, the Miami chose to stand and fight Anthony Wayne's well-trained troops at Fallen Timbers (August 20, 1794) and suffered a smashing defeat.

Yet the professional American soldier prior to the Civil War--with four notable exceptions--was slow to recognize the necessity for really isolating the guerrilla. Sullivan's campaign of 1779 against the Six Nations was directed in accordance with George Washington's order against Indian supply bases; Sullivan's instructions were "to effect total destruction of their settlements and the capture of as many prisoners of every age and sex as possible."<sup>3</sup> So Indian homeland holdings were ravaged, their settlements and agriculture destroyed, on a systematic "scorched earth" basis. William H. Harrison's campaign of 1811 against Tecumseh choked off British supply from Canada to the Shawnees and allied tribes. Andrew Jackson's Pensacola campaign of 1814 eradicated Hispano-British supply to the Creeks.

During the long drawn-out Seminole Wars Andrew Jackson, Zachary Taylor, and William J. Worth in turn tried to deprive the Indian of his bases of supply. Worth's campaign of 1841 was specifically directed against Seminole settlements and standing crops.

"The bands of Indians, which for years had lived from season to season in the enjoyment of abundance, celebrating their corn dances and festivals, harassing the white man as suited their convenience or inclination, were now driven in small parties to remote and unhealthy hiding places."<sup>4</sup>

However, in none of these instances was the final objective attained: round-up and destruction in combat of the guerrilla force.

Until the Civil War, the Indian problem had been regional. But by 1866 a radical change had taken place. Western expansion was in full flow. Transcontinental railway building gashed the plains, and the buffalo herds--the nomad Plains Indians' principal means of subsistence--were dwindling as white hunters massacred them wantonly to provide the railroad builders with meat and to obtain the hides for Eastern markets. Great wagon trains of emigrants were rolling westward on the Oregon, Santa Fe, and Bozeman trails. The gold and silver riches of Colorado, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana all incited white cupidity. The Plains Indians, their domain violated and their main food supply dwindling, quite naturally reacted violently, and the problem became a national one.

Outrages by red and white alike had already brought death and destruction along the frontier even before the Civil War ended. The massacre of a party of emigrants almost within eye-shot of Denver by a roving band of Sioux and Cheyennes in 1864 brought fierce and blind retaliation. An ex-clergyman named John M. Chivington disgraced the uniform he wore temporarily as colonel of the 1st Colorado Volunteer Cavalry by gathering a force of Colorado troops and cowboys and destroying on November 28, 1864, a peaceful village of Cheyennes and Arapahoes at Sand Creek, Colorado. A total of 300 Indians--225 of them women and children--were wantonly butchered and five score wet Indian scalps exhibited in a Denver theater.<sup>5</sup> The Chivington massacre would long poison Indian-US relations.

"But for that horrible butchery," wrote Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, "it is a fair presumption that all subsequent wars with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes and their kindred tribes might possibly have been averted."<sup>6</sup>

Colonel Jesse Leavenworth, West Pointer, Coloradan cavalryman and later a respected agent to the Kiowas and Comanches, was of the opinion that "this atrocity destroyed the last vestige of confidence between red and white."<sup>7</sup>



For more than a decade following, bitter conflict would rage between recalcitrant Plains Indians and the Army, before the backbone of Indian resistance was broken and the red man ceased to be a major menace to law and order in the western United States. The fighting spread from the Canadian border south to the Rio Grande (and on one occasion beyond into Mexico), with--in 1868--an estimated 300,000 Indians roaming the plains.<sup>8</sup> No less than 20 campaigns are noted in official records, with at least 729 distinct engagements of Regular Army troops, ranging from skirmishes of small detachments to pitched battle. (Encounters between settlers and state militia and the Indians are not included.)<sup>9</sup>

It was within this period that the Army first seriously undertook the complete isolation of the Indian guerrilla. From the congeries of campaigns we have selected two distinct operations: the Big Horn and Yellowstone expedition of 1876-1877, with its Powder River campaign as prelude; and the Nez Percé campaign of 1877. Both operations were against Northern Plains Indians--Sioux and Cheyenne in the first, and Nez Percé in the second.

#### ASSISTANCE TO THE GUERRILLA

Assistance lies in a special category, so far as the Indian Wars are concerned. Prior to 1815, the Indians were assisted by France, Spain, and England. French aid ceased with the conclusion of the French and Indian War.

English and Spanish assistance, supposedly ended by the conclusion (1815) of the War of 1812, actually continued for a few years in the South, for the benefit of the Seminoles. It was effectively, if high-handedly, ended by General Andrew Jackson's invasion of Spanish Florida in 1818, the capture of Pensacola and the arrest, court-martial, and execution of two British subjects --Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert C. Ambrister--on charges of aiding and abetting the outrages of the Indians. Arbuthnot was a trader who supplied arms and ammunition from his depot at Providence, Nassau; Ambrister a soldier of fortune who led Seminole guerrillas.

In these cases certain Indian tribes were acting in quasi-alliance with overseas nations, themselves overt or covert enemies of the Thirteen Colonies (later the United States). But after 1818 assistance to the Indian guerrilla came solely from the United States itself, his white opponent.

In 1823 the US Government, on the recommendation of War Secretary John C. Calhoun, adopted the removal policy, transfer of Eastern Indians trans-Mississippi. A permanent Indian frontier was established on the 95th meridian.

Was this an attempt to isolate the guerrilla? Only incidentally; the objective was to remove him from terrain coveted by the white man.

The removal policy was promulgated by President James Monroe in 1825 and put in operation by President Andrew Jackson the next year. The removal job fell to the Army, and a Bureau of Indian Affairs was established in the War Department to regulate the transfer and segregation of the Indian onto reservations.

"The United States, through its instrument, the Army, was in the paradoxical position of opposing and protecting the Indians, of taking their land from them and of guaranteeing their possession of the land. The military alone could not solve so complex a problem."<sup>10</sup>

To improve the situation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was transferred in 1849 to the Department of the Interior and headed by a civilian Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The Army retained its basic mission of protecting the frontier. Actually, this division of authority was no improvement at all. The red man, now a ward of the government, became a crafty shuttlecock between two bickering agencies. The strong right hand of government, the Army, was charged with restraining his violence, while the Bureau, its left hand, supplied him on the reservation with food, shelter, and arms, and no one knew exactly where the responsibility of either began or ended.

The Army in the West was at the beck and call of US marshals, of the Department of the Interior and its Bureau of Indian Affairs, and of the Bureau agents in charge of the reservations, as a posse comitatus, to act against both Indian and white lawbreakers. Conversely, the civilian authorities might object and obstruct military operations regardless of Army opinion.<sup>11</sup> The use of US land and naval forces as a posse comitatus ceased (in principle, at least) with the passage of the prohibitive Act of June 18, 1878.

The Indian on his reservation was entitled to rations, blankets, and shelter. Furthermore, he was issued arms and ammunition for hunting purposes; of agriculture the Plains Indian knew little (the Nez Percé excepted). The reservation was both base of supply for hostiles and, when they returned to its borders with troops in hot pursuit, their sanctuary. The Indian was therefore enabled to choose his time of departure on the warpath--usually in the spring and summer, when the lush grasslands furnished food for his horses --and for his return when winter set in and made life on the plains unbearable. Corruption among Indian agents, on whom rested the responsibility for issuing rations and supplies, became widespread. White traders, whose livelihood depended upon the agent's nod for authority to do business with the fur-trading Indian, further

played upon the agent's venality by selling high-power repeating arms and liquor to the red man and splitting their exorbitant profits.<sup>12</sup>

Army opinion on the situation is of particular value to this discussion, since the Army was in last resort responsible for the quelling of Indian insurrection.

Stated General William T. Sherman, Commanding General of the Army, in 1866:

This brings me to the consideration of the question of the Indians, who, in nomadic and predatory bands, infest the whole country . . . sometimes in one place and then in another. These Indians are universally, by the people of our frontier and of our isolated territories, regarded as hostile, and we, the military, charged with a general protection of the infant settlements and long routes of travel, have to dispose our troops and act as though they were hostile; while by the laws of Congress, and the acts of our executive authorities, these Indians are construed as under the guardianship and protection of the general government, through civilian agencies. . . . Indians do not read, and only know our power and strength by what they see, and they always look to the man who commands soldiers as the representative of our government.<sup>13</sup>

Stated General Philip H. Sheridan, then commanding the Department of the Missouri, in 1868:

The present system of dealing with the Indian, I think, is an error. There are too many fingers in the pie, too many ends to be subserved, and too much money to be made; and it is in the interest of the nation and of humanity to put an end to this inhuman farce. The Peace Commission [Board of Indian Commissioners], the Indian Department, the military and the Indian make a balky team. The public treasury is depleted and innocent people plundered in this quadrangular arrangement in which the Treasury and the unarmed settlers are the greatest sufferers. . . .

The Army has nothing to gain by war with the Indians; on the contrary it has everything to lose. In such a war it suffers all the hardships and privation, exposed as it is to the charge of assassination if the Indians are killed, to the charge of inefficiency if they are not; to misrepresentation by the [Indian

Bureau<sup>7</sup> agents who fatten on the plunder of the Indians, and misunderstood by worthy people at home who are deceived by these agents.<sup>14</sup>

Commented Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, commanding the Department of Dakota, in 1872:

At present, while bodies of our troops are moving from the Missouri to the Yellowstone, or from Montana down the latter river, escorting railroad surveyors, it is notorious, and not attempted to be concealed by the Indians themselves, that their supplies and munitions of war to enable them to carry on campaigns against these troops are provided directly by the authority of the government at the different Indian agencies and at other points [trading posts] within reach, at which establishments the employees have to be protected by troops from insults and violence of the same Indians. Even now supplies are being distributed to these Indians, who do not attempt, even while receiving their subsistence, to conceal the fact that when they leave these depots of supply it will be for the purpose of joining in attacks upon our troops who are engaged elsewhere in the surveys mentioned, and who otherwise occupy a friendly attitude toward the Indians; and it is known that when the Indians return from such attacks for further supplies they do not hesitate to boast of their achievements against our troops on their last foray, or of their purpose of hostility in the next. . . . If arms are issued or sold to the Indians, they should be not our arms of precision, but only those of an inferior quality, yet suitable for the hunt.<sup>15</sup>

#### SANCTUARY FOR THE GUERRILLA

Hostile Indians time and again sought and found sanctuary both in Mexico and Canada. On two occasions US troops crossed the Mexican border in pursuit of raiders from the south. In 1873 Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie and his 4th Cavalry, with the oral sanction of General Sheridan and President Grant,<sup>16</sup> raided Kickapoo, Lipan, and Apache villages in Mexico and captured a number of prisoners. The raid, covering in 32 marching hours 160 miles of Mexican territory south of the Rio Grande, was remarkable militarily, but contributed little toward permanent isolation of the hostiles. A diplomatic furor resulted, which subsided shortly; Mexico was having its own troubles with hostile Indians.

Of a different nature was General Crook's invasion of Mexico in pursuit of the Chiricahua Apaches, who had holed up in the Sierra Madre mountains. In 1883, these Indians conducted a number of raids across the US border, fleeing to their sanctuary after each occasion. Crook, after conferring with Mexican military leaders and obtaining their approval, with some 50 US troops and 200 Indian scouts crossed the border and succeeded in persuading the Chiricahuas to return to their reservation in the United States--a matter of remarkable personal leadership.

While Canadian sanctuary was several times sought and found by hostiles, no important raids from across the border ever occurred, and it does not appear that much international friction resulted.

#### PUBLIC OPINION<sup>17</sup>

Through the years public opinion in the United States concerning the Indian had hardened into two distinct categories. East of the Mississippi lived people by now long removed from direct contact and conflict with the Indian and lulled by the pleasant myth of the "noble red man." Apathetic in general, the altruistic Easterner, if he thought of the matter at all, ignored Indian excesses and the equally brutal white excesses of the frontier. The sentimental, looking through glasses tinted rosily by James Fenimore Cooper, laid the Indian troubles to Army "brutality."

Until 1876 little interest was evinced by the Eastern press. But one correspondent rode to his death with Custer at the Little Big Horn, and as a result of the furor stirred by that disaster five correspondents from prominent newspapers accompanied the troops during the later operations of the Big Horn and Yellowstone expedition. One might venture the opinion that General Sheridan's long-seated animosity toward newspapermen and his efforts to prevent their presence in the field actually worked against Army interest.

The Westerner, on the other hand, for a number of reasons--many of them valid--had become inculcated with a blind hatred of the Indian. There was more than a suspicion of genocide in the common frontier expression: "The only good Indian is a dead Indian," and time and time again the white people of the frontier areas exploded in savage reprisals for Indian excesses. The Colorado House, as late as 1880, actually considered--though it

did not pass--a bill offering rewards for "The Destruction of Indians and Skunks."<sup>18</sup>

### TERRAIN

The combat zone of the conflicts to be considered comprised the states of Montana, the Dakotas, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Idaho, in the Great Plains province, the huge plateau sloping eastward from the foothills of the Rocky Mountains to the Missouri River. Semi-arid, semi-humid, this expanse of grazing land was accented by the Black Hills, an isolated mountain uplift situated astride the Wyoming-South Dakota border, by the Big Horn Mountains, and by the clay of the Bad Lands in the angle between the Missouri and White Rivers. Temperature range was wide; from 102° in blazing summer to 30° below zero in howling winter.<sup>19</sup>

### OPERATIONS

#### The Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition

Discovery of gold in the Black Hills in 1874 brought an onrush of prospectors into the territory allotted by treaty to the Sioux and Cheyennes of the Missouri and Platte basins. Indian unrest churned into all-out revolt, under the principal leadership of the Sioux chief Crazy Horse, and their medicine man and "elder statesman," Sitting Bull. By December 1875, the situation was far beyond the control of the Indian Bureau. A final order by the Department of the Interior for the return of all Indians to their reservations by January 31, 1876, was ignored, and the Army was called in to do the job.

#### Indian Strength and Tactics

Of some 50,000 Indians--men, women, and children--now on the loose, the hostiles in this area approximated 8,000 warriors, consummate horsemen mounted on hardy ponies. Not a few of these warriors were armed with the latest model repeating rifles. They had plenty of ammunition. The Plains Indians fought mounted, attacking in strength, in encircling charges, against an enemy whom they had thoroughly reconnoitered and who, usually, they had first enticed by strategem into a place and time of their own choice.

Surprise was their initial aim. They avoided night fighting. Although personally fearless in combat, they never hesitated to break off engagement if the combat was going against them. Conversely, when themselves surprised, their lack of discipline usually brought about precipitate flight.

War parties could cover more than 50 miles in a day, their progress screened by scouts and hunting parties far on their front, flanks, and rear. Communication between neighboring war parties and their outriders was maintained by an amazingly efficient system of smoke signals.

A weak point in Plains Indian security measures made their night encampments vulnerable to surprise. Few guards were posted, even over their pony herds. Principal reliance was placed on their numerous dogs, who gave immediate tongue at any untoward sound or scent.

Such were the adversaries whom the Regular Army was now ordered to round up and return to their reservations: the finest light cavalry in the world. They were scattered through the Big Horn Mountain area, holed up for the winter in tented villages lying in almost inaccessible and unexplored recesses. With the coming spring, Crazy Horse and his warriors would open hostilities.

### US Forces

General Sheridan, commanding the Division of the Missouri, with troops scattered in 57 posts, was never able to field a force of more than an approximate 3,000 combat troops--cavalry and infantry. Officers and men included a proportion of veterans of the Civil War, who during the postwar period had had to unlearn the experiences of a mass army and conventional war, and relearn--at bitter cost--the complexities of Indian fighting. They were regulars, disciplined, and capable of rapidly assimilating recruit replacements. They were far superior to the Indians in pitched battle. These troops were equipped with single-shot breech-loading rifles, inferior to such modern repeating arms as were possessed by a substantial number of the hostile Indians.<sup>20</sup> However this was in part compensated for by superior marksmanship.

Field commanders were authorized to employ scouts, both white and red. Indians were utilized in considerable number, beginning in 1866 (Act of July 28), when 1,000 were authorized.<sup>21</sup> White scouts, capable frontiersmen, were also employed freely. The most noted of these men was William F. Cody (Buffalo Bill).

Logistical handicaps were many. Frontier posts were dependent on the main base at St. Louis; the supply line was by river boat up the Missouri and its navigable tributaries. In the field, the troops depended on wagon and pack trains. Communications, beyond the few frontier towns by this time linked by telegraph, were limited to the dispatch rider and the vagaries of short-range, wigwag flag. The cavalry, hampered by personal equipment and grain-fed animals, were confined in radius of action to their supply trains. In consequence they never could compete successfully with Indian mobility. The infantry, although some amazing marches were made, was of course out of the picture against hit-and-run mounted guerrillas.

Sheridan planned a pincers offensive to trap the hostiles. Brig. Gen. George Crook lay at Fort Fetterman, Wyoming, on the North Platte. He would move generally north. Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, moving by river boat up the Missouri to the Yellowstone, would concentrate at Fort Keogh, near the site of the present Miles City, and move south.

While Terry's command was slowly concentrating, Crook--with long experience in Indian-fighting--decided he would strike immediately, in the heart of winter, against the fast-riding, but thin-clad Indian. He moved out of Fort Fetterman with some 1,200 men, ten troops of cavalry and two companies of infantry, a wagon train and a pack train, on March 1, 1876. Five days later, on the Powder River, he parked his wagon train and infantry and rode north with his cavalry and the bobbing pack mules on one of the most amazing and gruelling forays US troops had ever made.

Officers and men were clad in a motley array of multiple layers of warm clothing and footgear--mostly civilian--completely lacking uniformity. Each individual was limited to the clothes he wore, plus one blanket, or buffalo robe, four days' rations, and 100 rounds of ammunition. Mess gear was nonexistent; a tin cup had to suffice. Animals would remain ungroomed and would subsist as did Indian ponies--on such grass as they could find, if necessary by pawing it up from under the snow. The pack train carried 15 days' half-rations and enough ammunition to supply each man with 50 rounds--and that was that.

Crooke, probably the first American soldier to adapt clothing to special climatic conditions, had made his plans well. His meticulous care that his troops be winter-clad was duplicated by his care of his pack train, with the aparejos individually fitted to each animal and his packers personally picked.



On March 16 Crook, casting across country under gruelling conditions of cold and snow, found indications of Sioux well up the Powder River. Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds, sent scouting up the valley with six troops, at dawn next day found a large village of skin tepees in a cleft of the cliffs. He attacked at once in weather 30° below zero, but sent back no word to Crook of his find and intentions.

The cavalry swept through the village, cut out the pony herd, and, driving the dismounted warriors well away, began systematic destruction. Suddenly, for no reason ever discovered, Reynolds ordered immediate withdrawal. The troops panicked, the Indians came swirling back to their half-burned tepees, where food and furs were still intact, and regained the pony herd.<sup>22</sup>

Crook, the fruits of victory lost, returned to his base. Encouraged by the outcome, Crazy Horse and his people welcomed the hundreds of new recruits who came streaming from the reservations to join them and prepared for a real campaign.

But Crook, his troops reorganized, was already in the field again by mid-June, accompanied by a force of friendly Shoshone and Crow warriors eager to hit their hereditary enemy the Sioux. At the Powder River a defiant note came in from Crazy Horse: if the troops crossed the river, it would be war.

Again parking his wagon train, which became a field fortress, Crook moved on June 17, with his command--1,100 regulars and 250 Indians--as mobile as a Tatar horde. It was a stripped-saddle affair again, with his two companies of infantry mounted on wagon-train mules.

Some 1,500 Sioux and Cheyennes were enticingly scattered in a broad canyon at the mouth of the Rosebud, with 5,000 more hidden in the hills above. Crook felt his enemy out. Crazy Horse's attempt to encircle the main command was foiled by judicious handling of reserves, and after a very serious pitched battle at odds of five to one, the Indians were driven off. Crook, however, had to fall back on his wagon train to refit.

Meanwhile the main campaign had commenced, as Terry moved from the Yellowstone; with him were Custer, with the 7th Cavalry, 1,000 strong, and Gibbon, with another 1,000, mostly infantry. Terry went with Gibbon. There was no communication between Crook and Terry; so the latter, when he found traces of a broad Indian train, had neither knowledge of Crook's Rosebud fight nor inkling that this was actually Crazy Horse's outfit. However,

Terry at once acted, sending Custer up the Rosebud with instructions to locate the Indian band and get south of them, while Gibbon halted at the mouth of the Big Horn to box them in.

But glory-hunting Custer, instead of encircling the Indians, followed close on the trail. On June 25, he plunged rashly, with but five troops of cavalry, into Crazy Horse's thousands encamped on the Little Big Horn, to die there with his entire command.

Crook, reinforced by another regiment of cavalry, took up pursuit of Crazy Horse by early August. Once again it was a stripped-saddle campaign; this time in the burning heat of a Plains summer which in September began to turn to torrential rain and freezing cold. Forced at last to turn back, with rations exhausted and with a great part of his animals used up, Crook sent a detachment of 150 of the best mounted men ahead toward Deadwood City, to get supplies. "Horsemeat March" was the name Crook's men applied to this grim hike.

The advance detachment discovered an Indian pony herd; further reconnaissance disclosed a large Indian village, one of Crazy Horse's. Hurrying a courier back to Crook, Captain Anson Mills attacked at dawn on September 9. On the best of his jaded animals, 25 mounted men charged into the village, while the others attacked on foot. The Indian pony herd was stampeded, most of the warriors scattered, except for one small group which kept fighting until their chief, American Horse, was mortally wounded. While Mills' detachment was still fighting them, Crook and his main command came up in an amazing forced march, just in time to meet and repel Crazy Horse himself, rushing to the rescue with 600 warriors.

This battle--Slim Buttes, September 9, 1876--was the first real body blow to the Sioux. The village tepees were crammed with food, ammunition, and furs, together with arms and equipment captured in Custer's disaster. Many 7th Cavalry horses were also found in the pony herd. Crook's command, their hunger satisfied by food, destroyed the village, and with the Indian horse herd moved on to Deadwood City, where they were royally received.

At the mouth of the Tongue River, Colonel Nelson A. Miles's command, some 800 infantry and 2 Napoleon guns, clashed with a large force of Sioux under Sitting Bull. A parley got no results; Sitting Bull demanded that the white man vacate the entire region. Miles attacked on October 24, drove the Indians away from their village, and then destroyed it and the large quantity of winter supply the Indians had accumulated. About 2,600 starving Sioux surrendered. Miles, unable to subsist them from his own stock, told them to report to the nearest agencies--Spotted Tail or Red

Cloud--which they did. The hard core of the band, under Sitting Bull, moved north, finally reaching and crossing the Canadian border.

Meanwhile Crook was again in the field, prepared for another winter campaign, and bucking bitter weather. A huge Cheyenne village was discovered in an ice-locked gorge of Crazy Woman Fork. Crook sent in Colonel Ranald Slidell Mackenzie with ten troops of cavalry. As usual, Indian security was poor, for the hostiles believed the place to be impregnable. Mackenzie's horsemen struck on November 24, 1876, in the dead of a frigid, moonlit night, spraying the lodges with rifle and revolver fire. Surprise was complete. But it was a hornet's nest; nude warriors, rifles in hand, wriggled out of their tepees. Some, swimming the icy stream, gathered on the cliff beyond; others climbed adjacent bluffs. Bitter fighting went on throughout most of the morning, but when Crook's main body came in after an amazing march of 26 miles in 12 hours, the surviving Cheyennes had given up and slipped away. In all 205 lodges were burned, with immense supplies of food, fur, and ammunition, and more than 700 ponies captured. This marked the end of Cheyenne resistance. Dull Knife, their chief, was rebuffed with disdain by Crazy Horse when he pleaded for help for his exhausted and broken survivors. So the Cheyennes surrendered formally to Crook and in droves enlisted to fight their former ally.

All effort was now concentrated on bringing down Crazy Horse and his remaining band. Miles, with his dogged infantry, and his two guns concealed in wagons, discovered the hostiles on January 6, 1877, their village ensconced on a commanding bluff on the Tongue River. Miles prepared to storm the cliff while the Sioux screamed down defiance. But Miles surprised them. Covers stripped from wagons disclosed his two fieldpieces, whose shells plastered the crest. Stunned, the Sioux put up but comparatively little opposition to the infantrymen climbing the slope and finally fled, leaving another rich haul of food, furs, and ammunition in Miles's hands. This was the last straw. Before spring was over Crazy Horse surrendered and the Big Horn and Yellowstone campaign had ended. So had Sioux resistance.

#### The Nez Percé Campaign, 1877

The Nez Percé tribe, agriculturalists as well as hunters, had dwelt peaceably in their broad domains in the states of Idaho, Oregon, and Washington since they first welcomed Lewis and Clark's expedition in 1804. Until 1877 it was their boast that they had never killed a white man nor broken a promise. Then the Government, abrogating old treaties, attempted to oust them. Part of the tribe submitted, but the southern branch, under their chief

Thunder-Rolling-Over-the-Mountain--commonly known as Young Joseph --refused to move from their fertile Wallowa Valley homeland.

Joseph tried to keep order among his people, but his hand was forced when in June 1877 a small party of his young braves went berserk and massacred white men, women, and children in a neighboring settlement. The entire tribe moved out--some 700 strong, of whom 300 were well armed, well mounted, and--exceptional among the Plains Indians--all sharpshooting hunters.

A small cavalry detachment, sent from Fort Lapwai, near Lewiston, Montana, to restore order and evict the Indians, found the tribe departed, and, rashly pursuing into White Bird Canyon on the Clearwater River, was ambushed and routed, losing a good third of its 90-odd officers and men on June 18.

Brig. Gen. Oliver W. Howard, commanding in the area, took the field with 227 men--detachments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery with a howitzer and two Gatling guns. He found the Nez Percé entrenched--a new departure in Indian fighting--on the far side of the Salmon River. Howard crossed to find the Indian position empty. Joseph had simply ridden away, crossed the river, and fallen on Howard's rear-guard detachment. Howard scurried back to rescue his men only to find the Nez Percé gone again.

On July 11 Howard found Joseph, again entrenched, on the south fork of the Clearwater. The troops' assault was repulsed. Howard was forced to dig in himself, and a mounted charge by Joseph actually captured his artillery. It took Howard two days of bitter fighting to recapture his guns (which the Indians did not know how to use). Then Joseph disengaged in a well-conducted delaying action and fled northeast, keeping a three-day lead over his pursuers.

Barred by the fairly well-populated area of Missoula and surrounding settlements from his original intention of making direct for Canada, Joseph hurried for the Great Divide of the Rocky Mountains, aiming for the Big Hole Basin, where he hoped to rest his horses and people. Howard tried to block him at Tacher's Pass, but Joseph outfoxed him. With a detachment of 45 warriors, riding through the night in columns of fours, Joseph passed an unsuspecting sentry who thought them to be a detachment of cavalry, and stampeded Howard's animals, including all the pack mules. Howard had to halt in place until the mules were replaced, while the Nez Percé pushed through the Yellowstone National Park.

Two parties of civilian campers were jumped, on the way, and two men killed, but Joseph scrupulously refrained from harming the white women present. The tribe passed through several settlements where again Joseph kept his men from doing any harm. On the contrary, at Stevensville he bought and paid for supplies furnished and reached Big Hole Basin safely.

But the telegraph--the "Singing Wires" of Indian jargon--had alarmed headquarters of the Department of the Platte at Omaha, and in response Colonel Gibbon, with 200 men and a howitzer, was moving on Joseph's resting place. Gibbon, reaching the Big Hole Basin on August 8, found the encampment and at dawn next day assaulted in complete surprise, for the Indians had posted no guards. Gibbon swept the camp, but Joseph rallied his warriors and a mounted charge threw the soldiers back onto a knoll where they were forced to entrench, separated from their wagon train, their howitzer, and reserve ammunition. The Indians captured the howitzer and the ammunition; had they known how to handle it, Gibbon might have shared Custer's fate on the Little Big Horn.

As it was, Gibbon's situation was desperate. But an Indian attempt to fire the tall prairie grass was frustrated when changing wind blew the flames back. After three days of battle Howard approached to the rescue. Warned by his scouts, Chief Joseph broke off action and disappeared. Behind him he left 89 dead, including some women and children. Gibbon had lost 29 men killed and 40 wounded.

But again the telegraph betrayed Joseph. Obeying hurried instructions, Colonel Samuel D. Sturgis, with eight troops of cavalry and a mountain gun, came racing northwestward from the Powder River country. Joseph crossed the Yellowstone River and halted in Canyon Creek, September 13. There Sturgis caught him by surprise, stampeding the Indian pony herd and driving off 400 animals. It was a bitter blow, but Joseph was able to hold his warriors together for a delaying action which enabled the tribe to escape along the Musselshell River to the Missouri.

The Indians crossed the Missouri, after a brief skirmish at Cow Island, then pushed northwest for Canada. Ahead went Joseph's plea for help to Sitting Bull and his Sioux in haven there. Joseph halted on Eagle Creek in the Bear Paw Mountains, 30 miles from safety. Almost half his warriors were dead or wounded, his pony herd depleted, and both food and ammunition running short. Sitting Bull might have helped him, but he never moved. Instead, on September 30--the third time the telegraph had woven its net--came Colonel Miles with 350 men--cavalry and infantry--and a howitzer.

Miles at once attacked, swept through the Indian camp, but for four days was unable to dislodge the Nez Percé from a deep ravine into which they had dug themselves. But their food was gone, the last cartridges were being expended, and the squaws, children, and wounded warriors whom Joseph would not desert were huddled in the cold Montana autumn, sprinkled by small arms fire and howitzer shells. To top it all, General Howard and his slow-moving column now joined Miles.

On October 5 a white flag waved from the gully. Then Chief Joseph, riding alone, rifle across his pommel, came into the Army lines to be received by both Miles and Howard with respectful handshakes. Only 70 warriors were left, together with 320 women and children. All were half-starved, a number of them sick or wounded.

"From where the sun now stands," said Joseph, right hand raised to the sky, "I fight no more forever!"

For 106 days this amazing self-taught field commander had matched the best the Army could pit against him, fought 11 battles, and held his warriors in battle through more than 1,500 miles of marching and combat. He well deserves a place on the long honor roll of American leadership in battle.<sup>23</sup>

#### COMMENT

The two examples cited above indicate that success in anti-guerrilla operations depends on proper utilization of the following factors:

1. Unity of administrative and military command in the affected area. Division of responsibility between the War and Interior Departments was responsible for much of the dismal mismanagement of the Indian problem and opened the way for active assistance to the guerrilla.
2. Seizure of the initiative, which includes choice of time and place of military pressure. Not until winter operations were initiated in the Big Horn and Yellowstone campaign, putting the Indian at a serious disadvantage, did Government forces attain lasting success.
3. Unrelenting pressure, which gives the guerrilla little time for recuperation.

4. Adequate communication between government forces in the field. Lack of such communication brought confusion and disaster to Government forces in the Big Horn and Yellowstone campaign. Conversely, telegraphic communication linking frontier posts enabled weaving of a fatal net about the Nez Percé, despite the splendid field generalship of Chief Joseph.

Also worthy of consideration is indication that the strength ratio of government (regular) troops to guerrilla forces may not always be of vital import. This was definitely the case in the Big Horn and Yellowstone campaign, where the overall ratio of government forces to guerrillas was approximately three to eight, a refutation of the common assumption that to be successful government forces in an affected area must be far superior in strength to the guerrillas. On the other hand, deliberate piecemeal commitment of small bodies of government troops, inadequate for the task at hand, merely invites guerrilla resistance, which, if successful in the first encounters, gains confidence and attains esprit de corps. This was true at the opening of the Nez Percé campaign.

One other point must be considered, true not only in the examples cited but also in many other combats between Indians and white regulars: the killing of women and children by the troops. Many squaws and children fell in the attacks on Indian villages. They were present, they were in the line of fire, or the rush of mounted charges, some actually fought beside their men, and perforce some of them died. Many squaws and children died also as a result of exposure to the elements or of starvation. This was true in particular as an aftermath of the Crazy Woman Creek fight, when hundreds of hapless squaws and children were left shelterless and hungry in subzero weather. Casualties among squaws and children were also high in the finale of the Nez Percé campaign, when they were exposed to the gunfire sweeping the Indian position.

Such incidental casualties among noncombatants bear no relation to the deliberate murder which marked both Indian raids and white civilian reprisals. However, the stigma was not overlooked in anti-Army propaganda at the time and must be expected in any operations of regular troops against guerrillas.

## Footnotes

1. An analogy might be drawn between the Indian nurturing his victim between phases of long drawn-out torture, and the attitude of the Japanese soldiers in World War II, who could beat an American prisoner of war to death, then, at his funeral, shed tears of genuine grief for a brave enemy.
2. For an impartial scrutiny see Loring Benson Priest, Uncle Sam's Stepchildren (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1942), passim.
3. R.E. Dupuy and T.N. Dupuy, Compact History of the Revolutionary War (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1963), p. 296.
4. Brig. Gen. John T. Sprague, as quoted by William A. Ganoe, History of the U.S. Army (New York: Appleton-Century, Crofts, 1942), p. 189.
5. U.S. Congress, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 97, 40 Cong., 2 sess., p. 9.
6. As quoted by William H. Leckie, The Military Conquest of the Southern Plains (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), p. 24.
7. Ibid., 24.
8. Ganoe, p. 321.
9. Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), vol. II, pp. 299-300.
10. Edgar Bruce Wesley, Guarding the Frontier, as quoted by Fairfax Downey, Indian Wars of the US Army (1776-1865) (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963).
11. For an interesting analysis of this confused situation see S.E. Whitman, The Troopers (New York: Hastings House, 1962), pp. 227, 233.
12. Priest, pp. 68, 70-71, 156.



13. Report, C.G. Army, 1866, p. 20.
14. Sheridan, report in Reports of the Secretary of War, 1868.
15. Hancock, report in Reports of the Secretary of War, 1872, pp. 41-42.
16. Fairfax Downey, Indian-Fighting Army (New York: Scribners, 1941), p. 114.
17. See Priest, pp. 81-92, for an analysis of American public opinion.
18. Ibid., p. 89.
19. Olin D. Paulin, Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States (Baltimore: Carnegie Institution, 1932), p. 3.
20. Many officers, and such few enlisted men as could afford the expense, had equipped themselves with Winchester, Remington, and Henry repeaters. The fact that many--though only a minority --of the Indians were also equipped with these fine repeating weapons has perhaps been exaggerated in popular books about the West. It was a fact, nonetheless, which was bitterly resented by the rank and file of the Regulars.
21. The highest number in service was 474 in 1869. When the authorization lapsed in 1901, 75 Indian scouts were still on the rolls. Heitman, vol. 2, p. 619.
22. Reynolds was later permitted to retire for disability, despite Crook's rage.
23. Dupuy and Dupuy, Brave Men and Great Captains (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 234.

## Bibliography

- Bourke, John G. On the Border with Crook. New York: Scribners, 1891.
- Custer, George A. My Life on the Plains. New York: Sheldon, 1874.
- Downey, Fairfax. Indian-Fighting Army. New York: Scribners, 1941.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Indian Wars of the U.S. (1776-1865). Garden City: Doubleday, 1963.
- Dupuy, R. Ernest. Men of West Point. New York: Sloane, 1951.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Compact History of the U.S. Army. New York: Hawthorne Books, revised edition, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_, and Trevor N. Dupuy. Brave Men and Great Captains. New York: Harper, 1959.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Military Heritage of America. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952.
- Ganoe, William A. History of the U.S. Army. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1942.
- Heitman, Francis B. Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903.
- King, Charles. Campaigning with Crook. New York: Scribners, 1890.
- Leckie, William H. The Military Conquest of the Southern Plains. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963.
- Paulin, Olin D. Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States. Baltimore: Carnegie Institution and American Geographical Society, 1932.
- Priest, Loring Benson. Uncle Sam's Stepchildren. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1942.

Reports of the Secretary of War, for 1866, 1867, 1869, 1872, 1874,  
1875, 1876, and 1877. Washington: Government Printing Office.

Spaulding, Oliver L. The United States Army in War and Peace.  
New York: Putnam, 1937.

Wesley, Edgar Bruce. Guarding the Frontier. Minnesota: Univer-  
sity of Minnesota Press, 1935.

# The Philippine Insurrection, November 1899-July 1902

by

Linnea P. Raine

## BACKGROUND

In November 1899 Americans were faced with their first experience with guerrilla warfare outside the continental borders of the United States. For the next three years the American forces had to pacify a hostile population, put down an insurrection, and institute a civil government, all the while struggling to overcome the problems of transport, disease, climatic conditions, inexperienced command, and an unfamiliar culture.

The Philippine archipelago, which had been discovered and conquered by the Spanish, encompasses over 1,000 inhabited islands, the largest of which and the center of the insurrection is Luzon, with a total population of approximately 7,000,000 in 1903. Manila, the political and population center, located in central Luzon, had over 200,000 inhabitants at that time.

The Islands provided a terrain well suited for guerrilla operations. Dense jungles afforded cover whence the insurgents could come at will to harass the American troops. Extensive mountain areas, especially along the western coast of Luzon, were utilized as supply bases and refuge. Numerous waterways, including the major rivers, the Rio Grande de la Pampanga (running southward from northern Nueva Ecija Province to Manila Bay) and the Rio Grande de Cagayan (flowing through Isabela into Cagayan Province in northern Luzon), provided both the guerrillas and the counterinsurgents with lines of communication and transportation.

Three Christian groups comprised the major portion of the opposition to American extension of sovereignty over the Philippines: the Tagalogs (3,000,000), inhabiting the eight provinces adjacent to Manila and filtering out to a number of other

provinces in Mindoro and Masbate, the center of the insurrectory area providing the greatest moral and military support; the Ilocanos, occupying the three provinces in northern Luzon (Ilocanos Norte, Ilocanos Sur, and La Union), who although suspicious of the Tagalogs gave strong support and excellent leadership to the cause; and the Visayans, who inhabited the islands known as the Visayas between Luzon and Mindanao and were the least active of the three. Also involved to varying degrees were the Negritos (Luzon), Moros (southern area of the archipelago),\* and Igorots (northern Luzon, namely Bontoc, Kankanaï, and Ilongot). In and around Manila as well as the other important trade centers there lived a considerable foreign population. Intermarriage of Chinese and Spanish with the Tagalogs and other lowland people by the end of the 19th Century had produced a large mestizo class, which embraced Catholicism and became the spearhead in the revolt against Spain and the later insurrection against the United States.

Since 1565, when Legaspi colonialized the Philippines, the archipelago had been subject to Spain, with Spanish influence, Catholicism, and the power of the friars extending from the "walled city" of Manila to the smallest and most remote barrio. Arbitrary and often repressive aspects of Spanish rule created much unrest, leading to over 30 major revolts. Three classes finally combined to lead the revolt against Spain--the native clergy, the Ilustrados (well-educated Filipinos), and the Caciques (large landholders)--all of whom desired to end the influence of the hated friar, the symbol of Spanish power. The revolutionary movement was manifested in the person of José Rizal, an accomplished author, scholar, and academician dedicated to the implementation of reforms in the Islands.

In 1896, while Rizal was in exile, a secret revolutionary society, the Katipunan, was formed, largely from the lower class Tagalog-speaking areas, by Andres Bonifacio. Estimates of its membership vary from 100,000 to 400,000. When its existence was discovered on August 26, 1896, the members openly revolted near Manila. The Spaniards, with 28,000 reinforcements, dispersed the rebels and put down the uprising in 52 days. After the execution of Rizal, the beloved figurehead of the people, by the Spanish, feelings again ran high and the conflict resumed. Without the tempering influence of Rizal, the leadership fell wholly to the Katipunan and the reaction against the Spaniards steadily increased

---

\*Guerrilla operations in the Moro islands of the southern archipelago--Mindanao and Jolo--are not considered in this paper. The Moro cared not whether Spaniard or American was overlord. His armed resistance was to law and order which interrupted his own outlaw operations.

in violence and in scope. After Bonifacio was executed for treason by an opposing faction within the Katipunan forces, the command was assumed by Emilio Aguinaldo. Fighting continued for a year before the Pact of Biac-na-Bato was signed on November 14, 1897.

Under the terms of the pact, Aguinaldo was to be exiled and given, along with 30 other leaders, \$800,000, of which \$400,000 was immediately awarded and taken by him to Hong Kong, where it was to be kept intact in a bank for the eventual procurement of arms and supplies and the financing of a later rebellion. (This sum, in fact, was used for arms procurement under the auspices of an organization called the Hong Kong Junta created for such purposes.) In addition, the pact provided for freedom of the press and the right to form associations. Spain agreed to pay indemnities, undertake certain reforms, and declare a general amnesty.

Hostilities broke out again in March 1898, for Spain had refused to honor most of the terms of the pact. By April the revolt had spread to Cebu and Panay in the Visayas. Meanwhile, the United States had gone to war with Spain, and by May 1, Commodore George Dewey and his US squadron had arrived and destroyed Spanish naval power in the Battle of Manila Bay. Since Dewey had a limited number of sailors, he could not put any force ashore. Consequently, the 15,000 Spaniards remained in the city of Manila. Not until July 31 did the first American troops arrive.

Aguinaldo, who had been busy in Hong Kong and Singapore gathering arms and ammunition and organizing the Junta, returned to Manila on May 19 and announced resumption of hostilities against Spain. After conferring with Dewey aboard his flagship, he was put ashore at Cavite, where the insurgents had already gained control. The results of their discussions are a subject of great debate. While Aguinaldo insisted that Dewey promised to aid him in setting up an independent government, Dewey held that he had no promises. Unofficially, the United States had assumed an attitude of wait and see.

On April 27, 1898, Aguinaldo had sent orders from Hong Kong to all the insurgent chiefs to resume hostilities against the Spaniards. On May 24, he proclaimed the independent aims of the Filipinos, and on May 28, his army defeated and captured a small Spanish column. Thereafter, as chief after chief was told of the resumption of hostilities, the insurrection spread until all of Luzon was on fire. All the while Dewey provided them with arms and assistance. On June 12, from the temporary capital of Bacoar in Cavite, the Filipinos announced their independence and proclaimed a provisional government with Aguinaldo as President.

By the end of June Manila was surrounded, some 4,000 Spaniards were prisoners of the insurgents, Spanish troops were demoralized, and Aguinaldo had refused a request from Spain for his allegiance. At Bacoar, he had drawn to him a clique of radical Filipinos including the intellectual, Apolinario Mabini, who until his deportation in January 1901 was to serve as Aguinaldo's chief adviser, with an ever increasing amount of influence. Dewey had begun to realize that he had started something in providing support for Aguinaldo's activities against the Spanish. He had allowed the insurgents to take to the field to train and to conduct operations, thereby gaining a great deal of experience. He had expedited the accumulation of arms which could be turned on American troops. Most importantly, he had encouraged the growth of popular enthusiasm for the cause of independence.

During the summer of 1898 the situation became increasingly confusing, with both the Americans and the insurgents proclaiming the legitimacy of their respective governments. The situation remained uneasy while all parties waited for the war between the Spanish and the Americans to reach a close. On September 9 Aguinaldo moved his government north to Malolos, northwest of Manila on the Dagupan-Manila Railroad in the province of Pampanga, a Tagalog stronghold. The Tagalog provinces had been well organized for the insurrection, but north Luzon, the Visayas, and a major portion of southern Luzon were hesitant as the leaders in these areas were not enthusiastic about either the Spanish or the insurgents. "It was necessary to persuade them to join the Tagalog provinces for their support was essential to the success of the new government, because not only were the provinces of Northern and Southern Luzon and the southern islands wealthy and populous, but as long as they did not fly Aguinaldo's flag they denied his assertion that he was the chosen ruler not only of the Tagalogs about Manila but of all the people of the Archipelago."<sup>1</sup> Although he had wished to institute a government in which civil functions would be exercised by civil officials, in many instances it became necessary to have military commanders supersede civil officials in the various towns under insurgent control.

Incessant activity was maintained throughout this period: letters of encouragement sent to insurgent leaders; conferences with his aides convened; diplomatic recognition from foreign governments sought; and meetings of the revolutionary assembly arranged. On September 29 the assembly ratified Philippine independence. Aguinaldo's recognition and support were increasing rapidly in central Luzon. J.R.M. Taylor describes the effect that the leader had on the people while the capital was at Malolos:

. . . those who heard him followed him [emphasis added]. He is Asiatic, his voice and his manner, and his eloquence appealed to the Malay and the Chinese in them. It was of the soil and not like the speeches of the educated men around him [Ilustrados], cultivated and elaborate, based upon the recollection of things read and heard, echoes of foreign and alien voices.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout the fall of 1898 revolutionary tribunals were established in the Visayas. At the time of the signing of the Treaty of Paris in which the United States agreed to pay \$20,000,000 to Spain for the acquisition of the Philippines, Aguinaldo had a force of approximately 40,000 men as well as the increasing support of the population. When it became apparent that the property of the Church would be restored and that no mention was made of amelioration of the land problem by the new sovereign authorities, the hostility which had formerly been directed against Spain was transferred to the United States. From December through February of 1899 the situation smoldered as relations between the two groups grew steadily worse. On January 23, 1899, the Malolos Constitution (which had been approved by Aguinaldo) was proclaimed and Aguinaldo was elected President of the Philippines. The insurgents were preparing for what they knew was coming. By the time the Treaty of Paris was ratified by the Senate on February 6, hostilities between the Americans and the Filipino "Insurrectos" had been going on for two days.

Although the insurgents were extremely strong at the commencement of hostilities, the American superiority of numbers and arms in conventional warfare quickly reduced these early advantages. As the war progressed it became increasingly evident that Aguinaldo's army could not survive if the prevailing type of war continued. Morale began steadily to decline. Throughout the summer and fall of 1899 the insurgent army was driven northward and scattered, hiding in the mountains of the Zambales area. Finally, on November 12, at the new insurgent capital at Bayambang, Aguinaldo convened a council of war in which a great number of Filipino leaders attended and announced the initiation of guerrilla operations.

American forces by this time had pushed the insurgents across Luzon, uniting in the mountains west of Mantaren. The long-thrust operations which they had been carrying out, explained Maj. Gen. Elwell Otis, Commanding General and Military Governor, helped the Americans gain knowledge of the area and laid the groundwork for establishment of permanent stations which he mistakenly felt confident the people would accept. But Aguinaldo had persuaded the inhabitants to offer resistance to the Americans. Attacks were



frequently made upon small US Forces in the territory throughout the following winter and spring. It was necessary, therefore, to send additional troops in to protect the peaceful elements from retaliation as much as for military reasons.

In December 1899, General Arthur MacArthur, who was in command of northern Luzon with the exception of Brig. Gen. Samuel B.M. Young's command in the northwestern provinces and a few other provinces, pursued the remains of Aguinaldo's northern army and guerrilla bands, giving "protection" as they moved through the area. During the winter of 1899-1900 insurrectory activity which had been held in check during the northern operations began to increase as some of the American units withdrew to Manila. The arrival of more troops from the United States meanwhile made possible the initiation of further operations in the south.

By May 5, 1900, when General Otis was succeeded by MacArthur as Military Governor, no large insurgent force was in the field at any one place and the Americans had occupied a large number of towns. The average strength of the US troops since August 31, 1899, had been 54,204 of which 1.56% were killed and 1.17% died from disease--a total of 2.73% losses for this period.

The summer of 1900 was a period of operational inactivity on the insurgents' part. The American command mistakenly believed that the war might be terminated and American sovereignty accepted, but this period lasted only the time necessary to organize for resistance against the Americans and support for the guerrillas in the field the groups of inhabitants throughout the archipelago. On June 3 the Taft Commission which had been appointed by President McKinley on April 7 arrived in the Philippines to observe and report results to the President through the State Department, succeeding the Schurman Commission of the preceding year. Acting on the assumption that the victories scored over Aguinaldo's conventional forces the previous fall and winter had sufficiently demonstrated the military superiority of the US Forces, General MacArthur, on June 5, recommended a general and complete amnesty, which was promulgated on June 21. Only 5,022 Filipinos presented themselves and took the oath of allegiance. As the total population numbered over 7,000,000, MacArthur was not pleased with his results. On June 21 a resolution for ending the war was presented by Pedro A. Paterno, a former member of the Malolos Cabinet. Although the hopes of the resolution were crushed with the reelection of McKinley later in November by the American people, its significance was considerable as it initiated reconciliatory discussions, which were to be resumed in December of 1900.

Meanwhile guerrilla activity broke out with renewed intensity in August 1900. A ditty sung by the soldiers at the time epitomized the Americans' bewilderment and frustration:

Oh is Mac the boss or  
Is Mac the tool?  
Is Mac the governor general  
Or a hobo?  
I'd like to know who'll be  
Boss of this show--  
Will it be Mac or Emilio  
Aguinaldo?<sup>3</sup>

From personal observation of the situation and conditions in the field through the fall of 1900, MacArthur slowly came to realize the critical importance of local support to the continuing operations of the guerrillas. He was far more astute than his predecessor, having spent a large part of his time in the field. Otis was an administrator who came to the Philippines totally unprepared to undertake command of as thorny a problem as the conflict proved to be. As can be seen from the above, even MacArthur did not completely comprehend the nature of the problem until seven months after he assumed command. Refusing a suggestion from General Young to take harsh action against the population, MacArthur began to develop and implement his own solutions. On December 19 and 20 he announced his intent to deport certain prestigious Filipinos to Guam, and on December 21 proclaimed "Laws of War." On December 23 a newly formed group called the Federation Party, led by Padro Paterno, signed a party platform and began its end-the-war campaign throughout Luzon and other islands. In January the Philippine Municipal Code was issued, and MacArthur ordered the deportation of 26 Filipinos to Guam. From February until August the organization of all provinces thought to be loyal to the United States for civil government was developed. On March 24 Emilio Aguinaldo himself was captured by a detachment under the imaginative direction of Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston at Palanan, a small town in Isabela Province.

This event marked the gradual transition from military to civil government in the archipelago. Although the insurrection continued in some areas in southern Luzon and a few islands in the Visayas until July of 1902, the greater portion of the population had been pacified. By June 20, 1901, when the executive authority was transferred from the Military Governor to the Civil Governor, the American forces had been reduced to 42,000. In those areas still considered unsafe, the military commands continued to maintain authority.

On July 4 MacArthur was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Adna Chaffee, who was to have to deal with a wholly different and more ruthless set of problems in the persons of General Miguel Malvar, commander of the insurgents in the Batangas area, and General Vincente Lucban, leader of the scattered guerrillas on Samar. By October 1901, operations for the suppression of insurgent activities were in progress in the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas on Luzon as well as on the islands of Mindoro and Samar. There were a few scattered bands elsewhere, but these were left to the native constabulary organized by the Americans. The operations against Malvar in the Batangas area were taken over by Brig. Gen. James F. Bell, the former Provost Marshal of Manila, who swiftly decided that stern measures would have a far greater effect on the population than an attraction policy. He pursued the scattered bands into the hills, searching out every hiding place and ultimately in April bringing Malvar himself to surrender.

Operations in Samar against Lucban were undertaken by Brig. Gen. Jacob Smith, following the infamous massacre of Balangiga on September 28. Until February Smith was to conduct an almost fanatical campaign on the island which eventually led to his court martial. But by April Samar was quiet.

By July 1902 the number of occupied stations had fallen from a peak of 552 to 195 and the number of troops from a peak of 70,000 to 34,000. On July 4 President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation of peace and a general amnesty. Except for inconsequential bandit type activity insurgent activity had ceased and the role of counterinsurgent forces was terminated in the Philippines.

#### THE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION

Aguinaldo's rebel forces or "Insurrectos," included almost all elements of the Filipino population. The Ilustrados had led the movement for reform under Spanish rule and had provided the leadership for Rizal's propagandist movement. Although many were sons of wealthy mestizo families of Spanish-Chinese-Filipino blood, some came from the peasant class in the outlying pueblos. From their travels and education abroad they had brought back to the Philippines ideas which had characterized the French and American revolutions. The Ilustrados had been the spearhead of the early revolt and wanted to keep control. The Caciques, the powerful land-owning "bosses" of the provinces, who contributed heavily to the military forces against both Spain and the United States, formed the bridge between the Ilustrados and the masses, or the

"tao." They were not humanitarians, for they had stood to gain both from eliminating the power of the friars and that of Spain. Rizal had been opposed to violent revolution largely because he understood this, fearing that if the Spanish were overthrown too quickly, before the Filipinos were properly prepared and educated, the tyranny of Filipinos over Filipinos ("caciquismo") might have been just as bad if not worse. Yet, without the cooperation of the Cacique class, Aguinaldo could not have gotten the material and moral support from the masses. He knew too that the Ilustrados were essential, for without them he could not ensure the success of the republic.

In order to secure the support of the Caciques in 1898, Aguinaldo had to attempt the type of operations which they favored, with a conventional field army. This was, in actuality, unsuited to Aguinaldo's army and it failed against the Americans. Hence in November 1899 he abandoned any attempt to confront the Americans with large masses of men directed by a single leader and rallied to his cause the people under the leadership of the Katipunans. "In making this choice he showed he knew the nature of his people."<sup>4</sup> He appealed to the hatred of routine and the lust for a wild life that lay deep in the heart of the masses, the so-called "tao"; he called for the aid of every leader of the people, even bandits and criminals.

The insurgents adopted a military policy based upon the idea of occupying a series of defensive positions and forcing the Americans to a never-ending repetition of tactical deployments. This strategy was carried out with great skill and some success for the next two years, since the guerrillas could hover close to the American camps and yet avoid close contact. Unfortunately the Americans interpreted the transition from conventional to guerrilla warfare as a defeat, and it took some time and many casualties to correct the miscalculation. When Aguinaldo and his government fled to the mountains of Zambales from Tarlac, and the members scattered to look for places of refuge, there were some 55,000 Americans in the Philippines. A year later some 69,000 troops were still engaged in trying to break the back of an insurrection that many argued was merely acts of banditry. Many American officers, including General Arthur MacArthur, expressed surprise that the "Tagalog Rebellion" continued after the forces had been scattered.

Reorganization of the guerrilla bands continued into the summer of 1901, at which time insurgent activity began to increase greatly. At the same time the insurgent forces were actively opposing and harassing counterinsurgent patrols sent out from the garrisoned towns, the civilian agents within the towns were

extending their influence over the local inhabitants. It became increasingly clear that the insurgents who had returned to their homes after the conventional war had not yet abandoned the cause of their fellow-natives and were now, if not overtly, covertly aiding the bands operating in the surrounding countryside.

### Political Structure

The Filipino guerrillas combined terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare with the objective of discouraging the American attempt to set up a sovereign government, by instituting a shadow government to which the population would maintain allegiance in every town occupied by the American troops. As a basis for insurrectionary tactics the alternative government was critical, for it provided the insurrection with a national character and an instrument for the control of the local population.

The establishment of municipal government under the Americans in 1899 and 1900 carried along with it support for the American forces. But insurgent governments had already been organized in these same barrios, and either the original officials remained or new ones were chosen who continued as the secret agents of the guerrillas. Often, town officials openly served the Americans while secretly aiding the guerrillas. In all matters touching the peace of the town, such as primitive road work, construction of streets and bridges, and the institution of schools which had been first organized by the American forces, their open activity was excellent. At the same time, however, they were exacting and collecting contributions and supplies and recruiting men for the guerrilla forces, as well as sending any obtainable military information to the insurgent leaders.

Throughout the area, wherever there was a guerrilla band the neighboring barrios contributed to its support and maintenance. Regardless of the fact of American occupation, the pueblos were the actual bases for all guerrilla activity. The towns, under the control of the dual officials, furnished the insurgents and also afforded them places of refuge. It was, in fact, one of the axioms of guerrilla tactics that a band should dissolve when pressed too hard and its members take refuge in the nearest barrio.

There were, then, two governments operating throughout the archipelago: the Katipunan-backed insurgent government to which the population covertly gave initially willing support and later forced involuntary support; and the municipal government set up by the American troops and later by the Taft Commission, to which the population overtly professed allegiance.

When the insurgents were retreating in the summer of 1899 and unable to influence the natives living in the various barrios, the American-sponsored municipal governments worked quite well. As soon as guerrilla warfare was initiated, however, the erstwhile insurgents returned to their native areas and began stirring up trouble and discontent among the native population.

### MILITARY STRUCTURE

The insurgent territory was divided into zones, each commanded by a general, colonel, or lieutenant colonel. Each zone was then divided into subzones headed by majors. Finally, every subzone comprised four or five towns, each of which had an agent, usually the presidente or mayor of the pueblo, responsible to the commander of the guerrilla band operating from that particular pueblo. The agent was responsible for supplying the guerrilla leader, through a line of couriers organized by the native civilian municipal authorities, with food, supplies, recruits, and information on troop movements. The agents also had the power to grant exemptions from military duty to those natives who were in a position to make certain contributions or financial payments. The municipal police in each pueblo were also at the disposal of the guerrilla commander.

Each of these small guerrilla bands operated within the jurisdiction of the pueblo to which its members themselves belonged and remained hidden in the surrounding countryside in the jungle or volcanic ravines. Their abundant and well-hidden supplies were so efficiently provided for them through the agent by the natives living in the nearby American-occupied pueblos that they could have been sustained indefinitely.

On February 21, 1899, the Insurrecto government at Malolos issued a decree establishing universal conscription of all men between the ages of 18 and 35. Eventually, every able man from 16 years old unless occupied in some other suitable activity was classed as a guerrilla reserve and liable to the call to the field at any time. When one adds to this the number of collectors (pagulos), agents, spies, and bearers it is obvious that the insurrection utilized a considerable number of natives, many of whom had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States.

According to insurgent plans, there was to be one boloman to every two riflemen. At the end of Bell's operations in southern Luzon, 3,600 rifles were captured in three provinces. This

meant a minimum of 5,400 men operating in the field during Bell's campaign (using the above ratio), and from ten to an entire company of bolomen in every barrio of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas.

### LOGISTICS AND TRAINING

Forces were organized throughout the archipelago on a territorial basis. When the insurgents wished to mobilize an area, Aguinaldo would issue a proclamation, draw a few followers around him, loot the area, and extract money from the people, using either persuasion or terror (depending on the degree of sympathy obtained from the population in the affected area). As the insurrection grew, however, the means of sustaining his forces became more sophisticated.

The problem of food supply presented little difficulty as long as the guerrilla bands retained the support of the population. The greater part of the Filipino's diet consisted of rice, which could be easily carried, plus a little meat and fish. Only later, when MacArthur and his successor, Chaffee, instituted their respective measures did food become a critical factor. Clothing was nondescript. Shoes presented no supply problem as the peasant was accustomed to going barefooted. Uniforms had been abandoned to facilitate a quick change from insurgent to "amigo."

Lack of training, arms, and ammunition, which had proved grave disadvantages during the period of conventional warfare, continued to plague the guerrillas throughout the insurrection. These shortcomings were mitigated somewhat, however, by resort to the small bands operating sporadically from the recesses of jungle or volcanic ravines.

Money was provided by the "voluntary" taxes collected from the local inhabitants. In addition to these taxes, export duties were levied by the local insurgent commanders upon the hemp exported under their control. At least some of the money from these duties was sent to Manila and passed into the control of the Insurgent Commission operating there. From these funds such supplies as could be smuggled through American lines were delivered to the insurgents operating in the field. As ammunition was difficult to obtain most of it was locally manufactured; small arsenals sprang up throughout the archipelago. Arms consisted largely of rifles obtained with the money collected through taxes or confiscated earlier from the Spanish garrisons, and bolos, which were in abundance. Other types of support such as medical, food, and shelter, were obtained in the pueblo from which the band operated.



## OBJECTIVES AND DOCTRINES

The Insurrectos' objective was to expel the American forces from the Philippines and to establish an independent government throughout the archipelago with Aguinaldo as president. Later, after the summer of 1901, when all of the areas except Batangas, Laguna, Tayabas, and Samar were pacified, the insurrection became little more than a situation in which to further the insurgent leaders' prestige or personal gain.

Action was directed toward the discouragement of the American authorities from attempting to set up municipal governments in the pueblos. Aguinaldo hoped that if the guerrilla bands could maintain harassing actions and the population displayed continuing animosity the American authorities would grow weary and return home.

The insurgent forces recruited from their pueblos operated in the vicinity of the town, and when they became tired or ill they would return to the town and their families, where they remained until time to return to the Insurrecto band. This would all be accomplished under the eyes of the counterinsurgents occupying the town.

Generally, the actions in the countryside were little more than skirmishes or encounters. Rarely would attacks be waged against the American garrison itself, with the one exception, Balangiga. On September 28, 1901, Company C of the 9th US Infantry stationed on Samar was attacked, and 44 of the Americans, including the commander, were massacred by a few hundred bolomen who had entered the town as "peaceful" inhabitants of the countryside. Although attacks such as this had been planned for use by the Insurrectos, this was the only instance where one was seriously executed.

As the conflict continued, brutality escalated, and each side utilized its respective governmental aspirations as rationalization. The Filipinos claimed that such actions as they were forced to commit were necessary, as they were fighting for the survival of their independence against overwhelming odds. The American forces felt that all natives were savages and that it was their duty to civilize them at any cost.



### MILITARY TECHNIQUES

The techniques used by the guerrillas in the insurrection were set out in a pamphlet printed by one of the Filipino juntas established abroad.

The purpose of the guerrilla will be to constantly worry the Yankees in the Pueblos occupied by them, to cut off their convoys, to cause all possible harm to their patrols, their spies and their scouts, to surprise their detachments, to crush their columns if they should pass favorable places and to exterminate all traitors, to prevent natives to (from) vilely selling themselves for the invaders' gold.

The guerrillas shall make up for their small numbers by their ceaseless activity and their daring. They shall hide in the woods and in distant barrios and when least expected shall fall upon the enemy . . . but they shall be careful to never rob their countrymen.

We repeat that we must not give or accept combats with such a powerful foe if we have not the greatest chance for success . . . even as should we rout him three times or five times, the question of our independence would not be solved. Let us wait for the deadly climate to decimate his files and never forget that our objective is only to protract the state of war.<sup>5</sup>

The general guerrilla operational plan was to watch for small bodies of American forces, prepare an ambush for them, fire a few volleys at short range, and then, if the enemy appeared demoralized, the bolomen were to rush the troops.

### LOCAL SUPPORT

The organization of a parallel government in the pueblos throughout the archipelago enabled the Insurrectos to secure support for the guerrilla bands as well as to present to the world an organization which demonstrated the Filipinos' ability to create and maintain a republic. Support was not entirely automatic, however, and much effort went in to maintaining it, largely directed by the Katipunan.

In 1898 Aguinaldo announced that the Katipunan had been disbanded as a separate organization, but warned the people that all Filipinos were Katipunan and liable to the society's punishments, which were cruel and awe-inspiring. Until the spring of 1901, the support of the population was generally sufficiently strong so that the repressive aspects of the society were in little evidence.

During 1900 the Katipunan was slowly organized throughout the archipelago in all towns, including those occupied by the counterinsurgent forces. It provided a valuable link between the guerrillas and the inhabitants of the towns. Its orders were to be carried out without question, for disobedience meant immediate punishment. The mystery surrounding its secret meetings appealed to the imagination of the people, and the secrecy of its deliberations and the ruthlessness with which its orders were executed aroused their fear as well as their awe. The organization presented different images, depending on the audience to which it was directing its focus: to Europe and the United States, it was an organization dedicated to the inception and the operation of a republic; to the inhabitants, its subjects, it was a mafia, an instrument of terror.

The government in actual control in the towns was the Katipunan, with a small group of leaders who controlled the actions of all the other members of the association, who were bound to them by an oath, violation of which was punished by death. The subordinate members in turn demanded absolute obedience from the rest of the community. Punishments were inflicted by a special band called the Mandudukuts or Mandukuts under the immediate orders of the local head of the Katipunan (usually the presidente appointed by the Americans). Despite its lofty aims the Katipunan's means of attaining its ends were so cruel that it finally became little more than a brutal instrument for imposing the will of a few on a terrified population. This was particularly the case in the four provinces last to be defeated in the insurrection.

As the resources of the country became nearly exhausted, the guerrillas still demanded the usual tribute in men, money, and supplies. When these were no longer given willingly, the guerrillas began to take them by force, striking terror into the hearts of those who did not follow the line. Only when a native had no more to lose, so reduced by circumstances that his life meant little, and driven to hate and rage, would he turn against the insurgents. Until this point was reached the dual governments continued to exist throughout Luzon.

After July 1901 and the surrender and/or capture of the prominent guerrilla leaders, control of insurgent affairs passed into the hands of men less scrupulous, often criminals and lardrones (bandits) who roamed the countryside. This transition completely changed the character of the insurrection, which rapidly dissipated into a means for gratifying pride or an opportunity for personal gain.

As the insurrection wore on the threat of death came to be used as a means of obtaining the support of the local population. The leaders imposed such oppressive and unjust taxes upon the natives that it became necessary to introduce a reign of terror in order to dominate the taos completely and to collect involuntary contributions. The penalty for failing to pay one's taxes was death. These taxes were regularly collected by insurgent agents called pangolos, several of whom were located in every town and one in every barrio.

Each pangolo was required to hand over to the insurgents a payment proportionate to the numbers and the wealth of the people from whom he collected. In most instances the pangolos were officials of the town or barrio occupied by the American forces, placed in office by the counterinsurgents after they had voluntarily taken the oath of allegiance to the United States and promised to perform their duties faithfully.

J.R.M. Taylor in his report presents an extract (General Orders No. 259, Division of the Philippines, of 1901) from the written confession of a murderer on trial, which illustrates the methods of procedure employed in cases of refusal:

I carried a letter of authorization to act as a special agent, which means authority to commit murder. Each time a murder was ordered a letter was sent to one of four men (named) by one of the chiefs (naming them). Afterwards the letter was taken up and burned. If a man did not pay his contributions to the insurgent collector he was ordered to be killed /emphasis added/.

On January 6, 1901, the order had been given that, henceforth, all those who disobeyed the orders of the Katipunan were to be tried and sentenced. There must have been an extraordinary number of murders, for the amount recorded in the investigations of cruelty charges on the part of American soldiers is considerable. One item concerning the trial of seven men accused of committing murder in Taytay, Morong Province, provides the following information. General Chaffee in questioning the man for the Military Commission reported:

.... No native inhabitant of Taytay opened his lips to the American authorities concerning the crimes being committed and of which all had knowledge. It appears that, following the general instructions laid down by the insurgent chiefs, any man might be put to death by the local authorities if the public witnessed and approved the execution. Accordingly, many of the people of Taytay assembled at night to witness the execution of the selected victim, and stood by at a short distance until the dead was buried, when they dispersed and made no sign of what had been done. As in all like cases, the people were warned that certain death would fall upon anyone who disclosed the truth to the Americans.<sup>7</sup>

Further disclosed by the testimony was the fact that nearly all the inhabitants of the town were present at these proceedings and, moreover, that they would go as soon as they discovered one was going to take place. The chaplain would give confession and absolution before the victim was to be executed. At least three of the Taytay victims were buried alive. One of the men testified that this particular order was given by General Pio de Pilar and that it was obeyed because he (the executioner) would have been killed if he had not.

.... If the presidente had ordered you to kill every person in the crowd witnessing the execution of Felipe and Honorio, would you have obeyed his order?

When the order is from my superior I can not disobey. I can not refuse.

Chaffee's report alludes to "hundreds" of such occurrences.

No one in the town dared to disclose the presence of the guerrilla as it was fully realized that not even the American commander could prevent the secret assassination of the informer:

... any native found rendering voluntary service to Americans without contributing a large portion of his compensation to the insurrection, and any native who showed any friendship for Americans, or was suspected of being a spy for them, was, regardless of sex, marked for secret assassination by the insurgents or their emissaries.<sup>8</sup>

It was not surprising, therefore, that almost every native practiced complete obedience to the insurgent government, and only when incessant pressure was applied by the counterinsurgents was this bond broken and the insurrection ended.

### OTHER TECHNIQUES

A less drastic method of obtaining the support of the natives was the utilization of superstition. In Manila one man was arrested for posing as Christ (with considerable success). In Batangas at least one native priest, taking a sacred image from the church and joining the guerrillas, enticed many men to follow him in order to obtain the protection of that particular saint. Figures of saints even began to be manufactured and pawned off upon the credulous as miraculous. They would be placed in trees or buried with perfume sprinkled around them so that even the most skeptical native could observe that the figures were not made by the hand of man. Then the "discoverer" of the miracle would collect contributions which went either to him or to the guerrillas. In July of 1902, Bell's provost marshal had 11 in his possession which had been used regularly in Batangas in order to obtain funds.

The unity of support given by the local population is essential to the success of guerrilla warfare. This unity existed for a time in central Luzon, for several reasons. First, it was far more natural to help men of their own blood, language, and thoughts rather than foreigners whom they did not trust, although the natives feigned aid to the Americans when it was temporarily expedient. Second, they had been told that the archipelago was about to be given its independence and they knew what would happen to any native who had been genuinely loyal to the counterinsurgent cause as soon as the leaders obtained the power which would inevitably fall into their hands. The insurgent leaders were threatening to release the ladrones of the hills and jungles upon the towns defended by American garrisons. Who knew how long a garrison would remain?

It is true that it would have taken only one traitor in each town to destroy the whole complex guerrilla network operating from it effectively. But no guarantees could be given for the informer's life. He would probably have had to denounce the organization through an interpreter, more than likely an active member of the organization, who would immediately report his action.

The taos or Filipino peasants, moreover, were led and directed by the wealthy class, whose orders they obeyed without question and without thought. To make this group desert the insurrection required (1) orders from the leading and directing group of natives (the Caciques and Ilustrados) or (2) that the penalties incurred by the informers and/or traitors should be so ruthlessly inflicted by the Americans that in every town and every barrio there would be witnesses of the counterinsurgents'

conviction. Prior to MacArthur's decision to issue his January proclamation, there had not been enough pressure put on the directing group. The American counterinsurgent leaders had decided to assume a wait-and-see attitude, hoping that the cruelty of the guerrillas and the ladrones would drive the population over to the American side. Although they knew that this would take longer, they had believed that it would be more effective.

#### OUTSIDE SUPPORT

To state it as simply as possible, the insurgents had almost no outside support, although two efforts to supply it are recorded. The Anti-Imperialist League founded in Boston in 1899, including such eminent Americans as Andrew Carnegie, Samuel Gompers, and David Starr Jordan, through literature, public meetings, leagues, and protests, attempted to provide moral support for the insurgents and many American Army officers believed that, more importantly, it gave material assistance to the guerrillas. Although it is easily proved that extensive moral support was given to the insurgents, it is far more difficult to ascertain whether assistance in the form of supplies or funds was made available to the insurgents. General H.W. Lawton, killed at San Mateo, hints at this in some of his correspondence. The Anti-Imperialist League did all in its power to approach the Insurrectos, applauding their spunk, telling them to be patient, that the Americans would never reelect President McKinley. One writer claims that Aguinaldo persisted in guerrilla warfare after fleeing to the mountains only because he felt sure Washington would call off the war after November 1900. There are a number of letters to this effect included in Aguinaldo's correspondence captured by the American forces. There seem to have been a few periods when a rise in the activities of the League were accompanied by increased activity on the part of the guerrillas. It must be remembered, however, that communication was not so highly developed then as to allow immediate and sensitive interaction. Consequently, it is rather difficult to attempt any measurement of relationship.

Perhaps, most important of all the effects the League did have was on the American soldier who, while struggling with an elusive enemy in thick jungles, beaten down with malaria and the like, was being betrayed back home. This, indeed, must have been maddening. Even if arms and supplies from the United States never reached the Filipinos, the above was enough to start rumors.

Sun Yat-sen, while residing in Japan, made another recorded effort to assist the newly created Philippine Republic in its fight for existence against the United States. Sun had secretly arranged for a shipload of arms to be sent from Japan as well as some Japanese officers to assist in the campaign. The Japanese officers did arrive, but the shipload of arms was lost at sea and with it went hopes for an effective military campaign against the counterinsurgents.<sup>9</sup> When one of the Japanese officers were captured by Americans in Manila, Japan ceased all further activity.

All financial and diplomatic activities of the Insurrectos were handled by the various "Juntas," including the well-known Hong Kong Junta originated by Aguinaldo while he was in exile in that city. The Juntas received the money collected in voluntary contributions and bought weapons which were sent into the country during 1900-1901. It is conceivable that sizable donations were made by interested nations, but there is no evidence on this point.

#### AMERICAN FORCES AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS

The Americans employed almost two-thirds of the total US military force during the period extending from February 4, 1899, to July 4, 1902. Between June 30, 1898, and June 26, 1899, 63,426 men consisting of 29 regiments of Infantry, 8 batteries of Field Artillery, over one regiment of Cavalry, proportional numbers of Engineers, Signal, Medical, Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps personnel, were utilized in the Philippines.

The problems encountered by the US command were unending. Food was a critical factor. The Americans could not subsist on rice as the major diet and still remain efficient. Because of the humid climate, fresh meat, if obtained, had to be slaughtered and eaten immediately. Most of the supplies had to be imported. Certain commodities, such as sardines, received special treatment for consumption in the archipelago. Early in the insurrection cured bacon had spoiled immediately upon arrival. Hard bread could not be kept for any length of time, and local fresh vegetables and fruit raised havoc on the men. Consequently, fresh vegetables from the United States were distributed as rapidly as possible, dehydrated vegetables were consumed extensively, canned meat distributed, and, eventually, frozen meat was shipped in from the continental United States and Australia.

Another situation harassing the American officers was transportation. Aguinaldo had inventoried all modes of transport and



forbade the natives to sell any without his permission. Consequently, it became increasingly difficult to obtain any carts or water buffalo, and even when the troops got possession of any that mode of transport was so slow that it proved militarily inefficient. Finally, American mules were shipped to the islands to fill in the gap. Later, horses arrived. Chinese coolies were used by the Medical Corps to facilitate the evacuation of the wounded.

A third source of worry was the lack of discipline among the American forces. A majority of the troops were Volunteers who had received little prior training and had almost no experience. As many had left home for the first time, their accounts to those they had left were full of exaggeration and faulty information. Since they were in a critically impressionable state the tensions and strain of their activities as well as sickness and weariness would produce cases of melancholia, depression, moodiness, and in some cases insanity.<sup>10</sup> Sexton makes observations on the impact the volunteer had on public opinion at home through correspondence and "first hand accounts." Drunkenness was often a problem and, at such times, the Filipinos were mistreated, subjected to bullying, taunts, and ridicule. Instances were recorded of stealing and cheating. Aguinaldo used this situation for propaganda to elicit support for the insurgents.

#### ATTEMPTS TO CUT LOCAL SUPPORT

During the fall of 1900 it became apparent to General MacArthur that efforts to gain support of the villagers by conciliatory action had failed and that the only hope of success lay in cutting off the guerrillas from the support of the pueblos, for without such support the guerrillas would cease to exist.

As he said at the time: ". . . . The 'skulking bands of Guerrillas,' as the remnants of the Insurgent army have been called, are mere expression of loyalty of the towns. They could not exist for a month without urban support. . . . Intimidation has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, but it is more probable that the adhesive principle comes from ethnological homogeneity which induces men to respond for a time to the appeals of consanguineous leadership, even when such action is opposed to their own interests. . . ."11

It was at this time that General Samuel Young proposed to MacArthur that the European methods of dealing with rebellious



Asiatics might prove valuable in putting a halt to the increasing guerrilla activities in northern Luzon. Young was proposing a virtual military dictatorship throughout the archipelago. The stern repressive measures included the following: summary punishment by death to all caught with arms after taking the oath of allegiance to the United States; confiscation of all property belonging to the insurgent leaders; removal of all native office holders and replacement with American military; laying waste all parts of the country used as hiding places and supply bases; deportation of all persons whose presence in the country was deemed prejudicial to the interests of the United States; strict censorship of the press; and concentration of people living in rebellious areas in circumscribed zones.<sup>12</sup>

MacArthur felt that the measures were far too severe and developed a less stringent program. On December 31, 1900, he proclaimed "Laws of War" in English, Spanish, and Tagalog. The following provisions were spelled out in detail: all those who had alternately taken to the field and then returned to their barrios in civilian clothes would be brought to trial for murder upon capture; all known Insurrectos would be sent to Manila and imprisoned; fear of Insurrectos would no longer be accepted as a legitimate excuse for failure on the part of the local civilian population to give full cooperation and loyalty to American authorities; civilians who were not by overt actions loyal to the American authorities would be considered as being against the government, i.e., neutrals were to be considered enemies. The last was one of the most critical and far-reaching of all the provisions in terms of cutting support.<sup>13</sup> Prior to this, on December 19-20, Washington had given permission to MacArthur to order deportation of all "irreconcilable" insurgents to Guam.

The effects of the proclamations were immediate. Apathy began to diminish and kidnappings and assassinations abated. The population still was not sure whether MacArthur would carry out the measures, until he ordered the deportation to Guam of 26 Filipinos, including Mambini (Aguinaldo's right-hand man) and the celebrated General Pio de Pilar, on January 7, 1901. This calculated move was excellent, for the Filipinos were shown by example that they would be held responsible for their actions. The deportation of prominent and popular agitators and the confinement of prisoners of war, pending cessation of hostilities, were relied upon to entice to the American side those who were interested in peace, either for public expediency or personal interest in a prisoner.

A few well-educated Filipinos (Ilustrados) who had filled cabinet positions under Aguinaldo's government, were held in

protective custody in Manila, where they had been taken upon their capture at Malolos when the insurgent army fled to the mountains in November 1899. One small group, headed by Felipe Buencamino and Pedro A. Paterno, had represented what might be called the pro-American element in Aguinaldo's cabinet. Earlier in June 1900 they had proposed a draft resolution for peace. During their imprisonment, the Americans treated them with great leniency and had managed to influence a number of the group to accept the idea of American sovereignty as outlined by the Schurman and Taft Commissions.

On December 23, 1900, this group issued their manifesto for the formation of the Federal Party. The manifesto urged the immediate acceptance of US sovereignty by all Filipinos, with the type of government outlined by the Schurman Commission, and announced the hope that the archipelago would be admitted as a state. (The American officers frowned at this last part.)<sup>14</sup> With American civil and military assistance the party began spreading its influence throughout the Philippines. The party members from Manila traveled from barrio to barrio, making speeches, forming local groups, and enjoining the people and Insurrectos to come over to the American side.

MacArthur's proclamation had stated the liabilities and penalties; the Federal Party provided an avenue by which the insurgent leaders could surrender gracefully. Some of the guerrilla commanders had come to realize that further resistance was futile. But they had wanted proof that if they surrendered they would be treated as soldiers and not as criminals and not lose their prestige among the people. Such assurance could be far more effectively given by men of their own race and tongue than by the alien Americans, who were in no mood to bargain with or pamper them. The American troops had no respect for the insurgents' fighting power or purpose. The troops followed the guerrilla bands relentlessly with little fear or hatred, but with mounting weariness and growing irritation.

The soldiers' attitude was well expressed in several jingles of the time. The chorus of the most popular:

Damn, damn, damn the Filipinos,  
Pockmarked kakiak ladrones.  
Underneath the starry flag,  
Civilize them with a Krag,  
And return us to our own beloved homes.

Another cynical soldier viewpoint was:

He may be a brother of William H. Taft,  
But he ain't no brother of mine.

The feelings of the Filipino population were a different story. They did not laugh. Both rich and poor, intellectual and ignorant peasant, had suffered greatly and found nothing ridiculous in those guerrilla bands who were formed from their own people. Although the bands had robbed, the natives considered it collecting contributions for support of the war. Although they had murdered, the natives looked on this as a natural right of the rulers, as it had been for the last 400 years. The guerrillas had fought in disguise to gain a slight advantage in dealing with a superior force. They were ill-clad and hungry because they were struggling in a fight for their cause. Although they were poorly armed, had only ineffectual ammunition, and would shoot, then run, they had fought bravely and forced the United States to send 69,000 well-armed and fairly well-supplied men to the Philippines to control them. Add to all of this the fear, intimidation, and terror and it is easy to understand the place the Insurrectos had taken in the esteem of the population. Often Federal Party members going into hostile areas were murdered simply because they belonged to the party.

The party communicated the Americans' warnings and promises to the guerrillas. They wrote letters to natives in the field telling them to surrender or be hounded to death or captured and treated as a parasite, promising them 30 pesos per rifle surrendered, and warning them of eventual devastation of the country and death to the inhabitants. A majority of guerrillas saw the point.

Meanwhile, happenings within the United States had produced some effect on the insurgency as well. The Paris Peace Treaty had been ratified by the Congress in February 1899 by only one vote over the required two-thirds majority. The greatest opposition had come from the Democratic Party, which questioned the desirability of initiation of US involvement in affairs so far from the continent. Certain well-educated, wealthy, and powerful citizens from both parties questioned the wisdom of such action as unsettled. When President McKinley won the election on November 4, 1900, however, it indicated to the Filipino leadership that the majority of US opinion was in accord with the administration. Three weeks later, in early December, some 2,000 insurgents took the oath of allegiance.

On March 23, 1901, Emilio Aguinaldo was captured by the American forces under the command of General Frederick Funston at Palanan. With his capture and the removal of his personality and strong leadership from the scene, the insurrection as it had been conducted for the past two years had reached an end.

### RESULTS OF MacARTHUR'S OPERATIONS

From November 1899 to September 1900, 239 Americans were killed, 750 were wounded, and 55 captured. On the Filipino side during the same period 3,227 were killed, 694 wounded, and 2,864 captured. From May 5, 1900, until June 30, 1901, there were 1,026 encounters in which 245 Americans were killed, 490 wounded, 118 captured and 20 missing, 3,854 Filipinos killed, 1,193 wounded, 6,572 captured, 23,095 surrendered. During the same period 4,871 rifles were captured and 10,822 rebels surrendered. By July 14, 1901, 23,000 firearms had been captured.<sup>15</sup> The above figures are probably too high, in all actuality, although the reported capture and surrender figures are assuredly accurate.

Although the improvement was not always progressive and there were times when the "quiet" provinces flared up again into insurrection, it was still possible to continue steadily to withdraw American troops from a pueblo and turn over whole provinces to the Philippine Commission. Starting in February 1901, province by province, the Commission took over the archipelago in order to establish a civilian government there. This continued through the spring and summer with the northern area finally completed in August.

By July 4, 1901, MacArthur was able to report that the insurrection was almost entirely suppressed. At that time there was no organized insurgent force above the Pasig River. All the Visayas were at comparative peace except for Samar. In southern Luzon disorders continued but were steadily diminishing.

At the end of the summer of 1901, the insurrection still continued in the important provinces of Batangas, and parts of Laguna and Tayabas that were adjacent to Batangas, Samar, Cebu, and Bohol. Miguel Malvar, the insurgent commander in Batangas, was still at large and created disturbances at every opportunity. On Samar, General Lucban's guerrillas were being pursued and scattered throughout the island by General R.P. Hughes.

Except for the provinces mentioned above, the archipelago was at peace and 30 provinces had been organized under the civil government. In these areas, the Insurrectos had surrendered or been captured, and it was considered safe for travelers to go from town to town in the daytime. The local populations were apparently friendly to the civil government and manifested no desire to continue the hostilities. Above all, at this point, they wanted peace and protection.

On July 4, 1901, William Howard Taft became the Civil Governor of the Philippines and MacArthur departed the archipelago, Maj. Gen. A.R. Chaffee being appointed in his place. From this point on the municipal and provincial civil governments as well as persons performing duties related to the civil government were under the jurisdiction of the Civil Governor. The Military Governor was henceforth relieved of all civil duties.

The authority of the Military Governor, however, continued to be exercised as before in those districts in which insurgent activity existed or in which public order was not sufficiently restored to allow the civil municipal governments to be established according to the lines laid down by the Commission.

In October 1901, operations against guerrillas were being conducted in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna in Luzon as well as on the islands of Samar and Mindanao. Some scattered, predatory remnants of guerrilla bands were active to a limited extent elsewhere, but these were left to the constabularies to clean up.

The major problem confronting the counterinsurgents during this last stage of the conflict was the person of General Malvar who, as stated earlier, commanded the insurgents in Batangas. General Chaffee was determined to begin operations which would end only in the surrender of this insurgent leader and his followers. Accordingly, it was decided to force natives of prominence, who had said they were against Malvar and proponents of peace, to use their influence against him. It was believed that without their influence Malvar would not be able to continue his operations. The enticements of the Federal Party members (whose powers expired December 31, 1901) during the year had had no effect on him. Consequently, on January 1, 1902, Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell was ordered to begin operations in Batangas which were to terminate upon the surrender of the recalcitrant general on April 16, 1902. By December of 1901, 639 points were occupied by the American forces. Present in the four provinces were 7,622 American and 680 native troops, with a garrison in practically every town.

The American force at each station, usually numbering less than 60 men, was not sufficient to supply guards for the supplies which had been collected. Few stations had more than one officer and usually he was a raw lieutenant. In Batangas, active scouting and patrolling were kept up, but because of the conditions and the impossibility of collecting any reliable information from the natives who were supporting the Insurrectos, little was accomplished. A town garrisoned in this manner would be fired into and the commander would be unable to order the punishment of the guerrillas who attacked.

Forcing the local population to support them, the guerrillas, in the meantime, did little but hide in order to escape observation by the American forces. This action had been advised by the Junta in Hong Kong, and perhaps Manila, in order to keep the Americans on the island as long as possible, hoping to wear out the patience of American public opinion. They hoped that the Americans would see that although the guerrillas were not strong enough to beat the occupying power, they still would rather starve and suffer than accept American sovereignty.

Occasionally, Malvar's men made long-range, harassing attacks on American garrisons, simply to demonstrate that the guerrillas were still protesting with arms. Often a small detachment would be attacked by an overwhelming number of Insurrectos; but they would never shoot at short range unless they were discovered or surprised. Even if they wanted to initiate a greater number of encounters, they were prevented from doing so by the shortage of ammunition (10 cartridges per man per year).

After late 1901 no American or pro-American Filipino was safe outside the garrisoned towns, as the guerrillas stepped up their activity. Americans were liable to be shot at any time, day or night, and consequently they never travelled alone. Almost the entire native population of the four provinces and the islands of Mindoro and Samar was a secretly organized camp, and whereas a garrison could protect a town and beat off attacks it could not provide defense against the "amigo" who covertly was engaged in guerrilla activities. Nor could it be spread very thin to protect the population and still retain effectiveness as a unit.

General Bell felt that the only way he could terminate the insurrection in the region under his command was by cutting off the income and the supplies of the insurgents and at the same time pursuing them with sufficient persistence and vigor to wear them out. Although he believed that there were elements of the population who contributed to the insurrection through fear, he felt that it was impossible for him to identify who these were as opposed to those who were not.

Three conditions further complicated the identification of true supporters. Some of the natives were so poor that even though they were sympathetic to the cause they had to be forced through intimidation to contribute to the insurrection. The rich, both sympathetic and unsympathetic, who all lived in towns under American occupation would easily provide the required contribution as it represented only a small per cent of their total income. In addition, there was a group unsympathetic to the insurrection who because they lived outside the garrisons had to

pay or lose their lives. At first it was impossible for Bell to distinguish them in operations to get weapons from the Insurrectos.

The insurgents had accumulated enough food, chiefly rice, for two years in the mountains and other hiding places. The counterinsurgent who confiscated it could bring it into the towns for the use of the people from whom it had been taken or else destroy it. But a large number of the poorer class were noncombatants, living with insurgents, aiding and assisting them. They, too, had food hidden which Bell did not want to confiscate or destroy. It was impossible for the counterinsurgent to identify which was the guerrilla food supply and which belonged to the poorer classes. Therefore, Bell felt that he must give these people an opportunity to "securely separate themselves and their supplies from the hostile natives."<sup>16</sup> He did not want to make war on this poor element. He wanted to protect them from the vengeance of the others.

Most importantly, it was absolutely essential to make it impossible for the insurgents to procure food by forced contributions.

In order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hardship, as much as possible, and preserve their food supply for themselves and their families, it was decided to establish zones of protection.

His directive read in part:

Immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town boundary a zone within which it may be practicable with an average sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depravations of armed insurgents. The limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which livestock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.

Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 (1901) from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, including rice, palay, chickens, livestock etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town,



their property (found outside of the said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those seeking protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been restored in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes and such assistance be rendered to them as may be found practicable.<sup>17</sup>

It was deemed best not to force the people to enter the zones. But they were warned that unless they accepted this protection of their property which consisted almost entirely of food supplies, it would be liable to confiscation and destruction as it would otherwise be impossible to identify whether or not the supplies belonged to peaceful or hostile elements of the population.

To put an end to the vengeance of assassination it was decided to put to use the right of retaliation conferred by General Order 100, issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular telegram was published announcing the American forces' intention to retaliate "by the execution of prisoners in case any more prisoners were assassinated by insurgents for political reasons."<sup>18</sup> It was not found necessary to do this, however, as the assassinations halted immediately.

As a result of the zoning campaign and retaliation, it became more and more apparent that people had been contributing through fear, for the power of the Insurrectos to collect voluntary contributions came to an abrupt halt when they lost the facility of intimidation. As the protective mechanism became more efficient many who had not entered the area of protection in the beginning were persuaded of its efficacy and moved to the area. The sentiment for peace grew stronger among the people, and a growing number began to volunteer assistance to the Americans. When native volunteers were deemed trustworthy they were armed and sent out into the mountains, from which they brought back arms and insurgents and hundreds of half-starving men, women, and children, who after release from the intimidating influence of the guerrillas gladly entered the zones of protection.

On December 10, 1901, the ports of Batangas and Laguna were closed to prevent the insurgents from importing any food from



Manila. Consequently, food began to run short in the protected areas as well, and the counterinsurgents began to import it. The native men were put to work on roads in order to buy the imported rice; those who didn't want to work on the roads were charged a road tax. The land was prepared for planting by working parties under the protection of patrols. The insurrection collapsed, however, before the spring planting time had arrived.

No one died of starvation nor experienced serious hunger in these districts, although at one time some 300,000 people were located within them.<sup>19</sup>

The most dramatic blow was to the pride of the mestizo ruling group (Caciques) who bitterly resented being treated like everyone else including the taos. To a man who could speak "Spanish and who had always been the lord of his barrio, the possibility of having to cultivate a field with his own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing."<sup>20</sup>

#### EFFECT ON THE INSURGENTS

The actions taken by the counterinsurgents in December 1901 provoked immediate alarm among the insurgents which was manifested by increased activity and resentment. In late December the number of skirmishes and sharp encounters increased a bit, but this only resulted in relentless pursuit (which Bell had suggested to accompany the other techniques by the Americans). The Insurrectos became so thoroughly demoralized by this and other measures that after January 10, 1902, there was no armed encounter of any importance.

Bell continued to pursue them persistently, not waiting for them to come out of hiding, penetrating into every mountain range, and searching every ravine and every mountain top. The American forces continually found their barracks and hidden food in the most unexpected and remote hiding places. They burned hundreds of small barracks and shelters as fast as the insurgents would build them. They destroyed their clothing and supplies. Finally, the guerrillas ceased to stay in one spot for longer than 24 hours. They were on the run.

Bell maintained as many as 4,000 troops in the field at one time, keeping them supplied in the mountains even where roads did not exist. They camped by companies at strategic points on trails, each sending three or four detachments with five- or six-days' rations to bivouac at points radiating several miles from the company

base. The detachments would leave their rations in charge of one or two men and search and scour the mountains both day and night. In this manner, it was rendered unsafe for the insurgents to travel at any time, and, no longer having any retreat in which to hide themselves, they became so scattered and demoralized that they were constantly being captured and surrendering in large numbers.

In this way, Bell finally succeeded in securing and sending into the zoned towns, or destroying, almost every pound of food which the insurgents possessed or could obtain. About the first of April (1902) it became increasingly difficult for the guerrillas to maintain themselves any longer. Their appearance when captured or surrendered indicated starvation and lack of medical attention. Many were so ill that they had to be immediately hospitalized for treatment.

Bell's men suffered much from dysentery, fever, etc. When Malvar finally surrendered in April, many of the American troops had been in the mountains for over a month without returning to a post. They could be kept supplied with food but not with clothing; consequently numbers of the men had to conduct their operations in rags and barefooted, which made them all the more susceptible to disease and fever.

On April 16, 1902, Malvar surrendered, and guerrilla warfare in the Philippine Islands drew to a close. Most of the population had turned against the once highly respected chief, and several hundred in Batangas had joined the Americans in the hunt for the leader. It was, supposedly, the realization that the people were against him that aided in bringing about his surrender.

Bell had captured or forced to surrender 8,000 to 10,000 people who had been actively engaged in the insurrection in one capacity or another. All were released after taking the oath of allegiance to the United States. By July 7, 1902, no political prisoners were left in this region.

On July 2 the office of Military Governor was terminated; on July 4 full and complete pardon and amnesty had been granted to all who had participated in the insurrection (with a few reservations).

## OBSERVATIONS

The Insurrectos discovered that the financial resources of the United States were not exhausted by the prolonged rebellion of the population and that the killing of American troops was not the best way, ultimately, to secure the support of the party in the United States which Aguinaldo had proclaimed was in sympathy with the insurrection.

The guerrilla leaders, dependent on local support, were not able to sustain the continuing loyalty of the population. MacArthur's actions of January 1901 and the creation of the Federal Party ended voluntary support of the guerrillas. Most of the Insurrectos were either captured or surrendered. In the summer of 1901 only hard-bitten insurgents remained in the field, and these applied force and terror to elicit the essential support. Consequently, when Chaffee provided security and protection for the population coupled with confiscation and destruction of insurgent supplies, the insurrection was broken.

In effect four different techniques were utilized by the American forces to attempt to end the insurrection. First was the conventional military action in which General Otis used his "long thrust" approach, driving the guerrillas into the mountains and away from their home areas, then withdrawing when an area had been cleared. But this did not break support among the natives for the guerrilla cause and when the occupying forces withdrew the guerrillas returned. The second was through conciliatory moves including the granting of amnesty and setting up civil governments in each area. But the feeling for independence and hostility toward the Americans was too great, and Aguinaldo's shadow government flourished. Then MacArthur, realizing the degree of local support given in many cases most willingly to the guerrilla, coordinated harsh measures (deportation and "Laws of War") and conciliatory moves (Federal Party) in order to break voluntary support. These techniques together with the capture of Aguinaldo were largely successful in putting to an end guerrilla activity throughout the archipelago as the large majority of the population joined the American camp. In those remaining areas the lack of sympathy for the insurrection as well as the exhaustion of ready sources of supply for the guerrillas resulted in the necessity of obtaining support by force, creating a situation in which Chaffee's extremely harsh actions and the implementation of protection and control could be successful.

It is important to note that the repressive measures used later in the 1901-1902 period were directed toward a more ruthless

group of guerrillas and that it was possible to isolate them from the population by strong action. These same techniques probably would have proved counterproductive in the earlier phase as the sympathy of the population was generally with the guerrilla. The counterinsurgents would have had to intimidate an entire population, thereby alienating them and causing lasting resentment. In the Philippine situation, therefore, the institution of control and security was effective only when the population was providing involuntary support for the guerrilla.

From November 1899, Aguinaldo's policy was to keep the people with him either by making them feel that his cause was theirs or, if that plan failed (which it eventually did after January 1901), by making them fear the punishment of the agents of the Katipunan far more than that of the American forces. This policy ultimately failed because (1) the people grew weary of the exactions and abuses of the insurgent leaders--life came to mean so little that the loss of it became insignificant, and (2) the security and protection of the counterinsurgent forces prevented continued intimidation after January 1901.

Footnotes

1. J.R.M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection against the United States, Vol. II: May 29, 1898-July 4, 1902 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1906), p. 41.
2. Ibid., p. 54.
3. William T. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Services Publishing Company, 1939), p. 251.
4. Taylor, op. cit., p. 27 HS.
5. Sexton, op. cit., p. 239.
6. Taylor, op. cit., p. 24 HS.
7. J.R.M. Taylor, Philippine Insurgent Records (in the custody of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1906), Exhibit 33, p. 291.
8. Taylor, op. cit., p. 24 HS.
9. For a detailed discussion of this aspect, see Marius Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 68-74.
10. For an interesting account of these problems, see Joseph L. Shott, The Ordeal of Samar (Indianapolis: Howard W. Sams and Co., Inc., 1964), opening chapter.
11. Sexton, op. cit., p. 247.
12. Ibid., p. 251.
13. Ibid., p. 252.
14. Ibid., p. 258.
15. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection against the United States, Vol. II: May 29, 1898-July 4, 1902, p. 22 HS/E-L.
16. Ibid., p. 25 HS.
17. Ibid., p. 26 HS.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

## Bibliography

### BOOKS

Baclagon, Uldarico S. Philippine Campaigns. Manila: Graphic House, 1952.

Bernstein, David. The Philippine Story. New York: Farrar, Straus & Co., 1947.

This serves as a useful complement to Baclagon.

Blount, J.H. The American Occupation of the Philippines (1898-1912). New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1912.

Although this work is perhaps too subjective, it does provide considerable material on the insurrection.

Cerezo, Don Saturnino Martin. Under the Red and the Gold. Being Notes & Recollections of the Siege of Balar. Kansas City: Franklin Hudson Pub. Co., 1909.

Cerezo, the commander of the Spanish detachment, provides for the reader an interesting account of the insurgents' actions during the period of the siege.

Dewey, George. Autobiography of George Dewey, Admiral of the Navy. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913.

Elliot, Charles B. The Philippines to the End of the Commission Government. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1917.

Forbes, W. Cameron. The Philippine Islands. Rev. Ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1945.

Friend, Theodore. Between two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines (1929-1946). New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965.

Although the book deals with the later years, it does contain some useful background material on the earlier period.

Grunder, Garel A., and Livezey, William E. The Philippines and the United States. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951.

Account contains US sources with an emphasis on American official attitudes.

Harrison, F.B. The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence. New York: 1922.

Hayden, Joseph Ralston. The Philippines: A Study in National Development. New York: Macmillan Co., 1942.

Jansen, Marius. The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Pages 68 through 74 provide an account of Sun's efforts to give assistance to the Philippine insurrection.

Jessup, Philip C. Elihu Root. 2 vols. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1938.

Kirk, Grayson L. Philippine Independence: Motives, Problems and Prospects. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1936.

Le Roy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914.

Sexton, William T. Soldiers in the Sun. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1939.

Probably the most thorough account of the entire insurrection. The material on guerrilla warfare, however, is somewhat superficial.

Shott, Joseph L. The Ordeal of Samar. Indianapolis: Howard W. Sams and Co., Inc., 1964.

An admirable work dealing with the events of the massacre at Balangiga, the testimony from the Waller court martial, and the operations against Malvar on Samar.

Taylor, George E. The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership. New York and London: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964.

Provides some background material.

University of Chicago Philippine Study Program. Selected Bibliography of the Philippines. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956.

Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present. New York: Macmillan Co., 1930.

Worcester's opinions pervade most of the material.



Zaide, Gregorio F. The Philippine Revolution. Manila: The Modern Book Co., 1954.

Zaide utilizes a great number of primary sources.

#### ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS

Asprey, Robert B. "Waller of Samar," Marine Corps Gazette. Part one: XLV, No. 5 (May 1961), pp. 36-41. Part two: XLV, No. 6 (June 1961), pp. 44-48.

A superficial account of Waller's exploits and court martial. In glamoring Waller, the author has done him an injustice. Shott gives a far better insight into Waller's motivation and behavior.

Krieger, Herbert W. "Races and Peoples in the Philippines," The Far Eastern Quarterly, IV, No. 2 (February 1945), pp. 95-101.

Kuder, Edward M. "The Moros in the Philippines," The Far Eastern Quarterly, IV, No. 2 (February 1945), pp. 119-125.

Lasker, Bruno. "The Shadow of Unfreedom," The Far Eastern Quarterly, IV, No. 2 (February 1945), pp. 127-134.

Marquardt, W.W. "An Unparalleled Venture in Education," The Far Eastern Quarterly, IV, No. 2 (February 1945), pp. 135-147.

This article contains a short reference to the use of English in the American organized school as a means of combating the influence of the insurgent "shadow" government.

Wickberg, E. "The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History," Journal of Southeast Asian History, V, No. 1 (March 1964), pp. 62-100.

An excellent survey of the development of the mestizo class in the Philippines. Provided considerable background material for the paper.

#### UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

Taylor, John R.M. (Captain, 14th Infantry, U.S. Army.) The Philippine Insurrection against the United States. Vol. II: May 29, 1898-July 4, 1902. Unpublished Report based upon Taylor's collection of insurgent records for the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1906.

. Philippine Insurgent Records. Collected during and after the insurrection by the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, 1906.

These invaluable documents and letters, including much of Aguinaldo's correspondence throughout the insurrection, are reproduced on microfilm at the National Archives, Washington, D.C. They provided the author with considerable material on the techniques used by the guerrillas to obtain the support of the local population as well as on the motivation and personality of the individual insurgent leaders, including Aguinaldo himself.

## The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines:

The Hukbalahap, 1942-1955

by

Charles T.R. Bohannon

### THE COUNTRY, THE AREA, AND THE PEOPLE

Composed of more than 7,000 mildly tropical islands, of which not more than 1,000 are inhabited, the Philippines stretch over some 1,200 miles from north to south, with the two principal islands, Luzon and Mindanao, lying at opposite ends. Less than a fifth of the islands' area is cultivated. Mineral wealth is substantial and little exploited. Agriculture is the principal occupation, employing nearly 68% of the labor force in 1955 (no great change from pertinent preceding years) and producing some 44% of the national income. Roughly speaking, out of every four acres under cultivation, two are used to grow rice, one grows corn, while the fourth grows the sugar, coconuts, hemp, and tobacco (as well as assorted garden produce) which are the principal Philippine earners of foreign exchange. The combination of predominantly subsistence agriculture, small landholdings (whether owned or sharecropped) subdivided each generation so that each heir may have his share, and strong family ties which militate against pioneering, dictate that the average man will have very little indeed.

Add to these factors the relatively good communications and relatively high educational level (meaning that most can read, many see movies, most listen to the radio, most know about voting and basic democratic theory), the conspicuous consumption of the wealthy, and the activities of self-seeking political agitators and demagogues (four or more generations of them in some areas) and the potential for insurgency is obviously high.

The people, some 18,000,000-20,000,000 of them at the time of the Huk (the commonly used abbreviation of Hukbalahap)

insurgency, are of basically Malayan stock, subdivided into 80 or 90 tribal or regional groups, with nearly as many different languages and dialects. Most are Christian, most speak, read, and write English, which is the lingua franca of the country, and most of those over 20 have vivid memories of the insurgency or the Japanese occupation during which it began.

Their Christianity was gained during some 350 years of Spanish rule. The wide spread of education, of English, and of knowledge of the basic mechanisms and ideals of democracy came during the years following the Philippine Revolution of 1896-1902, when self-government under American tutelage became the way of life. In 1936 the Philippine Commonwealth was instituted, and with it came almost complete internal autonomy, and politics became almost a disease. The years of World War II saw the Japanese occupation of the country, and saw, too, the development of a nationwide guerrilla resistance, unified to some extent by direction from MacArthur's distant headquarters. Some guerrilla forces were led by Americans, more by Filipinos, and all, except the Huk, clearly owed allegiance to democratic government and freedom. Less than two years after liberation (the return of American forces) began, full independence, as promised ten years before, was achieved on July 4, 1946, and the new nation, along with its legacy of democracy and of war wreckage, inherited the problem of a Communist insurgency.

Although "the HUK rebellion was, of course a produce of the total situation existing in the Philippines in the difficult postwar years"\* it was a product of factors consistently misinterpreted by both sides until a government leader, Magsaysay, read them aright and finished the insurgency. The Huk insurgency may be divided into four phases, corresponding generally to their own efforts as well as those of their opponents.

#### THE HUKBALAHAP MOVEMENT

##### A "Third Force," April 1942-April 1946

The Hukbalahap movement grew out of the implantation by dynamic leaders of Communist doctrine and organizational techniques,

---

\*R.M. Leighton, Ralph Sanders, and Jose M. Tinio, The Huk Rebellion: A Case Study in the Social Dynamics of Insurrection (Washington, D.C., Industrial College of the Armed Forces, March 1964).

among a people already predisposed to discontent and rebellion, in an area well-suited to guerrilla warfare, at a most propitious time--occupation of the country by a hated invader, the Japanese. Hukbalahap is a contraction of the Tagalog words for "Peoples Anti-Japanese Army," a name the movement bore from its organization in March 1942 until 1948 (after that the name was changed to Peoples Liberation Army, officially abbreviated as HMB)--but the shortened acronym of "Huk" still is commonly used.

Communism was not new in the Philippines. Agitation began about 1920, soon after the formation of the Comintern and reached the stage of formal Party organization in 1930. Generally speaking, it followed the classic Russian line, emphasizing the role of the urban proletariat. After a series of Communist-led strikes, the Party was outlawed, and several of its leaders imprisoned. While they were in prison the Socialist party emerged as a major factor, with significant leadership from top-flight intellectuals. The head of this party was a wealthy landowner, Pedro Abad Santos, a former member of the legislature and brother of a Supreme Court Justice, who in effect tutored several of those who were later to become the most popular leaders of Huk movements. After their release from prison the Communist leaders resumed their agitation, having some influence in at least three ill-conceived peasant uprisings, the Tanggulan, the Sakdal, and the Colorum. In 1938 the Communist and Socialist parties merged, and militancy (with a careful eye on government authority) became the order of the day.

However, it was the former Socialists who had influence in Huklandia, and it was they who organized peasant unions and strikes during the 1930s. In part at the urging of the Communist activists, in part because of unscrupulous opportunists, perhaps most because of the inexperience and philosophical poverty of many of their junior leaders, their principal organization, the "League of Poor Laborers," or AMT, at times resorted to crippling work-animals, murdering landowners, and destroying crops and mills.

These actions focussed in the province of Pampanga, the center of the insurgency. From Pampanga came many of the better field leaders of the Philippine Revolution of 30 years before--as well as the most effective of the Filipinos who fought against the revolution. It is characterized by large landed estates producing rice and sugar at fantastic profits to their owners, and by tenants holding grimly onto the tiny plots whose cultivation rights, under sharecropping, they have inherited from their

parents. It is a region where only the fortunate and the far-sighted prosper, where agitators risk a short shrift in the hope of spectacular personal success, where no one starves but few have enough to eat.

It was in Pampanga in March 1942 that the Central Committee of the PKP organized the Hukbalahap, as a coalition of existing guerrilla bands, under Luis Taruc, a seemingly humble yet charismatic Socialist agitator turned Communist. The initial force of some 500, armed in part from weapons lost by retreating regular forces, or captured from ambushed Japanese, grew rapidly. Part of this growth was with the help of "advisers" from the Chinese Eighth Route Army, who organized an all-Chinese unit, generally known as the Wa Chi, and, more importantly, made it possible for the Huk to draw support from the prosperous Chinese community in the Philippines. They assisted also in the establishment of training centers for the Huk soldiers and agents.

So rapid was the growth of the forces calling themselves Huk (not all of whom were Communist-led) that by 1943 they claimed as many as 10,000 men under arms. That spring, when they sought to hold their ground against a powerful Japanese offensive directed at their central stronghold of Mt. Arayat, they learned the lesson which all guerrillas must. They soon recovered, however, despite a similar but smaller lesson a year later and despite the increasing hostility of USAFFE guerrilla units--which were loyal to the commonwealth of the Philippines and to the United States. By May 1945 when active hostilities against the Japanese had ceased in their area the Huk probably had at least 15,000 men under arms, and by their own statements had killed more than 25,000 "enemies," mostly Filipinos, and participated in 1,200 combat operations.

The military movement of the Huk could not have achieved such success had there not been a parallel civilian organization. This took the form of ostensibly autonomous groups, the Barrio United Defense Councils (BUDC) which functioned at the lowest echelon of political geography in the Philippines. Headed by Communist cells as rapidly as Party members could be recruited and trained, these BUDC formed the effective shadow government wherever the Huk established their influence or control. They organized supply and intelligence activities, collected taxes and contributions, sought out spies and enemy collaborators, conducted propaganda and group indoctrination activities, tried and judged offenders, and even performed marriages.

To what extent the individual BUDC were controlled through the Party organization and to what extent they were controlled

by the Huk units operating in the area is not clear--almost certainly it varied from place to place and from time to time. What is certain is that they were an effective civil government in many areas, and one which rapidly grew upward as the Japanese were driven out. When American forces arrived provincial offices from governor down to postal clerk were held either by Huk-PKP officials or by those who had made their peace with them, in much of Pampanga, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, and Laguna. Some of these provinces were the bases of strong anti-Huk guerrilla forces, whose leaders were too busy speeding the Japanese on their way to worry much about who held civilian offices. For the most part, the Commonwealth government refused to recognize these officials, appointing others, often chosen from the loyal guerrillas, pending elections scheduled for April 1946.

Recognition that the Huk, and the PKP, posed a real threat to the restoration of lawful government was sufficient to insure that some of the more prominent leaders, Taruc among them, were arrested (by the US Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps) and that others were liquidated by local leaders who had suffered from their depredations. It was not general enough to insure that the leaders were held, or that their followers were disarmed. The Huk squadrons in the field demanded to be incorporated as a body into the Philippine army; failing this, with the exception of one unit, they held to the field, refusing to obey orders from either the Commonwealth government or the US Army. Some hid their arms and dispersed temporarily. The organization itself remained under control of the leaders and actively recruited and gathered arms for the showdown which they felt was sure to come.

The PKP leaders were now in a position they would have considered impossible of achievement four years before. As one authority puts it:

For the Communists the Japanese occupation had been well-nigh an unblemished boon. The great majority of Filipinos in Central Luzon now regarded them as patriots, the one group that had kept alive the spark of freedom and harried the enemy until the Americans returned. The Huk had, in short, a mobilization base of mass popular support. They had, besides gained invaluable experience in guerrilla fighting and organization--a craft known to only a few specialists and (vicariously) scholars before the war, but destined to become a key to power in the emerging nations of Asia. And not only had they mastered the techniques of survival and of seizing power; they had learned the art of exercising it--

operating civil administration in large areas, administering justice, collecting taxes, conducting schools and other public services, maintaining their own law and order. If they should ever succeed in overthrowing the government, they would be prepared to install another in its place. Finally, the occupation had forced the Communists out of the cities and factories into the countryside, accelerating and completing the process begun by their association with the pre-war peasant protest movements. During the war most factories were closed, and those that operated were under tight Japanese control; cities and large towns were garrisoned and heavily patrolled. But in the barrios, in the plantations deserted by their owners, and in the rice fields and jungles, the Communists became a genuinely peasant party with far-flung roots in the countryside. In an overwhelmingly agrarian society, this was an indispensable passport to power.\*

While carefully maintaining and building up their military power, the Huk-PKP leaders saw the national elections of April 1946 as the easiest means of securing recognition of their power. Accordingly they plunged into political activity. At the provincial and local levels they put up their own candidates. On the national level their leaders joined a coalition of liberal and progressive groups, the Democratic Alliance, which supported incumbent President Sergio Osmeña and Congressional candidates of the Nationalist Party (and of the Huk). Their own political organization was the National Peasants Union (PKM), a merger of the prewar Communist and Socialist Peasants Unions. Through the PKM, recognized as a legal political party, the Huks (whose control of the organization was carefully denied) gained an open mass base among the peasantry of Central Luzon. The pre-election campaign of 1946 was bitter and violent, with the Huks leading in the use of terrorism to influence the voting. Six of their Democratic Alliance candidates for Congress, including Taruc, Alejandrino, and Jesus Lava, were supposedly elected, but were denied their seats because of charges of fraud and terrorism. Roxas and the Liberals came to power. Taruc and Lava returned to the field to reactivate their armed forces, while other PKP leaders in Manila continued to work for "reforms" through ostensibly legal political processes.

---

\*Op. cit., p. 27, edited.



### Indecisive Insurgency, May 1946-December 1949

By conventional theoretical standards the Philippines in 1946 were clearly on the brink of revolution; by the end of 1949 any orthodox student of revolution would have said, as did the leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP), that a true revolutionary situation existed. By that time the worst of wartime misery had abated, few starved, but relatively few lived much above a bare subsistence level--any many of those few were ostentatiously wealthy. National leaders of prestige, as well as strident voices in the free press, were busily proclaiming that democracy had been raped in the elections just concluded, that the processes of legal government did not and could not work --indeed, there was an abortive revolt on behalf of the defeated presidential candidate. Many of the wartime guerrilla organizations still maintained some cohesiveness and remnants of organization, and few of their leaders thought well of either presidential candidate. Arms and ammunition were plentiful. Government troops who had been in the field against the Huk for four years, and had seen them get steadily stronger, were dispirited and discouraged, seemingly unwilling to seek encounters with the Huk.

In much of the Huk-controlled area Communists and socialists had been agitating and organizing for nearly 20 years. The Huk had an organized mass base in excess of 50,000 and 10,000 or 15,000 armed men, of whom a substantial portion had from 3 to 8 years in the field as guerrillas. The PKP had agents, leaders, and propagandists concealed in most levels of government and society.

The product of all these factors certainly should be success for the insurgents. The fact is, however, that despite all these advantages and their determined efforts, the Huk in four years had little success in expanding the area of contest. Even in the two islands of Negros and Panay, where the bulk of the workforce were sugar plantation laborers paid by the day, the Huk enjoyed no real success, although they captured a well-established union which embraced most of the workers. Even the personal efforts of onr Guillermo Capadocia, a "founding father" of the PKP and the Huk movement, were not enough.

Although expansion forces of the movement sought to establish it in all the major islands and did succeed in creating several small local groups which broke up when submitted to pressure, the Huk created a viable insurgency only in three areas of Central Luzon.

One was Manila with its sprawling slums and suburbs, the de facto capitol of the Republic of the Philippines, and, until 1953, of the Huk-Communist movement as well. Badly damaged by the war, with perhaps half of its 2,000,000 population rootless transients, refugees, or unemployed peasants, Manila was the natural hotbed for any kind of politics, including revolution. The Communist foothold in the labor movement, established in the 1930s, was rapidly expanded after WWII. In fact, the steering committee of the labor union congress interlocked with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines, usually called the PKP.

A second was the highly diversified farming area south of Manila, which has been a hotbed of agrarian unrest for over 100 years. This hotbed has been systematically exploited by politicians, demagogues, and racketeers selling land which they did not own, as well as the site of many large church and private estates. Traditionally it is a land of violence, banditry, and local insurrection. The Huk were able to establish there an almost viable movement (at least one which the people did not actively oppose), but one which never satisfied the leaders with its accomplishments.

"Huklandia," the real heartland of the movement, consists of some 6,000 square miles, mostly included in four provinces north of Manila, and is the richest rice-growing area in the Philippines. It was in this valley, bordered by mountains, swamp, ocean, and Manila, that the Huk movement was born and flourished, and where some Huk activity persists today. Well over half of the population are small sharecroppers, wresting a marginal livelihood from plots which have been subdivided through inheritance, chronically in debt to usurers, and trained to discontent from earliest childhood. The failure of the Huk to win the overwhelming support of a population so well conditioned for revolution and so deprived is perhaps their greatest failure.

When the attempt to gain power through electoral politics failed in April 1946, Huk-PKP activity resumed in all areas. In Huklandia open hostilities began almost immediately, and it became apparent that the Huk had installed in local civil governments. Targets of military operation were usually selected to serve a political purpose, such as enforcing or expanding their control of the rural population. Raids, ambushes, and political executions sought to make clear that the Huk-PKM-PKP leaders were still in control and still fighting for the welfare of the peasants.

The PKP leaders who remained in Manila were more concerned with the urban population. Many of them were old-line Communist labor leaders, and the new confederation of unions, the CIO, seemed to them to offer better promises of success than carrying

on guerrilla warfare among the peasantry. Two factions emerged among the members of the Politburo (which was the body responsible to the Central Committee for day-to-day direction of the Party). One favored emphasizing the legal struggle through exploitation of the urban proletariat, the other favored emphasizing the struggle among the peasants. All were agreed on the ultimate objective--the seizure of national power by the PKP. All agreed on basic targets for attack, with major emphasis directed at "American imperialism" and at discrediting and weakening the legitimate government. Most were dedicated Communists, who probably placed the interests of the Party above their own, but each was convinced that his part in the effort was essential and must be emphasized.

As a result the Huk in the field operated until 1949 without overt sponsorship of the PKP and with relatively little effective direction from the Politburo. The PKP was, nevertheless, not only the parent body but the urban support element, furnishing intelligence, supplies, funds, and recruits to the Huk in the field. Only a little less covert were the PKP relations with the PKM (National Peasants Union) which was at once the shadow government and the mass base organization, and the principal support of the Huk. The indoctrination of all initiates, in both the Huk and the PKM, was patently Communist--but neither organization admitted during this period that it was dedicated to overthrow of the government by force. It was not until November 7, 1948 (the 18th anniversary of the founding of the PKP) that the Huk were officially converted into the Peoples Liberation Army (HMB), a name change to which few on either side except the excessively doctrinaire paid any attention. An ambush in April 1949, in which the widow of former President Quezon was killed, was the only combat action initiated by the Huk which aroused real public indignation, or called forth an intensive major military operation against them.

From their words, during this period, the Huk seemed content to bide their time and increase their strength until a national administration came into office which would grant their demands for reforms and protection. During the 1949 national elections they campaigned vigorously for presidential candidate Laurel, who five years before had been the Japanese puppet president, and the Huk's Public Enemy #1.

From its deeds, the government seemed little more determined to finish the Huks by force. Stern admonitions and announcements of a "mailed fist policy" alternated with amnesties and negotiations for surrender. Not until March 1948 were the Huk and the PKP proclaimed illegal associations--and the prewar ban on the

PKP was not invoked until 1951. Several large operations were mounted against known Huk headquarters with little effect, small detachments of government forces were scattered throughout Huklandia, existing in fact at the pleasure of the Huk, who could have easily overrun any of them at a time of their own choosing. Huk and government forces were about equal in numbers, and the soldiers' small superiority in weapons and communications were more than offset by the Huk's superiority in intelligence and cross-country mobility.

This is not to say that there was a general truce. Press reports for the period list 357 operations against the Huk, and 207 operations by the Huk against government forces or civilians. (The latter figure is almost certainly far too small.) The press also reported some 2,804 Huk killed in action, as against 149 members of the armed forces of the Philippines admitted killed. (Were the number of irregular forces supporting the government who were killed added to the government casualties, the ratio would be about 16 to 1, a figure which can be derived from reports of counterinsurgency operations elsewhere.) Add to this the number of civilians killed by both sides, and it is probable that not less than 5,000 died during these four years--a figure far lower than the 25,000 whom the Huk claimed to have killed during less than three years of war against the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Huk grew stronger, the forces of government seemed unable to make progress, and the people grew disgusted with both.

#### High Tide and Defeat, January 1950-December 1955

The defeat of the Huk-supported presidential candidate in the November 1949 election, the flagrant cheating and violence on both sides, and the general attitude of dissatisfaction with the government seemed to the PKP leaders evidence that a truly revolutionary situation had been reached. Accordingly a formal meeting of the enlarged Politburo was called in January 1950, the situation reviewed, and momentous decisions taken. These included the statement that a revolutionary situation (where the armed struggle for victory should be emphasized) existed, that the Huk should be converted into a regular army, which would seek to attack and destroy government forces and installations, and prepare for the final offensive; far-reaching and grandiose changes in organization.

Pursuant to these decisions a plan of operations and timetable were prepared. This called on the PKP and Huk to double their strength every three months, beginning June 1950, so that

by June 1951 they would have 172,000 Huk, organized into 35 divisions, spread throughout the Philippines. These were to be allowed several months for training and equipping, and then, on November 1, 1951, the final offensive for victory was to be launched. (Ironically, November 13, 1951, the date of the national elections, was in fact destined to mark the beginning of the end for the Huk.)

During the middle part of 1950, prospects for a successful communist overthrow of the government were very bright. Army estimates placed HMB strength at 12,800 equipped with 8,850 arms, and mass organizations at 54,200. The trade unions under the leadership of the CLO could count on a 100-thousand membership in seventy-six labor unions, or one fifth of the total labor force of the Philippines. Infiltration in the branches of the government had been going on smoothly. . . . To top it all, the government and the people were divided among themselves. . . .\*

In the beginning things went well. The first Huk offensive in March 1950 seemed a resounding success. Some 10 to 15 attacks were staged in various parts of Huklandia and the area to the south of Manila with uniformly good results. The people and the government were badly shaken, and, for perhaps the first time, the real threat of the Huk was generally realized. For some years the Philippine Constabulary had been charged with primary responsibility for the campaign against the Huk; this was now given to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), specifically the army, and additional units were deployed to the contested areas, placing perhaps 20,000 government troops of all kinds in the field against perhaps 12,000-15,000 Huk.

There were several serious attacks against the newly deployed forces, and in August a second period of widespread attacks ensued. In one a provincial capitol was overrun and looted; in another provincial capitol, an army camp and hospital were wiped out and the patients murdered in their beds. Huk patrols came to the very edges of Manila, and the army felt compelled to establish what was virtually a defense perimeter across the land approaches to the capitol.

The ridiculous recruitment program was never implemented, nor were there serious attempts to establish "liberated areas" according to the doctrinaire "Maoist" theories of then-dominant

---

\*Handbook on the Communist Party of the Philippines, pub. by Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1961.

PKP leaders. The reasons these directives were ignored are not clear, but one suspects that field leaders recognized the fallacies of the plans and felt too that the government and people were so divided that they might well be able to assume power by default. One suspects also that the Huk may never have realized their full strength, or had the determination to use it to the maximum. Almost certainly, given the requisite determination, they could have overrun Manila by a surprise attack in mid-1950, possibly capturing the president and many ranking civilian and military officials.

What seems to have been the tacit strategy of the field leaders might well have met with some success--probably the formation of an emergency coalition government in which they participated--had it not been for an unexpected reaction to their display of strength. Rather than negotiate, the government decided to try a new approach, that of appointing a Secretary of Defense who was aggressive, understood the people, had experience as a guerrilla, high motivation, and a willingness to accept and act on good advice. This man was Ramon Magsaysay, one of perhaps a dozen such men who had either not been employed in the campaign against the Huk, or were in positions too subordinate to be effective.

His appointment, the powers entrusted to him, and a few lucky breaks made an immediate change in the attitudes and effectiveness of the armed forces, the government, and the people. On October 28, 1950, 48 days after his appointment, Magsaysay, acting on information he personally secured from a Huk agent, ordered a raid on the secret headquarters of the PKP in Manila. A truckload and a half of Party files, some going back to 1942, were seized, as well as the members of the urban half of the Politburo and others. The importance of this capture can scarcely be overemphasized, for it not only disrupted the control echelon of the PKP, but made available excellent evidence on which to break up the subversive operations being carried out under a cloak of legality.

Perhaps even more significant in the long run was the re-orientation given the armed forces. Magsaysay made it clear that every soldier had three primary missions: to represent the government to the people in a favorable light by his actions as well as by words, to collect information, and to kill or capture Huks. Action was insisted upon, good actions rewarded, bad or omitted actions punished. He personally sought to be, and often seemed to be, everywhere at once, checking on implementation. At times there seemed some question as to who were the most confused by his whirlwind ways, the Huk or the AFP--but the AFP had the

better direction. Press coverage of the efforts of the AFP changed from bitterly critical to laudatory, and a major psychological operations program, designed to convince the people and the Huk that they should support the government, began.

One of the most potent claims of the Huk for support, after the 1949 elections, was their thesis that free and honest elections should not be held. As the time for the 1951 elections approached, they began a campaign against them, instructing their supporters to boycott the elections. Magsaysay countered with statements that with the President's approval, and the assistance of the armed forces and of all good citizens, the elections would be free and honest. Most candidates of the Party in power lost, and no one questioned the freedom of the elections, except in the areas where the Huk themselves drove voters away from the polls. Most important, the credibility of the armed forces as protectors of the people and the practical effectiveness of orderly democratic processes were firmly established in the minds of the people, including many of the Huk and their supporters.

Seen in retrospect, and indeed seen within a few months, it is clear that from then on the only chance for success for the Huk would have been a complete reversal in the actions of the armed forces. This did not occur. By the end of 1953 the strength of the Huk still in the field was estimated at 2,616, and these were hard pressed to stay alive. Until the end of 1955 there were no major encounters, and no substantial attacks launched by the Huk. Military actions were designed to track down or surprise those who still held out. In May 1954, Luis Taruc, the best-known field leader of the Huk, and at one time their field "generalissimo," surrendered. At the end of the period there were no more than three or four leaders, and an estimated 828 armed Huk, still at large.

In 1956 the AFP was withdrawn from the campaign and responsibility for the final mop-up given to the Philippine Constabulary. This fourth period in the Huk movement, which might be called "The Huk Smoulder On," continued in 1965. No major leader of the Huk armed forces was free. Those who were not dead have been imprisoned after due court action. On the morning these words were written (December 31, 1965), the Manila press carried prominently the story of how three minor Huk leaders of an assassination squad, recently become active in Pampanga, were ambushed and slain by PC the previous day. The war was long over, insurgency was not active, but not dead; it smouldered in the swamps and rice-lands of Huklandia still.

## THE NATURE OF THE HUK MOVEMENT

### Organization

While the Huk during the Japanese occupation included elements not already involved in, or subscribing to, the theory of the "class struggle," this was not true of the vast majority of those who were active thereafter. The leader elements were largely drawn from the prewar Communist and socialist parties, or from orthodox hard-line trade unionists in the tobacco and printing industries. To these must be added, of course, some adventurers, chronic malcontents, disappointed intellectuals, and opportunists. The rank and file of soldiery were drawn from the peasant class, mostly tenant farmers of rice. Most had enough schooling to read and write and to have some concept of how the government (which in the Philippines is largely patterned after that of the United States) is supposed to work. About half of the PKP leaders were middle-class intellectuals, the other half (who for the most part were also field leaders of the Huk) were of peasant or laborer origin, but with education usually of high-school level or above.

The political structure of the movement followed fairly orthodox Communist Party lines, although the details of organization changed from time to time. In its final form Party organization ran upward from barrio or shop cells through district committees, regional (usually three or more provinces) committees, to the national command structure. There the National Congress, which met but rarely, was the highest authority. In practice, final authority was exercised by the Central Committee which again met rarely, or by the Politburo, the small coterie of top leaders who theoretically met often. With the dislocation imposed by the full-scale hostilities which began in 1950, and with the arrest of many Politburo leaders that same year, day-to-day direction of the movement was technically in the hands of the Secretariat and its departments--Education, Organization, Finance, and Military. The Huk were the responsibility of the Military Department, while the PKM was under the jurisdiction of the Organization Department (then, a bureau) until it was outlawed in 1948. After PKM lost its value, civilian government was the responsibility of the Organization Department.

The real coordinating and control centers for both the military and civilian arms were the Regional Committees/Regional Commands (RECOs). Originally these were separate but overlapping, with the Commands subordinate to the Committees, but eventually they merged, and the politico-military distinctions were blurred.



Military organization was orthodox enough at lower levels --squads, platoons, squadrons--then theoretically into battalions, perhaps regiments. In practice, organization and command channels above the squadron level varied from time to time and place to place. Field Commands normally existed, as area organizations, subordinate to the Regional Commands mentioned earlier. Apparently, not all squadrons were subordinate to a Field Command, which might have no more than a few squads of village guerrillas under its control. There seemed to exist no rigid chain of command tying military and political elements together at the lower levels, or requiring the approval of lower political echelons before orders of a higher military command were obeyed. In practice, military authority rested in the Regional Command, which in turn supposedly took orders from a (national) Military Committee to which the commander belonged. Only briefly, and ineffectively, were there attempts to establish a single individual as commander in chief.

The military doctrine of the Huk, as it evolved, was virtually classical guerrilla and might be summarized as follows: Fight when and where there is a political purpose, when you can get supplies in no other way, or when you need to delay the enemy temporarily. Except in the last instance, never fight unless sure of achieving surprise and a cheap victory. Do not stand and fight if surprised, or to hold terrain.

The training of the Huk recruit was long on the principles of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism (their basic text) and woefully short on practical military subjects. Great stress was placed on education, always with a heavy political content, and this proved one of the more effective lures for recruits. It was only in the third phase, after the decision to undertake an all-out offensive, that military topics were given serious attention by the National Education Department, and by that time it was too late.

The logistic organization of the Huk was never developed as a separate entity. Instead they concentrated on financial matters. The PKP had an extensive and highly organized system for the collection of taxes, contributions, and loot, and for disbursing these to the units in the field. In practice it appears that most units maintained their own supply officers, with connections with the PKM shadow governments in their area, and obtained the bulk of their requirements from them. Medicines, military material not available through capture, and other manufactured items which could not be obtained as direct contributions were supposed to be purchased, either by the using unit or by representatives of the Manila headquarters. Cash for such purchases was supposed to be drawn from the National Finance Department--to which all

acquisitions of cash or valuta were supposed to be delivered. "Economic opportunism," as the holding out of loot for personal use was called, was a matter of real concern to the moralists at the national level, and at least two formerly respected minor leaders were liquidated for this deviation from the norm of Communist morality.

### Objectives

The major objective of the Huk-PKP-PKM movement was the establishment of a Communist-Socialist government of the Philippines, affiliated with the international Communist bloc. How this was to be accomplished seems never to have been agreed upon, or even understood, by all of the important leaders. This was a weakness, but also a strength, for it precluded the commitment of all resources to a single course of action which almost certainly would have been both doctrinaire and impractical.

The political objectives of the movement were the organization of both rural and urban groups and the creation of so much discontent that these organized elements, backed by the military Huk, could take power locally and nationally. Whether this power was achieved through participation in the normal democratic processes, by swinging their votes in favor of candidates who would give them concessions, or through strikes and riots leading to the fall of the government, seemed not to matter too much to any except theoreticians.

Until the beginning of 1950 the military objectives were to remain alive and effective, to extend political influence through selective actions and to damage the enemy when this could be done cheaply. After the decision to "regularize" the Huk, multiply their strength 16-fold, and assume the final offensive, these became the nominal objectives. Actually, the military objectives seem to have changed little, but more emphasis was given to expansion and to aggressive action.

The Huk never had geographical objectives, as one normally thinks of them. They sought to control as many people and as much terrain as they could; they preferred to keep government forces away from their camps, schools, and headquarters, but after some sharp lessons from the Japanese they never attempted more than delaying actions.

## Techniques

The military techniques of the Huk were in accordance with their doctrine. Probably the preferred type of operation was that in which 100 or 200 men would enter a small town where there were no more than a dozen or so armed representatives of government, disarm them, confiscate all military material, lay a heavy tax on the merchants, and leave without firing a shot. Next to this was certainly the ambush, usually at a bend in the road or trail. Sometimes they disguised themselves as government soldiers (they had no distinctive uniform, and as often as not were dressed in government uniform) and set up checkpoints on a highway to stop busses and trucks on which they would then levy for what seemed appropriate. On the rare occasions when they mounted major military operations they usually set up blocks to prevent reinforcement of the place under attack, and either infiltrated the target area or laid down a burst of fire followed by a wild charge. Invariably they pulled out before reinforcements could arrive. Perhaps their most effective military techniques were those they used to avoid contact with enemy forces, often outflanking and then following rather closely behind a government unit making a reconnaissance in force. Combat elements which held to the field moved their camps almost daily, not infrequently having a series of sites which they visited in turn. Always they avoided an encounter for which they were not prepared; when attacked they usually put up a brief delaying action from prepared positions while the main body withdrew. Militarily they were most distinguished by their survivability.

The political techniques of the Huk-PKP-PKM were based on the fact that the Philippines is, and has been for the last three decades at least, with the exception of the period of Japanese occupation, a functioning democracy patterned after that of the United States. Further, and this was and is important, winning national candidates usually profess a welfare-state philosophy, while incumbents practice it, at least just before elections. Finally almost everyone is keenly interested in politics, and is predisposed to believe that all politicians, except perhaps the candidates he personally favors, are congenitally dishonest and incompetent. The strategy of the movement was clear--to increase discontent with those in power, and offer support to their opponents in return for concessions--including positions for members of the Huk-PKP-PKM on the national tickets of the major parties.

While simultaneously denouncing the incumbents and supporting their opponents, the movement lost no opportunity to spread the belief that constitutional government never could or would

work--that only the "New Democracy" (of communism) could meet the just needs of the people. Finally, of course, there was the bogeyman of American imperialism to be injected into every issue. The field commanders were not too fond of this issue, however, because they usually lost support when the peasants began to believe the Huk were really anti-American.

Needless to say, the Huk-PKP-PKM used all of the applicable techniques of influencing elections (except, probably, outright vote-buying) from terrorizing voters to false registrations, to the theft, stuffing, switching, or destruction of ballot boxes. In every presidential election they supported a candidate, invariably one whom they had been bitterly denouncing a few months before, and invariably they hailed the defeat of their candidate as proof of the corrupt reactionary fascist-imperialist colonialist tendencies of those in power, and the futility of any system of government not based on the "New Democracy."

Their preferred propaganda medium was the Manila press, made available to them by skillful exploitation of gullible columnists and reporters, for this reached the literate, influential leaders who were their principal targets. To some extent they were able to employ commercial radio in the same way. Rumor and word-of-mouth propaganda was used extensively; so too were mimeographed newsheets and leaflets. During the first two years after the war an official party newspaper was openly published in Manila and was supplemented by a crypto-Communist newsheet of the labor congress.

Terror was selectively employed. On a few occasions substantial numbers of people in a particular community were systematically murdered, but these were exceptions which probably did more harm than good. There was no systematic program of assassination of government officials in rural (or urban) areas, but those in exposed areas usually cooperated with the Huk--or moved out. Urban terrorism was not attempted, except where directly connected with a contested labor strike.

#### SUPPORT FOR THE HUK-PKP-PKM MOVEMENT

##### Local Material Support

Most of the logistic requirements of the Huk were met through contributions from civilian supporters, either among the peasantry or in Manila. At times elements sought to grow their own rations,

either to support themselves in isolated locations, as at a school camp, because of difficulties in drawing them from the civilians, or for purposes of self-discipline. Cloth, medicines, flashlight batteries, etc., came originally from commercial sources, acquired through direct purchase or by donation of the purchasers. Money was collected in the form of taxes, seized in raids which were sometimes conducted specifically for this purpose, or by kidnapping wealthy individuals and holding them for ransom. Initially the Huk were armed with abandoned or captured American or Japanese weapons; they were largely re-armed at the end of the Japanese occupation with American equipment issued to guerrillas or stolen and sold to civilians. Throughout the second and third phases they were able to maintain a functionally adequate level of ordnance supply through capture and purchase of stolen arms and ammunition. Some home-made weapons were employed, but these largely dated from occupation days. They rather soon ran low on machine guns and mortars, for which they really had little need. Mines and booby-traps they employed rarely, for want of people trained in the use of explosives, and, in part at least, out of fear of injuring civilian supporters. Small arms and ammunition were never a major problem, nor should they be in a well-organized, well-led guerrilla movement.

#### Local Nonmaterial Support

The truly essential support for any insurgency is nonmaterial; it is the willingness of people to help, or at least not to hinder, the insurgents. Sometimes this is predicated on sympathy for the insurgents as individuals or as province-mates, sometimes on sympathy for their objectives, and sometimes purely on antipathy for the government or the administration. Finally, of course, there are those who help in the hope of future gain, or out of fear of punishment by the guerrillas.

All of these factors entered into the support given to the Huk-PKP-PKM. The peasants of Huklandia gave them information, food, shelter, and recruits for all of these reasons, and for a time in many areas were completely devoted to the ill-understood cause. Manila intellectuals gave them information and money and helped them in their psychological operations, as did the journalists who were their best disseminators of propaganda. This was done partly out of a spirit of joining the "wave of the future," partly out of sympathy for their professed objectives of a better life for all and a strong dislike for those who would repress these heroic idealists. The politicians gave them support in return for votes.

## Outside Support

The Huk received virtually no direct material support from outside, nor did they need it. Their weapons and ammunition came from outside the country, but not to them. In the first two years after the Japanese occupation the PKP, largely through its labor front, the CLO, did receive substantial financial and propaganda assistance, largely through the US Marine Cooks & Stewards Union. Additional funds may have come in later, but this has not been proven. The principal outside assistance to the whole movement was propaganda made abroad, especially in the United States, to make the various components, from Huk to CLO, seem separate, legitimate, agrarian, or labor reform movements. In addition, American and Chinese advisers gave substantial assistance, especially in the field of domestic propaganda. Some Russian assistance was alleged (certainly several of the older leaders were trained in Russia before the war) but postwar Soviet involvement was never proven. There were many reports of sightings and even landings of unidentified submarines, presumably Chinese or Russian. Investigation never confirmed these. The reports themselves were subject to psychological exploitation by either side, and certainly many were "planted" for such exploitation.

## THE COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

### Introduction

Throughout the entire period of Huk insurgency, the primary emphasis has been on fighting the Huk or on finding and finishing him. The approaches taken and the other techniques employed have varied through the four phases of the counterinsurgency. These correspond generally to those of the insurgency, i.e., Phase I, the Japanese occupation (1942-1945); Phase II, the Indecisive Insurgency (and counterinsurgency, it might well be added) (1946-1949); Phase III, Huk High Tide and Defeat (1950-1955); and Phase IV, Huk Smoulder On (1956 to date of this paper). Only in Phase III did the counterinsurgency forces place significant emphasis on isolating the guerrilla, and there the emphasis was on psychological rather than physical isolation techniques. For the purposes of the following discussion it should be considered that "local support" refers to material and intelligence support originating in Huklandia, Manila, and south Central Luzon, and sympathy or tolerance from people anywhere in the Philippines; while "outside support" refers to material support in interisland transport or to material or nonmaterial support originating outside the Philippines but designed to aid the Huk-PKP-PKM.

## Denial of Support

### Phase I

During Phase I police methods were employed to some extent. The Japanese sought to establish "neighborhood associations" which compelled people to watch and report on one another. They required passes for travel from place to place, they established frequent checkpoints along routes of communication, they conducted unexpected searches of small communities or sections of larger ones, they sought to plant agents and informers everywhere, and they used the most brutal and terroristic methods of interrogation and punishment on those suspected of supporting the guerrilla. In all of this they received some assistance from Filipinos who cooperated out of sympathy, hope of reward, or fear of punishment. After the nature and purpose of the Huk movement became apparent, some of these same measures were independently applied against suspected Huk supporters by other guerrilla units which regarded the Huk as an enemy second only to the Japanese. These measures were a nuisance, at times an intolerable nuisance, but they were ineffective. The vast mass of the people hated the Japanese and cooperated enthusiastically with the guerrilla, any guerrilla. In Huklandia the Huk, by and large, already commanded the support of substantial numbers of peasants, and not a few middle-class ideologues or "trimmers," and were never more than temporarily separated from them. The results of the isolation efforts of the Japanese--increased support for the Huk.

### Phase II

During Phase II constitutional government, with all the civil liberties guaranteed by the Philippine (as by the US) laws, were in effect, so the police measures which could be used legally were sharply reduced. Checkpoints remained on the highways and functioned primarily as a means of obtaining "coffee money" for those maintaining them. Arbitrary arrest and detention were illegal, as was the use of force in interrogation. These things were practiced, but on a greatly reduced scale, extra-legally, and with the certainty of arousing public indignation if discovered. Occasionally isolated communities were searched, even destroyed. Persons against whom suspicion of collaboration with the Huk was strong, and who seemed unimportant, were often liquidated. The emphasis seemed to be on making people afraid to give support to the Huk. Intelligence agents were fairly active, and not a few suppliers were identified--but usually there was no legal way to punish them. In fact, it was no crime to be an

admitted Huk until 1948, and unless one were caught with an unregistered firearm, or actually identified as the probable perpetrator of a common crime, he could not legally be held. The result of these efforts to isolate the Huk from popular support, combined as they were with attempts to win political support, was again to increase support for the Huk.

### Phase III

After Magsaysay became Secretary of Defense, early in Phase III, great emphasis was placed on the psychological separation of the Huk from the people. Every effort was made to establish credibility for the claim of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to be friends and protectors of the people, and to show that the Huk were really their enemy. Roving checkpoints, conducted with scrupulous honesty and courtesy, harassed Huk couriers and suppliers, as did agents surveilling likely sources of supplies such as medicines. There were occasional searches of communities known or believed to harbor Huk, but these again were so conducted as to give the minimum of offense. The only formally prohibited items were arms and ammunition. Those possessing stocks of other materials of obvious use to the Huk might expect to be required to explain their need for them. Intelligence made intensive efforts to discover regular Huk supply channels, and sometimes to introduce into them items which would compromise the supposed suppliers with their Huk customers.

No effort was spared in seeking the psychological isolation of the Huk. Where the demands for reform had some validity, the AFP sought to institute or encourage those reforms. When the Huk called for "land for the landless"--the AFP offered every Huk who would repent a chance to own his own land. In answer to accusations of injustice in the courts, AFP lawyers were made available to help those with cases against landlords which they could not afford to defend or prosecute. "Honesty in government and free elections!"--the 1951 elections were proof that government could and should work as it was supposed to--and proof that the Huk who remained in the field were the dupes or the hirelings of sinister foreign agents. The actions taken were far too many to enumerate here, but they effectively isolated the Huk from the sympathy or willing support of virtually all Filipinos outside Huklandia and from most of those in their area.

### Phase IV

In Phase IV there seems to have been little effort to isolate the Huk from local support except through intelligence activities and occasional checkpoints.



The Japanese sought to cut off outside material support by patrolling the interisland waterways, as well as by ocean surveillance. They were notably ineffective. Similar measures, on a greatly reduced scale, persisted through Phases II and III, and on into Phase IV, although the principal target has always been commercial smuggling. These efforts have had little or no apparent effect on the Huk movement; they did not even stop the smuggling out of arms to Indonesia, Vietnam, and China in the late 1940s. Some support did enter through commercial channels, mostly through the port of Manila, in the 1940s. Counterintelligence methods, largely implemented through the Customs Secret Service, and in conjunction with military counterintelligence, effectively reduced this to an unimportant trickle.

#### Administrative Adequacy

During Phase I administrative adequacy was hampered by the administrative problems of the Japanese, as well as by the often enthusiastic sabotage of any Japanese effort by most of the Filipinos who supposedly were working with them. In theory, their control measures should have eliminated all support to the guerrillas except that received from isolated hill farmers; in practice they were seldom more than a nuisance.

Perhaps the greatest administrative handicap during Phases II, III, and IV has been the fact that the Philippines has been a functioning democracy with guaranteed civil liberties and elections every two years--elections in which, with one exception, the Huk and their supporters enthusiastically participated.

Aside from this the administrative problems were, and remain, formidable. The Japanese occupation left a shortage of trained administrators and a legacy of noncooperation. Entrenched bureaucracy with a "business as usual" attitude is always a formidable foe of effective counterinsurgency, and the Philippines was no exception to this rule. The legacy of the mutual distrust and suspicion left by the Japanese occupation resulted in the proliferation of secret investigative agencies. At one time in the late 1940s there were at least 17 intelligence, counterintelligence, or other investigative agencies involved in operations against the Huk-PKP-PKM, with coordination only on an ad hoc basis. Even when the campaign against the Huk was most effective, in the middle of Phase III, there were at least four such agencies operating more or less independently. None of them had really adequate support, money, facilities, or organization. Military and civilian agencies might or might not coordinate at provincial

level or below, depending largely on the personalities and political connections of the individuals involved.

The police contributed little to the counterinsurgency effort other than occasional surveillance and arrests--indeed, it occurred to no one, except a few ambitious police officers, that they had much to contribute other than in such technical fields as identification of handwriting, typing, bullets, etc. (Although the Philippine Constabulary and the Military Police Command, their postwar interim substitute, had the theoretical mission of law enforcement, they were and are not police, and their operations against the Huk were primarily of a military or intelligence nature.) Local police forces in Huklandia tended to be neutral, when they did not actively support the Huk.

### Dealing with Public Opinion

In Phase I the Japanese in general cared nothing for public opinion. It was a concept entirely foreign to them. In Phase II there were limited attempts by the national government to influence public opinion, largely of the "we are good--they are dirty Communists" type. These were coupled with threats of sanctions against those mass media elements which seemed too openly sympathetic to the insurgents. Further, there was a constant barrage of press releases about government victories over the Huk and promises that they would be wiped out "within 60 days." These were not entirely self-seeking or self-delusionary, for they could have contributed to a loss of faith in the possibility of Huk success. Instead they served to lull those who opposed the Huk, and arouse the contempt of the Huk and of critical observers who realized their falsity.

In addition, of course, some military and civilian leaders in the field attempted to influence opinion against the Huk as the cause of the damage and inconvenience the civilians suffered. Too, there were deliberate attempts to cut off support for the Huk by terroristic activities, to make people afraid to support the Huk lest they be tortured or killed by government forces. This naturally had a profound effect on public opinion, both in the provinces and Manila, and contributed substantially to the growth of antigovernment (not necessarily pro-Huk) sentiment.

The efforts to influence public opinion made in Phase III have already been described. Each combat unit of battalion level had a team whose mission was to improve relations between civilians and soldiers. They assured that government objectives were

explained to the people and that any complaints the people might have against soldiers were promptly investigated. Conscientious and highly successful efforts were made to win the support of the mass media. Any reporter could go anywhere, anytime, with the blessings of the Secretary of Defense. If he came back with a story unfavorable to the AFP he was not asked to suppress it, but to observe the corrective action taken, so that he could present a balanced report. Within this policy framework, of course, efforts were made to insure that what the reporter saw was good.

The defeat which the Huk suffered may be attributed primarily to the success of government representatives in influencing public opinion, secondarily to their success in controlling the behavior of government representatives. In Phase IV there seems to be little or no effective effort to influence public opinion against the Huk, and, indeed, one reading the Manila press today might be excused for thinking that many contributors are again sympathetic to the Huk-PKP-PKM.

Until Phase III, efforts to influence public opinion outside the Philippines were largely confined to the efforts of Communists and fellow-travellers, primarily in the United States. Three books (one allegedly written by Taruc himself) appeared in the United States, which represented the Huk as heroic agrarian reformers, and their opponents as corrupt, fascistic, imperialistic, pro-Japanese oppressors. A number of articles conveying the same theme appeared in Communist and liberal publications. No great excitement was aroused however.

As part of his effort to win the support of the mass media, Magsaysay was most cooperative with foreign reporters. He was, in addition, a man uniquely able to win sympathy and support, perhaps especially from Americans. The resulting stories in the US press helped substantially in gaining American support, especially for matters outside normal routine.

#### Psychological Effects of Specific Incidents

There was scarcely an incident in the relations of the Free, the Axis, and the Communist worlds that did not have some psychological effect; just as there was scarcely an operation by, or against, the Huk that did not have a psychological effect, usually one greater than the material effect. There were four occurrences, however, which appear especially significant in their counterinsurgency importance.

The first of these is the campaign of the Nenita Unit from 1946-1948. This was a small group of Philippine Constabulary men who constituted themselves a hunter-killer team to track down and eliminate Huk leaders. As part of their program, they sought to instill terror into all who might support the Huk in their theater of operations. They did. They eliminated a significant number of Huk leaders. They received much publicity as relentless, almost omniscient Huk killers. This publicity did much to turn public opinion against the government which supported such activities, and the Huk increased their strength in the area of Nenita operations. Actually the Nenita unit was probably more scrupulous in its behavior than most of the government units active in the field, but the terror it created did more harm than good for the counterinsurgency.

The second was the 1949 presidential election. The incumbent, actually not a bad man, had been so vilified by the press and the political opposition including the Huk-PKP-PKM that he was grossly unpopular. His opponent, a Japanese puppet president five years before, was probably more unpopular except among a certain class of noisy would-be intellectuals. The Huk--his bitterest enemy a year or two earlier--decided to support him. Fraud and terrorism were rampant during the election. President Quirino, the incumbent, almost certainly would have been re-elected in a free and honest election, but as it was, the claim that he stole the election was plausible. Worse, it gave some credibility to the Huk claim that the corrupt administration could be eliminated only by force. Popular support for government dwindled alarmingly, but fortunately, support for the Huk did not grow in proportion. Toleration for them did--to too many people the administration and the Huk seemed almost equally evil. Had it not been for the dramatic changes in public opinion induced by the new Secretary of Defense in the latter part of 1950 the government might well have fallen.

The third significant occurrence was the appointment as leader of the effort against the Huk of an aggressive, popular, charismatic individual, who was then given almost a free hand in directing actions designed to defeat the insurgency and to win support for the government. This condition did not last long--he wrote a letter of resignation bitterly assailing the restrictions placed on his efforts two and a half years later--but it lasted long enough to bring about an almost complete victory over the insurgents. His greatest accomplishment was to convince the people that their government could and would function as it was supposed to--and to convince both the people and the armed forces that the latter were the friends and protectors of the people.

The fourth significant occurrence was the national election of 1951 (not presidential but for senators, governors, and congressmen). The Huk-PKP-PKM propaganda machine for months charged that the election would be meaningless, and ultimately called upon the people not to participate. Magsaysay, the AFP, and citizens' organizations (largely based on the Philippines Veterans Legion) vowed that the elections would be free and honest. They were palpably so and popular belief in the workability of constitutional democratic processes was renewed. This, almost certainly, was the turning point in the whole campaign.

### The Moral Conflict

The Huk-PKP-PKM claimed to fight for the welfare of the masses. The government claimed to represent the people, to be subject to change in accordance with their will and with established processes, and to protect the rights of all. To the extent that the government failed, or seemed to fail, to live up to its claims, the Huk grew in strength. When it became evident that the government was effectively trying, and succeeding, in efforts to make good its claims, the Huk lost.

### The Outcome

The Huk-PKP-PKM movement, perhaps since China the first truly indigenous Communist-inspired insurgency which had a chance of success, collapsed. It never had a real chance to take control of the country by force of arms--but it came perilously close to plunging the country into chaos. It failed because the people believed in a different form of government and because that government found a better leader, and trusted him more, than did the Communists.

Nevertheless the significance of the Huk approach to insurgency should not be minimized. Disorganized and indecisive as they were, their movement might very well have served as a model for Castro, and as a precursor of a type of insurgency far more generally applicable than that taught by Mao and his followers.

The counterinsurgency experience is equally important, for all that no more than perhaps 40,000 government forces were ever deployed against some 15,000 insurgents; for all that most of the mechanical gadgets of today were not available or not deployed. It was indeed "a war for the hearts and minds of the people," and clearly won on that battlefield.

## The Irish Troubles, 1916-1921

by

Gunther E. Rothenberg

### BACKGROUND

Armed insurrection can be carried out in various ways, and it appears that there are certain conditions in which such an insurrection can succeed even against the professional armed forces of the government when, for one reason or another, the government cannot employ its full strength.

A technique of insurrection suited to such a set of circumstances was successfully employed by the Sinn Fein in Ireland. Along with a long and bitter history of resistance to English government, Ireland offered a terrain which was suited for the operation of small bodies of rebels, forcing their opponents at the same time to disperse into isolated groups. Ireland is a predominantly agricultural country. There are no real industrial areas except for Cork, Dublin, and Belfast. A thin population is spread out over hamlets, villages, and small towns. Great stretches of bog and mountain land exist where modern communications were lacking. Terrain thus favored guerrilla fighters working in their own countryside against strange occupation troops. At the same time, except for Ulster, because of the almost exclusively nationalist nature of the rising, it could count on widespread tacit support--at the very least--from a homogeneous population.

Here then the Irish, employing a highly original revolutionary strategy combining political warfare with guerrilla tactics and terrorism, succeeded in gaining victory. It is not suggested that they beat the British army. They did, however, produce conditions which made it impossible for England to govern and to reconquer the island except at a price unacceptable for political reasons, both foreign and domestic, to the government of the day.

This pattern has been described by Professor Cyril Falls in A Hundred Years of War (p. 280) as the classic pattern of the new insurrectionary warfare, to be imitated later in Palestine, "John Bull's other Ireland."

#### HISTORICAL SUMMARY

The Irish republican nationalists, later to be known as the Sinn Fein movement, and their military arm, the Irish Republican Army, IRA, were in their nucleus the remnant of an organization which dated back to the days of the armed rising in Ireland in 1798. They had been part of the Invincibles who used dynamite and attacks on the English police to carry forward their political goals; they had not shied away from political assassination, such as the murder of Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke in Phoenix Park in 1882. These men, connected with the Fenians, had now grown old, but their ideals and their tactical concepts had been taken up by the Irish Republican Brotherhood. Out of the IRB the later Sinn Fein movement emerged.

Between 1900 and 1916 the IRB cautiously but effectively moved to take over many phases of Irish political life. Although originally very small in numbers, a mere handful, their influence was quite out of proportion to their size. Their methods were conspiratorial and they were able to exploit the divisions among the Irish and the failures of governmental policies.

The Irish were divided, first, between Ulstermen and others. The Ulstermen, in general, preferred a continued union with Great Britain, and under the leadership of Sir Edward Henry Carson the Unionists were openly arming early in 1914 to prevent the introduction of Irish Home Rule, which meant for them submission to an Irish parliament. To the majority of Irishmen, on the other hand, the British were intruders in Ireland with a long record of exploitation and oppression. Nonetheless, it appears that the vast majority of the people were moderate nationalists who would have been at least temporarily content with free dominion status within the empire. Their leader was John Redmond.

Even so, opposition to the introduction of Home Rule led to the establishment of a volunteer movement in Ulster. The Volunteers, some 70,000 strong, armed with small arms, were allegedly drilled by officers holding the king's commission. The threat led in turn to the organization of Irish Volunteers in the south. The Irish Volunteers were overwhelmingly Redmondites and led by

moderate leaders such as Professor Eoin MacNeill. However, the IRB was able to infiltrate the Irish Volunteer command structure and assume a leading part. The Irish Volunteers were somewhat smaller, and much worse armed, than Carson's Volunteers.

In addition there existed in and around Dublin another Irish paramilitary force, potentially more revolutionary, but limited in its appeal. This was the Citizen Army, originally formed by Irish syndicalist labor leaders like James Larkin and James Connolly during a violent strike in 1913. Although Connolly and the IRB leaders were hostile in their domestic politics, they opposed British domination of Ireland. The CA, however, at best numbered some 2,000 men, mainly in the industrial centers of Dublin and Cork.

The outbreak of the war in 1914 changed the situation. Redmond decided to support the British government, and many of his followers joined the British forces as volunteers. Yet there was some discrimination. The men from the south of Ireland were not formed into a distinctive division, as the Ulstermen were, and although conscription was not imposed on Ireland until the spring of 1918 there was soon a renewed sense of grievance. The question of Ireland's position in the war had caused a split in the Irish Volunteers. The majority, some 20,000, followed Redmond; the residue, about 14,000, formed a new body, the Republican Volunteers. Professor MacNeill remained in command, though unknown to him the IRB assumed a stronger and stronger position within the Republican Volunteers.

Indeed the Supreme Council of the IRB had decided by 1915 that there should be a rising in Ireland before the end of the war. Consequently arrangements were set afoot to produce such a rising. The aim was not military victory, but rather to provide enough embarrassment for England to induce her to grant immediate Home Rule, which had been shelved at the outbreak of the war, or to make even wider concessions. At the same time, and a source of great anxiety to the leaders of the IRB, James Connolly, the labor leader, was also toying with the idea of a socialist coup against the government. Indeed, his open activities led the IRB to fear lest the authorities should take the alarm. After rather melodramatically kidnapping Connolly they let him into the secret that the IRB planned a rising in Easter Week 1916.

Arrangements for such a rising proceeded. John Devoy, an old Fenian veteran, was attempting to collect arms and money in the United States, while Sir Roger Casement was in Germany to recruit an Irish legion from the prisoners of war and to arrange for the Germans to send a ship with arms to Ireland. On the



whole the preparations were quite amateurish and could easily have been interrupted before the rising.

Since February 1916 British intelligence had been tapping Irish-German-American communications, but it did not inform the CinC Ireland of their findings. Finally, on the Monday previous to Easter Sunday naval intelligence finally informed the CO Southern Command, Ireland, that a German arms ship was nearing the coast and that arrangements had been made to intercept it. The CinC, General Sir John French, was then informed, but no serious countermeasures were prepared. Perhaps, as Patrick Henry Pearse, the commander of the insurgents, pointed out, the whole idea was so insane that no one would believe it.

There is no need to recapitulate the story of the Easter Rising here. Its general assumption was that (a) the mass of Volunteers would respond and (b) that if the rising could hold out for a week the mass of Irishmen would be inspired to join the revolt. Defeat might well follow; but the repression, with the fact that an attempt had been made, would reawaken and revivify the national spirit for independence. In the event only the last part of assumption (b) came true. Attempts to gain aid from the United States were foiled by the authorities there; the German arms ship was intercepted; and only a small number of men, less than 1,500 in all, joined the fighting which was almost entirely restricted to Dublin. The revolt, delayed by one day, broke out on Easter Monday, April 24, and lasted until Friday afternoon. The great mass of the people remained passive.

On the British side the failure to prevent the rising had been in large part due to that lack of coordination between the military and civilian branches of government in Ireland and England, a situation which was to persist. However, once the fighting started the use of artillery and the rapid arrival of reinforcements, combined with the lack of popular support, doomed the attempt.

The casualties amounted to some 60 volunteers killed in action and some 300 wounded. British losses were about 300 in all. On the whole, British reaction was rather mild. There were 16 executions of leading rebels. There were, to be sure, a large number of heavy prison sentences meted out by courts martial and a large number of Irish leaders, guilty or not, were placed in internment camps. However, measured by the standards of earlier and later ages, the repression was relatively light. Even so, it was enough to revive the national spirit and lay the basis for the future struggle.

In the immediate aftermath of the rebellion the government had a fleeting chance of isolating the guerrillas. There was much favorable sentiment for the government and resentment against the rebels who were blamed by the Irish for having caused senseless destruction. In Dublin and Cork prisoners marched to detention were jeered in the streets. However, the executions and the detention camps changed this in short order.

The prison, detention, and internment camps in fact became the school for the rebels. There the various shades of opinion consolidated; future leaders came to know each other; the empty old romanticism died and the new, and much more dangerous, Sinn Fein movement was born. In addition the prisoners soon became an embarrassment to the government. American support for the war was needed, and the Irish bloc in the United States was powerful. By the winter of 1916 the government released most of the internees; the convicts were largely released the following summer. They returned in triumph. If in the immediate aftermath of the revolt they had been jeered, they now returned as heroes. For the moment, however, they eschewed armed action and instead began to run for political office on the Sinn Fein ticket. After initial successes in the winter of 1917, popular support began to taper off early in 1918. At this point, however, the British government decided to extend conscription to Ireland. Opposition to this move united the country and led Mr. Lloyd George's government to abandon conciliation in favor of repression. On May 18, 1918, simultaneous raids resulted in arrests of almost all leaders in the Sinn Fein movement on the pretext of a German plot. Some escaped and went underground, and a new resistance movement developed. The Irish Volunteers, now known as the IRA, gained recruits; arms were again procured; an intelligence system was developed; and a secret arms factory, producing primarily ammunition was set up in Dublin. On January 21, 1919, the IRA undertook its first raid against a government arms depot, thus opening a long series of hostilities which did not end until the Truce of July 1921, followed by the Treaty of December 1921. In this second phase the rebels, forming a shadow government, enjoyed the support of the great mass of the Irish people in the South.

The objectives of the Sinn Fein rebellion were simple; to end English rule in all of Ireland and to establish an Irish Republic. The Sinn Fein were no longer interested in accepting Home Rule as a workable alternative.

In the end, of course, the Truce of June and the Treaty of December 1921 provided somewhat less. Above all they established the geographic division of the country, with the Northern Six

Counties, Ulster, being left out of the settlement. At the same time, the northern counties could opt for coming into the Irish Free State, while the new state accepted an Oath of Allegiance to the king and empire.

Although some members of the original Dail, notably Connolly, had vague left-wing ideas, the movement had almost exclusively nationalist objectives.

#### POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE SINN FEIN

The insurrectionary technique of the Sinn Fein combined terrorist tactics of guerrilla warfare with a design to boycott English government by setting up an alternative Irish administration and whenever possible inducing the Irish people to refer to this Sinn Fein organization. As a basis for insurrectionary tactics the alternative administration, both as a conception and as a fact, was enormously important. It gave the insurrection a national standing which it could not otherwise have won.

In the elections of 1918, while the obvious revolutionary tactics might have seemed to be to boycott the polls, Sinn Fein put up candidates in every constituency but two, and out of the 105 members of Parliament returned for Ireland 73 were Republicans. Thus the justice of the Sinn Fein claim to represent the feelings of the majority of the Irish people was demonstrated to the world. The Sinn Fein leaders proceeded at once to organize this legally elected majority into an Irish National Assembly (Dail Eireann). On January 21, 1919, the assembly proclaimed that "Ireland was a sovereign and independent nation," that a republic had been established in Easter Week of which the Dail constituted itself the continuation. An acting president, Cathal Brugha was appointed. Throughout the years of the rebellion the Dail continued to function, in whatever chequered circumstances, guiding the armed forces, IRA, providing a system of courts alternative to the British courts, levying taxes, and in general providing an alternative government.

The situation was, then, that there were two governments: the Dail Eireann, backed by the moral authority of the majority of the people and by its military arm, and that of the English authorities operating from Dublin Castle who tried, through the increasing use of force, to coerce the Irish into withdrawing their support from the Dail Eireann.

The provisional Irish government attempted to set up a complete governmental structure, though in practice it concentrated on support of the IRA, an Irish judicial system, and a tax system, dubbed the National Loan.

Undoubtedly the most important political activity of the Sinn Fein-IRA resistance was the setting up of the alternate government. This enabled them to exercise considerable influence within the country as well as to rally support abroad. One may say that in 1919-1920 the struggle divided between Ireland and the United States where Irish emissaries were seeking to get financial assistance, public support, and, if possible, US recognition of the Irish republican government. Similarly, the Sinn Fein movement was able--in part aided by the excesses committed by the government forces--to rally support in England and the empire.

#### MILITARY STRUCTURE AND DOCTRINE

The Irish insurrectionists organized a small force permanently under arms as their first line, backed up with what might be described as a militia of men coming out for a single operation and then hiding their arms and returning to their normal pursuits.

The IRA was small; the number of men in action over the greater part of the campaign was only about 10,000. The number engaged in any one action was usually less than 50; there were never as many as 200 engaged in any single operation, even in the burning of the Dublin Customs House.

The IRA was then divided into a general service militia built nominally on a normal army model, though its tactical force was a company of 50 to 100 men, usually based and recruited locally. Company officers were elected by their men and higher regimental officers by a meeting of company officers. The elections had to be ratified by IRA headquarters in Dublin.

Ultimately the whole organization was responsible to the Dail, to which the volunteers took an oath of allegiance. How far local action was autonomous and how far it was directed from headquarters is hard to ascertain. There seems little doubt, however, that all actions on a major scale were the result of general headquarters planning and were specifically ordered.

The core of the guerrilla activity were the Active Service Units, about 1,500, who were paid and on full-time service. A special elite body of picked men in Dublin, commanded by Michael Collins, was dubbed the "Squad" and specialized in actions against members of the British intelligence services.

The tactical doctrine of the IRA aimed at preventing the English government from ruling Ireland. The leaders did not believe that they could beat the forces of the Crown, nor that a general insurrection was desirable or possible. Therefore they resorted to two parallel activities. British administration was attacked by direct action, and the administrative, economic, and political life of the country was paralyzed by civil action such as civil disobedience.

The IRA rejected the use of armed masses in favor of entrusting military operations to a picked body of men and gave civilians only the job of supporting the fighters and obstructing British administration by civil methods. It adopted the principle of striking at individuals and avoiding large-scale actions. There were, however, notable exceptions. A successful drive, combining social ostracism and military action, was put on to force the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) to evacuate its barracks and concentrate in the larger towns. The attacks on the RIC were pressed because this body, thoroughly familiar with their districts, represented a real threat to the IRA. On the other hand troops from England, ignorant of the country and unacquainted with the people, were no substitute for the constables who knew every path and track and most individuals in their district. (Similar reasons motivated the special attacks on the members of the intelligence services.) Deprived of their ability to strike at the IRA directly, the troops were forced to resort to reprisals which in turn brought more hostility from the population.

In regard to the growing escalation of the war the existence of a national government was important. Actions which otherwise could be taken as gratuitous acts of terrorism can be shown to be parts of a plan to liberate Ireland from English rule. As Michael Collins proclaimed in An t-Oglach, the paper of the IRA, as early as January 1918, "The state of war which is thus declared to exist . . . entitles every volunteer to treat the armed forces of the enemy, whether soldiers or policemen, exactly as a national army would treat members of an invading army." In due course, this concept was extended to include civilian agents of the government. In Michael Collins's view England could replace her soldiers, but not her intelligence agents. This explains the assassination, for example, of Mr. Alan Bell, a magistrate who was busy ferreting out

the financial relations between Sinn Fein and various Irish banks. (For further details on this see below.)

Logistics problems were simplified by the small number of men under arms permanently. Money and supplies for these were found by the great mass of supporters as well as by the imposition of a national loan. The Sinn Fein movement had relatively small requirements for arms and ammunition. Some were procured in the United States, mainly automatic pistols, others were captured from the enemy. Grenades and bombs were in part locally manufactured. Rifles and shotguns were sometimes confiscated from local people, dynamite from local enterprises. On the whole, logistic requirements for the IRA were small, since no popular insurrection or major action was contemplated or undertaken. However, despite the relatively small logistic needs the IRA Active Service Units were running short on ammunition in the spring of 1921.

### MILITARY TECHNIQUES

The insurrectionary techniques of the Sinn Fein and the IRA combined political (civil) and military elements. From the outset the IRA realized that it could not meet English regulars in open fight and issued instructions that "the method adopted should be to act in small numbers in suitable localities, thus compelling the authorities to disperse" in their search for attackers. To hamper the authorities, destruction of communications should be carried out widely; telegraph and telephone communications, railroads and roads, transport and gasoline stores were to be attacked. In general attacks were to be carried out at night, because this gave the IRA, familiar with the locality, an advantage.

An important aspect was the campaign to remove the RIC from the rural areas. The RIC, recruited among the Irish and well acquainted with their districts, were socially ostracized, harassed, their barracks attacked, their personnel murdered. This produced wholesale resignations from the RIC and led to its virtual withdrawal from the countryside, where the republican government effectively took over.

At the same time, the IRA struck particularly hard at individuals, military or civilian, regarded as intelligence agents. "To paralyse the British machine," wrote Michael Collins, "it was necessary to strike at individuals. Without her spies England was helpless. It was only by means of their accumulated and

accumulating knowledge that the British machine could operate." Regarding attacks on individuals, he considered that they shook the morale of the enemy and were a necessary act of war.<sup>1</sup>

Against troops and large organized bodies of police, etc., the usual tactics were those of the ambush. Indeed by 1920, by which time personnel from most of the small outlying police stations, posts, etc., had been withdrawn into strongly fortified points, the IRA commonly used ambush tactics, carried out against truckloads of troops and convoys, usually in the countryside with grenades and small arms fire. Another method was the attack carried out in crowded city streets where the attackers could dash for cover in the side streets or merge into the population. The latter type of attack inevitably created high civilian casualties and was permitted only after a long debate within the highest levels of the Irish republican government.

Big operations like the burning of the Dublin Customs House in June 1921 were carried out mainly for political reasons and played a somewhat minor part.

The methods of direct attack were supplemented by other means. In the spring of 1920 Sinn Fein ordered dockers to refuse to handle military cargoes, and railwaymen were ordered to refuse to work trains carrying men or materials for the government. When the British in turn suspended the railway-workers this did not improve the situation since replacements were not available. According to General Sir Neil Macready, these transport strikes set back the British military effort severely. Even so, they were called off in December 1920, probably because the Sinn Fein could not carry the financial burden of supporting the dismissed men, coupled with the counterproductive effect the interruption of rail service was having on the population.

A weapon not used by the Sinn Fein was industrial sabotage. In the industrial north the pro-British Unionists were too strong; in Dublin it was not considered likely to have any effective results.

#### LOCAL SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS

By and large local support for the guerrillas came from the Catholic portions of the country. Historically it had its foundations in the bitter memories of the near wars of extermination fought by the English--the days of Elizabeth and Cromwell, the Famine, and other horrors. In the north, especially in the region around Belfast, there was a Protestant majority, and feeling

for the English connection was strong. It seems fair to say that eventually a majority of the Irish people supported the IRA guerrillas; yet at the outset this was not so. In the beginning the Sinn Fein movement was led by middle class intellectuals, supported by some farmers and professionals. Business people and large landowners generally were pro-British. In many ways support for the guerrillas came as a result of outrages and reprisals, both authorized and unauthorized, by forces of the crown. The great mass of the poor and semieducated gave but little support at first, but this changed when the reprisals and terror raids carried out by British troops after the retreat of the RIC from the countryside forced them out of their apathy. It must be said, however, that the majority of the people never were active supporters, though they may have sheltered the IRA and refused to give any information to the authorities.

It appears possible that if the British had been able to maintain successful control of the area and its government, and if they had not resorted to reprisals, they might have found a greater measure of support--or diminished the support given to the IRA.

The great mass of support was passive--refusal to cooperate with the authorities. At the same time, the Irish people relied more and more on the administration provided by the republican government. They shunned the British courts, they refused to pay their taxes, they generally applied to the alternative government in all cases. People of all political parties found it prudent to deal with the republican authorities who were able to constitute a real functioning government. Disobedience to the edicts of the republican courts, moreover, support of the English authorities, etc., were punished by death.

The Irish government asked for cooperation against the authorities, for food and shelter for its fighting men, for medical care, and for intelligence. It did not impress men into its ranks to do any fighting. There were more than enough volunteers at all times.

It should be noted that popular support reached new heights when in the summer of 1921 the fighting strength of the IRA had declined and the Bruce constituted a political and not a purely military victory for the Sinn Fein.<sup>2</sup>



## OUTSIDE SUPPORT

In 1916 the German government had only a very limited interest in supporting the revolt. The arms ship was actually paid for by the Irish, and no German agents or other measures in support were present. Also in 1916 US authorities effectively interfered with Irish schemes to seize certain German liners tied up in New York for the transport of men and materiel.

In 1919 Irish efforts in the United States, though hampered by rivalry among the Irish emissaries, aimed at gaining financial assistance and public support, as well as recognition of the Irish Republic. The first aim was achieved, but though the US Senate did vote in 1919 to ask that the government hear the Irish case at Versailles, no official or semiofficial aid was ever given.

Unofficially, Irishmen and others in the United States subscribed to the Irish National Loan, and some supplies of arms were procured through private sources. Most important, in the end, however, was public opinion.

In England and the empire, sections of the public, mobilized by such papers as The Times, the Manchester Guardian, and the Daily Mail, were appalled at British actions in Ireland, especially at the policy of official reprisals authorized in 1921. In the United States the British found no support. Great Britain theoretically could muster the forces to put down the Irish, but her army was still convalescent after the most gruelling war in her history. Her foreign relations were likely to suffer from an all-out war in Ireland; her imperial affairs in India and in Egypt were tense; relations with the dominions were strained. Thus in the end the IRA won because it had reduced not the British army, but the British government, to a mood of retrenching its losses. And here the effect that the counterinsurrectionary responses had evoked abroad were all important.

## THE COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

The first British line of counterinsurgent action were the police. Before 1916 these consisted, outside of Dublin where the police were unarmed, of the Royal Irish Constabulary, a locally recruited body of some 6,000. In view of past history this was an armed body carrying revolvers and service rifles. No heavier weapons were available at first. In addition, there was a usual Criminal Investigation Establishment.

The RIC was backed up by a body of troops normally stationed in Ireland which had been augmented to some 20 battalions after the Easter Rising. In 1919 this force was enlarged, and when General Macready took over in April 1920 he further increased his forces to 46 battalions. By December he had 51 battalions and six cavalry regiments, as well as 100 heavy armored cars.

With the RIC practically ousted from the countryside and beset by numerous resignations the British government set up two new bodies of special police. The first were the notorious "Black and Tans." This body of men, actually members of the RIC recruited in England, were thus named after their motley uniforms, partly RIC dark green, partly khaki. More important were the Auxiliary Division of the RIC which the British raised about the same time. These men, all ex-officers, operated as a special force of shock-troops against the IRA. They received higher pay and allowances and ranked as sergeants in the RIC. The "Auxies" soon made a name for their brutality and were accused of employing torture to gain information. Various other armed government bodies in Ireland brought the total up to nearly 100,000 men.

The first phase of the conflict was an attempt by the British to prevent the Dail from establishing any machinery by government. The Dail and its subsidiaries were declared "illegal assemblies." Newspapers which published advertisements for the National Loan were suppressed; possession of nationalist literature was declared an offense. Many of the nationalist leaders were arrested; even more went underground. To achieve their end the British needed an intelligence apparatus, the backbone of which was supplied by the RIC. When this force was driven out of the countryside the British had to resort to other measures.

At first, for political reasons the British were unwilling to suspend the ordinary processes of civil law, though their enforcement had become impossible. In January 1920 a Curfew Order was introduced, followed later that spring by the raising of the Black and Tans and the Auxies. Although of military character, the latter were still a concession by the government. For political reasons Lloyd George considered that only "police measures" were called for in Ireland, and only in December 1920 was a "state of insurrection" declared in the south and west of the island. In addition the Crown Forces were declared to be "on active service." The death penalty was introduced for anyone possessing arms or ammunition, for anyone who took part in insurrectionary activities, and for anyone who sheltered a rebel. Permission was given for "official reprisals," largely the demolition of buildings where, or near where, assaults had taken place.

The policy of official reprisals was backed up by a policy of "unofficial reprisals," mainly carried out by the Black and Tans and the Auxies. These included the use of torture to obtain information and the killing of suspected Sinn Fein and IRA leaders. In addition, when the IRA tried to carry its activities into Ulster, the government winked on riots in Belfast where Protestant mobs attacked northern Roman Catholics, in many cases families who had taken no part in the campaign.

The policy of reprisals was unquestionably effective, though it was counterproductive by swinging many Irishmen, until then nonsupporters of the IRA, to their side. Official reprisals had to be discontinued because of their adverse effect on public opinion abroad. Unofficial reprisals and the use of torture continued and brought about counteraction. The most spectacular event was the raid by Collins's squad on Sunday, November 21, 1920, on the billets of a British intelligence unit of the Auxiliaries in which 21 British officers were killed.

The military were less implicated in these events. In fact, the commanding officers considered the employment of regular troops deleterious to their morale, and often opposed some of the police and Auxiliary excesses. Beyond that, relations between the various bodies, especially between the military commanders and the civilian authorities controlling the police, were poor, and cooperation not always perfect.

Despite the effectiveness of reprisals, the government began to feel the pressure of foreign and domestic disapproval and looked for a policy of limited concessions to isolate the guerrillas from their popular support. A proposed Bill for the Better Government of Ireland provided for partition and home rule with one parliament for the south and another for Ulster. This partition of the country was, at that point, unacceptable to the Sinn Fein, and the troubles continued. In the end, the Truce of July 1921 and the protracted negotiations that followed were forced on both sides by material and moral circumstances. On the Irish side the chief difficulty was the economic chaos into which the country had been thrown, together with the exhaustion of the IRA. In fact, the British military chiefs felt that although a prolonged and bitter campaign was still necessary, military victory could now be achieved, albeit with the employment of about 100,000 troops, armored cars, and heavy equipment.<sup>3</sup> This was, however, deemed unacceptable by the British government, and the truce was signed.

On the Irish side, too, there was opposition to the truce, but IRA leaders, including Collins, believed that the country

3

was in no shape to sustain any further fighting. Defending his support of the truce before the Dail, Collins said, "We as negotiators were not in a position of dictating terms of peace to a vanquished foe. We had not beaten the enemy out of the country by force of arms."<sup>4</sup> Even so, the Sinn Fein revolutionary strategy had been successful. It had produced conditions which made it impossible for England to hold and govern Ireland by any methods acceptable to the political leadership; thus by a combination of political action, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism it substantially achieved its goals.

### ANALYSIS

Theoretically Ireland could no doubt have been conquered by methods similar to those used in South Africa, but in practice to embark upon such an operation would have involved a number of extremely serious political considerations. Experts believed that between 100,000 and 150,000 troops and police would be needed, the southern counties would have to be laced with a cordon of blockhouses and barbed wire, and the entire population of the areas would have to be screened and controlled. Neither domestic nor foreign policy considerations admitted such a course of action.

To sum up the factors contributing to the success of the Irish revolt it would appear that given certain favorable conditions it is practicable for a relatively small party of fighting insurgents to embark on a war against a status quo government with a professional army and that such an undertaking has a fair chance of success.

The most important of these factors are: (1) that the opposing army (police) be for one reason or another prevented from exerting its full strength; (2) that the general population be sympathetic to the guerrillas and prepared to give its secret or open support; (3) that the guerrilla organization be closely controlled and directed to a strategic-political plan; and (4) that the operations be maintained for a long enough period and on a rising scale so as to wear down both the political and military morale of the opposition.

It would seem that (2) is perhaps the most important, and here the fact that the Irish revolt was a national and not a social revolt became most important. The advantage of united popular support, open or tacit, is always denied to social insurgents, but often available to nationalist rebels, especially in an ethnic, religious, and historic homogeneous population.

In judging the success of the Sinn Fein-IRA revolt the enormous advantage and impetus that was given them by the initial slackness of the English counterinsurgent response cannot be discounted. From the outset the Sinn Fein-IRA pursued their course with energy and utter ruthlessness. On the English side there was reluctance to admit that an actual state of war existed. When all-out measures were finally used in 1920-1921 the British had to contend with such a high degree of consolidated national opinion that it became impossible to secure the respect, let alone the support, of the Irish population. Thus, though by June 1921 the fortunes of the IRA were at low ebb, many of its best fighting men killed or captured, its weapons lost or no longer serviceable, and stocks of ammunition running dangerously low, the military estimate of the effort required to reestablish English authority in Ireland was so high that it became politically impossible. To be sure, the threat of possible full-scale hostilities in case of a breakdown in treaty negotiations forced the Irish reluctantly to sign an agreement which fell short of their maximum objectives. But the revolt still must be considered a victory for revolutionary-political-guerrilla and terror techniques.

The importance of popular support in the success or failure of such an undertaking may best be illustrated by the second Irish Civil War, which broke out when a section of the IRA would not accept the Free State. In this war the rebels did not command the support of the majority of the country and suffered from its lack. Therefore, despite the general paucity of government resources they were soon eliminated as a serious force, though they continued to exist as a semiactive underground organization.

### Footnotes

1. Dorothy McCardle, The Irish Republic (London: 1937), p. 319.
2. P. Beaslai, Life of Michael Collins (2 vols.; London: 1926), II, pp. 247-50.
3. Macready, Annals of an Active Life (London: 1924), pp. 561-563.
4. McCardle, p. 635.

### Bibliography

- Barry, T.B. Guerilla Days in Ireland: A First Hand Account of the Black and Tan War, 1919-21. New York, 1956.
- Beaslai, P. Life of Michael Collins. 2 vols. London, 1926.
- Crozier, Brig. Gen. Frank P. Ireland for Ever. London, 1933.
- Figgis, D. Recollections of the Irish War. New York, 1927.
- Holt, E. Protest in Arms: The Irish Troubles 1916-1923. New York, 1961.
- Jackson, T.A. Ireland Her Own. London, 1947.
- Macardle, Dorothy. The Irish Republic. London, 1937.
- Macready, Gen. Sir Neil. Annals of An Active Life. London, 1924.
- O'Callaghan, S. The Easter Lily: The Story of the I.R.A. New York, 1958.
- O'Donnell, P. There will be Fighting. New York, 1931.
- O'Faclain, S. De Valera. London, 1939.
- O'Malley, E. Army without Banners: Adventures of an Irish Volunteer. Boston, 1937.
- Phillips, W.A. Revolution in Ireland, 1906-1923. 2nd ed. London, 1926.
- Street, C.J.C. (IO). The Administration of Ireland. London, 1922.

## The German Experience in World War II

by

Gunther E. Rothenberg

During World War II Germany conquered and for up to five years held vast areas of Europe. In turn, this occupation encountered resistance movements on a vast scale, which, despite a comprehensive, sophisticated, and totally ruthless counter-insurgent response, the Germans were unable to eliminate, although on occasion they were able to contain it. While justice cannot be done in this short space to the complexities of the story, this paper will try to define two major types of resistance, outline their major achievements, and then describe and analyze the German response and the reasons for its failure.

Although anti-German activities in occupied Europe varied widely, their pattern was largely determined by three major factors which permit their classification into two major categories. In order of their importance these factors are: the geography of the country, the nature of German occupation policy, and the direction and scale of outside support. To a remarkable degree these factors differed between eastern and western Europe and permit a rough division of the resistance into Eastern and Western types.\*

The highly civilized, thickly populated areas of western Europe, crisscrossed by a close communication network, administered by well-established civil services, etc., made the task of the German security forces relatively easier. The main pattern, though there were exceptions, was "underground" resistance, taking the form of propaganda, intelligence, and sabotage activities,

---

\*The proximity of Britain to western Europe and of the USSR and the Red Army to eastern Europe has much to do with this distinction in addition to the other points noted in succeeding paragraphs.



while forces were prepared against the day on which they would operate in conjunction with an Allied landing. On the other hand, eastern Europe is mountainous, thickly forested, with extensive marshes in Poland and western Russia, relatively thinly inhabited, and with poor communications. Here existed opportunities for large-scale guerrilla activity along the traditional lines of armed resistance. The identification of the Eastern type with armed resistance, and of the western type with "underground" activities, is, of course, an oversimplification, but it is a serviceable one for the purposes of this study. Certainly, it was recognized as such by the Germans.

Differences in the East-West pattern of anti-German activities were also determined by the different nature of occupation policy. The Germans aimed at integration of western Europe in their "New Order," and whatever their ultimate designs, and except for the Jews, the lives of the ordinary citizens were rarely threatened while the routine business of government was continued by the national administration. Therefore the number of active resisters was, at the outset, quite small. While German policy in western Europe may be characterized as one of forced cooperation, Nazi policy in eastern Europe was one of open and brutal depopulation. The Slavic countries, especially Poland and Russia, were to provide land for colonization, as well as raw materials for German industry. Certain population groups were to be exterminated, while the "racially inferior" majority was to be reduced to helot status.

A recent version of events, current especially in Germany, holds that at the outset there was no resistance in the East and that it arose only due to German "mistakes." This version, like the Communist version of a spontaneous and general resistance led by party cadres, is a vast oversimplification. It greatly underrates the patriotism of Serbs, Poles, and Russians and also forgets that mass killings began with the entry of German troops. From the outset the people in eastern Europe were given much less of a choice than those of western Europe.

It is, of course, true that resistance, guerrilla, and partisan activities began slowly and on a small scale. In part this was due to the third determining factor: outside support. Here again there were differences between East and West. Although the possibilities of supporting resistance movements on the continent had been considered in Great Britain prior to 1940, it was not until late summer of that year that a special organization, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) was set up, as Sir Winston Churchill put it, "to set Europe ablaze." These were brave words but the means available to do it were at first totally inadequate.

Although the submarine, the development of air transport, and w/t communications had created new possibilities for the support of resistance groups, shortages of all kinds precluded any large-scale operations. Moreover the British, who up to 1944 played the leading role in the support of western resistance movements, did not really accept the value of vast underground armies. As they saw it, in western Europe at least, the Germans occupied a number of highly industrialized countries, and the main task of resistance groups was to gather intelligence and sabotage communications, industry, and depots. This initial concept changed very slowly, and it was only in early 1944 that Great Britain (and the United States) began to recognize the combat potential of the resistance groups, especially that of the various organizations organized in France. United, or at least coordinated, as the French Forces of the Interior (FFI), these groups were finally armed and supplied on a larger scale to act in conjunction with Allied landings. In Holland and Belgium, however, the resistance by and large remained in the intelligence and sabotage stage. In summary then, in western Europe the configuration of terrain, the nature of the German occupation, as well as the nature and direction of outside support created "underground" resistance movements which became military forces only in early 1944.

In contrast, the picture in the East was rather different. Partisan warfare was a central element in the Soviet theory of war. In his first Order of the Day Stalin called for "bands of partisans and saboteurs everywhere, blowing the bridges, destroying roads, telephones and telegraphs, setting fire to depots and forests. In territories occupied by the enemy, conditions must be made so impossible that he cannot hold out." But despite this order and despite the Soviet theory of partisan warfare, the fact was that the Soviets had neglected to establish a material and organizational base for such warfare. Therefore, the initial response was not highly effective, and during the dark days of the first war year partisan needs were low on the list of Soviet priorities.

By May 1942, however, a Central Staff to direct the partisans was established in Moscow, and support to the partisans increased rapidly. Terrain again proved a determining factor. Although partisans were active everywhere, they operated at their greatest strength and effectiveness in the forest areas--Leningrad province, Belorussia, and the northern Ukraine. By 1943, for instance, the German Army High Command War Diary (Kriegstagebuch) recorded 1,560 attacks against rail communications alone, followed by 2,121 in August, and 2,000 in September. Alexander Werth

estimates that at the height of the partisan movement, in later 1943, there were some 500,000 armed partisans in the Soviet Union.

If the entry of the Soviet Union greatly increased the scale of partisan warfare against the Germans, it also created new problems within the anti-German coalition. As early as 1928 a Comintern resolution had made it the duty of each Communist Party "to transform an imperialist war into a proletarian war against the bourgeoisie." Instructions on these lines were sent out the day of the German attack. One result was the entry of Communists into the resistance movements. In the West, while there remained doubts about their ultimate objectives, the Communists proved effective, devoted, and loyal fighters against the Germans. Unquestionably most of them hoped to establish Communist regimes in their countries after the war, but the Allies and their countrymen did not give them an opportunity to do so. In the East, however, and to some degree in Italy, Communist participation in the struggle against the Germans did become, in part certainly, a stage in an international civil war and led to deep rifts, even fighting, between various wings of the resistance movements.

The imposition of an anti-imperialist war on the war against the German occupation had particularly tragic consequences in Poland. The Polish resistance operated on the principle of not recognizing either the German or the Russian occupation, but establishing its own secret administration, army, and press. Despite considerable difficulties, it built up its own underground armed forces, and by May 1940 the Germans were already sufficiently alarmed to carry out special military operations against it. The invasion of the Soviet Union gave the Poles new opportunities, and they performed good service by destroying rail communications. Although Russia refused to render any assistance to the Polish Home Army (Armija Krajowa, AK), locally procured arms and supplies flown in by daring Polish air force pilots enabled it to build up considerable combat strength. In March 1944 some three understrength AK regiments engaged two German regiments.

However, large-scale reinforcements and supplies could come only from the Soviet Union, and relations with that power deteriorated rapidly. Although the Polish government in exile in London had established an effective communication system with the home front and, in contrast with many other exile governments, enjoyed broad popular support, the Soviet Union was determined not to allow the restoration of prewar Poland. In late 1943 the Russians organized a rival partisan army in Poland. One result of the break in relations between the Soviets and the Polish exile government

1

was the Warsaw tragedy. In August 1944 the AK rose in Warsaw, hoping to liberate their capital before the arrival of the Russians so that a provisional government would already exist to shield the country from further direct foreign exploitation.\* Lack of support and strategic miscalculations doomed the rising, but for several weeks the AK engaged elements of several German divisions, including armor. Though doomed by political circumstances, the Polish resistance must definitely be considered to belong in the Eastern, i.e., the traditional guerrilla, category.

The division between Eastern and Western types of resistance is also valid for Northern, Central, South-Central, and South-eastern Europe, of which little has been said up to now. Here the picture is indeed complicated. There were vast differences in terrain ranging from the mountains of Norway to the Danish plain, the Bohemian hills, and the rugged Alpine and Balkan areas. Here too German occupation policy fluctuated widely. On the whole, the Germans relied on a chain of puppet and satellite governments to do their bidding, while certain strategic areas were under direct German military administration. In addition, up to 1943, Italy shared in the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece. In this vast area the nature of external support, and its effectiveness and direction, together with the intrusion of the civil war pattern within the resistance movements, provided additional complications. Nonetheless, it is possible to classify resistance activities in these parts of occupied Europe roughly into the Western and Eastern types.

In Norway and Denmark, despite the vastly differing terrain, the resistance was of the Western type. In both countries, considered to have a "Nordic" racial structure, German occupation policies were at first quite restrained and left much authority in the hands of the local administrations. Given the nature of the terrain, the Danish resistance was limited to "underground" activity, achieving public success only in the great Copenhagen strike of 1943 and in the successful evacuation of the Jewish population of Denmark to Sweden.

In Norway, on the other hand, the terrain was highly suitable for guerrilla warfare, but since Norway was considered to be outside the area of the intended Anglo-American landings, the SOE in cooperation with the exile government decided to concentrate on technical sabotage, including coup de main operations against certain German installations, including the experimental

---

\*The advancing Russian armies deliberately halted on the Vistula, in sight of Warsaw, permitting the Germans to subdue the uprising.

heavy water plant. After 1944 an underground army (MILORG) of some 40,000 men was armed and equipped with help from Sweden to prevent any large last-minute destruction by fanatical German troops. In the event, MILORG did not see any combat action.

In occupied Czechoslovakia, divided into rump Bohemia-Moravia, the so-called Protectorate, and Fascist-ruled satellite Slovakia, resistance activities must mainly be regarded as of the Western type. Industrial sabotage and individual acts of terror were carried out. In 1942 a team parachuted in by the exile government assassinated the Protector, Heydrich, but this led to extremely heavy reprisals and this type of action was not repeated. In general German policy allocated Czechs an inferior place in the new order, but production from Czech industry was needed, and therefore a policy of "the sugar and the whip" was applied. Even so, repression in the Protectorate was very harsh, and about 350,000 Czechs were killed between 1939 and 1945. Resistance remained in the "underground" stage, except for an abortive Slovak rising late in 1944. But, though this enterprise was supported by contingents of the Slovak army, detachments from the Red Army, and an OSS team, the rising was suppressed. The theater of operations was not extensive enough to provide for adequate guerrilla mobility and was mopped up by convergent German columns. Here then was another example of the influence of terrain creating essentially an "underground" resistance movement.

Italy provided a mixed picture. Especially in northern Italy there occurred, after September 1943, an almost spontaneous eruption of partisan resistance against the newly installed German occupation and its Fascist supporters. The terrain was quite suitable for the traditional, i.e., Eastern, type of guerrilla warfare, especially in the Apennine and Alpine regions. But to sustain such an effort proved difficult, partially due to divisions among the Italians as well as differences between the partisans and the Allied commanders in southern Italy. In general terms the Allies wanted to confine the partisans to the disruption of German communications and to the preservation of Italian installations from destruction by the retreating enemy. The partisans, largely led or at least strongly influenced by Communist elements, wanted to create an anti-Fascist "Liberation Army," to play a determining role in shaping postwar Italy. These conflicts gravely impeded cooperation at various stages. Also, the ambitious plans of the partisans led to premature operations in large formations which usually became attractive targets for the Germans and Mussolini's restored forces.

In spite of these difficulties, however, the Italian partisans played a useful role as the Allies moved north of Rome and in the final stages of the war proved valuable auxiliaries of the Allied command, preventing the destruction of ports and industrial installations by the Germans.

The final area which we must consider are the Balkans, the traditional land of guerrilla warfare in the Eastern style. Major anti-German guerrilla operations took place in Yugoslavia, with Greece running a poor second. In mountainous Albania the Germans managed to establish a modus vivendi with considerable portions of the population and were even able to gather a certain amount of local support. Attempts to create a resistance movement here failed by and large.

Mountainous, with poor communications, and a long history of resistance to invaders, both Greece and Yugoslavia produced large popular guerrilla movements, but their effectiveness differed. In both cases the movements were divided between groups adhering to the royal government in exile and those led, or strongly influenced, by Communists. The Greek nationalist EDES group, some 10,000 strong, were nominally subordinate to the British Middle East Headquarters, but in fact some EDES forces collaborated with the Germans against the left-wing ELAS. On the other hand ELAS, some 30,000 strong, was considered to be operating primarily with the intention of seizing power at the moment of a German withdrawal. Under these circumstances active operations against the enemy lagged, though in balance ELAS was more effective than EDES. In July 1944 EDES, bolstered by some 2,500 British-trained reinforcements landed in a large-scale amphibious support operation, finally opened hostilities against the Germans. However, by this time the Germans were already withdrawing from Greece, and the summer campaign of 1944 merely set the stage for the opening of the Greek civil war.

Turning northward we find an initially comparable situation in Yugoslavia. Here, however, the Serb nationalist Chetniks led by Colonel (later General) Draja Mihailović were rapidly eclipsed by the Communist-led Tito partisans. Mihailović had been first in the field, but his desire to maintain his forces in being to permit eventual restoration of the prewar status of the country made him reluctant to engage the enemy. Some of his subordinates actually cooperated with the Germans and Italians. On the other hand, the partisans were able to capitalize on the brutal massacres perpetrated by Germany's Croatian satellites against the Serb population and to assume the leading role in a National Liberation Movement.

In many ways Tito's achievement was most remarkable. In almost complete isolation, opposed by as many as 350,000 enemy troops, he was able to build up a force of 80,000. In this he received no outside aid, because what little support SOE could provide until June 1943 went exclusively to Mihailović. A British mission finally reached Tito in September 1943, and that month his fortunes changed. The Italian surrender provided him with arms and supplies for several divisions, and from early 1944 on he received massive Allied supplies through the new SOE base at Bari. By the summer of 1944 his forces had grown into a regular field army.

The assessment of the military value of the various resistance and guerrilla movements was and still is a matter of considerable dispute. Yet, there can be little argument about the contribution that Tito made to the liberation of his homeland. While exact casualty figures inflicted on the Germans (and their supporters) by the partisans are not available, Axis casualties in the Balkans were undoubtedly very high. And while these include casualties inflicted by the Chetniks, the EDES and ELAS forces, the greatest percentage was without a doubt due to Tito's partisans.

In considering the general development of resistance movements one is struck by the great importance played by terrain and by the great acceleration in the tempo of the movements after 1943. The date 1943 constitutes the great psychological turning point. By 1943 it was clear that Germany could not win the war and that eventual liberation would come sooner or later. Without that hope to sustain the resistance movements it is most likely that the movements would have eventually given in. Here then was the great importance of outside support. It did not consist so much of supplies or agents, for neither of these were available in quantity until early 1944; its importance lay in the fact that it prevented a psychological isolation of the guerrillas and provided that spark of hope without which they might well have succumbed to German pressures.

In turn, the guerrilla and resistance movements, although the picture of their activities especially during the early part of the war tended to be overdrawn and overromanticized, provided inspiration for the Allies during the days when the initiative in the war seemed to lie exclusively with the Germans.

When we turn to analyze the German counterinsurgent response we find a most complex situation. In one sense, of course, the entire political and military machine of the Reich, its allies, satellites, and collaborators was part of this response. Even

so, primary responsibility for directing and carrying on counter-insurgent activities rested with the German intelligence, security, and police services.

During the Second World War these services were a curious and often competing mixture of military, paramilitary, and civilian organizations, a mix peculiar to Hitler's Germany. The major characteristics of this apparatus may be defined as: complexity of organization, rigidity and at the same time flexibility both operational and organizational, and above all a dualism of function which not only created a duplication of effort, but went far beyond the usual interservice rivalry and was rooted in basic differences of philosophy and in a real life and death struggle for power within the structure of the Reich.

As the German-occupied territories grew, intelligence, security, and police services multiplied and became more complex. Not only did organic units undergo frequent reorganization and modifications, but the number of special purpose units seem endless. While these units, often locally recruited, provided considerable flexibility, this was counterbalanced by the rigidity which ideology imposed upon them. Nazi ideology could not conceive any loyal cooperation with members of other nations, especially those regarded as racially "inferior." This concept, reinforced repeatedly by directives from the Führer, severely handicapped the utilization of such local troops in intelligence and security functions. At best the reliability of such troops was suspect and required close supervision by German officers and NCOs; at worst such troops turned against their employer when the tide of war turned. Even the loyalty of Germany's major allies was suspect.

Complexity of organization, ideological rigidity, and bitter rivalry were at their worst in the relations between the combined military-naval-air intelligence and security organization under the direction of the Amtsgruppe für Auslandsnachrichten und Abwehr (commonly called Abwehr) and the ever-growing apparatus controlled by the Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei, Heinrich Himmler. As RF/SS Himmler wanted to eliminate the Abwehr, indeed the army, and constitute his formations as the controlling instrument in a Nazi-occupied Europe. As a first step he envisaged elimination of the Abwehr, a goal he substantially achieved in 1944.

The Abwehr constituted one of the main branches of the German Combined Armed Forces Staff (OKW) and maintained its head office in Berlin. After 1939 branch offices (Abwehrstellen) were organized in the various occupied territories, reporting



directly to Berlin, though for local security purposes they fell under the jurisdiction of the regional armed forces commander (Wehrmachtsoberbefehlshaber). In addition the High Command of the Army (OKH) had a staff section, Oberquartiermeister IV (OQ IV) which was responsible for operational intelligence as well as security in the occupied territories.

In the German army, as in all other armies, the immediate security of an organization was in the hands of its commander, but there also existed a number of special intelligence and security troops. We are not concerned here with combat intelligence units, though they played an auxiliary role in the counter-insurgent effort, but with organizations acting primarily as counterintelligence and security units. Most important was the Geheime Feldpolizei (GFP), the nearest equivalent to the US CIC. This organization was established shortly before the outbreak of the war when Admiral Canaris, chief of the Abwehr, persuaded the OKW that the Abwehr needed a police of its own. Membership in the GFP was drawn from the civilian Criminal Police. The GFP, organized in groups ranging from battalion to regimental size, operated under the area commander and ultimately under the direction of the OQ IV of the OKH.

Abwehr and OKH also shared the services of a number of special purpose units of highly diverse organization, equipment, and function. Most notable was the Brandenburg Division, specially established for long-range penetration, sabotage, and antipartisan warfare. In the latter role, the Brandenburgers formed cadres for the Jagdkommandos (ranger detachments) which, after 1943, operated against the partisans in the Balkans and Russia. These detachments, however, were not numerous enough to affect seriously the outcome of operations.

In addition, the German army possessed a number of less well trained guard and security duties. In the early phases of the war these functions were performed by second-line troops, Landeschützeneinheiten, located in Germany as well as in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. During preparations for the Balkan campaign, and in the simultaneous planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union, the OKH expanded these units into organizations of division size, Sicherungsdivisionen, in anticipation of the need for greater protection of its rear areas. Nine such divisions were assigned initially to the German invasion forces, and in 1942 the number was expanded to 17. In addition, the personnel of these divisions was diluted with indigenous troops drawn from various ethnic subgroups of the Soviet Union. The combat value of these divisions, suffering from a lack of equipment, was not high, and the indigenous components required close supervision.

Competing at all levels with the armed forces security organization was the vast establishment of the RF/SS. Although in return for cooperation during his consolidation of power in 1933-1934 Hitler had promised that the armed forces would hold a military monopoly, the Führer never trusted his generals completely and countenanced the creation of a counterforce, Himmler's SS. The SS (Schutzstaffeln), originally merely an elite party guard, had by 1939 developed into a hybrid between a party militia, an elite corps, and a super police force. In addition to a pool of general members, serving part-time, it comprised fully armed and equipped divisions, the Verfügungstruppen, and it was linked to the German Police apparatus by Himmler's dual command function as well as by dual membership.

While the Verfügungstruppen, which included a special corps of concentration camp guards, were eventually to expand to an army of some 40 divisions, designated the Waffen SS, the most immediate challenge to the army was offered by the SS's own intelligence service, the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). In late 1939 the SD was formally amalgamated with the German police, already under Himmler's command, into a labyrinthine security and intelligence agency, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA). The German police forces were divided into two main branches, the regular police (ORPO), and the security police (SIPO) which included the dreaded secret state police, the Gestapo. The RSHA thus combined party with state organizations and became Himmler's chosen instrument for the implementation of his vision: a Nazi-dominated continent, closely controlled by party and SS.

Excluding the administrative, economic, and ideological branches of the RSHA, the major division responsible for the counter-insurgent activities was Amt IV, the Gestapo, with IV B 4 entrusted with the liquidation of the Jewish population, while IV D was in charge of occupied territories. Amt V was the KRIPO, or Criminal Police, providing auxiliary services, while Amt VI was the external branch of the SD. Amt IV was supposed to be the main executive arm of the RSHA, but the line between staff and operational functions was neither clearly drawn nor in practice adhered to. To provide muscle for this agency, Himmler at the outbreak of war formed the regular police into special battalions and also constituted special units within the Waffen SS.

Himmler and the traditional-minded army generals had radically differing concepts of the aims and nature of German occupation policy, though it should be said at the outset that these applied mainly to the western areas and to the pre-1942 period. The army conceived the occupation essentially along the lines

laid down by the Hague Convention. Except where it was absolutely necessary, the administrative control was to be left in the hands of the national authorities, and there was no intention of changing the basic structure of the nation. To be sure, should the security of the army be endangered, the OKH was prepared to be ruthless and was willing to utilize such measures as the execution of hostages, collective responsibility, and other reprisals against the population. But such measures were traditional, had been employed in 1870-1871 and in World War I, and had some sanction in international law. In contrast, Himmler wanted to change the whole structure of the occupied countries to make room for the "New Order." His concept included the immediate arrest and extermination of certain population groups deemed inimical to the Third Reich--Jews, intellectuals, individuals considered hostile to Germany, and a system of "sugar and whip" for the remainder of the population. Racially "valuable" elements were to be selected to help contain the rest, which, especially in the case of the Slavs, was to be accorded no consideration. "What happens to a Russian or a Czech," Himmler stated, "does not interest me in the least."

Convinced that the army generals did not share his views in their entirety, a correct assumption, Himmler's police and security units entered Poland with the first wave of the fighting troops. In occupied Poland, a Höherer SS und Polizeiführer (SS/PF) acted as Himmler's personal representative, while actual control over the police and security units was exercised by a Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (BdS). The activities of the SS, as well as Himmler's intrusion into a sphere they regarded as their own, shocked the generals, and the OKH took steps to prevent a recurrence during the campaign in the West.

The army's stand was complicated by the widely differing types of occupation administrations. Some areas, like Alsace-Lorraine, were directly incorporated into the Reich and thus fell under the normal German police administration. Other areas, Holland and Denmark, for example, were until 1943 administered by civilian High Commissioners. Finally there were certain areas, occupied France or Serbia, for instance, which were under military administration. The case of France provides a typical instance of the struggle between the military and the SS for control of the counter-insurgent apparatus in a western country.

Initially the OKH had been able to insist that no police and security units subject to the RSHA (except for Waffen SS divisions under army command) entered France. However, Himmler managed to introduce a small Gestapo/SD detachment into Paris and the army

reluctantly accepted the accomplished fact. Meanwhile, in Germany Himmler continued to press for a greater role for his organization. In 1941 the army faced a series of attacks against its personnel by the French resistance, and finding itself short-handed called on the Gestapo to help out. The Gestapo/SD was to deal with the political and civilian side of the resistance, while the Abwehr and the GFP were to handle the military. Thus the opening wedge was made.

The preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union, and Hitler's growing disenchantment with the cautious generals gained Himmler greater influence, and in April 1942 he obtained authority to take over the police functions from the army in France. SS General Karl Oberg was appointed SS/PF and immediately set up a full-fledged apparatus, modelled on the RSHA. In all, the total number of Gestapo/SD offices in France reached 131, with an additional number of auxiliary command posts for special units and French collaborators. For the moment, the Abwehr was left alone, but the GFP was reduced to control of prisons and customs. The number of GFP groups in France was reduced from 25 to 2, its personnel either absorbed by the new organization or transferred to Russia.

In contrast with the gradual developments in France, Himmler held the upper hand from the outset in Russia, where his preeminent position in security and counterinsurgent functions was never questioned. The army played a purely subordinate role, furnishing troops and logistical support when called upon. In the Balkans, however, the army retained its control over the counterinsurgent operations, though here too it had to suffer SS interference. Toward the end of 1942 Himmler appointed SS General Erich v. Bach-Zelewski as Chef der Bandenbekämpfungsverbände (Chief of antibandit operations) and while this appointment was essentially a coordinating one, Bach-Zelewski inevitably assumed a measure of operational control, such as during the Warsaw rising of 1944.

Himmler, however, was not content with this success. He always intended to eliminate the Abwehr and finally achieved this goal in 1944. The Abwehr was well aware of his plans but, in the words of Trevor-Roper, "rotten with corruption, notoriously inefficient, politically suspect, it could do nothing." Much of this harsh indictment is true, and when some of the Abwehr leaders were found to be involved in the general's plot of July 1944, Himmler was able to eliminate many of the leading figures and substantially assume control of the organization. Himmler's victory, however, was short lived. By early spring 1945 the days of German occupation were numbered, most of western and eastern

Europe liberated, and even some of Himmler's trusted henchmen were entering into negotiations to save their skins.

Despite the internal struggle for power, it would be wrong to assume that the German counterinsurgent response was gravely impeded until 1944 and it scored some notable successes.

The response, like the resistance movements, falls into eastern and western patterns. In the West the whole native administrative apparatus, consisting of tens of thousands of officials, was made to serve the needs of the German occupation. To be sure, the total number of genuine Nazi collaborators was relatively small, but the cooperation of the great majority of officials, however reluctant, made the continued occupation possible and removed a great burden from the Germans. Whatever the motivation of individuals, and many if not most acted honorably, the total result tended to aid the counterinsurgent effort.

In the East, on the other hand, the German attack against the population, especially the intelligentsia, tended to demolish the local administrative structure which, in any case, was much less comprehensive than in the West. Here the Germans had to appoint new men, usually less efficient than the old, or do the job themselves. In either case it put greater stress on the Germans.

The East-West pattern also was present in the type of repression undertaken. In Russia, Poland, and the Balkans repressions were largely on a nonselective basis; in the West, while massacres like Oradour and Lidice were not uncommon, action was more selective. In the East special units, Einsatzgruppen, accompanied the German armies and immediately proceeded with the extermination of certain population groups. Follow-up operations continued, and the first ill-organized partisan groups were decimated during the winter of 1941-1942. When resistance continued, the Germans countered with a series of drives designed to clear out partisan-infested areas. Since the Germans did not have the manpower to hold such regions once cleared, these drives assumed the character of punitive expeditions. German regulars, SS and police troops, and their auxiliaries proceeded with utter ruthlessness. Usually few partisans but a great number of civilians were killed. For instance "Operation Cottbus," mounted in June 1943 in Belorussia, produced 4,500 suspects killed, but only 492 captured weapons, indicating that among the killed were numerous harmless peasants.

In the Balkans the Germans were at first content to follow the usual policy of taking hostages and reprisals for actual acts committed against occupation troops. These reprisals would in

all probability have generated further resistance, as they did in 1914-1918 in this region, but the German position was hopelessly compromised by the wholesale population massacres undertaken by the Croatian puppet government and its forces.

In the West, except for measures against the Jews, the policy was more selective. Nonetheless, the number of hostages killed was very high. In France, for instance, the total number of hostages executed reached 29,660, of which 11,000 were executed in the Paris region. Usually, the hostages were selected by the Gestapo/SD and shot by army or police units. In addition, suspects were transported to German concentration camps, a fate almost equal to, in some cases worse than, death. Again in the case of France, of 250,000 deportees only 35,000 returned; of 126,000 Dutch deportees only 11,000 survived. In order to heighten terror and fear, arrests were commonly made in the early morning hours and the arrestees disappeared without a trace. This policy, called Nacht und Nebel (night and fog) arrests, was considered a prime psychological weapon. In both East and West the Gestapo/SD used torture extensively.

Together with the initially amateurish security precautions of the resistance and the existence of traitors, the Germans managed to score considerable successes against outside aid to the resistance. Toward the end of 1941, for instance, the whole SOE organization in the unoccupied zone of France fell into a Vichy police-Gestapo net. In the same year, the Gestapo managed to arrest some SOE operatives in Holland and induced them to transmit fake radio messages to Britain. For over a year, carelessly convinced that the messages were genuine, the SOE continued to parachute agents and supplies into Holland to be promptly taken by the Germans. Similar, though less complete deceptions, were practiced by German radio squads, Funkspielkommandos, in Belgium. It is estimated that during 1942-1943 95% of all supplies sent to Holland, 30% of supplies to Belgium, and 10% of supplies sent to France fell into German hands.

Despite these temporary successes, the Germans failed to eliminate resistance in both East and West. Perhaps the most important reason for the German failure lay in the political sphere. Whatever German pretensions, Hitler essentially had nothing to offer to the peoples of occupied Europe. He had no intention of granting any freedom or self-administration to the occupied nations and thus could never gain a substantial measure of popular support. As he stated in his Secret Conversations: "A state can only be established and maintained by force." But as Clausewitz pointed out force always creates its own counterforce, and German ferocity embittered the population and stiffened the resolve of the resistance.

Moreover, despite the fact that the Germans did not trust the conquered people they had to rely on them. The shortage of German manpower forced occupation commanders to employ vast numbers of local civilians, not only in the administration, but also to work in German installations. This created a substantial security menace and undoubtedly compromised major antiguerrilla operations.

Allied with the rigid German ideology which underrated the Germans was the tendency to underestimate the guerrilla, especially the armed guerrilla of the East. Until 1944, when guerrillas were operating in divisional strength, the Germans referred to them as mere bands to be dealt with by second-line troops and police units.

A feature of significance in the failure of the German counter-insurgent response was the overlapping and competing nature of the apparatus, though this played a role primarily at the upper command levels and was resolved, as we have seen, in Himmler's favor, by late 1944. Even so, it contributed to the stresses on the German machinery.

Finally, we must return to the psychological factor. The overall progress of the war, the continued improvement of chances for victory of the nations united against Hitler, could not be concealed from the population under German domination. Hope of relief from a monstrous tyranny kept alive the flame of resistance and aided in its downfall.

## Bibliography

The literature on resistance movements during World War II is immense; on the other hand there is little on the German counterinsurgent response and much of what is available must be read with due caution. The following works, in the western languages, are perhaps the most useful.

Bräutigam, Otto. Überblick über die besetzten Ostgebiete während des 2. Weltkrieges. Tübingen, 1954.

Colvin, Ian. Chief of Intelligence. London, 1951.

Delarue, Jaques. The Gestapo. New York, 1965.

European Resistance Movements. A Symposium. London, 1964.

Lemkin, Raphael. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Washington, 1944.

Leverkuehn, Paul. German Military Intelligence. New York, 1954.

Reitlinger, Gerald. The SS: Alibi of a Nation. New York, 1957.

Schellenberg, Walter. The Labyrinth. New York, 1956.

Stein, George H. The Waffen SS. Ithaca, 1965.

Teske, Hermann. Die silbernen Spiegel. Heidelberg, 1952.

Toynbee, Arnold and Toynbee, Veronica. eds. Hitler's Europe. London, 1954.

Warmbrunn, Werner. The Dutch under German Occupation. London, 1963.



Israel

by

Gunther E. Rothenberg

BACKGROUND

One of the most significant and interesting modern developments in guerrilla warfare is that of "underground resistance" in civilized and industrialized countries--indeed in great cities--where guerrilla operations in the normal sense would not appear to be practicable. Such operations were conducted between 1946 and 1948 between the Jewish community in Palestine (the Yishuv) and the British authorities in that country. Confronting an enemy whose strength they could never hope to match militarily, the Jewish resistance fighters adopted many of the techniques of the Irish rebellion. They resorted to ambushes and demolitions, though, given the nature of the country, they placed most of their emphasis on urban sabotage, where they used explosives to great effect. The aim of the Jewish insurgents was to make British rule so onerous and so costly, in men, prestige, and expense, as to force the authorities into reprisals which would turn enlightened opinion both in England and abroad against them. With Great Britain heavily overcommitted at this time in Greece, Turkey, and other areas, and virtually bankrupt in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Jewish rebellion succeeded. As in the Irish rebellion, success was due to a combination of political, guerrilla, and terrorist tactics.

Although similar in many instances to the Irish revolt, Jewish guerrilla operations differed in a number of factors. For one, the topography of Palestine was much less suitable for guerrilla warfare, and second whereas the Sinn Fein had enjoyed the support of the great mass of the Irish population, the Jewish community within Palestine actually was a minority, and the British could, and did, count on the support of the Arab majority. The roots of the Jewish rebellion are deep and tangled,

but there is no need to go into the long history of the Balfour Declaration (1917) and the Palestine Mandate (1922) here. Put at its simplest, the Jewish community felt that the British government was abandoning its policy of creating a Jewish "National Home" in Palestine and abandoning the Yishuv to permanent minority status in an Arab-dominated Palestine. The Jews believed that Arab revolts in 1920-1921, again in 1929, and finally between 1936 and 1939, had led Great Britain to make substantial concessions to Arab nationalist demands. These concessions, embodied in the famous White Paper of 1939, had been unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of the Yishuv, but the outbreak of the war in Europe caused most Palestinian Jews to declare a truce in their hostility to the administration.

When during the war, however, the administration continued to go ahead with the implementation of the White Paper, and when against all expectations the British Labor Party, elected to office in July 1945, continued the pro-Arab policy (which from the British point of view was based on the necessity of retaining Arab friendship, just as the original pro-Jewish policy had been based on the necessity of obtaining Jewish support), the Jewish population of Palestine, supported by Jews from abroad, slowly swung into opposition, and then open revolt, against the British administration. Although as early as 1938 certain Jewish elements had proclaimed that only arms could conquer Palestine, Jewish hopes on the whole had been based on the assumption that the British government favored the establishment of the National Home, interpreted generally as a Jewish state. The destruction of the Jewish population in Europe increased the urgency of desire for such a home, and when the British government refused to admit large numbers of Jewish survivors living in DP camps in Europe, the Jewish community swung into a campaign to force the British to change their mind. The aim was not--at first--to force the British out, but merely to induce the government to change its policy. However, as hostilities escalated, the aim became the creation of conditions which would cause Great Britain to surrender her mandate.

Just as the former pro-Jewish policy had necessitated the use of force to coerce the Arab majority to accept the establishment of the Jewish National Home, so now the White Paper policy necessitated the use of force to coerce the Jewish minority. Thus the position of the Arabs and Jews vis-a-vis the administration became reversed and the Jews found themselves engaged in a struggle for which they were not well prepared.

As indicated above, the Jews lacked the popular majority and the favorable topographical features which had helped the

Sinn Fein. They did, however, possess a good military organization, superior technical skill, a cadre of experienced leaders, and considerable support abroad. Above all, the Yishuv possessed all elements of self-government, constituting almost a state within the state.

### TERRAIN

The territory comprising the mandated area of Palestine, excluding Transjordan, was less than 10,000 square miles in extent, about the size of Vermont. It was a tiny country, about 210 miles at its greatest north-south extent, about 60 miles east to west. The country was roughly divided into the following parts: the Galilee hill district, the central hill core formed by the hills of Samaria and Judea, the desert region of the Negev, the plains of Sharon along the coast from south of Jaffa to Acre north of Haifa, and the plain of Esdraelon between the uplands of Galilee and Samaria. Finally there was the narrow valley of the Jordan River.

Communications were limited. There was a railway, originally built during Allenby's advance from Egypt along the coastal plain to Lydda, a village inland about 12 miles from Jaffa, with connections to Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa. On the other hand, during the Arab revolt the administration had found that the roads of Palestine for the most part skirted the hill district where the Arab bands operated and that there were large areas crossed only by paths inaccessible to motor traffic. Consequently, the military and civilian authorities started a program of road building designed to provide easy access for motorized troops to the hill area and to reduce the areas in which rebels could operate. The most important road was the coastal road from Jaffa-Tel Aviv to Haifa continued to the Syrian border. A direct road from Jenin in the heart of the hill area connected with Haifa. A series of roads were cut through the Carmel Hills, the Judean and Samaritan plateau regions. At important spots strongpoints, capable of withstanding attack with light arms and even mortar fire--so-called police fortresses--had been constructed.

These developments, together with the fact that the hill areas were almost entirely Arab and with certain other factors, compelled the Jewish insurgents to concentrate their military action primarily on urban sabotage. (I am solely concerned here with Jewish operation against the Mandate government; during the course of fighting against the Arabs, the Jews did of course

operate in the hills.) A final development which prevented any Jewish guerrilla use of the hill country was the almost total lack of cover. The hills were largely barren, and the wide availability of aircraft in the post-World War II period inhibited the movement of men and their effective concealment in such terrain.

#### HISTORICAL SUMMARY

The Jewish population of Palestine was divided into two major groups. The large majority were Zionists--i.e., wishing for the establishment of a Jewish National Home. This majority included all shades of political opinion from the left to the right. The non-Zionist minority included the extremely orthodox in religion, who believed that the return of Israel to the Holy Land would be arranged by the Messiah and that any political activity toward that end was desecration. They opposed Zionism for this reason. Another segment opposing Zionism, considering it an agent of imperialism, were the minute Communist and Trotskyite groups. There also existed a small circle of pacifists. The Zionists shared in the belief that, since the Mandate government had been unable, or unwilling as some maintained, to safeguard the Jews against attack, a defense organization had to be established.

The beginnings of such an organization, the Hagana, went back to the professional Jewish watchmen under the Ottoman regime. Gradually all Jewish settlements were provided with secret and illegal stores of arms and ammunition, originally collected for the purpose of supplementing the usually inadequate official protection afforded against Arab attacks. If it had not been for these illegal weapons a great many Jewish settlements would have been obliterated in 1929 and again in 1936-1939.

There is no doubt that, with a few exceptions discussed below, the secret arming of the Jews started with the quite genuine purpose of self-defense. During the dark days of World War II, the prospect of German occupation shifted the emphasis from self-defense against the Arabs to tactical guerrilla warfare, and for a short time the British army cooperated in the training of certain units and provided stores. However, this short-lived cooperation dissolved, and by 1946 the Jewish leaders were prepared to use their formations to fight the British administration.

This decision was not an entirely new departure. Already in the late 1930s the Revisionist party, so called because it

demanding a revision of the Mandate to include Transjordan in the scope of the National Home, had split from the World Zionist movement over the question of the use of violence. The revisionists argued that only by Jewish arms could the National Home be conquered, that reliance on the British was foolish, and that the official policy of self-restraint practiced by the Hagana which limited itself strictly to defense of life and property was self-defeating. The Revisionists formed their own underground army, the Irgun Zevai Leumi, which proceeded to acquire arms for offensive purposes, and beginning in 1938 started on a series of reprisals against the Arabs. Using mainly bombs, the Irgun attacked Arab crowds and inflicted very heavy casualties. The outbreak of the war, however, brought a cessation of these tactics.

The truce between the Irgun and the government declared at the outbreak of World War II led to a split in the Irgun. One group, led by Abraham Stern, a fanatic gunman poet, denounced the truce as a capitulation and founded its own organization, the "Fighters for the Freedom of Israel" (Lechy), commonly known as the Stern Gang. The Sternists did not respect the truce, but during the early years of the war, from 1939 to the end of 1943, their terrorism was no more than a sporadic nuisance. In all 8 Jewish, 6 Arab, and 11 British policemen were killed during this period. In 1943, finally, with active cooperation of the Hagana, the gang was temporarily broken up; Stern was shot while "trying to escape." The Irgun at the same time was largely quiescent, and by the end of 1943 both extremist terrorist groups were temporarily out of action.

In 1943, however, Menachem Beigin, a young Revisionist lawyer from Warsaw, arrived in Palestine and within a few months managed to resurrect the Irgun. At the same time, most of the imprisoned Sternist leaders managed to escape, and early in 1944 both groups were again ready for action.

By this time the truce between the British authorities and the Jewish community had broken down in general. The British authorities continued to implement the White Paper policy and prevented, as best they could, all "illegal" Jewish immigration to Palestine. Returning such immigrants to Europe, as was done on several occasions, or interning them on Mauritius aroused much bitterness. By this time news about the fate of the Jews in Europe became known, and this aroused a very strong reaction. All Jewish underground groups, the Hagana, the Irgun, and the Sternists, began to smuggle in Jewish immigrants and to protect their landing with armed force. At the same time the Irgun

continued its direct action, limiting itself, however, to the destruction of government installations and avoiding the taking of life. The Sternists, however, began to attack British officials. In August 1944 an abortive attempt was made on the life of the departing British High Commissioner, Sir Harold MacMichael, and in October Britain's Resident Minister in the Near East, Lord Moyne, was killed by two teen-age Stern terrorists.

The official Zionist movement, and its military arm the Hagana, watched these developments with concern. On the one hand, news of the Jewish catastrophe in Europe and the evident intention of the British government to carry out the White Paper of 1939 had led to the adoption of a more militant program, aiming definitely at the early establishment of a Jewish state. However, it was feared that the terror activities might be counterproductive, and for a while the official Zionist bodies and press exhorted the public to cooperate with the British police against the terrorists. However, relations between the British police and the ordinary Jewish citizen in Palestine were poor, and little came of this. Finally, however, the Hagana took direct action--intercepting terrorists, detaining them in private jails, etc.--and for the moment the situation was in hand.

The rather uneasy partnership between the Hagana and the authorities continued until the end of 1945 when their hopes that the end of the war and the victory of the Labor Party would bring about a change in Britain's Palestine policy collapsed. On December 30, 1945, the leaders of the Jewish Agency, the officially recognized executive body of the Zionist movement, informed the British High Commissioners that in view of British policy further cooperation against the terrorists would be futile. This decision inaugurated a new phase in Palestine's history which was to last to the end of the British Mandate. From then on the Hagana, which had teetered between supporting "illegal immigration" and collecting "illegal arms," and at the same time supporting the British both by furnishing manpower for the army, especially for special service units, and by suppressing the extremists of the Irgun and the Stern Gang, entered into the arena of combat. The Jewish revolt began in earnest.

#### THE HAGANA

The Hagana was sponsored more or less openly by the Jewish Agency and on occasion tacitly supported, or at least tolerated,

by the authorities. Since under the Mandate the British government gave both the Jewish and Arab communities a fair degree of internal self-administration, the Jewish members of the Palestine police, as well as of the various auxiliary police forces, were quite openly members of the Hagana. In addition, the Hagana had branches in all Jewish settlements in Palestine. Its political direction was by a committee composed of delegates from the various political parties within the Zionist movement represented according to their voting strength. Its military direction was in the hands of professional, nonpolitical appointees, comprising a Chief of Staff and several assistants.

Although started largely as a local self-defense organization the Hagana gradually evolved a conventional military structure. Some 80,000 members, with about 25,000 rifles, some 500 machine guns, a few mortars, and a fair complement of Sten guns and pistols, were divided about half and half into territorial (local) and field units. The former were primarily static and designed to defend Jewish settlements against attacks. Beginning in the late 1930s field units of battalion size were formed in the major areas of Jewish settlement (Tel Aviv, Haifa, the plain of Sharon, etc.) to provide a mass of maneuver. By late 1947 these units were formed into five brigades, the Palmach, organized in understrength companies with a fairly high proportion of automatic arms.

The military aim of the Hagana always remained subordinate to the political aim of the Jewish Agency, achievement of a Jewish National Home, and, as an intermediate goal, modification of the British White Paper policy. Geographically, while the Agency would have preferred implementation of the original Mandate policy, as it conceived it to be, it was ready to accept partition of the country in principle.

From its inception until 1947 the guiding military doctrine of the Hagana was defensive, to protect Jewish settlements but not to resort to offensive means, even in limited tactical situations. There was no expectation of being successful in a showdown with British forces. Only after several incidents revealed the hostility of these forces was the Hagana allowed to fire in self-defense. Self-restraint was the main directive of the Hagana during the 1936-1939 disturbances. When in protest against this policy the Irgun broke away in 1938 and began its outrages against the Arabs, the Hagana issued leaflets against the Irgun headed by the Sixth Commandment. The Irgun answered with the statement of Exodus xxi, 23: "Life for life, eye for eye."

Although the policy of self-restraint tended to break down as relations with the authorities deteriorated, Hagana operations in general were not directed against British personnel but rather at demonstrating to the authorities that (a) they could not prevent Jewish immigration, and (b) if, as was supposed, they had made concessions to the Arabs in order to avoid employment of force, even more force would have to be employed to put down Jewish resistance. The Hagana assumption was that its organization, intimately tied up with the Jewish state within the state, connected with almost all Jewish institutions and involving at some level almost every Jewish man, woman, and child in the country, could be broken only by wholesale massacre. And as the GOC Palestine, General D'Arcy, remarked: "You cannot disarm a whole people. I rather think the world will not stand for another mass murder of Jews."

Arms for the Hagana, the Irgun, and the Stern Gang as well were generally procured from abroad. Arms were brought in, hidden in barrels of cement or in agricultural machinery, run ashore at night from small ships, etc. Few arms were captured from the government. The availability of arms increased during World War II and considerable quantities were procured by purchase, and by occasional diversion, from military depots. A certain amount of small arms, including several types of hand grenades, some simple mortars, and a simple model of the Sten gun, were made in Palestine.

For financial support and supply the Hagana looked toward the general revenues of the Zionist movement and the self-tax imposed on the Jewish community at large. Training centers were set up at remote settlements, which also provided food and medical support; schools could be used as billets; the cooperative Jewish bus lines provided transportation, etc. The Irgun and the Stern groups did not enjoy this wide degree of support. But they too had their supporters and, given the psychological climate of the country, a wounded terrorist could count on the tacit support of those whom he met. The Irgun received some support from the Revisionist party, but, as did the Stern Gang, it also relied for a great part of its finances on bank holdups. These actions, usually against British-owned banks such as Barclay's, etc., nonetheless aroused a considerable amount of averse reaction and were resorted to only in case of absolute necessity.

#### THE IRGUN AND THE STERN GANG

In contrast with the Hagana, which had a kind of semilegal status, the Irgun was from the beginning organized on the strictly



conspiratorial lines of a terrorist underground movement. Its relations to the Revisionist party were much looser than those between the Hagana and the Jewish Agency. It took orders only from its own "High Command."

The Stern Gang was a completely terrorist organization, acknowledging no other political authority than that of its own leadership. With some exceptions, both the Irgun and the Stern group drew their membership from the Revisionist party.

Neither the Irgun nor the Stern Gang developed the elaborate command and organizational structure of the Hagana. Both were modeled largely on the IRA. A very small force permanently under arms was backed by a militia which might come out for a single operation. Both the Sternists and the Irgun had special units, drawn largely from oriental Jews, to be used for special operations against the Arab community. In doctrine as well as in organization, Irgun and Sternists drew deliberately on the Irish experience, especially the ideas of Michael Collins. In numbers the Irgun had some 6,000, the Sternists between 200 and 300 active members.

The Irgun believed in reprisals, but it operated in a most peculiar ideological climate combining patriotism and romantic chivalry with the archaic ferocity of the Books of the Maccabees. Throughout its struggle with the British the Irgun observed an elaborate "code of honor" which included, inter alia, that warning be given in writing or by telephone, before an installation was attacked; that during each action the "soldiers of the Irgun" had to wear identifying armlets in place of uniforms; that "executions" had to be preceded by a verdict of Irgun's military court and communicated in proper form to the accused; that after each action Irgun must take public responsibility for it by posters and radio announcements, and, finally, unconditional refusal to engage in acts of violence against the Hagana or any other Jew. In return, the Irgun claimed that its men, if captured, should be given prisoner-of-war status by the British.

The Sternists derided the Irgun's observance of underground etiquette as quixotic and phony. Sternists ambushed individuals and shot them on sight. However, the Sternists too made public announcements of their acts. But while the Irgun, at least initially, concentrated on installations, the Sternists always concentrated on individuals.

The two terrorist movements were unwilling to accept the partition of the country, indeed their aim was to carry the

Jewish flag across the Jordan and establish a Jewish state in Palestine and Transjordan. In general, both groups were in accord with the aims of the Revisionist movement, though the Stern Gang especially contained a considerable streak of mystic nihilism and adoration of violence as a solution for all problems.

#### MILITARY ACTION

The methods evolved by the Jewish resistance movements differed widely from those that had been adopted by the Arabs during the rebellion of 1936-1939. The Arabs, who were a majority, could operate in force and with comparative immunity in the hill districts and were assured of information and assistance when operating in the plains. Arab guerrillas were largely peasants or of peasant descent, ill-fitted for urban operations. The Jews, on the other hand, had to operate in a country in which they were the minority and mostly concentrated in the towns or in sharply defined rural settlements. Although able to meet the Arab in the hills on his own terms, the Jews chose, with some notable exceptions, the larger towns of the country--Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel Aviv--as their area for military action. By infiltration of the British administrative apparatus, moreover, Jewish organizations gained an important advantage through prior warning of moves against them and knowledge of weaknesses in the British protective setup.

All three groups, Hagana, Irgun, and Sternists, accepted the same reasoning, implicit rather than stated, that as Arab terrorism had forced the hand of the Mandatory power, so Jewish action could do the same. However, at the outset at least, the Hagana did not engage in any action deliberately designed to kill personnel. During the period of World War II and the immediate aftermath, the main aim of Hagana was the organization of "illegal" immigration and the accumulation of arms. When during the summer of 1945 it became clear that the British Labor Government would continue the White Paper policy and not only keep up the bars against Jewish immigration, but also deport such illegal immigrants as could be apprehended, Hagana took more direct action. In fact, despite attempts of certain Jewish Agency leaders to make a distinction, the fact is that from late 1945 on the Hagana embarked on an undeclared warfare whose methods were hardly distinguishable from those of the Irgun.

On October 10, 1945, the Hagana overpowered the guards at the Athlit detention camp and set free 170 persons destined for deportation. One British constable, the first English victim of the Hagana, was killed. On October 31, the Hagana staged its first country-wide sabotage action. Railways all over Palestine were paralyzed by blowing up bridges and switches; police patrol ships exploded in the ports of Jaffa and Haifa; bombs damaged the Haifa oil refineries. The British reaction was the deployment of over 30,000 troops for arms searches, which on occasion turned into major riots, killing Jews as well as British soldiers. By the end of 1945 the Hagana, as well as the Irgun, were blowing up police barracks and military installations throughout the country, a pattern continued in 1946.

The Sternists, too, cooperated. Their numbers were small, but they now came out in the open. In June 1946, for example, fighting squads of the Stern Gang attacked the government railway repair shops in Haifa which were under heavy guard, leaving 11 out of 30 attackers, including 4 girls, dead on the field.

The most famous incident, however, was the blowing up of a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, seat of the government's secretariat, on July 22, 1946. In accordance with Irgun practice, warning of the impending explosion was given by telephone, but it was disregarded. There were 91 persons killed, British, Arab, and Jewish, and 41 injured. The operation was denounced by the Jewish Agency, but in fact it had been carried out with the cooperation of the Hagana, which was becoming increasingly restive under its orders to attack the barriers to illegal immigration, rather than British personnel as such. In any case the British government and administration did not distinguish between these rather nebulous gradations of opposition but carried out reprisals against the entire Jewish population. During the last two years of the Mandate, relations between Jews and English became more and more poisoned. There were murders on both sides; atrocities were committed under the guise of reprisals; fanatic Jewish gunmen killed British soldiers in their sleep; British policemen and soldiers exploded devices which killed scores of Jewish civilians. Each act in turn made the maintenance of British rule less possible, because throughout the process of escalation the support given to the terrorist activities, and these now included those of the Hagana, solidified. To pursue a wholesale war against the Jewish population of Palestine was politically impossible. In many ways the parallel with Ireland was complete. Palestine became "John Bull's other Ireland."

## POLITICAL WARFARE

A potent weapon in the hands of the Jewish resistance movement was the struggle for immigration. The plight of the Jewish survivors in the DP camps of Europe, their desire to go to Palestine, and British naval and military efforts to keep them out, became very powerful factors in the all-important support which the Zionist cause needed from people outside Palestine. This weapon became especially potent when on August 13, 1946, the British government announced that in the future illegal immigrants who managed to reach Palestine despite the naval blockade would no longer be held in detention camps in that country but be deported to "Cyprus or elsewhere." This decision brought about a series of deplorable incidents in which large numbers of troops, police, even armor were employed to transfer the immigrants from their ships to vessels carrying them to Cyprus. During the transfers, fully reported in the foreign press, there were incidents and a number of casualties. The immigrant ships kept coming. When the government decided in July 1947 to deport the immigrants from the ship Exodus back to Germany, the action aroused public and press reaction in Palestine and abroad and was also much criticized in England.

The deportation proceedings perhaps more than anything else turned foreign opinion against England and prevented the British from gaining any measure of popular support among the Yishuv. At the outset of the terrorist campaign, the moderates had argued against it because Zionism stood or fell by the support of enlightened foreign opinion and Jewish terrorism risked losing much of that support. The deportations, perhaps more than anything else, prevented this from happening and put England in the most unfavorable light.

## LOCAL SUPPORT

As indicated above, the Jewish guerrillas operated mainly in the Jewish-settled areas of the country. The Jewish population of some 650,000 lived primarily in the coastal plain from Tel Aviv to Haifa and in the valley between Haifa and the Jordan, where the Jews were in the majority, though there were strong Arab enclaves. Tel Aviv was an all-Jewish city of some 170,000; in Haifa there were 84,000 Jews and some 70,000 Arabs. In Jerusalem there were some 100,000 Jews. There were strong Jewish groups in Galilee, but in the south the number of Jewish settlements was negligible.

The Hagana, and to a growing degree the Irgun, had the support of the entire community. Active sabotage actions were usually carried out by the Palmach, but the real strength of the Hagana rested on its mass membership in the Jewish urban and the some hundred rural settlements dotted all over the country. There all attempts at disarming the organization failed. To be sure, some arms were found, but any program of "disarming the Jews" (and such a program was indeed conceived and attempted) would have meant digging up the whole country from Dan to Beersheba.

Support for the terrorists varied, though it was always very strong. By 1946 support was almost solid with the exception of the extreme orthodox Jews of Jerusalem who still believed that political action was sacrilegious and the Communists who believed that the Jews as well as the British were instruments of imperialism. The other small, but significant, group not in favor of terrorism centered around the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and was in favor of a compromise with the Arabs, even if it meant abandoning the idea of a Jewish state.

The salaried middle class, a relatively small group, was on the whole strongly nationalist and tended to throw some support toward the Irgun. The Hagana, on the other hand, drew its support mainly from the working class, urban as well as rural. Its greatest strength perhaps, and its most solid support, came from its 40,000 members in the 100 or so collective settlements dotted all over the country. Their social and economic cohesion made it impossible for the government to gain any support whatsoever, while the terrorists were given whatever support the Jewish leadership desired them to have.

A significant element in the strength of the Irgun and the Sternists was the oriental Jewish communities. These, numbering about a fifth of the Jewish population, tended to be underprivileged, poorly educated, mainly lower working class. But their ability to pass as Arabs made them especially valuable for the Irgun and Stern operations. Finally, the terrorist groups drew increasingly on recent immigrants to the country, many of whom were survivors of the Nazi extermination camps. This was a body of people unwilling to compromise and unlikely to be deterred by any political or ethical considerations.

The Hagana was afforded almost total support by all official, and unofficial, Jewish organizations and institutions. It could call for transport, nurses, doctors, manpower, etc., almost at will--constituting in effect the army of a state within a state. This was particularly true in the settlements, but it operated

also in the cities where considerable pressure could be brought, and was brought, on individuals to support the cause. While most operations were carried out by the Palmach, support was given by almost every other able-bodied person in the country.

The situation differed somewhat in regard to the Irgun and the Stern Gang. Many members of the Hagana believed that the Revisionist party was Fascist in nature and opposed the activities of the terrorists at first because of internal ideological reasons. However, by 1946 the Jews of Palestine as a whole no longer regarded the terrorists as criminals, but at worst as misguided enthusiasts. They realized the necessity, from the administration's point of view, of tracking them down, but they were not prepared to assist the police. As relations between the Jews and the English worsened, this passive support turned to active support.

The relationships between the terrorist organizations on the one hand and between the Jewish Agency and the Hagana on the other varied. There was considerable ill feeling between the Hagana, heavily socialist, and the Irgun, which many of the Hagana members considered tainted with fascism. During the early stages of the terrorist campaign, from 1944 to early 1945, especially during the months following the murder of Lord Moyne, the Hagana provided the Palestine police with a list of some 400 Irgun and Stern members. It also tried to furnish the government with intelligence data regarding terrorist actions. In the end the Hagana took into custody and detained in special private prisons in co-operative settlements certain individuals considered particularly dangerous. This collaboration stopped when the British Labor Government indicated that it would continue the White Paper policy. From then on support for terrorism grew increasingly.

From late 1945 to the late summer of 1946 there was cooperation among all three underground organizations. After the blowing up of the King David Hotel the militant faction, then in control of Hagana, were temporarily superseded, and there was no longer cooperation (though also no collaboration with the authorities). Late in December 1947, when the British had announced their intention of ending the Mandate, cooperation among the three bodies, at this time above all against the expected Arab reaction, started again. Thus for nearly half of the period the terrorists enjoyed an alliance with the state within the state, and therefore active support of the great mass of the population; for the remainder they enjoyed at least a measure of tacit support and immunity from betrayal. In contrast

with other terrorist groups, with the Arabs of 1936-1939, with Ireland, Cyprus, Kenya, etc., the Jewish resistance movements never had to resort to a "death to the traitors and collaborators" campaign. This in itself illustrates the extraordinary intense and complete nature of popular support and explains why the administration was unable to isolate the guerrillas.

#### OUTSIDE SUPPORT

A distinction must be made between the support offered to Zionism in general (or Revisionism) and to the Jewish resistance movements in particular by the Jewish communities abroad, and the support offered to these movements by foreign governments and their agencies. Both existed in various degrees. Finally, there was a very strong element of general popular support abroad which tended to mobilize the two first-named groups into action.

Support by foreign governments directly to the terrorist movements, or even to the Hagana, was scanty. In the 1930s the Polish government, desirous of reducing the number of Jews in Poland, offered the Revisionist Youth Organization some training facilities and also sold the new Irgun a small quantity of arms, mainly Radom 9mm. pistols. At the end of World War II the French government, opposed to British policies in the Near East, provided a small quantity of war material for the Hagana, although most of this material arrived only in time to be used for subsequent Israeli hostilities with the Arabs.

While not giving direct support, many countries sympathized with the Zionist aims and welcomed the establishment of a Jewish state. By far the most important sympathizer was the United States, where representatives of the Irgun and the Hagana often vied for funds. As early as 1944 Irgun representatives made open appeals and were supported by some prominent Americans, Jews and non-Jews alike. In general, however, terrorism was officially deplored, while the policy of immigration, legal or illegal, was supported.

After receiving a report on the condition of Jewish DPs President Truman requested the British government to admit 100,000 refugees to Palestine, and in December 1945 both houses of Congress resolved in favor of free Jewish immigration to Palestine. The refusal of the British government to accede to these requests, the deportation of "illegal" immigrants, etc.,

provided considerable material for Zionist and Revisionist propaganda. By the beginning of 1947 Great Britain submitted the problem to the United Nations, which in November 1947 by a vote of 33 to 13, with the United States, France, and the Soviet Union voting together, recommended partition of the country. Since this solution was not acceptable to the Arab majority, the British declared that they would not proceed to enforce the decision but that they would depart on May 15, 1948, in effect leaving Arabs and Jews to their own devices. The final months of the Palestine Mandate were even more bitter and bloody, but the decision had been made and on the expiration of the Mandate a Jewish state was proclaimed and successfully defended.

In any case it would have been difficult for the British government to muster foreign support for its Palestine policy based on an implementation of the 1939 White Paper; the deportations and the great show of military force used to effect them was, some months after the end of the war, unacceptable to world opinion and was duly exploited by the underground movements as well as by the official Zionist and Revisionist groups.

It is much harder to determine accurately the amount of support given to terrorist and underground groups by nongovernmental bodies. Zionists, non-Zionists, Revisionists, and others were all moved by the plight of the surviving Jews and contributed large sums to various funds. Much of this money was used for the organization of illegal immigration, which constituted an important technique of fighting the Mandatory administration. Other money went for arms, medical supplies, etc., sent to the Jews of Palestine. Since by 1946 almost the entire community was involved in the struggle, it may be argued that supplies of almost any kind, indeed almost any support, constituted aid for the Jewish guerrillas.

The support tended to grow as the struggle grew in intensity. It was muted during the war years and in the immediate postwar period. But especially after the advent of the Labor Party to power, the British lost much support by inept handling of the situation. Attempts at reprisals against the entire population and the bungling of the question of "illegal" immigration were most important.

#### THE COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

Forces at the disposal of the government in Palestine were numerous. The police forces included the Palestine police,



consisting of British, Jewish, and Arab constables and officers. In addition, there existed several auxiliary bodies, raised either in the 1936-1939 period or during World War II. These bodies, the Auxiliary Police, the Special Auxiliary Jewish Settlement Police, and the Railway Security Police, were predominantly Jewish. Under the Mandate Great Britain had limited permission to raise military forces in Palestine and Transjordan. These included the Transjordan Frontier Force and the Arab Legion, the latter originally a rural and urban constabulary. Both were predominantly Arab.

In addition, during and after World War II Great Britain had a large number of troops stationed in Palestine. Some of these forces, notably Australian and New Zealand troops, were highly sympathetic to the Jewish cause and could not be used. Indian troops could be and were used for police purposes. However, the core of the forces used by the government between the end of 1945 and the end of the Mandate were furnished by the 6th Airborne Division, several battalions of the Brigade of Guards, supported by two armored regiments. In all, inclusive of the Police Force, the government employed the equivalent of three war strength divisions in Palestine, backed by several air squadrons, naval craft, etc.

From the outset the British police were none too well liked and apparently not too efficient. Some of the original members were recruited from the Black and Tans, others came in via the regular army. They usually had to rely on the aid of their Jewish colleagues for dealing with the "natives," and thus their efforts were doomed from the beginning. Moreover, due to the autonomy granted the Jewish community and the failure of the large-scale action of June 29, 1946, the scope of government control was always limited.

The British administration and the Jewish population had never really become close friends, and despite their 20 years in the Holy Land the British had remained essentially foreigners and outsiders. Few of the English civil servants bothered to learn Hebrew or for that matter Arabic, and many got misleading impressions from servants, obliging subordinates, and the wealthy business class. Administrative machinery was inadequate for total surveillance of the Jewish population. The British required the support of the Jewish population to fight the terrorists and guerrillas, and this they were unable to obtain. Failure to obtain support resulted in part from the poor relations existing between the Jewish population and the individuals comprising the Mandatory administration. As General Sir John Gort,

High Commissioner, commented, the system of sending to Palestine officials from colonies in Africa or Asia produced curiously unhappy results. The imported Britons formed the top strata of the administration and held a virtual monopoly of higher posts. Their refusal to recognize that Palestine Jewry, highly literate, highly trained and professional, was unlike any other colonial population caused considerable difficulty. There were also points of friction at the lower end of the administrative scale. A particular frustration was the Palestine police whose behavior on many occasions was no credit to the British police system.

But these irritations, in part also due to Jewish sensitivity, were minor. Most important was the change in British policy. As long as the Jewish Agency, representing the political will of the majority of the Jews of Palestine, believed that the British government would eventually change its policy and continue its implementation of the Jewish National Home policy, it was possible for the Agency to order the Hagana to cooperate with the police in the suppression of the terrorists. This was also possible because the Hagana was strongly socialist oriented and both the Irgun and Sternists drew their membership largely from the right-wing Revisionist party. Therefore, from 1944 to the end of 1945 there existed an uneasy partnership between the administration and the Hagana via the Jewish Agency. When, however, it became clear that the Labor government would not reverse British policy, the Jewish Agency could no longer afford to give consistent support to the administration.

Thereafter the support of Jewish institutions and of the general public was given to the activists, and as we have seen above, within a few months Irgun and Hagana operations became, at least as far as the administration was concerned, indistinguishable. Realizing that these had the support of what constituted a Jewish state within Palestine, the authorities prepared a plan which comprised in effect destruction of the entire apparatus--political, economic, and military--of the Yishuv.

The plan had originally been conceived in 1943 by Sir Harold MacMichael, High Commissioner, and since then elaborated by the various services concerned. It included forcible disarmament of the Hagana, breaking of the various economic monopolies held by the Congress of Jewish Trade Unions, arrest of the leaders of the Jewish Agency and other political bodies, and breaking up of all Jewish political institutions. This plan, despite the opposition of the High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham, was undertaken on June 29, 1946. Half-way through the planned operation public opinion and practical difficulties on

the spot--especially the reluctance of the British services to use extreme force--forced a halt to the operation, and this sealed the ultimate defeat of the administration.

With artillery, armor, and RAF units standing by to put down resistance, the headquarters of the Jewish Agency were occupied; 3,000 Jewish leaders of trade unions, political parties, cooperatives, etc., were arrested, and 27 settlements were searched. However, the troops were confronted with almost total passive resistance; many Hagana leaders had gone underground; arms stores were effectively hidden. Above all, the fact that the Hagana enjoyed the support of almost the entire population confirmed the old experience that a resistance movement based on the support of a population cannot be defeated by any traditional military operation short of a total extermination policy. And as neither the government, nor British public opinion, nor the international situation, allowed the latter alternative, the operation was doomed and the administration reduced to a series of ad hoc measures which could not gain victory but only lead to attrition, demoralization, and frustration among the government forces.

From then on the government used the gamut of counterinsurgency measures. By and large, however, the counterinsurgency effort was ill-directed and only served to inflame tempers more and more. As had happened before in the history of the Palestine Mandate, the administration's inability to appreciate the psychology of the people it was supposed to be administering exacerbated an already dire situation.

Aimed at halting illegal immigration, arresting "wanted" persons, and exerting pressure on the population in the hope that it would stop support of the guerrillas, searches, curfews, roadblock checks, etc., were made on a large scale. Non-possession of the identity card which had been in use since the Arab revolt in 1936 was taken as evidence that the person involved was either an illegal immigrant or a person on the run. Following incidents, the authorities proclaimed curfews, first from dusk to dawn, later curfews which kept people in their home all day as well. To enforce such a curfew, mainly in Tel Aviv and in the Jewish sections of Ahifa and Jerusalem, large bodies of troops and English police were moved in. Areas were systematically cordoned off; search parties looked for arms and inspected identity cards. In March 1947 statutory martial law was proclaimed, and Tel Aviv was kept under strict curfew for four days while the entire population was screened. The results were not highly productive; the irritation produced was great.

Cordon and search operations were also, and perhaps primarily, directed against Jewish settlements where arms were assumed to be hidden and where "illegal" immigrants were quartered. Then, too, the rural settlements were usually the quarters for the Palmach which the British alleged, not without foundation, was cooperating with the Irgun and the Sternists. Raids on settlements for arms and for "illegals" started on a large scale in 1943, that is when the threat of invasion was removed. In November 1943, for instance, three Indian battalions surrounded Rmata ha Kovesh in the Sharon Valley. The Jewish reaction was one of passive resistance. The settlers had to be dragged one by one into barbed-wire cages for interrogation. Sometimes, as on November 25, 1945, when raids took place in the vicinity of other areas of Jewish settlement, throngs of other Jews flocked to the settlement and further confused the troops. To a man they would refuse to produce any identity documents, answering all inquiries with the stereotyped reply: "I am a Jew of Palestine." On the whole these operations, which sometimes resulted in casualties, were highly counterproductive. They tended to confirm, rather than to reduce, support for the guerrillas.

In regard to finding arms the searches sometimes had more effect. On July 1, 1946, for instance, at Yagur near Haifa arms for about one Hagana battalion were discovered. These, however, belonged to a static unit and the loss did not for the moment influence the guerrilla units which were manned by Palmach, Irgun, and Stern personnel.

Other measures taken to divorce the population from the terrorists (or from the resistance movement) may be described as the application of special laws. Palestine was still under a series of special emergency laws, dating in part to the 1936-1939 era, in part the heritage of World War II. These gave the administration power to detain and intern suspects, first in Palestine, and beginning in 1944 in various British and British-occupied territories in East Africa. No trial was necessary; administrative process sufficed. At the same time, special military courts, operating under the emergency regulations, decreed draconic penalties for terrorists, for persons found carrying or concealing arms, and for persons associating with terrorists. Although these resulted in the execution of less than ten individuals, they created a furor throughout Palestine and considerable unfavorable publicity abroad. Again, they served to unite, not withdraw, Jewish support for the guerrillas. Another custom, under special legislation, was the imposition of fines on towns and villages. This, too, proved counterproductive. In collective settlements individuals were not affected; in the towns the municipality bore the brunt, and money

could be obtained from sources abroad. Fines too heightened resentments against the administration and were counterproductive.

As the government's efforts to separate the zealots from the general population failed, there was a feeling that if precise intelligence about the guerrillas could be obtained, the guerrillas could be isolated from the population and dealt with as individuals. To obtain such information the government created special units, mainly composed of officers seconded from the army, within the Palestine Police Criminal Investigation Department for the special interrogation of prisoners. Set up late in 1946 under the command of Colonel B. Ferguson, these groups operated outside the usual processes of even the state of emergency. Suspects were abducted in the streets, and torture was used during the interrogations. The exact number of instances and of the personnel involved are not quite clear, but there were at least two documented cases in 1947, and there may have been others. These, as well as the execution of several convicted Irgunists, led to further outrages. These in turn brought retaliation.

Another attempt to divorce the guerrillas from their support, undertaken without the consent of the government, were reprisals. In the spring of 1947 a series of bomb incidents, causing a large number of Jewish casualties, were perpetrated in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It was believed that these were the work of a counterterror squad within the British Palestine Police Force, recruited largely from former members of Mosley's British Union of Fascists. These reprisals were unauthorized and too limited to affect Jewish will to resist. Nor did authorized reprisals affect the community. One such attempt was the boycott and nonfraternization policy against the Jews ordered by the GOC Palestine in 1946 and rescinded on pressure from London within a few days.

The Jewish community was in a position to surmise government intentions, blunt their effects, evade control measures, etc., because it had developed an internal state of its own. To be sure, at first this aided mainly the Hagana, but from 1946 on the Irgun as well as the Stern group were supported too.

Having failed in its only systematic attempt to break the total Jewish resistance and thus isolate the guerrillas, the administration fell into the temptation of fighting the entire population. In all fairness, it must be admitted that there was little the administration could do. Once the government had decided to implement the pro-Arab solution, the result was a

7

vicious circle. The Jews could not accept the government's position and there was no political middle ground available. Again, the Irish parallel is striking.

To be sure, there were three periods in which the government could have gained and exploited wide cooperation, through the Jewish Agency, to isolate the guerrillas from local support. The first occasion was immediately after the outbreak of the war, the second after the murder of Lord Moyne, and the third after the King David Hotel incident. To gain any lasting results, however, the government would have had to reverse its policy regarding the White Paper and Jewish immigration and to afford a measure of conciliation on these points.

Attempts to block outside support could meet only with very limited success. The government was successful in sealing the land frontiers of Palestine, and its naval blockade intercepted the great majority of ships bound for Palestine with immigrants or warlike stores. However, the interception and subsequent internment and transfer of the immigrants was in itself highly counterproductive.

Attempts were made to cut off support for the guerrillas by turning public opinion outside Palestine against them. In 1943 the occasion of a court martial for two soldiers convicted of smuggling arms into Palestine was turned into an attack on the Hagana. American journalists had been specially invited to attend, and the prosecution accused the Jews of maintaining armed organizations to "sabotage the war effort." More productive was world reaction to the murder of Lord Moyne. This act overstepped the limits of useful guerrilla or terrorist activities. It was the signal for the second antiterrorist campaign launched by the Jewish Agency. Outside Palestine it produced a bad popular and press reaction. Even more, Lord Moyne had been a close friend of Winston Churchill, and the murder caused a revulsion which, for a time, led to a marked setback for Jewish aspirations.

Attempts to mobilize public opinion were also made after 1945, using two lines of attack: that the mass immigration of Jewish DPs would upset the economy of the country and that it would lead to armed Arab resistance. The first argument was not highly successful in achieving press or public acceptance, while the second was in part counterproductive by convincing many Jews, previously neutral, that if Arab violence, or the fear thereof, could sway British policy, it was time for Jewish counterviolence.

A last line, aimed at the diminution of the "illegal" immigration to Palestine, was the attempt in 1946-1947 to denounce the entire thing as a gigantic Zionist scheme foisted on the unwilling DPs. While a high degree of Zionist and Revisionist organization was present, the DPs were very strongly motivated, and their struggles to reach Palestine, often facing armed interception, disproved the story. In any case, coming hard on the genocide of World War II, the Jewish resistance in Palestine enjoyed a favorable press abroad. Moreover, diplomatic attempts undertaken by Mr. Bevin to influence the United States to withdraw its support for Jewish immigration also reacted against the government.

Because of its composition and nature, the English Palestine administration manifested an extraordinary inability to appreciate the psychology of the Jewish population. Although on the whole well meaning, and certainly intent on carrying out a pro-Jewish policy at least until 1939, the government was never able to gain the respect or the wholehearted cooperation of the majority of the population. This was due in part to the method of selection of personnel, already discussed above. Individual High Commissioners, especially General Gort and Cunningham, were well liked--but they could not overcome the gulf between the English administration and the Jewish community.

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF SPECIFIC INCIDENTS

It is easy to see that certain incidents provided a turning point and had great influence on the support for the guerrillas. During the war the most important incident was the Struma affair of 1942. The Struma, a small unseaworthy vessel with some 800 refugees from Hitler's Europe, reached Istanbul, where the Turkish authorities held it pending word from the Palestine administration about the admission of the refugees. When this was refused the vessel was sent back into the Black Sea, where it sank with all aboard.

The sinking of the Struma brought to a focus all the resentment felt by Palestine Jewry against the British administration in Palestine and against the 1939 White Paper. Up to this time the terrorist activities had been genuinely deplored; after this incident Jewish opinion became more and more reconciled to the necessity first of noncooperation and subsequently of active violence against an administration which was regarded as irredeemably hostile.

The next decisive turning point was October 10, 1945, when the Hagana attacked the detention camp at Atlit. This evidence of armed hostility in turn strengthened British efforts to break Jewish resistance and led to the unsuccessful attempt to implement the total elimination of the Jewish state within the state. After this failed toward the end of July 1946, the pattern of resistance was set.

On January 31, 1947, the British government decided to evacuate all British women and children and all male civilians in nonessential positions. This indication that the British were prepared either to intensify their efforts or to give up the struggle (coming two weeks before Mr. Bevin referred the problem to the United Nations) had profound effects and greatly strengthened the determination of the guerrillas. The final incident, which perhaps did more than anything else to turn world opinion against the British, was the decision to return the refugees of the Exodus, in July 1947, to Germany.

Looking at this from the point of view of isolating the guerrillas, there were three occasions when the government gained the cooperation of the leading elements within the population and even their active support. The first period was immediately after the outbreak of World War II when cooperation with the Hagana led to the temporary elimination of the Stern Gang. The Struma incident ended this period. The murder of Lord Moyne provided the second opportunity, but again the unwillingness of the government to modify its basic policy regarding Jewish immigration and the White Paper ended this. The period following the King David Hotel incident brought about a third period of possible conciliation, though again the government was unwilling to pay the price, and on the part of the Jewish Agency hostility against the government had reached such proportion that it no longer could afford to take active measures against the terrorists, though it could still officially disown them. By this time, in any case, most of the Hagana would no longer have acted offensively against the Irgun.

#### COMMENT

No guerrilla campaign is possible without some powerful motivation which for the Jews was provided by the example of what happened in Europe and by their fear of what might happen under Arab domination in Palestine if the White Paper policy were implemented. In addition, guerrillas need an unpopular enemy. It is difficult to create widespread guerrilla activity



against a regime which is genuinely popular with the people. The British had never been popular; they rapidly became more and more unpopular after 1939.

On the British side the difficulty of grappling with guerrillas who were highly integrated with the population led to frustration and to a number of excesses. Yet in the end the British character prevailed. To implement the overall scheme to break Jewish resistance would have required the bombardment of Jewish settlements. This was theoretically possible and preparations had been made. But in the end the government was unwilling to see this through.

As in Ireland, the victory of the guerrillas came because the government forces were for various reasons unable to deploy their entire power. As in Ireland, one of the effects of terrorism was to force the government into ever mounting expenditures and an ever mounting cycle of repression which brought adverse political as well as local security results. Mounting costs might have been borne, internal security could have been improved and terror put down by greater violence, foreign pressure might have been withstood if the retention of the Mandate had been deemed essential to Britain's national existence. But it was not.

## Bibliography

- Beigin, M. The Revolt: Story of the Irgun. New York, 1951.
- Ben Gurion, D. Rebirth and Destiny of Israel. New York, 1954.
- Dekal, E.S. The Exploits of Hagana Intelligence. New York, 1959.
- Garcia-Granados, J. The Birth of Israel. New York, 1948.
- Hyamson, A.M. Palestine under the Mandate, 1920-1948. London, 1950.
- Kimche, J. and D. A History of the Foundation of Israel. New York, 1959.
- Koestler, A. Promise and Fulfilment. New York, 1959.
- Learsi, R. Fulfillment. New York, 1951.
- Lorch, N. The Edge of the Sword. New York, 1961.
- Marlowe, J. Rebellion in Palestine. London, 1946.
- Sacher, Harry. Israel: The Establishment of a State. New York, 1952.
- Sharef, Z. Three Days: An Account of the Last Days of the British Mandate and the Birth of Israel. London, 1962.
- Weizman, C. Trial and Error. London, 1949.
- Wilson, R.D. Cordon and Search. Aldershot, 1949.

## The Hungarian Uprising, October 23-December 15, 1956

by

Andrew C. Janos

### INTRODUCTION

The following essay deals with the Hungarian uprising of 1956 from the point of view of the problem of isolating and combating insurgents. This particular perspective implies that the study will focus upon the strategies of Soviet and government forces in meeting the emergency created by the insurrection. The techniques of the insurgents, much publicized at the time of the uprising, will be peripheral to the subject under discussion. In essence, the study will attempt to answer three questions. First, what specific techniques were applied by the incumbents in combating and isolating the insurgents? Second, what conditions rendered these strategies effective or ineffective? Third, what conditions and strategies prevented the expansion of the popular rebellion into protracted, revolutionary warfare? In answering these questions shall be able to draw certain conclusions as to whether or not Communist governments (like Communist revolutionaries) operate on the basis of elaborate strategies in dealing with political adversaries and a hostile population.

The discussion of these themes will be restricted to the period October 23-December 15, marking the beginning and the approximate end of armed resistance. The ultimate purpose of the current project, it should be remembered, is to understand techniques of isolating armed insurgents from the population. The protracted political strife preceding and following the insurrection is therefore only of marginal relevance to the subject.

The sources of this study include samples from both the voluminous secondary literature on the subject and from the equally substantial documentary materials. The latter were of special significance, since most of the secondary literature

deals with the behavior and motives of the insurgents and with the political antecedents of the revolution. Thus in dealing with Soviet and government strategies I had to use sources like leaflets, the daily press during and after the revolution, radio monitoring records, and recorded interviews with participants. Many of these materials and a series of "Special Reports" from the days November 4-December 12 were made available by the courtesy of the staff of Radio Free Europe in Munich, whose assistance in this study I feel obliged to acknowledge. I further made use of documentary materials published by the Special Committee of the United Nations<sup>1</sup> and by the Hungarian government<sup>2</sup> following the revolution. I also have to make special reference to a series of highly revealing papers presented at a symposium sponsored by the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology.<sup>3</sup>

### BACKGROUND

The Hungarian revolution of October 1956 was preceded by several months of popular unrest and, what is equally significant in this context, by a grave internal crisis of the ruling Communist Party, the origins of which went back to the years 1953-1954. These two factors, popular dissatisfaction and the crisis of the Party, interacted and were fed by one another, resulting finally in the explosion of October 23 and the following weeks of armed conflict. Popular defiance of the regime had been encouraged by the crystallization of an intraparty opposition around the figure of former Premier Imre Nagy, by the vocal criticism of a number of Communist intellectuals, and the increasingly evident vacillation and demoralization of the Security Police (AVH or AVO) in the face of compromising revelations about its operations.

The growing boldness of popular criticism of the regime and the outburst of the uprising itself were encouraged by popular perceptions of the international situation. The conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from a neighboring country engendered the belief that a similar solution would eventually be possible for Hungary, and in general, it appeared to demonstrate that negotiated settlements with the Soviet Union concerning the status of East-Central Europe were possible. At the same time, the 20th Party Congress and the ensuing Soviet declarations created the false illusion that the Soviets would henceforward refrain from the use of violence in settling intrabloc disputes.<sup>4</sup> A third factor, not yet properly evaluated by the chroniclers of the revolution, was the admission

of Hungary to the United Nations in 1955. This event had been adequately propagandized as a diplomatic victory for the regime. Many Hungarians became suddenly aware of the existence of the organization without comprehending its powers and competence. In 1956 the belief was general ~~that~~ the United Nations could function to prevent foreign intervention even by major powers, and that the United Nations had unconditional jurisdiction over international disputes. The desperate radio messages of November 4-7 requesting the "rapid dispatch of U.N. troops" bears ample testimony to the misunderstanding of the powers and limitations of the organization. Last but not least, years of propaganda and a basically distorted view of the West were responsible for the generally held opinion that massive disorders in the Soviet bloc would be "exploited" by the United States and its allies. All these together created the unjustified notion that the freedom of action of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe was limited. T

The violent upheaval itself started on October 23 as a peaceful demonstration expressing sympathy for the victory of Gomulka in Poland. At 5:00 P.M. the crowd had swollen to at least 300,000. Between 5:00 and 7:00 P.M. this crowd marched in front of the parliament building and demanded the appearance of formerly deposed Premier Nagy. The mood of the crowd became violent around 8:00 P.M., about which time three events took place almost simultaneously: (1) a radio speech by First Secretary Kero denounced the demonstrations, (2) the personal appearance of Nagy proved to be a disappointment, and (3) the Security Police made an attempt to disperse the crowd gathered in front of the radio building.

Apparently the first shots were fired at the radio building at 9:02 P.M. By midnight the same building was under siege by several hundred people who acquired arms by breaking into an arsenal, while several thousand people still blocked the main thoroughfares. The statue of Stalin was torn down, and the editorial offices of the central Party organ Szabad Nép were occupied without siege. At 2:00 A.M. (October 24) shots could be heard at several points of the city. At about the same time Soviet armored troops entered Budapest. At first their apparent intention was to guard bridges, government buildings, and the main streets. It is not clear whether they made an attempt to disperse crowds or were attacked by the revolutionaries. In any case they were engaged in heavy fighting by 6:00 A.M., October 24.

The following four days represented the first phase of the encounter between the population and the rapidly dwindling pro-government forces and their supporting Soviet troops. During

this period the AVH forces disintegrated, and the government headed by Nagy appeared willing to grant a number of concessions to the rebellious population. On October 29 a cease-fire was agreed upon. The next day Soviet troops were withdrawn from the capital and from the provincial cities. During the following days the government was expanded to include non-Communists. The days between October 31-November 4 were those of the victorious revolution. A process of rapid de-Communization was evident in the capital as well as in the countryside. All over the country compromised Communists and members of the Security Police were rounded up, in some cases subjected to lynch law.<sup>6</sup>

On November 1, however, reinforcements started to pour in from the Soviet Union. Preparations for an attack were evident on November 2 and 3. At 4:25 A.M. Soviet forces launched a massive offensive against the capital and a number of provincial cities. In Budapest, members of the Nagy government were forced to flee, and the formation of a new "Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government" was announced on the wave length of Radio Moscow. In the cities organized resistance ceased between November 11 and 14. Sporadic resistance continued in certain mountainous areas for at least three more weeks (see below). Thereafter, popular resistance took the form of strikes and occasional street demonstrations. Until the middle of December the majority of the labor force refused to take up their regular duties. Railroads and the public transportation system of the capital were effectively struck. On November 22-24 and December 3-9 the revolutionary forces could still organize impressive demonstrations. After the end of November, however, the morale of the population rapidly declined.<sup>7</sup>

The political liquidation of the revolution was guided by Soviet political advisers; their decisions were carried out by Soviet military personnel. It is significant to note here that during the revolution the Hungarian state apparatus had completely disintegrated. Like the rest of the population, members of the administrative apparatus adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude. The border guard and the regular police disappeared. Characteristically, for several weeks duties of traffic policemen in the capital were performed by Soviet troops. The only effective support to the Kádár government came from the remnants of the Security Police, but it appears that in the first days even the AVH personnel were used merely as auxiliaries and guides to the Soviet troops.<sup>8</sup> Until the end of 1956 the Kádár government had not appeared as an independent factor in the political equation. In many instances, most notably in the case of the arrest and abduction of Imre Nagy and his entourage, the actions and orders of the government were blatantly ignored by Soviet authorities.

The political liquidation of the revolution involved (1) the dissolution of the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils that had sprung up in October, (2) the suppression of the free press and the reestablishment of government controls over communications, (3) the rebuilding of the state apparatus and official instruments of coercion, and (4) the ruthless hunting down, arrest, imprisonment, and execution of participants in the revolution.

After initial promises of amnesty (November 4 and 14), martial law was declared against perpetration of "counterrevolutionary" crimes. An "accelerated" criminal procedure was introduced for a broad range of political offenses on January 15, 1957. A decree issued on April 6, 1957, created a special People's Court Bench of the Supreme Court to conduct summary trials. In February 1957 all justices were admonished by the Prime Minister to resume work and to act as instruments of the proletarian state.<sup>9</sup> Altogether about 1,000 executions and 22,000 detentions took place; 190,000 Hungarian citizens escaped to Austria and Yugoslavia.

A significant aspect of the political pacification of the country was the combination of repressive measures with economic concessions. Substantial grants from the Soviet Union enabled the Hungarian government not only to survive the adverse effects of strikes and destruction, but also to raise standards of living considerably in 1957. The houses destroyed by the Soviets in November 1956 were rapidly rebuilt during the next year.

#### Terrain and Communications

Hungary is one of the smaller countries of Europe, with a territory of 34,000 square miles and a population of 9,000,000. Most of the territory of the country is open, cultivated plain with the exception of two mountain ranges, one between Lake Balaton and Budapest (Bakony, Vértes, Pilis), the other following a northeastern direction from the capital along the Hungarian-Czechoslovak border (Börzsöny, Mátra, Bükk). There are also hills on the Austrian-Hungarian border near the town of Kőszeg and in the south around the city of Pécs (Mecsek). Most of the hills are covered by thin forests, and thus average altitude is about 1,500 feet. They exceed an altitude of 3,000 feet at only two points, in the Mátra northeast of Budapest. The marshes of western and central Hungary, once the refuge of highwaymen and outlaws, had been gradually drained and no longer exist. The railway and road network is adequate and easily passable by military and armored vehicles.

The position of Budapest in Hungary is similar to the position of Paris in France or Vienna in Austria. Two out of the nine million Hungarians live in their capital and at least half of the industrial capacity of the country is located in and around the city. The capital is the center of the network of roads and railroads; travelers from the Central Plain to Western Transdanubia have to pass through Budapest. In addition Budapest has a near-monopolistic position of cultural and higher educational activities. Despite the efforts of the Communist government to the contrary, half of the students of universities are located in Budapest.

Except for its capital, Hungary has no cities with a population exceeding 200,000. The cities Miskolc, Debrecen, Szeged, and Győr, have a population of over 100,000. Miskolc, Debrecen, and Szeged, together with Veszprém and Pécs, are also university cities.

### The Combatants

In the fall of 1956 the Hungarian armed forces are estimated to have been about 200,000 strong, consisting of nine infantry and two mechanized divisions, a small and antiquated air force and auxiliary services.<sup>10</sup> There were in addition an estimated 40,000-90,000 combat troops organized separately as the mobile units of the Security Police ("blue AVH") and the units of the Border Patrol ("green AVO"). Members of the latter units were recruited by regular draft, though somewhat more selectively than in the case of regular army units. Recruits in the "blue AVH" and in the units guarding the Austrian and Yugoslav borders were supposed to be politically reliable. Officers and NCOs in these units were carefully selected and indoctrinated.<sup>11</sup>

It is one of the remarkable facts about the revolution that the army played no role to speak of in the armed conflict. Troops sent to relieve the besieged radio building on October 23 refused to fire on the crowd. The armored brigade sent to besiege the insurgents at the Kilián barracks on October 25 defected under their commander, Colonel (later General) Maléter. Outright defection, however, was an exception rather than the rule. In most instances army personnel sympathized with the insurgents but did not join the insurrection in organized units. At the same time many members of the army, including officers, joined the insurgents as individuals.<sup>12</sup>

After November 4 many soldiers simply left their units and returned home or escaped abroad. To avoid trouble, the Soviets



demobilized the entire army after the revolution, and suspended the draft for 1956. Members of the border guard often acted in a similar manner. There were no organized units fighting on the side of the insurgents; on the other hand, defections and poor morale rendered most units ineffective. The "blue AVH" was more effective, though here too one may safely assume that the men fought only under the threat of being shot by their officers. Some of the enlisted AVH men fought to the bitter end (as the ones defending the party HQ on Köztársaság Square on November 1), because the insurgents in many instances failed to discriminate between professional and enlisted AVH-men and executed several of the latter category. On the whole, the hard core of progovernment Hungarian combatants was probably not more than 4,000-5,000 consisting mostly of AVH officers, NCOs, and some of the enlisted men in their mobile units.

The Soviet forces participating in the suppression of the uprising consisted originally only of the Second and Seventeenth Mechanized Divisions stationed in Hungary.<sup>13</sup> By November 4 this number was increased to approximately six mechanized divisions, including 2,500 tanks and 1,000 supporting vehicles.<sup>14</sup> It appears from various reports that in the first days of December these divisions were reinforced by infantry deployed mainly along Hungary's western border.<sup>15</sup> The exact number of Soviet troops participating in the pacification of the country cannot be established.

An estimate of the number of actively engaged insurgents is even more difficult to arrive at. In Budapest and in some of the provincial cities probably one out of five adults participated in demonstrations or at least spoke out against the regime. The number of people carrying arms at one time or another was also substantial. (Some 100,000 small arms were reported to have been lost during the revolution.) But only a small minority of those who had acquired arms did actually and effectively use them. After October 28, for instance, university students were armed, but only a few of the many thousands of their numbers participated in the defense of the capital during the second Russian onslaught. The hard core of the defenders of the Kilián barracks, "Corvin Block," and Széna Square did not number more than 3,000-4,000. Altogether, I am inclined to put the number of those who actively fought the Soviets and the Hungarian AVH at 8,000-10,000.

### Popular Support and the Scope of the Insurrection

The overwhelming impression that one gains from the literature on the Hungarian revolution, including official Hungarian documents, is that popular support for the uprising was widespread and nationwide. This is explicitly stated in the UN Report, together with the observation that after November 4 there was "no evidence of support for the Kádár government."<sup>16</sup> The White Books published to support the argument that the uprising was the work of a small group of Fascist conspirators often slips into stating that on particular occasions large numbers of people sympathized with the insurgents. Thus in Volume II one finds references to "misled socialist masses" (p. 3), to "crowds" turning against AVH-men (p. 13), to an "enraged mob" (p. 95), then again to the "aggressiveness of crowds" and to "large masses of people" (p. 32) congregating to commit acts of violence.

Most of the fighting took place in Budapest. This is reflected in the casualty rates published by the Hungarian government. According to these, 78% of fatal casualties occurred in Budapest, 22% in the provinces; of the 12,971 wounded, 11,513 were registered in Budapest, 1,458 in the provinces.<sup>17</sup> But the high concentration of casualties does not mean inaction in the provinces. On the contrary, the rebels of provincial towns and villages were often more active than in the capital, while the smaller provincial garrisons of the AVH were less effective in defending themselves and in many cases gave up without fighting. Thus according to official statistics 1,870 of the 2,929 arrests of Communists occurred in the countryside and only 1,059 in Budapest.<sup>18</sup> In the villages there were no AVH garrisons and local Communists were incapable of rendering any form of resistance. Almost without exception village councils and collective farms were dissolved. The White Book registers acts of violence in 34 villages and notes that "countless members of councils and other democratic bodies were arrested in Budapest as well as in the countryside."<sup>19</sup>

### COMBATING THE INSURGENCY, OCTOBER 23-OCTOBER 28

As already indicated, fighting between the AVH and the insurgents erupted on the night of October 23 and continued with varying intensity until October 29. In Budapest Hungarian government troops were reinforced by Soviet armored units on the morning of October 23. Nevertheless, the brunt of combating the insurgents fell on the "blue AVH" units. Soviet troops occupied

strategic points, but on October 24 and 25 did not initiate actions against the insurgents unless, and this was quite frequently the case, they were attacked by small groups attempting to demolish their armor. On October 26 and 27 Soviet troops were engaged in the siege of the Kilián barracks. They sustained about 70 casualties and did not press their attack thereafter. In the provinces Soviet troops remained confined to their quarters. With the exception of Debrecen they made no attempt to occupy cities or villages.

During the same period the insurgents resorted largely to hit-and-run operations. There was sniping from windows by insurgents equipped with small arms and attacks on Soviet military vehicles with hand grenades and "Molotov cocktails." At the same time insurgent positions were stabilized in the industrial district of Csepel, around the already-mentioned massive Kilián barracks in the Eighth District, and around the Széna Square on the right bank of the Danube. At these points the insurgents were able to hold their positions because of their possession of artillery and armor.

During the first days of the uprising the strategy of combating the insurgency rested on the fictional assumption that the rebels were a small band of social deviants intermingled with a few honest but misguided young people, and that the population though harboring legitimate grievances was on the side of the government. Accordingly, with the exception of the mass demonstration of October 25 when some AVH-men apparently lost their heads and machine-gunned the crowd, considerable effort was made not to retaliate against the insurgents in an indiscriminate manner. In the case of sniping, Soviet troops retaliated with machine guns rather than artillery. During the first days of the fighting, except in the vicinity of the Kilián barracks, material damage in the city was not substantial. In many cases the machine-gun duels between the Soviet troops and the insurgents attracted large crowds of curious bystanders who apparently felt safe to watch the battle from a certain distance.

The propaganda effort of the government was aimed at isolating the insurgents from the population and later at encouraging the insurgents to withdraw from the fighting by promises of impunity and by harping on various sentimental themes. After an initial harsh tone the government turned to cajoling instead of threatening, hoping to project an image of popular unity versus social deviation. The broadcasts of the morning of October 24 described the insurgents as "counterrevolutionary bands killing civilians, soldiers and AVH-fighters" (9:00 A.M.),<sup>20</sup> "murderous

gangs" and plunderers who broke into Közpert markets and depots (12:22). In the afternoon of the same day, however, the emphasis changed. It was now conceded that the insurgents included besides the "obscure hoodlum element" also a number of misguided teenagers. Subsequent communications held out the prospect of returning home without fear of punishment. At 5:50 P.M. an interview with prisoners pointed out that two arrested teenagers would be allowed to go unpunished despite the fact that they were known to have been actively involved. A similar program was broadcast at 7:23. Both programs emphasized that only thieves, criminals, and Fascist elements would be subjected to punishment. (The interviewing reporter was able to point out the names of a few criminals possibly arrested as such and not as revolutionaries, but no Fascists or reactionaries could be named.) At noon October 24 an amnesty was proclaimed for those who would surrender before 2:00 P.M. During the next 72 hours this deadline was extended five times, and each time the insurgents were dramatically reminded that they had only a few more minutes to think. The repeated extension of the deadline and the accompanying reminders created ridicule and helped to underline the weakness and confusion of the government.

As in all wars and insurrections the government tried to convince the population that its troops were winning and the insurgents were losing. The first "victory" was announced at 11:24 and the news of the surrender of 120 insurgents (grossly exaggerated) was repeated at 12:19. At 2:08 P.M. it was reported falsely that the former attackers of the radio building were surrendering. At 3:00 P.M. a jubilant voice announced that "five jets had joined the fight against the counterrevolution." At 4:30 A.M. on October 25 the radio commented that "the counterrevolution has essentially been liquidated." At 1:13 P.M. it was announced that "the entire population is celebrating the victory over the counterrevolution."

The sentimental themes to divert potential insurgents from joining were intermingled with other propaganda communications. Most notable was the text read by the popular sports commentator Szepesi who called attention to the approaching date of the (Melbourne) Olympic Games, reminding his young listeners that as long as fighting continued Hungarian athletes were unable to train effectively. He also pointed out that unless fighting ended soon enough, the scheduled Hungarian-Swedish soccer game would have to be cancelled. Shortly thereafter (at 2:12 P.M., October 24) an address was read to "Hungarian wives and mothers," entreating them to prevent their "husbands from seeking their ruin in the streets and to hold back their sons from carrying murderous

weapons." A few minutes later (2:26 P.M.) the commentator remarked that "infants, children, women and old people are waiting for their milk, flour and bread."

#### COMBATING THE INSURGENTS AFTER NOVEMBER 4

The temporary victory of the revolutionaries created a new political and military situation. The Communist Party and the AVH, the keystones of Soviet control over Hungary, had disintegrated. The units of the army had either melted away or were drawing close to the victorious insurgents. Thus when the decision was made in Moscow to subdue the revolution it was evident that the operation would have to rest almost entirely on Soviet resources and capabilities.

The Soviet objective on November 4 was the rapid liquidation of the armed insurrection irrespective of costs in political and economic terms. It was no longer important (or possible) for the Soviet leaders to win popular support for their policies. What was foremost in their minds was the necessity of clearing up a fluid and internationally dangerous situation and presenting a fait accompli to the world within the shortest possible time.

Thus in contrast to October, the Soviet troops and their commanders made little pretense of being guests invited into a friendly country. The decrees issued by Soviet military commanders are curt and harshly worded; their tone reminds one of the language of wartime communications to the inhabitants of occupied territories. In some cases these instructions were issued through local Hungarian authorities (as in Miskolc or Nyiregyháza). In most places, however, the proclamations were signed by the local Soviet commander. In Budapest, Major General Grebenik issued the following order:

With a view to re-establishing order and normal life in Budapest, I command the following:

- 1) Those persons who are in possession of arms should immediately . . . hand them over to Soviet military units. . . . Persons who refuse to hand over their arms or attempt to hide them will be severely punished.
- 2) The public is allowed on the streets only between 0700 and 1900 hours.
- 3) Workers of factories and public services offices and other enterprises are ordered to resume work.

4) Local authorities are ordered to ensure the supply of food and fuel for the population. Stores will be open between 0800 and 1800 hours. Vehicles delivering food and fuel will operate with special permits both day and night.

The Military Commander of Soviet forces  
in Budapest.<sup>21</sup>

The order of Major Kornusin, commander of the Soviet forces of Pécs, was worded in a similar vein:

Order of the Soviet Military Commander:

Today the Military Commander of Pécs has assumed his duties and issues the following order:

- 1) The counterrevolutionary National Committees must be dissolved.
- 2) The population must surrender all arms before 1900 hours, November 5. Those who fail to do so will be called to account in accordance with the emergency regulations.
- 3) Work will be resumed in all factories and offices in the morning of November 5.
- 4) Demonstrations and assembly are strictly forbidden. . . . Cultural establishments and places of amusement will remain closed until further notice.
- 5) The public will be allowed on the streets between 0700 and 1900. . . .
- 6) If Soviet soldiers are fired upon they will return it with all the weapons at their disposal.

During the second Soviet intervention propaganda was less important than during the October days. Even though Soviet forces captured Radio Budapest on the morning of November 4, practically no attempt was made to communicate to the population until November 8. The proclamation signed by Kádár and Münnich was first broadcast on the wave length of Radio Moscow's Balkan transmitter, later repeated a few times. Other than that no bulletins were issued and a concerted propaganda effort did not resume until the middle of December.

The aim of the Soviet attack was no longer to isolate the insurgents from noncombatants, but to terrorize the entire population. This was done by way of raising the risks of participation and support without trying to distinguish between active and passive involvement. In contrast to the first round of fighting in October, the Soviets returned the small-arm fire of the insurgents almost exclusively with heavy artillery. A shot

fired from a rifle was answered with volleys from seven-inch guns. Thus incidents of sniping had the consequence of the destruction of whole blocks of houses. Within 72 hours the houses on the main thoroughfares and intersections of Budapest were leveled to the ground. A similar procedure was followed wherever the Soviets met resistance in provincial towns.

The second aspect of terroristic warfare against the population was a high degree of randomness in applying punitive measures. In Budapest as well as in the provinces Soviet soldiers would fire indiscriminately into crowds, passers-by, and people standing in breadlines. In at least one recorded instance they stopped a truck on one of the main streets of Budapest and shot the driver without apparent reason.<sup>23</sup> In other instances they would pick up one or two wounded in hospitals at random and shoot them.<sup>24</sup>

The campaign of general intimidation further involved deportations to the Soviet Union conducted in a similarly random manner. Arrest and transportation of suspected sympathizers started shortly after November 4 and continued until the end of the year.<sup>25</sup> Most reports of the conduct of these are emphatic that the arrests and deportations had no direct connection with the fighting.<sup>26</sup> Most frequently persons were picked up in the streets without an obvious pattern to explain who was being taken, although the majority of those arrested were between 15 and 35.<sup>27</sup> Some preference was also shown for young men wearing trenchcoats, berets, and beards.<sup>28</sup> In other instances, people were taken out of queues.<sup>29</sup> In one provincial city Russian soldiers accompanied by AVH-men in civilian dress conducted a house-to-house search. "There was apparently no pattern to their search, they went into every house and took one or two young men from each. Even if thirty persons were in the building they only took away one or two. They had no list of names with them."<sup>30</sup> Another way of terrorizing potential insurgents was to set up roadblocks and take away identity cards from young people to frighten them and to ensure that they would stay indoors.<sup>31</sup> Arrested and deported persons were later released, and, as one report clearly points out, already in November "it was generally felt that the Soviets were using deportations to remove the threat of armed resistance . . . to force adamant workers to take up their tools."<sup>32</sup> Testimony taken by the UN Special Committee also tends to corroborate the randomness of arrests and deportations.<sup>33</sup>

Besides this campaign of massive intimidation the Soviets apparently decided to permit the potentially dangerous element to leave the country. It is true that during the revolution the border guard partly disintegrated and also that the Soviets, until



the end of November, had only armored units and no infantry to patrol the Austrian-Hungarian border. But while it would have been impossible to seal the border hermetically, they could have substantially reduced the number of escapees by applying their terroristic tactics against those attempting to cross the border or, as they did subsequently, by threatening the Hungarian guards in order to apply sterner measures. This they failed to do. Shooting incidents were rare. If and when they used their arms they fired in the air or at the ground.<sup>34</sup> Throughout most of November refugees were free to pass Soviet lines. On occasion they were held up by Hungarian AVH units, admonished, and sent to one of the neighboring cities from where they would immediately repeat their attempt to escape. As a result, about 190,000 individuals left the country in the weeks following the second Soviet intervention. Soviet control over the border began to be slowly tightened only after November 27.<sup>35</sup> On December 6 numerous shooting incidents were reported and Soviet troops began to lay spider mines in the border area.<sup>36</sup> Later in December Hungarian border guards began the systematic apprehension of escapees. Some of them were reported to be apologetic about it, saying they had to do it or else "it meant their own necks."<sup>37</sup>

#### CONDITIONS ACCELERATING SOVIET SUCCESS

The single most important factor explaining the collapse of armed resistance was the overwhelming preponderance of the Soviet forces, the number of troops and the amount of resources that the insurgents were able to mobilize for the quelling of an insurrection with dangerous international implications. However, the question still remains to be answered: why did the armed insurrection collapse so rapidly, and why did it not develop into protracted revolutionary warfare? This question is particularly relevant because conditions of guerrilla operations were present and because initially efforts were made to continue the military phase of the insurrection.

During the first days of the uprising a number of commando units sprang up all over the country. After November 4 many of these units withdrew from the cities into the hilly areas. On November 10, the entire command of the National Guard moved from Budapest to the neighboring Pilis mountains and set up its headquarters in the village of Nagykovácsi.<sup>39</sup> The National Guard of Pécs moved out into the Mecsek hills on November 4. For days thereafter Radio Pécs, controlled by the Soviets, made references to military operations in the area, warning inhabitants not to aid



and shelter the partisans in the hills.<sup>40</sup> The insurgents of many Transdanubian localities retreated to the Bakony mountains. On November 21 sabotage actions were reported near the forest of Dabas (Bakony). Subsequently, the partisans appeared in the village of Padrag, asking for food and medical supplies.<sup>41</sup> Considerable insurgent units survived in the Bükk mountains. They descended upon the Soviet garrison of Miskolc twice in November and December, causing the Soviets considerable losses and material damage. But the last such action was repressed on December 12.<sup>42</sup> Despite widespread popular identification with the objectives of the insurrection and the moral outrage felt at the fact of foreign intervention, the guerrilla effort petered out within a few weeks after the beginning of massive Soviet intervention without having engaged in significant harassing operations.

The answers as to the causes for the rapid collapse of the insurrection and the petering out of guerrilla operations must be tentative. But one may at least hypothesize that the single most important factor responsible for the ineffectiveness of the partisan movement was connected with the fluctuations of popular morale. As the RFE reports point out, after the first panic of November 4 popular optimism returned briefly and it was not before the end of the month that most individuals interviewed had characterized the situation as entirely hopeless.<sup>43</sup> It was only two or three weeks after the Soviet intervention that it had become obvious to all that no diplomatic or military assistance was forthcoming. At the same time the insurgents faced with no hope of success were suddenly confronted with the attractive alternative of being able to escape to the West. Once the chances of success declined, the outflow of active insurgents as well as of many of their potential supporters began. The choice was implicitly between Soviet concentration camps (a vision conjured up consciously by deportations) and the freedom and material comforts associated with Western societies. This the Soviets perceived, and they made little attempt to obstruct the escape of would-be guerrillas. Had the border been sealed, many of those who escaped would have been compelled to choose between deportation (or worse, execution) or fighting in the hills or in the underground.

A third factor one has to take into account in evaluating the outcome of the insurrection is Hungarian historical tradition. Series of national revolts, in particular the revolution of 1848, established a clear-cut pattern of revolutionary behavior. The events of October 23, the mass demonstration, the role of the intellectuals within it, the formulation of a definite number of demands by university students and the desire of communicating them through available mass media represented a close replica of

the events of March 15, 1848. (During the demonstrations one would often hear the exclamation: "This is like March 15." And many of the participants seemed to be consciously reenacting the events of the historical day, known to all Hungarians from their earliest school days.) The conduct of the strikes and the behavior of the working class had similarly been shaped by the experiences of the Socialist movement before World War I and at the time of the October revolution of 1918. The country had a strong tradition and experience in urban insurrections, strikes, and mass demonstrations. On the other hand there had been no tradition or example of guerrilla warfare in Hungarian history. (An attempt by Louis Kossuth to organize guerrillas against the Austrians and Russians was an abysmal failure. Among other reasons, officers refused to set up ambushes and commando raids.) Hungary had not had chetniks, hayduks, and komitachi in the Balkan tradition. Underground movements and conspiracies had been doomed to failure inevitably throughout history. The techniques of partisan warfare were associated in the public mind with traditional enemies of Hungarians. Thus the image of the partisan or guerrilla is not only alien but also negative, which made it easy to rationalize withdrawal in terms of national character and conventional standards of social conduct.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The examination of evidence concerning the Hungarian uprising indicates the existence of a Soviet political and military doctrine of combating insurgencies even though, for obvious reasons, the precepts of this doctrine have not gained the same prominence as various theories of revolution and revolutionary warfare. The political principles involved are probably part of the basic indoctrination of staff and general officers. Tactical details most likely appear in confidential manuals available for company and platoon commanders. A slipshod comparison of the events of 1956 with the military occupation of Eastern Europe suggests that no separate doctrines exist for combating domestic insurgencies and controlling hostile populations in times of war.<sup>44</sup> The essence of both appears to be a reliance on terror.

The use of the instrument of terror assumes the existence of a hostile population and of potential collaboration between insurgents and population. The basic objective of terror is not the isolation of the insurgents from the population but the intimidation of all by (1) measures to maximize the costs and risks of participation and (2) random acts of force to increase the general

feeling of insecurity and helplessness in the target group. The combination of these two techniques and the perfection of the second may be regarded as a Soviet (or probably Russian)<sup>45</sup> practical and doctrinal innovation. German and French forces made extensive use of terror as an instrument of pacification (during World War II and in Algeria respectively), but they restricted their campaign to setting horrifying examples by meting out punishments disproportionate to the act of violence committed. There is less evidence of extensive and sophisticated techniques to randomize acts of retaliation.

Such sophisticated use of terror involves a degree of selectivity within the basic pattern of randomness. Terror in the Soviet operational doctrine is random in picking the individual within the group, but tends to be selective in defining the target groups. The principal target groups of terror appear to be ones most closely identified with active opposition (in Hungary, young men between 15-35 in clothes indicating that they might be engaged in fighting), and appearing in strategically vulnerable places. (Arrests took place in the main thoroughfares of Budapest and not in small villages where there was no evidence of resistance.)

A further observation that one can make concerning the Soviet use of terror is that, however harsh were the measures of retaliation used, the insurgents were given a chance to withdraw from active participation. At no point did the Soviets create a situation where the choice would have been between perishing or continuing to fight. In the first phase of the insurrection they permitted the withdrawal of activists by promising impunity to all "misguided" participants (and the category was defined so broadly that practically everybody could be identified within it without, however, committing the government in any individual case). At the time of the second insurrection the withdrawal of active insurgents and sympathizers was encouraged by leaving the Western borders unguarded.

As a general conclusion one may say that terror is a strategic alternative to regular police methods, law enforcement, and the systematic isolation of the insurgents from the population. In this context we may hypothesize that terror is the more efficient strategy if and when, for some reason or other, the objective is the rapid military liquidation of an insurrection or guerrilla warfare. Therefore if a military commander is confronted with the need of securing vital communication lines during a crucial offensive, or a politician is faced with the necessity of a fait accompli in domestic or international relations, there will be strong pressure to apply terroristic tactics.

5

On the other hand, while more efficient militarily, terror is costly in political terms. While terroristic methods, given adequate manpower and resources, are more likely to succeed, they are also more likely to produce lasting popular bitterness and thereby make the task of political stabilization more difficult. The decision to use terror must always take into account the long-range damage it will cause politically. Military capabilities being equal, the choice is between rapid military and protracted political pacification on the one hand, and protracted military conflict but less protracted political pacification on the other.

The second drawback of the use of terror is the psychological strain it is apt to cause for the troops involved. There is some evidence that the suppression of the uprising created such psychological strains, even though no defections or serious breaches of discipline are known to have occurred.<sup>46</sup> But quite frequently Soviet soldiers showed considerable hesitation when confronted with large numbers of civilians, and in the first days of the uprising there was even some evidence of fraternization. As a consequence most of the troops originally stationed in Hungary were later withdrawn, and reinforcements came from Soviet garrisons. As uncorroborated rumors had it these soldiers were told they would fight at Suez against the imperialists.<sup>47</sup>

To conclude, we may once more summarize the proportions of the paper. Initially we raised a question concerning Soviet techniques of combating insurgencies and found that these represent adaptations of techniques of "normal" political control to revolutionary situations. Accordingly, the Soviet principles of pacification can presumably be extrapolated from studies dealing with terror and propaganda under the Stalinist system. The study of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising could, of course, provide no clues as to changes in operational thinking since 1956. Second, we may conclude that the techniques of pacification were rendered particularly effective because of the psychological isolation of the insurgents and the absence of foreign assistance to sustain the military effort as well as popular morale. The same conditions were effective in preventing the expansion of the insurrection into protracted warfare and guerrilla operations. By implication this last proposition suggests that terrain and demographical factors played no significant role in determining the duration and basic strategies of the insurrection.

### Footnotes

1. United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, New York, 1957.

2. Fehér Könyv (White Books) (Budapest: Government Printing Office, 1957-1958), Vols. I-IV.

3. Second Seminar on the Hungarian Revolution, June 6, 1958.

4. In this context it is particularly interesting to point out that many demonstrators on October 23 voiced the opinion that "Berlin was not possible in 1956."

5. U.N. Report, p. 6.

6. According to the White Book (Vol. III, p. 143) 2,929 persons were arrested by "counterrevolutionaries." The same source lists 234 party and AVH members as victims of the "white terror." More than half of these, however, appear to be casualties incurred during the armed fighting.

7. The RFE "Special Bulletins" from Vienna report signs of declining morale beginning December 9. The report of December 14 summarizes the morale of the Hungarian population as follows: November 4-11, panic and terror; November 12-December 10, hope; December 10, apathy.

8. U.N. Report, p. 101.

9. Ferenc Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass.: 1961), pp. 396-398.

10. Ibid., p. 72.

11. A description of the organization of the AVO (AVH) appears in Helmreich, Hungary (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 132-150.

12. This fact is evident from the texts of radio broadcasts on October 24 and 25. On the 24th (1:23 P.M.) Radio Kossuth announced that all who surrendered including military personnel would be amnestied. At 7:23 a radio report about prisoners indicated the presence of military officers among those arrested

fighting and wearing their uniform. On the next day (12:07 P.M.) the Minister of Defense called on all soldiers who "for some reason or another lost contact with their units" to report immediately.

See The Hungarian Revolution As Reflected in Radio Broadcasts (in Hungarian) (New York: Free Europe Press, 1957), pp. 26, 36, and 69.

13. U.N. Report, pp. 24 and 159.

14. Ibid., p. 76.

15. RFE Special Report from Vienna, November 27, 1956.

16. U.N. Report, pp. 10, 24, and 129.

17. White Book, Vol. III, p. 144.

18. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 143.

19. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 95.

20. The following quotations are taken from The Hungarian Revolution As Reflected in Radio Broadcasts and refer to the program of Radio Kossuth of Budapest.

21. RFE Radio Monitoring (typewritten, in Hungarian), Radio Kossuth, November 8, 1956.

22. Ibid., Radio Pécs, November 4, 1956.

23. RFE Special from Graz, November 26, 1956.

24. There is reliable evidence for at least two such incidents, one in Budapest, one in Tata. See RFE Special from Vienna, November 22, 1956.

25. See U.N. Report, pp. 123-127.

26. See U.N. Report, p. 103.

27. RFE Special from Vienna, November 23, and November 26, 1956.

28. RFE Special from Vienna, November 26, 1956.

29. RFE Special from Vienna, November 22, 1956.

30. RFE Special from Graz, November 26, 1956.
31. RFE Special from Graz, November 24, 1956.
32. RFE Special from Vienna, November 26, 1956.
33. U.N. Report, p. 103.
34. RFE Special from Vienna, November 24, 1956.
35. RFE Special from Vienna, November 27, 1956.
36. RFE Special from Vienna, December 6, 1956.
37. RFE Special from Vienna, December 28, 1956.
38. There is ample evidence, for instance, that peasants continued to bring free supplies to the inhabitants of cities, an unselfish act that rarely if ever had parallels in the history of modern Hungary.
39. Váli, pp. 322-323.
40. RFE Radio Monitoring, November 5, 4:30 P.M., p. 378.
41. RFE Special from Graz, November 21 and 24.
42. RFE Special from Vienna, December 14.
43. RFE Special from Vienna, December 9.
44. This is based on a comparison of the orders issued to the civilian population, the use of random killings and deportations to terrorize the population into unconditional submission.
45. A comparison of the Hungarian events with the pacification of Petrograd and Moscow after the Russian revolution of 1905 shows considerable similarities. Just as in the case of Hungary the government forces under General Trepov made extensive use of random shootings, arrests, and deportations.
46. There were widespread rumors of defections and Soviet troops fighting on the side of insurgents, but these could never be confirmed. On November 21, however, two Soviet soldiers defected to Austria.
47. RFE Special from Vienna, November 19, 20, 22, and 24.

A Summary of French Efforts at Isolating the Guerrilla  
During the Algerian Conflict, 1956-1962\*

by

Peter Paret.

ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA FROM THE POPULATION

The most successful part of the French effort consisted in conventional police measures that kept the population under surveillance, controlled movement, contained rebel political action. Means employed were census of the population, passes, permits, traffic control, checkpoints, informers, raids, counterterror, etc.

Far less effective were the accompanying psychological measures: reeducation of prisoners, education of children and adults in the schools, propaganda in radio, films, and the press.

Equally ineffective in the long run were attempts to turn guerrillas against the population by compelling the people to fight on the side of the French against the FLN. The rebels

---

\*The original terms of reference for this study did not include provision for a study of the French counterinsurgent experience in Algeria. Subsequently it has been felt that some reference to this experience would usefully contribute to the purposes of this study. Without resources in time and funds available to permit exploration in depth of this experience, HERO has asked Dr. Peter Paret to prepare this summary of French efforts to isolate the guerrilla forces in Africa, based upon his experience and research in preparing his books, Guerrillas in the 1960's, and French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria.



understood the element of constraint involved and did not regard the mass of collaborators as permanent enemies but rather as people to be won over.

Technically effective was the resettlement of the population in certain areas to create forbidden zones in which conventional military operations could be carried out without concern for hurting friendly or neutral inhabitants. However, the relocation centers to which these people were moved were inadequately planned, financed, and administered, and rapidly turned into centers of subversion and anti-French feeling.

### ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA FROM OUTSIDE SUPPORT

The French naval and air blockade, and the sophisticated barriers along the Tunisian and Moroccan frontiers, kept shipments of arms and equipment to a minimum, prevented rebel units trained in foreign sanctuaries from coming to the help of the guerrillas, and handicapped rebel planning and coordination. But again, conventional military success was compromised by inadequacy in the civil sector. For the barriers to be effective they had to be backed by zones in which troops could operate freely, i.e., from which civilians had been evacuated. Yet far less money and expertise was invested in relocation than in constructing and manning the barriers. A major component of the system was slighted. Outside support was blocked, but within the country new and extremely favorable opportunities were provided to the guerrilla.

### ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA DIPLOMATICALLY

Here the French failed completely.

### SUMMATION

French military techniques, which have served as models for much recent US activity, proved reasonably successful in the narrow conventional context. If France had been able to invest more money, equipment, and men, they would have been even more successful. French political measures failed, because the population was not presented with a clearly superior

alternative to the FLN, and because some military techniques undercut political and psychological action. In theory the French understood the importance of nonmilitary measures in this type of conflict, but in practice these measures suffered from representing an unacceptable national policy, from being ill-conceived, and from being carried out too often as an afterthought.